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2Abstract
This thesis addresses the long-standing debate about the ability of investors in public listed 
companies to significantly influence or even control certain aspects of board and management 
decision taking. Much of the recent interest in these issues has focused on increased public 
disclosure of boardroom practices and standards.
In contrast, my research shows that informal relationships between companies and their major 
shareholders are playing an increasingly important role in influencing key aspects of corporate 
strategy, major financing and investment decisions, and board membership.
The research was undertaken through: an analysis of the investment portfolios of the 50 
largest fund managers investing in the shares of UK companies and the ownership of 297 of 
the UK’s largest listed companies; in-depth interviews with 120 companies, fiind managers 
and others concerned with the quality and regulation of company shareholder relationships 
and information flows; and studying the role of fund managers and other shareholders in the 
resignations of the CEOs of 24 case history companies.
The growing importance of informal mechanisms of fund manager influence and networking 
means that shareholder influence no longer depends on the formation of coalitions of the size 
proposed by Scott, or the alignment of interests through formally constituted Shareholder 
Protection Committees. A model of ‘extended ownership’ describes how effective control 
may pass to the fund manager with the largest, but still sub-minority, shareholding.
It is also crucial to understand that investment decisions by fund managers are influenced by 
and related to a wide range of company and investor-specific factors. These are described and 
the impact of their interactions on shareholder behaviour discussed.
This thesis is relevant to the current debate about the public role that should be taken by 
institutional fund mangers in the process of corporate governance. Models of investor 
behaviour which assume that fund managers are a homogenous investor type or which do not 
take into account the key role of informal influence mechanisms are therefore of limited value
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Introduction
This thesis addresses the long-standing debate about the ability of investors in public listed 
companies to significantly influence or even control key board and management decisions. 
Much of the recent interest in these issues has focused on increased public disclosure of 
boardroom practices and standards.
My research' shows that, in the UK, informal relationships between companies and their major 
shareholders are playing an increasingly important role in influencing key aspects of corporate 
strategy, major financing and investment decisions, and board membership.
In contrast, much of the academic work that has taken place, particularly in the USA, and in 
general, over the last 15 years, on the relationship between share ownership and shareholder 
influence, has focused on formal mechanisms of control through the ownership and use of 
shareholder voting rights. Many of the theoretical papers written on these issues and the 
empirical studies that have taken place have looked at the economic impact (for example, on 
corporate performance, shareholder wealth and the value of management incentives) of the 
differential treatment of shareholders (for example through the payment of ‘greenmail’) and 
actions by incumbent managers to retrospectively constrain shareholders’ rights and influence 
through mechanisms such as ‘poison pill* defences. Many of these sorts of practices, which 
were widely used by US companies during the 1980s (but a number of which were initially 
developed in the 1970s), would have been (and still are) legally prohibited, or for regulatory 
or other practical reasons impossible to initiate in the UK. However, in the USA, Longstreth 
(1991) estimates that in the 1980s over 1,200 listed US companies adopted some kind of 
‘poison pill’ defence against hostile takeovers, providing a rich and rewarding research 
environment for US economists.
Much of the work on corporate ownership and the responsiveness of corporate managers to 
shareholders’ interests has its roots in the pioneering study by Berle and Means (1932) who 
sought to describe the supplanting of personally owned and managed business units by ‘great 
aggregations .. under unified control and management’ (Means 1983b, p.299). Berle & 
Means put forward the case that, ‘the separation of ownership and control increases ... the 
market power that arises naturally from active competition among a few large independent
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corporations’ (Means 1983a, p.467), and that this follows the atomisation of corporate 
ownership and the corresponding rise in managerial control. Although seemingly flawed in 
some respects (for example, incorrect judgements were apparently made about the underlying 
ownership of over half the industrial companies in their sample1), Berle & Means introduced 
both a methodology, namely the use and analysis of share registers to determine underlying 
ownership, and a typology to describe how organisations were controlled.
Their view that the majority of their sample of 250 major US companies were not effectively 
controlled by anyone other than their managers (and certainly not by shareholders) led to the 
rise of ‘managerialism’; a model which is implicitly behind much of current concern with 
corporate governance, the issue of who is ‘controlling the controllers’ and the role of 
institutional investors in this process.
In the UK, interest in ‘corporate governance’, initially in the late 1970s and then more 
intensely in the late 1980s, arose from coincident concerns. These can be summarised as the 
belief, held by an increasing number of listed companies, that their institutional shareholders 
were ‘short-term’ in their investment strategies and their evaluation of companies’ future 
prospects. On the part of fund managers, there were growing concerns that there were too 
few accepted standards about how companies should be run by their boards of directors and 
respond to the interests and concerns of their shareholders. It therefore became increasingly 
clear during this period, to many companies and their major shareholders, that a consensus 
was lacking in relation to the nature of the ‘problem’ and how this should best be addressed in 
order to benefit the major interested parties.
One response was Marsh’s (1990) review of the perceived problem of ‘short-termism’ by 
institutional investors. Published by the Institutional Shareholders Committee, which through 
its membership bodies represents a high proportion of UK institutional shareholders and funds 
under professional management, this study represented a comprehensive articulation of the 
financial ‘efficient markets’ model of the stock market, share ownership and the disciplines 
and mechanisms of professional fund management.
1 For example, see Nyman & Silbertsou (1978).
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The background to my study is therefore multi-disciplinary. Chapter 1 (Ownership & 
Management) and Chapter 2 (Shareholder Influence & Governance) review research from 
sources reflecting sociological, economic and financial perspectives, as well as the published 
views of interested parties more actively involved in the day-to-day management of corporate 
- shareholder relationships.
The review which comprises Chapters 1 and 2 suggests that past models of shareholder 
company relationships fail to satisfactorily describe the underlying dynamics of corporate 
ownership and shareholder influence in the UK, for three main reasons.
Firstly, accurate, reliable information about the ownership of listed companies has been 
difficult to obtain, as it has had a high commercial value to the companies which specialise in 
analysing the information and is normally considered confidential by their listed company 
clients. This information is also only available for a limited number of companies - those 
willing to pay for it to be compiled using information from their share registers. An alternative 
is to use a proprietary database of ‘raw’ information compiled from companies’ share 
registers, but these mostly contain details of nominee accounts which can only be 
consolidated into useful information about fund managers’ shareholdings with specialist 
knowledge and computer systems.
However, in 1994 Citywatch was founded to provide a more accessible and comprehensive 
service to stockbrokers, with a regularly (monthly or quarterly) updated database of 
information about fund managers’ holdings in all the major listed companies. The Citywatch 
database for the Top 300 companies in January 1996 was made available for my research. 
The analysis of this information provides valuable insight into the ownership of the UK’s 
largest listed companies and the investment strategies of the largest fund managers.
Another source of information on share ownership in the UK has been the studies undertaken 
by the then Central Statistical Office (CSO). However these aggregated studies have given 
little indication of potentially important differences between companies and also give little 
insight into investors’ portfolios within the main ownership categories (pension funds, 
insurance companies etc). In addition, by focusing attention on the beneficial ownership of 
shares, and separating the holdings of UK and foreign investors, the CSO statistics have
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tended to lead to an under-appreciation of the extent to which shares in listed companies are 
now under the control of professional fund managers.
Secondly, although many aspects of US models of company-shareholder relationships are not 
applicable to the UK, due to the UK's different legal and regulatory environment and also for 
reasons of ‘accepted practice’, the implications and repercussions of the ‘arms’-length’, and 
not infrequently adversarial and litigious, corporate-investor relationships in the USA, have 
tended to dominate much academic thinking about the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ model of corporate 
governance2. The substantial differences between the Anglo-Saxon (USA & UK) system and 
those operating in counties such as Japan, Germany and France have tended to disguise, in 
turn, important differences between the UK and USA. Since the publication of the Cadbury 
Committee Report on ‘The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance’ (1992) and shorter 
accompanying ‘Cadbury Code’, awareness of these differences has increased.
Whilst the Cadbury Code, as currently being implemented by listed companies in the UK, 
could provide a satisfactory model for the USA, as Black & Coffee (1993) suggest, there are 
many factors which make this unlikely. In addition to legal and regulatory hurdles, the wider 
dispersal of share ownership amongst both private and institutional investors in the US also 
represents a substantial barrier to the development and operation of a consensus-based Code 
in the case of Cadbury one which is also substantially underpinned by informal relationships 
and networking between the key participants, rather than the force of over-riding legal and 
regulatory constraints on the relationships between the key participants. However, it can also 
be argued that a weakness in the Cadbury Code is that it treats institutional investors as a 
homogenous group and thereby underestimates important aspects and implications of the 
level of concentration of ownership found in many UK listed companies.
Thirdly, models of shareholder coalitions fail to describe in any detail how these actually 
operated. The existence of these groups was generally assumed in the absence of a controlling 
minority shareholder, majority shareholder, or closely linked group of shareholders with a 
majority or large minority interest. This assumption was supported by restricted evidence of 
shareholder co-operation and knowledge of formally constituted Investor Protection
2 For a comprehensive description and review o f  the development o f  the legal and regulatory framework in the 
U S A  governing company-shareholder relationships, see Roe (1994)
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Committees. Changes in share ownership since these coalition models were developed mean 
that the holdings of many individual fund managers are now large enough, and the structure 
of the ownership of many companies so concentrated that, in many cases, the largest 
institutional shareholder alone has a combination of sufficient formal and informal power to 
effectively control a company, without necessarily being a controlling minority shareholder 
under any conventional definition3. This power is a result of both the concentration that 
continues to take place in the UK fund management industry, reflecting the portfolio 
performance, and strategies of individual managers, and informal arrangements made between 
major shareholders.
I have researched these issues in three ways. Firstly, through an analysis of share ownership, 
which uses the Citywatch database to analyse the ownership of the ‘Top 300’ listed 
companies and the equity portfolios of the Top 50 fund managers investing in UK shares. In 
December 1995/January 1996 these comprised approximately 83% and 50% of stock market 
value respectively. This information highlights substantial differences in the structure of fund 
managers’ equity portfolios and I use a number of ranking and concentration measures to 
quantify and compare these.
Secondly, using qualitative research into the factors which drive the relationships between 
listed companies and institutional shareholders, and the circumstances which enable 
institutional investors to influence key aspects of corporate strategy, major financing and 
investment decisions and board membership. This research was based on 120 in-depth 
interviews, undertaken with: Company Chairmen, CEOs, Finance Directors, Company 
Secretaries and Investor Relations Managers; Brokers; Fund Managers and Regulators; and 
others concerned with the management and intermediation of company-shareholder 
relationships. These interviews took place in the Summer and Autumn of 1993 and early 
1994.
Draft copies of a Report based on these interviews were sent in the Autumn of 1994 to all 
those interviewed (see Appendix I) and the comments received were taken into account when 
preparing Chapters 4 to 7, which are closely based on that report4.
3 Berle & Means (1932) and Florence (1961) used a shareholding o f  20% as the threshold for minority 
control, Scott (1986 p .50) 10%.
4 The final version o f  this report was published as ‘Ownership & Influence’ by the Institute o f  Management,
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This research strongly indicated that informal control mechanisms were the primary means 
through which the largest institutional shareholders of under-performing companies sought to 
influence key board and management decisions. A huge amount of material was gathered in 
the interviews on these and related issues. Although this is summarised in Chapters 4 to 7, the 
analysis fails to capture many of the comments and disclosures that were made with respect to 
individual companies, fund managers and the personalities involved. The interviews were 
undertaken on the basis that none of these specific comments would be attributed or 
published in my thesis, yet there is no doubt that this material is extremely pertinent and 
provides an important bridge between the general statements set out in Chapters 4 to 7 and 
the case histories of CEO resignations which are summarised in Chapter 9 and set out in more 
detail in Appendix K.
To provide this bridge I have created a ‘Composite Case History’. This is based on the many 
company and fund manager specific references made in interviews but which could not be 
used or quoted directly because of the issue of confidentiality. The Composite Case History 
forms Chapter 8 of my thesis and describes the progression of shareholder intervention in a 
company in which a number of management and financial problems emerge. These become of 
increasing concern to the company’s major institutional investors and eventually undermine 
their confidence in the executive directors, leading in turn to the resignation of the Finance 
Director, CEO and Chairman over a period of months.
Twenty four actual case histories of CEO resignations in poorly performing companies are 
set out in Chapter 9. Although each of these case histories is inevitably more specific than the 
Composite Case History which forms Chapter 8, the close relationship between the 
Composite Case History (based on interviews) and actual case histories (based on press 
accounts) is very apparent.
The ownership information analysed in Chapter 3 closely supports the views expressed in the 
one-to-one meetings. Rather than needing to operate in extended ‘coalitions’ of possibly 20 
fund managers to influence the board or management of a company, far fewer fund managers
Loudou School o f Economics (Gaved 1995). A  summary o f  this material was also included in a more recent 
paper published by Institute o f  Accountants in England and Wales on ‘Q osin g  the Commuuications Gap: 
Disclosure and Institutional Shareholders’ (Gaved 1997).
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are now typically involved. Although ownership concentration declines with company size (in 
terms of market capitalisation), the Top 10 fund manager shareholders of a typical (‘modal’) 
Top 300 company control approximately one-third of the shares and the Top 5 fund 
managers around one-quarter.
This analysis and the material obtained from interviews supports the view that the greatest 
shareholder influence typically lies with the Top 3 or Top 5 fund manager shareholders. In 
practice, the interests of these investors is often closely related and rather than form an active 
coalition (involving perhaps meetings and agreed objectives), the largest shareholder takes the 
lead in representing the views and interests of companies’ major shareholders where there is a 
particular requirement to do so. This will typically be triggered by a loss of confidence in the 
CEO, board or management team and a deterioration in past or forecast financial 
performance.
I have described the role of companies’ lead shareholders in these situations as being one of 
‘extended ownership’, in which the biggest shareholder takes the dominant role with at least 
the tacit approval of other large shareholders. Although this may represent a weak form of 
coalition, it can be argued that the concept of a coalition ties in more closely with the formally 
constituted Investor Protection Committees which were not unusual in the 1980s and earlier, 
but which appear to have seriously declined in number and individual importance during the 
1990s.
The relationship between companies’ major fund manager shareholders is both more focused 
than implied by the term coalition, due to the emergence of lead shareholders and their 
importance through extended ownership, and more diffuse, because arrangements between 
fund managers appear to be a good deal less formal than they were in the past. Informal 
arrangements have replaced more formal structures, and the concentration of ownership 
found within many companies provides a strong platform for their largest fund manager 
shareholders to act as the dominant source of external influence on a CEO, or board or 
management team.
My third area of research looked for evidence of shareholder intervention in under­
performing companies. From the interviews summarised in Chapters 4 to 7, it is clear that
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financial under-performance is the most common trigger for intervention by fund managers in 
the affairs of a company, in which they may seek to influence corporate strategy, key board 
decisions and even board composition.
As set out in Chapters 4 to 7 and the composite case history (Chapter 8), much of the 
attention of fund managers is directed at the leadership, performance and credibility of the 
CEO5. In cases where institutional investors or other major shareholders have lost confidence 
in the CEO, they may seek the resignation of the CEO from the company.
In Chapter 9 I describe how I have identified 18 companies in which there is either strong or 
circumstantial evidence of shareholder influence contributing to the immediate resignation of 
the CEO (ie leaves the company the same day) in 1995. This group comprises approximately 
12% of the 150 companies which announced the resignation of their CEOs in 1995 and one 
quarter (26.1%) of the 69 companies which had below average shareholder returns and which 
announced the resignation of their CEOs in 1995. In the case of three companies (Calor, 
Central Motor Auctions, News International) the CEO resignation was apparently influenced 
by a majority non-financial shareholder (SVH, the Myers family and News Corporation/ 
Rupert Murdoch respectively). In a fourth case (the computer games retailer Rhino) the CEO 
was ousted by the management team from Electronics Boutique, which had taken a 29.9% 
stake in Rhino.
In the other 14 companies, the analysis of news stories and ownership of the company either 
directly or circumstantially implicates fund managers in the resignation decision. In nine of 
these cases I have rated the evidence to be very strong and in the other five the evidence to be 
more circumstantial.
In nine companies it appears that a small coalition of the companies’ top three to five 
shareholders were the primary source of influence, in which the largest fund manager 
shareholder may well have taken the leading role. In the other five companies it appears that 
the largest fund manager may have acted alone, without having had the need to form even a 
loose coalition or to act as the lead shareholder representing the interests of other 
shareholders. In three of these companies PDFM was the dominant financial shareholder
5 A lthough other titles m ay be used, the m ost com m on being Group M anaging Director.
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(Hickson, Mowlem, United Carriers). In the other two cases, Top 10 fund managers MAM 
(OMI) and M&G (JLI) appear to have taken the dominant role.
The analysis of fund manager portfolios (Chapter 3) shows that these three fund managers are 
amongst those which are most willing to take above average or ‘overweight’6 stakes in 
companies, apparently increasing their investment risk. Why are fund managers prepared to 
do this?
My qualitative investigation (Chapters 4 to 7) suggests that the UK's largest active fund 
managers adopt this investment strategy because they are able to commit sufficient internal 
resources to effectively monitor companies and thereby reduce investment risk below the 
level incurred by other investors without the same internal monitoring resources and skills. 
The two most important ways in which investment risks associated with large holdings are 
reduced are, firstly, through improving the quality and breadth of information flowing into 
fund managers’ investment decision taking and portfolio management processes. For 
example, closer direct contact with a company’s senior executives enables a fund manager to 
assess their personal management skills and better evaluate the statements made directly by 
the management team about the company as well as information indirectly received by the 
fund manager from third party sources (including competitors, customers, trade papers and 
brokers analysts).
The second reason is that, through being better informed and in more regular contact with the 
executive directors and possibly other senior managers, a fimd manager is more likely to be 
able to effectively and credibly bring informal influence to bear on the company relative to 
other shareholders.
Thus through being better informed (but without necessarily requiring the disclosure of 
‘inside information’) and a credible source of shareholder influence, investment risk is 
reduced. The argument for active investment monitoring and corporate governance processes 
is therefore that they will yield higher portfolio returns on both a risk and cost adjusted basis, 
relative to the market as a whole.
6 Portfolio investments in individual companies are often described as under or overweight relative to the 
stock market as a w hole or the coastituents o f  a reference index.
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Whilst the Cadbury Code provides a formal framework for corporate governance and 
shareholder oversight, principally through defining the roles and responsibilities of NEDs 
more clearly in relation to those of the whole board, just when shareholder influence is 
generally becoming less formal. In particular, Investor Protection Committees, used in the 
past to co-ordinate coalitions of institutional shareholders, are now of declining and probably 
negligible importance. They have been replaced by informal relationships between an elite 
group of fund managers, acting in small groups and working through personal influence on 
companies and their boards. These informal coalitions exercise control over troubled 
companies through the actions of ‘lead shareholders’, which typically have holdings 
significantly below those previously thought necessary for the exercising of minority control. I 
have called the increase in shareholder influence occurring in these situations ‘extended 
ownership’.
The idea of ‘extended ownership’ encompasses both cause and effect, as large active fund 
managers have come to realise that they need to take large stakes in companies they favour in 
order to have a significant impact on investment performance. At the same time, company 
specific risks are controlled through increased monitoring and the more general corporate 
governance framework set out in the Cadbury Codes and supporting Codes and standards (eg 
about boardroom pay, and reporting on companies as going concerns and the adequacy of 
their internal controls). If risk and market adjusted total shareholder returns are average or 
above, large actively monitored shareholdings should be associated with higher levels of 
‘investment comfort’ and therefore greater stability and reduced likelihood of dis-investment 
compared with smaller shareholdings, which are more likely to be associated with lower 
levels of monitoring and, as a result, higher investment risk.
This apparent loyalty on the part of companies’ major shareholders, is however, a double 
edged sword, as the objectives of fund managers and the companies do not necessarily 
coincide and as the number of companies held in actively managed investment portfolios 
tends to decline, fund managers naturally become more critical of their investment choices. In 
many cases, the size of the stakes held strongly influences the response of fund managers to 
declining performance, missed opportunities, self-serving and faltering management, but other 
portfolio-based and company specific factors are also important.
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However, as Ball (1990, 1991) recognises, the relationship between owners and the owned' 
will always be in a state of ‘creative’ tension, reflecting fundamental differences in the 
objectives of fund managers in particular, and the companies in which they invest. I hope that 
this thesis will provide a useful model of some aspects of this asymmetry, with particular 
reference to the exercising of ownership rights and informal influence by institutional 
investors.
To summarise: Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 comprise a review of literature raising issues relating 
to share ownership and the rights and responsibilities of companies and shareholders.
Chapter 3 provides a quantitative analysis of both published and original data about the 
ownership of UK listed companies and the structure of fund managers’ equity portfolios.
Chapter 4 looks at key aspects of fund management, whilst Chapter 5 reviews how investors 
become knowledgeable about companies and how the latter seek to keep shareholders 
informed.
Chapter 6 looks at some of the formal mechanisms available to shareholders if they wish to 
exercise ownership rights and influence over a company.
Chapter 7 analyses mechanisms of informal control, the informal relationships and networks 
which exist between senior fund managers, and the issues they and other shareholders 
consider when deciding if they should try to influence the board or management of a 
company.
Chapter 8 is a composite case history, describing the relationship between a company and its 
major financial shareholders in response to financial, management and strategic problems.
Chapter 9 describes the selection of companies whose CEOs resigned in 1995 and the 
analysis of press stories and Citywatch and other ownership data about these companies.
My conclusions are set out in Chapter 10.
Chapter 1 Review: 
Ownership & Management
I Introduction
II Narrowing Share Ownership
A Privatisation Programme 
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In this Chapter I review previous work in the fields of corporate ownership (Section II) and 
management and institutional influence (Section III).
In the UK, ideas and information about ‘private’ share ownership have been caught up with 
those of 'wider share ownership' and the Government's privatisation programme, which 
started in the 1980s. In this Section I look at how these ideas emerged and became 
intertwined, and also the underlying fiscal forces pushing investors towards collective, and in 
many cases contractual, savings schemes. Personal Equity Plans (PEPs) and employee share 
ownership schemes, and the relationship between these and direct ownership, are also 
reviewed.
The management, ownership and performance of companies under different forms of 
ownership have been studied a great deal, particularly in the USA. In Section HI, I review the 
literature on the relationship between managers, ownership and corporate performance. The 
evidence is mixed, and important issues are raised about: the alignment of management 
objectives with those of shareholders; the ability of managers to extract private benefits from 
companies; and the problems shareholders have to address in terms of the separation of 
management and ownership.
Mutual mistrust often results from this separation. In practice the shape of management and 
shareholder horizons are probably rather similar, but each group wishes the other took a 
longer-term view1. In response to this mutual asymmetry, managers may seek to entrench
1 For example, models o f  the value o f future earnings from current and planned activities and investments are 
seem ingly based on similar assumptions, which may include the current values o f  future cash flow s. However 
it is important to remember that investment decisions by managers require a commitment for a project to 
actually happen; in a sense their valuation o f the project becomes fixed at the moment o f  decision and 
subsequent choices are significantly constrained by this determination. In contrast, investors are able to 
continuously re-evaluate projects and the current value o f  expected future cash flow s and the impact o f  these 
on shareholder value. Managers do not have this freedom, nor at the time o f  investment decision are 
shareholders as well informed as managers. Therefore at no point in time will both the information possessed 
and the value o f  this information to managers and shareholders be the same. The more flexibility managers 
have in influencing the outcome o f a project in the light o f new information and the more informed are 
investors, the lower value discrepancies are likely to be and the lower the risk (in terms o f perceived earnings 
volatility) to investors and the higher the value that w ill be placed on the company. See Marsh (1990, p. 11) 
for a description o f  the time horizons over which future divideuds are valued.
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their position and shareholders retain the right to freely transfer their part-ownership of the 
company to a willing buyer.
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II Narrowing Share Ownership
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The ownership by the private individual of shares registered in his or her name is the simplest 
and most 'direct' definition of private share ownership, one also used in a recent study of 
private share ownership in the USA (Poterba, 1993). This is also the narrowest definition of 
private share ownership and needs to be distinguished from other forms of private share 
'ownership', in which individuals can be identified as beneficial owners but the shares involved 
are legally controlled by a trust or intermediary and are registered in the name of this 
(impersonal) third party on the companies' share registers.
Typically shares held in employee savings schemes and share plans are under the control of 
trustees, and investments in Personal Equity Plans (PEPs) are controlled by professional fund 
managers. Although normally included in CSO and Government statistics about private share 
ownership (see Chapter 3) these forms of ownership are essentially collective and not 
individual, with personal share ownership rights either absent or significantly curtailed. The 
distinction between direct and beneficial ownership of shares by private individuals is 
important when reviewing the changes which have taken place in the ownership of shares in 
recent years and the increasing dominance by institutional investors of share ownership in the 
UK.
A Privatisation Programme
Both the promotion of employee share ownership and the introduction of PEPs were 
elements of the Government's self-professed drive in the 1980s towards 'wider share 
ownership', the major component of which was the sale to members of the public, through 
Public Offers for Sale, of shares in companies previously exclusively in Government 
ownership.
However, the privatisation programme, employee share ownership and PEPs did not start to 
constitute a coherent programme until after the 1983 election (Grimstone 1987). PEPs, 
although announced in the 1986 budget, were not in fact introduced until 1987.
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Both Grimstone (1987) and Kay & Thompson (1986) identify a speech by Moore (1983) as 
establishing the policy framework for the Government's privatisation programme and the role 
of wider share ownership within this, in which wider share ownership was described as the 
‘Promotion of a kind of popular capitalism’ (Kay & Thompson 1986, p. 19), although these 
ideas had previously been set out before the Conservative re-election in 1983 (Moore 1992).
However coherent these policies may have sounded in policy papers (Moore 1992) or 
speeches (Moore 1993) or the House of Commons (Ridley 1981), Kay & Thompson (1986) 
believe that ‘any objective which seems achievable [wa]s seized as justification’ (p. 19) by the 
Government and the communicators of its policies. Although Ridley (1981) asserted in the 
House of Commons that ‘the more all our citizens own capital .. the better it will be for 
political reasons’ the view of Kay & Thompson was supported by Grimstone (1987), who, at 
Schroders, was closely involved in the development of the privatisation programme. He 
describes the structuring of the first sale of British Telecom shares and the directing of the 
marketing programme to the general public as taking place because ‘new distribution 
channels would be needed’ (p.24), and the subsequent sale of British Gas using very similar 
techniques as ‘pragmatic’ (p.24) because of the size of the issue. Grout (1987b) also identifies 
the BT flotation as ‘not only presenting] a change in the fortune of the wider share 
ownership programme, but also a major change in the policy itself (p.60).
Brittan (1986) saw these and other privatisation sales to the general public, and the massive 
increase in the number of private shareholders which resulted (from around three million at 
the beginning of the 1980s to over 11 million in the early 1990s) as providing the Government 
with a strong constituency against re-nationalisation of the enterprises (by some future 
Labour government2). However, Brittan thought that the substantial incentives given to the 
‘new’ shareholders represented a regressive subsidy, from the general body of taxpayers to 
the enlarged shareholder class.
2 This objective appears to have been successful by 1989, wheu 'The [Labour] party's policy documents 
stressfed] the need to work with markets, rather than replace them with the tools o f a command econom y' 
(Kellner 1989, p .35) in  marked contrast to the position seven years earlier when party policy was strongly 
opposed to share ownership 'by private individuals, through [which they could] reap the benefits o f  the 
collective effort o f  others' (p .35).
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Brittan also argued that one of the reasons for the final scale of the privatisation programme 
was that it ‘proved technically easier and politically more acceptable than originally proposed’ 
(p.35) and coincided with other government objectives, including an end to the Government’s 
inability to control the expenditure/investment of nationalised industries and the need for the 
Government to finance expenditure in other areas.
That neither of these were at the forefront of the Government’s 1979 election manifesto is 
perhaps understandable; instead privatisation was presented as a way of increasing 
competition and improving services to customers. Other components of this policy were 
decentralisation, reduction of monopolies and contracting out public sector work (Grimstone 
1987). Nevertheless, by 1986 Goodison, as Chairman of the Stock Exchange, was able to 
claim that ‘wider share ownership has got on to the agenda’ in its own right (p.5) but voiced 
the concern that ‘the growth of contractual savings institutions ... has been at the sacrifice of 
more direct personal involvement in the risks and rewards of industry’ (Goodison 1986, p. 5).
The emphasis by Goodison on contractual savings is significant, because non-contractual 
institutionalised savings, such as Unit Trusts were not seen as having created an extensive 
‘consumer franchise’, witnessed by the widely (if not wildly) fluctuating levels of sales and 
repurchases by Trust managers (Kempster 1990, p.28).
In fact, it is now clear that, although the Government's privatisation programme established 
something of a consumer franchise for privatisation issues (purchased through the primary 
market), this did not extend to the secondary market either in respect of individual companies 
(analysed in Chapter 3) or the stock market in general (CBI1990).
B The Gap Between Primary & Secondary Markets
The division between the primary and secondary markets for shares is critical to an 
understanding of the impact of the privatisation programme on private share ownership. 
Although the privatisation programme was a primary market activity, at least one 
Conservative thinker connected this with an opportunity to ‘arrest the downward trend in the 
individual ownership of company securities’ (Redwood 1986, p.7) and ‘reduce political 
tensions that come from misperceptions of the City as a rich man’s casino’ (Redwood 1990,
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p.2). Perhaps based on his prior experience as a fund manager in the City, Redwood also 
believed that greater private share ownership would ‘provide firmer underpinnings for the 
large liquid London markets3’ and that ‘small shareholders are often long-term investors’ 
(Redwood 1990, p.2). This view was shared by the Institute of Directors (IOD) (Bracewell- 
Milnes 1987) and Cadbury (1990) when discussing the proprietorial role of personal and 
family based shareholdings in the post-war period. However, Grout (1987b) thinks that 
‘many of the privatisation holders may simply see themselves as being in the position of 
traders with no information and high transaction costs4 .. in which case the widening of share 
ownership may stop as abruptly as it started’ (p.73), a concern shared by Skidelsky (1992).
Like Goodison (1986), Redwood also voiced concerns that the individual was ‘seldom 
interest[ed] in the nature of the investment his [pension] fund managers make, vital though 
they are to his future prosperity’ (Redwood 1986, p.8). Indeed, he argued that the component 
investments of pension plans should be transferred to the direct control of a beneficiary ‘in 
proportion to his contributions and entitlements’ (Redwood 1985, p. 14).
Although the latter proposal appears impractical in terms of the restructuring of occupational 
pension schemes, the idea of pension ‘portability’ is now to be found in transferable pension 
rights and personal pension schemes, and the idea of ‘transparency’ in the annual statements 
of fund value, as well as projected benefits, produced by many occupational and personal 
schemes.
As Hutton (1988) describes, before the onset of the Government’s privatisation programme 
‘traditionally shareholding had been for an elite class in Britain’, partly because ‘at least half 
the population are excluded simply because they have no cash’ (Hutton 1988, p.3). This 
problem, and the limits the sale of shares would place on the breadth of share ownership were
3 Breedon (1993) found that the distribution o f  stock market trades by size was quite different between Rolls- 
R oyce (privatised) and Lloyds Bank and Marks & Spencer (both long-established listed companies), with  
R olls-R oyce show ing many smaller trades. Whether this makes any significant contribution to the level o f  
liquidity experienced by large (institutional) traders is not clear, although there are presumably benefits for 
other small traders.
4 For exam ple, although explicit (commission) costs have remained steady for som e years for private 
investors, their orders are normally executed at the touch (bid-offer spread, which ranges from 0.7%  for FT- 
SE 100 companies up to 6% for less liquid stocks) whereas professional investors frequently deal inside the 
touch, considerably reducing their im plidt transactions costs. However, since B ig  Bang (in 1986) the 
Securities & Investments Board (SIB) believes that retail investors have benefited from the more efficient 
processing o f  orders, whilst admitting that 'The LSE's trading structure in principally designed to meet 
institutional preferences for liquidity, and is generally perceived to do this very w ell' (SIB 1994).
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also recognised by other proponents of even wider, ‘universal’ share ownership through the 
giving away of shares (see Letwin & Letwin (1986) and the SDP (1986) for example).
Although Hutton argues that this wealth-based ceiling on the extent of shareholdings meant 
that ‘so long as the next privatisation is bigger, then you stand a good chance of extending 
share ownership. But with anything smaller, the shares are likely to be taken up by existing 
share owners’ (p.8) evidence from a number of surveys suggests that the overlap between 
successive privatisations was comparatively weak and that the success of each privatisation 
was as dependent on attracting first-time shareholders as on existing owners buying shares 
again. It is the preponderance of the former group of ‘one company share owners’ - which 
accounted for approximately half of all shareholders by 1990 - that led to increased awareness 
of the ‘thinness’ of UK share ownership (see, for example, Gaved & Goodman (1992)).
Although Government policy has made only a limited contribution to the ‘deepening’ of 
direct share ownership (for example by the reduction of stamp duty), the supposed citizen- 
based benefits of wider share ownership were consistently articulated during the late 1980s 
and early 1990s - see for example Lamont (1991a, 1991b), Shaw & Marsella (1990), HM 
Treasury (1990).
Others saw additional benefits, including those of private shareholders adding to the diversity 
of investment views and ‘a greater willingness to move in the opposite direction to the herd of 
investment management’ (Hugh-Smith 1990), and a belief by the National Economic 
Development Council (NEDC) that ‘the accumulation of share portfolios would cheapen the 
cost of equity finance to industry’ (NEDC 1990, p.6), although no explanation was provided 
by the NEDC as to why this should be the case, nor would this view necessarily be held by 
supporters of efficient market models of the stock market (eg Marsh 1990).
However, the NEDC did identify that the bulk of private wealth lay in owner-occupied 
housing and that this acted as a barrier to the wider ownership of equities5. This is an issue
3 Perceptions that owner-occupied housing is 'a sound investment' has been substantially driven in the past by
high rates o f  inflation in house prices. In periods o f  low  inflation it is not clear that the fiscal treatment (the
principal element being Capital Gains Tax (CGT) exemption) o f  housing will be seen as so attractive, given  
that potential capital gains liabilities are at least partly shielded through indexation. Only when house prices 
inflate above RPI is the CGT exemption valuable. On this basis, house price inflation below  or in step with 
RPI w ill make other forms o f  investment relatively more attractive than they have been in the past, although
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raised by Grout (1987a, 1987b) in the context of portfolio diversification of both financial and 
human capital. Grout is of the view that the minimal impact that small, directly held, share 
portfolios make on the variance implicit in an individual's total portfolio, means that there is 
little to choose between a direct portfolio and an investment in a collective (though not 
necessarily contractual) vehicle such as a unit trust. This is because, although collective 
schemes incur higher explicit costs than direct share ownership, these may well be less than 
the (implicit) monitoring costs which would be incurred by a single private investor making 
rational investment decisions.
Direct private investors are seen as essentially ‘passive’ in nature (see Hutton and Scott
(1990) for an account based on British Telecom shareholders) and appear to diversify their 
portfolios less than expected (King & Leape 1984). Grout (1987) sees this as consistent with 
long-term investment horizons and the relatively high transactions costs incurred by private 
shareholders with modest portfolios. Oldham (1990) also discovered that private investors in 
the UK are very price resistant to even basic portfolio management services of the kind 
provided through High Street banks.
Shleifer & Summers (1990) have shown that the activity of private share portfolios in the 
USA is affected by whether the individual is personally making the investment decisions or 
whether the portfolio is managed on their behalf by a professional manager - although based 
on the Poterba (1993) definition this kind of'ownership' would be classified as institutional 
and not direct.
The 1980s were therefore characterised by a massive widening in the number of private share 
owners, both created by and contributing to the success of the Government's extensive 
privatisation programme. Apart from Redwood's (1986, 1990) comments specifically relating 
increased private share ownership through the privatisation programme to the secondary 
market for companies' shares, government interest in wider share ownership was strongly 
focused on its own interests and need to distribute large quantities of primary equities into the 
retail market and, at the very least, establish a competing source of demand to the institutional 
sector. However, based on the evidence of Grimstone (1987) and Kay & Thompson (1986) it
there is little likelihood that this will be preferentially diverted towards direct share ownership and away from 
collective schemes PEPs, Pension Plans or employee share ownership schemes, all o f w hich benefit from 
different degrees o f  fiscal privilege superior to direct equity investments.
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is fairly clear that it was only over a period of several years and with the benefit of hindsight 
that these requirements joined the facilitation of employee share schemes and PEPs to create 
a ‘wider share ownership’ programme of any coherence, and one in which long-established 
listed companies were to play only a very limited role.
C Fiscal Factors
Goodison (1-986) lamented that the greatest part of personal financial investment was made 
through collective vehicles operated by professional fund managers. The basis of these 
collective schemes has been overwhelmingly tax driven, different types of investment schemes 
benefiting from varying degrees o f ‘fiscal privilege’. This has meant that, in the early 1980s, 
the choice of investment scheme could make a difference of at least three times the effective 
after tax rate of return (Hills 1984). Goldsmith (1969) believed that the use of level premiums 
by many of these schemes was also a significant contribution to the rise in life assurance and 
pension fund assets.
Although it is clear that degrees of fiscal privilege converged in the period 1979-1988 
(Saunders & Webb 1988), pension funds continue to attract and retain savings far more than 
any other kind of financial investment (the only other comparable, and competing, source of 
personal wealth being housing), while the overall impact of the differential treatment of 
savings mechanisms and their impact on different classes creates a ‘mosaic of different 
regimes’ (IFS 1989). Many savings investment vehicles are long-term, but in the USA 
mutual funds (broadly equivalent to investment and unit trusts in the UK) attracted huge 
flows of retail funds in the two year period 1993 and 1994. Kaufman (1993) saw these 
massive retail investments as being made in response to the decline in short-term interest rates 
and believed that the subsequent disinvestment, when interest rates rose, would add to overall 
market volatility and the risk profile of investing households. He contrasted this scenario of 
direct investment (albeit through collective vehicles) to long-term, normally level premium 
savings products which typically involve the intermediary (an insurance company or bank for 
example) allocating some of its own capital to reduce the volatility of returns to investors.
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The introduction of PEPs in 1987 (offering two of the three key tax privileges enjoyed by 
pension funds6) was positioned by the Government as an extension of its wider share 
ownership programme, but as Lee & Saunders (1988) and the IFS (1988) describe, PEP tax 
privileges appealed most to existing shareholders and the relatively sophisticated investor. 
Part of the reason for the limited initial response to PEPs may well have been their complexity 
and restrictions on investing in collective vehicles such as investment and unit trusts. An 
easing of the restrictions in 1989, and a change in the annual limit resulted in an increase of 
250% in the. number of plans taken out in 1989/90 and an increase of 375% in the amount 
invested (Inland Revenue 1990) compared with the previous year; evidence indeed of the 
impact of tax incentives and legislation on the pattern of personal investment7.
The softening of the rules surrounding PEPs was seemingly undertaken in response to the 
Government's growing realisation that PEPs were not successful in significantly increasing 
direct stock market investment (Lee & Saunders 1988), largely because PEPs required the 
operation of nominee accounts by plan managers, which presented a significant and costly 
barrier to the maintenance of ownership rights8. However, the changes made to PEP 
regulations since their introduction in 1987 have done little to address this issue and PEPs are 
now largely collective investment vehicles, operating in a similar way to Investment and Unit 
Trusts and operated by the same fund managers. Although often included in accounts of 
progress towards ‘wider share ownership’ PEPs are largely outside the scope of descriptions 
of direct share ownership because, although linked through being part of the Conservative 
Government's political agenda for 'wider share ownership', they are managed by professional 
fund managers in much the same way as other collective funds. They therefore present 
similar, continuing and significant ownership barriers to the investor.
6 These being the tax free treatment o f  income received by the fund and capital gains made within the fund. 
The third significant benefit enjoyed by pension funds but not by PEPs is tax rebates at the marginal rate o f  
tax on contributions (to a maximum ceiling); this tax benefit therefore effectively compounds tax free within 
the fund. Funds taken from a PEP are however completely tax free (whether as a lump sum or as a series o f  
'income' type payments) whilst income derived from a pension policy (possibly through the operation o f  an 
annuity) is taxed, although part o f the total value o f a pension policy (now generally 25% ) can be taken as a 
'tax free'lum p sum.
7 See Wirth (1986) for comments on the impact o f  the ERISA legislation on savings patterns in the IIS.
8 For example, many plan managers made a charge (of around £10 .00  per occurrence) for forwarding Annual 
Reports or arranging for an investor to attend an AGM  of a company in which they, through their PEP, held 
shares.
Chapter 1: Ownership & Management 33
D Employee Share Ownership
Employee share ownership represents the third component of the Government's wider share 
ownership policies (HM Treasury 1990), both in respect of companies which have been 
privatised by the Government and others, although as Poole (1988) observes, the adoption of 
schemes has been uneven, depending both on the size and industrial relations/organisational 
style of the organisation.
Employee share ownership has long been one of the objectives of proponents of 
increased/wider share ownership (for example, see Temple 1990), although it is not clear 
whether employees fully value their participation in schemes of which they are members or 
understand the significance of the correlation between (or ‘bundling’ of) their financial capital 
held in a scheme and their firm-specific human capital held in the same organisation (Grout 
1988). However, while it appears that the share prices of companies with employee financial 
(equity) participation perform on average better than firms without such schemes 
(Richardson & Nejad 1986), there is no evidence that there is any direct causality (for 
example both may reflect the impact of better/more enlightened corporate management).
Were it not for the tax benefits associated with employee share schemes approved by the 
Inland Revenue, this suggests that employees should invest in any company but their own 
(and, for correlation reasons, preferably one in a completely different industry) in order to 
avoid the problems of tying together returns from their human and financial capital. This view 
was also shared by the TUC (1990): ‘if shareholding is seen as a means of increasing wealth, 
then most workers would be well advised to build up a portfolio of other shares, in addition 
to those which they might get free or cut price’ (p.7).
As Langdon, a promoter of employee share schemes, comments (1989, p.8) ‘a prudent 
financial advisor would probably advise individuals not to hold a significant proportion of 
their savings in shares of the company which employs them’9. But as such schemes are seen 
as valuable by corporate managers and provide tax incentives (and so much of savings
9 Echoing this concern, Williams (1991) comments that 'the cold verdict o f the market on a com pany's share 
price can leave its mark on others in the organisation in addition to the hoard and CEO. W e have very broad 
equity participation amongst our employees and the fluctuations in our share price, particularly when they do 
not appear to correlate with news or information published by the company [Oxford Instruments] causes
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behaviour is tax-based (Saunders & Webb 1988)), the benefits are seen as outweighing the 
potential disadvantages.
The motivations of companies in supporting such schemes may be less altruistic than 
generally thought, as restricted executive share option schemes have been introduced and at 
four times the rate of ‘all employee schemes’ (Young 1989). One mechanism for the funding 
and operation of employee share ownership is the use of an Employee Share Ownership Plan 
(ESOP). Although these have hardly been adopted by UK listed companies for a number of 
legal and tax-based reasons, their use in the US is much more widespread ‘one by-product of 
the development of the ESOP in the US [being that] employee share blocs can be seen as a 
useful weapon to a company in the event of a hostile takeover’ (Graham 1990, p.46).
In common with many corporate managers, even strong proponents of employee share 
schemes (see, for example, Breenan 1988) accept that it has not been proved that such 
schemes work, but a second cause for concern is that corporate managers believe that such 
schemes are essentially costless and may even be a cheap way of raising capital. As 
Richardson & Barnes (1991) show, this is not the case; shareholder dilution does occur and 
such schemes are therefore far from costless. Richardson & Barnes therefore regard the 
widespread adoption of unproven and unmonitored share schemes as supporting the 
managerialist model of corporate control in which managers (and their stafi) capture benefits 
at the expense of shareholders. But, as Young (1989) notes, these schemes have also been 
‘approved in committees of Non-Executive Directors (NEDs), in general meetings of 
shareholders and by the discrete but powerful subcommittees of the institutions’ (p.9).
These concerns are shared by the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF), the 
industry body representing pension fund trustees and companies operating schemes for their 
employees. The NAPF (1992) recognises that employee schemes claim to achieve 
incentivisation, and may play a useful role in aligning the interests of employees and 
shareholders and therefore may benefit both the company and its shareholders, but actually 
feels that well structured profit related pay and cash bonus schemes are generally more 
appropriate. Certainly, there is evidence of only a weak alignment between participation in 
share schemes and measures of commitment to the firm and other work attitude measures
pressure o f  a different, but altogether very real variety
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(single plant study, Dewe, Dunn & Richardson 1988), a view shared by the TUC: ‘The view 
that individual ownership of shares in an enterprise is an effective means of involving the 
workforce in its strategic direction is .. overstated’ (TUC 1990, p.8).
Proponents of employee share ownership have previously argued that the concern of 
shareholders with the dilution of both ownership (a current cost) and pre-emption rights (a 
potential cost) has placed unwarranted hurdles in the way of more extensive employee share 
ownership, but there is little doubt that employee share ownership involves transfers from 
existing shareholders and other taxpayers to the beneficiaries of these schemes.
Whether executive option schemes involve the same transfers, and in particular imply no net 
gain to shareholders is open to question. Nyman (1974), for example, found in the USA a 
significant and positive relationship between the value of directors' holdings, company profits 
and growth (in revenues), although a relationship was not found between measures of 
corporate performance and the percentage of shares in issue held by directors. Instead, the 
relationship between ownership and performance is found in significance of directors' stakes 
to their personal wealth.
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III Management, Ownership & Corporate Performance
A Models of Management Behaviour
Agency models of the corporation are based on the principle of alignment between the 
interests of shareholders (as owners) and managers, as their agents. Much effort is put into 
the design of executive and director compensation and share ownership schemes which best 
achieve this alignment over different periods of time; typically at board level with a three to 
five year performance horizon in mind. These schemes are created with the belief that the 
closer the alignment, the more likely it is that managers will work to further their own 
financial interests in ways which will also produce maximum rewards to shareholders. In these 
schemes, the alignment of interests is not left to chance but becomes an explicit linkage. The 
structure of these schemes has become of increasing interest to institutional shareholders in 
both the UK and USA although their direct control of the operation and terms of these 
schemes remains comparatively weak. In the UK this led to the establishment of the CBI- 
initiated Greenbury Committee in 1995 and the subsequent publication of the Greenbury 
(1995) Report and Code.
Agency models of management behaviour will therefore predict that the interests of managers 
and shareholders should become increasing aligned as managers' direct shareholdings in their 
employing company increase.
In contrast, managerial models predict that, as managers' share stakes increase, so too will 
their control of the corporation to the detriment of other shareholders. Such self-serving at 
the expense of other shareholders will be indicated by reduced returns to all shareholders, as 
corporate value is endogenously captured by the internal management group. This model 
suggests that, as managerial control of the corporation increases through share ownership 
managers are increasingly able to successfully deflect corporate profits and wealth to their 
own ends, before net corporate earnings become attributable to shareholders, in which they 
would only share a part.
The case for such management expropriation in situations in which managements’ influence 
was sufficiently strong, through share ownership, was put forward by Jensen & Meckling
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(1976) and formed the basis of a study by Morck, Schleifer and Vishny (1988) using a 
composite measure of corporate wealth (Tobin's Q). They found that with stakes below 5%10 
there was a positive relationship between management ownership and performance, 
apparently supporting the agency model of management behaviour. However, in this study 
the cause and effect may be the other way round, as it can also be argued that already 
successful companies are more likely to reward their managers with stock options, which are 
subsequently exercised and the resulting shares retained by managers increasing their direct 
holdings and possibly also reducing their taxation liabilities (in the USA) after a further 
holding period.
Morck et al also found that for management shareholdings of between 5% and 25% there 
was a negative relationship between size of stake and corporate performance. This result 
suggests that managers were using their position to extract wealth from shareholders, but that 
their personal loss (as shareholders) was below their personal gain as members of the internal 
management group who ‘squander corporate wealth’ (Morck et al 1988, p.293)11. Above 
25% there was also a positive relationship between ownership and performance, suggesting 
that managerial and shareholder interests had again converged. A similar result was found by 
Wruck (1989) when investigating the impact of announcements of public and private equity 
sales in the USA; sales which entrenched management in the 5-25% shareholding range had a 
negative impact on firm value, as did other announcements indicating shareholder 
entrenchment.
Holdemess & Sheehan (1988) made a comparable study looking at both managerial 
shareholders and non-personal majority shareholders (ie with stakes in excess of 50%) and 
found a similar lack of expropriation for both groups, which does not support Marine’s 
(1964) prior assertion that the value of a large/majority holding in a corporation is the 
additional compensation and perquisites that the controlling security holders can accord 
themselves. It would appear that at high levels of ownership12, the costs of self-serving
10 Gordon (1966) found that the median aggregate holding o f management was only 2.1%  o f the issued share 
capital o f  the 176 largest non-financial companies in the U S.
11 One w ay this may happen is through management diversifying business activities beyond that expected or 
required by shareholders. Wauatabe & Yamomoto (1993) described this in terms o f  a mismatch in the 
diversification utility curves for management and shareholders; the maximum utility shareholders being at a 
low er level o f  diversification than that for managers; who shareholders may fear are building a business with 
interests outside the span o f  their management competence.
12 For example, in excess o f  25% (Morck et al 1980; Wruck 1988); in excess o f  50% (Holderuess & Sheeuau
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outweigh any potential advantages, although the alignment of the management role with that 
of majority shareholder may inhibit management taking actions that they would if ownership 
was more dispersed (eg in wage negotiations; Grout & Laisney 1987).
Earlier, Glasberg & Schwatz (1983) found that both shareholder controlled and management 
controlled companies exhibited little or no difference in either profit margin or rate or return 
to stockholders, consistent with the convergence of interests and agency models of 
companies, but not with the finding of Curcio and Wadhwani (1990) that firms with difluse 
ownership showed faster Total Productivity Growth (TPG) than those with an entrenched 
management group, effectively insulated from takeovers by the extent of their own holdings. 
This latter finding is, however, consistent with the finding of Weston (1979), that no firm in 
which 'insiders' owned more than 30% had ever been acquired in a hostile takeover.
These multi-firm studies create an image of an ‘average’ firm in which ownership is either 
difluse or concentrated in the hands of managers or a large minority or majority shareholder. 
But at firm level, they fail to take into account important practical differences between 
companies, such as industry-specific barriers to entry13 and financial risks (caused for example 
by higher borrowings to finance new investments) faced by each firm and its management 
team.
Risk is easily diversified by a fund manager through the structure of his portfolio (for 
example, see Fama & Jensen (1983)) but not so easily by owner-directors, who may have a 
substantial part of their personal wealth tied up in the company. In these circumstances they 
are likely to prove more risk averse than directors who have little personal financial 
investment in the firm (Jensen & Murphy 1990).
B Management Incentives
In contrast, directors with significant share options may be excessively risky in their 
management actions as they essentially have no downside risk, an asymmetry which may 
implicitly present shareholders with an unacceptable risk/reward relationship. But the problem
(1988).
13 See study by Palmer (1973) which found that owner controlled firms only showed significantly higher rates
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of relating management rewards to corporate performance also exists with basic remuneration 
packages (eg excluding the value of outstanding or exercised options). Gregg, Machin and 
Szymanski (1993) report that a prior relationship between earnings per share (eps) and stock 
market value and the remuneration of the highest director of the UK's top 200 companies 
broke down in 1988. After 1988 remuneration was most closely related to sales growth, 
which is not seen as so closely related to shareholders' best interests as eps and other 
measures of profitability.
However, it is possible that if the value of exercised options were included in this analysis, 
total rewards would more closely match performance measures of greatest importance to 
shareholders, for example eps and profitability rather than corporate size (measured by 
turnover) in its own right. This issue continues to be of great concern to UK fund managers, 
represented by organisations such as the ABI, NAPF and ISC (see, for example, ABI (1993).
A more favourable view of directors' behaviour comes from the Gibbons & Murphy (1991) 
study of R&D investment in firms with a CEO close to retirement. A managerial model of 
corporate behaviour would predict that R&D expenditure would decline in order to boost 
profits and the value of bonuses and options based on them, which would in turn lead to an 
increase in the personal wealth of the departing CEO. However, Gibbons & Murphy found 
no evidence that such ‘end games’ were being played by near-retirement CEOs and thought 
that other factors at work (more than counteracting any tendencies towards managerial self- 
serving in the context of long-term R&D decisions) would probably include the operation of 
internal constraints and socially rooted ‘managerial legacy’ factors.
This finding supports the classical view of the company and corporate governance, that 
managers can be trusted and that directors can be relied on to act in the best interests of the 
company (Tricker 1993). This perspective is, to a degree, also shared by Child (1969, Ch.3) 
who felt that social constraints have an important influence on managers behaviour in the 
absence of sources of countervailing power, and Taveme (1990), who felt that ‘managers 
who are accountable to no-one may still run their companies well - because they have a sense 
of public service, or because they are ambitious14, or because they are subject to the discipline
o f profit thau management controlled firms in industries with high barriers to entry.
14 Marris (1963) also refers to internal pressures from competing groups o f managers forcing senior 
management and boards to perform their roles to maximise rewards to shareholders (from Thompson, Wright
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of competition’. But ‘without the discipline of some accountability, many managers will be 
tempted into complacency or self-aggrandisement, neither of which will serve the interest of 
the shareholders or the public’ (p.6).
Aligning management incentives and systems of accountability with shareholder goals is a 
classic principal agent problem. This attracted much attention in the USA in the 1980s as the 
management teams of many listed companies sought to entrench themselves through the 
widespread adoption of defensive 'poison pills' (Dahn & DeAngelo 1988) and also the many 
cases of the payment of 'greenmail' to protect their companies against hostile takeovers 
(Longstreth 1991). Although both types of management action were often presented in 
company announcements and management statements as being in the long-term interests of 
shareholders, this sort of behaviour appears to be inconsistent with the view that management 
always acts in shareholders' interests (Jensen & Warner 1988) and agency models of 
management behaviour.
C Management Entrenchment
Although shareholders failed to stop the widespread adoption of these measures, internal 
competition between individuals and groups of senior managers for the most senior roles has 
taken its toll on many directors (particularly CEOs) of under-performing companies. For 
example, Klein & Rosenfeld (1988) found that the payment of ‘greenmail’ (more politely and 
technically known in the USA as ‘targeted share repurchases’, which are illegal in the UK) 
was strongly associated with subsequent changes in the position of the company's Chairman, 
President or CEO. That these changes were only the result of the payment of greenmail is 
uncertain; in the case of poison pills, Malatesta & Wakling (1988) found that such companies 
were already less profitable than others in their industries, so it may well be that the payment 
of greenmail was less a sign of management power relative to non-greenmail receiving 
external shareholders than a symptom of declining power of an already under-performing 
management group.
Thus although the payment of greenmail supports models of managerialism and management 
entrenchment, subsequent events often suggest that other managers are effectively acting as
and Robbie (1992)).
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agents of (non-greenmail extracting) shareholders, reflecting Coulson-Thomas's view on UK 
Boards that ‘outcomes reflect temporary accommodations and balances of power’ (Coulson- 
Thomas 1993, p. 136) and Kotter's examples of power struggles, parochial politics and 
bureaucratic infighting in large US corporations (Kotter 1985).
Weisbach (1988) found that such infighting, and the resulting announcements of 'inside' 
(executive director) board resignations is recognised as value enhancing by shareholders, 
despite the fact that these changes were not the direct result of shareholder actions - although 
resignations were more commonly associated with outsider (NED)-dominated boards than 
insider-dominated boards. But, in any case these are less likely the better the share price 
performance of the firm (Warner, Watts & Wruck 1988). Collusion between outside directors 
and senior managers of the company, leading to both internal and board level power 
struggles, cannot be eliminated from descriptions of events leading to the firings studied by 
Klein & Rosenfeld and by Weisbach and described more graphically in terms of organisational 
and personal behaviour by Coulson-Thomas and Kotter.
One of the issues that US managers and boards need to continuously have in mind is the 
highly litigious nature of US shareholders (see for example Jones (1981) and Thompson 
(1980)) as different groups seek to control the allocation of corporate wealth and resources 
to different parties. Although such litigious struggles for and against the board of directors 
and its actions (Lemer 1988) are all but unknown in the UK, management concerns about the 
threat of hostile take-overs and short-termism on the part of institutional investors have 
played an important role in the shaping of corporate investor relationships in the UK over the 
last 10-15 years.
D Investment Horizons
Concerns about these issues and their implications for the ‘funding’ of British industry15 and 
the impact of claimed short-termism on the international competitiveness of UK industry 
contributed to the establishment of the Wilson Committee, which reported in 1980 (see 
Wilson 1977, 1980).
15 Concerns about 'City' short-tennisin were dted as oue o f the major reasons why small and medium sized 
companies did not want to be listed on the Stock Exchange or Unlisted Securities Market (U SM ) according to
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This was followed by the CBI establishing a City/Industry Task Force (CBI 1987a, 1987b) 
which ‘found no evidence to link attitudes of the City directly to the long run decline of the 
nation's manufacturing sector. Rather it found that many commonly held perceptions were 
simply not supported by the facts. They were part of a pervasive mythology that needs to be 
debunked (CBI 1987b, pp.9-10), a conclusion mirrored by that of Marsh (1990).
It should be noted that many of the ‘early’ studies on stock market efficiency quoted by 
Marsh (for example Fama (1970), Jensen (1968) and Bogle & Twardowski (1980)) were 
based on studies of share prices and the responsiveness of these to information about 
corporate performance. Observations of share price behaviour are used to infer that, on the 
basis of available information (ie in the absence of false markets) investors behave rationally. 
Brancato (1991) describes the methodological problems of directly observing the behaviour 
of institutional investors in the management of their portfolios16, although she too concludes 
that there is little evidence of short-termism.
This problem is closely connected with that of measuring fund performance, and that of 
pension funds in particular, about which the NAPF (1992) stresses that the ‘overwhelming 
requirement is to ensure that like is being compared with like when comparing the 
performance of one fund against others’ (p. I)17. Warrington (1993), on the basis of pension 
fund performance data collected by WM Company, suggests that ‘the average pension fund 
holding in UK equities is now about 5 years .. [which is] not an unreasonable time frame for 
industrialists to demonstrate their ability to manage a company's affairs’ (p. 189).
However, the biggest contribution to fund performance is not stock selection (see Conference 
Board (1994), Lever (Ref)) for example, but asset allocation, a factor which Howell (1991) 
thinks will becoming increasingly important during the 1990s18. Asset allocation is also
Paunell Kerr Foster (1990).
16 For example, to determine how different types o f  buying and selling programmes should be treated; how  to 
judge the duration o f actual and average holdings in actively managed portfolios; the treatment o f  derivative- 
based positions.
17 Factors such as client objectives, risk adjustment, and the median drift caused by an inbuilt survivor bias, 
when comparing time series also need to be taken into account and add complexity to comparative 
performance analysis, particularly when trustees and fund managers may be unable or unw illing to provide 
identical information sets (N APF 1990).
18 The importance o f the asset allocation decision was also confirmed by a number o f the larger fund managers 
that I interviewed (see Chapter 4). Changes in asset allocation may be achieved both through direct investment
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characterised as a ‘top down’ approach to the selection of companies in which to invest, in 
which company specific decisions follow choices between countries, markets, currencies and 
industrial sectors and other factors.
The returns from stock selection come from both income, in the form dividends, and 
appreciation in capital value. Needless to say, shares are not purchased for the long-term in 
the expectation that the price will fall (although this is the case when shares are ‘shorted’), as 
this would result in a capital loss. Investors' views of what a share is currently worth are based 
on expectations about the price at which informed marginal buyers and sellers will be 
prepared to trade the company's shares at some time in the future - ‘what the market will 
value it at, under the influence of mass psychology, three months or a year hence’ (Keynes 
1936, p. 154).
Thus ‘the professional investor is forced to concern himself with the anticipation of 
impending changes, in the news or the atmosphere, of a kind which shows that the mass 
psychology of the market is most influenced’ (Keynes 1936, p. 154/155). This ‘mass 
psychology’ may also lead investors to consistently overvalue companies, as Breeden (1993) 
notes: ‘investors who concluded that GM was pursuing a fundamentally unsound business 
course in the early 1980s would not have been more responsible for waiting ten years to sell 
their stock’ (p.76). Decisions to sell can be more difficult than those to buy and the 
background against which these decisions are made (inflation, reference time periods and the 
aggregation of data) add to the complexity of measuring fund performance and in particular 
making multi-country comparisons (Farb 1992).
Whether short-term measures of performance measurement (typically quarterly reports are 
provided for pension funds trustees) encourage short-term investment behaviour (indicated by 
portfolio ‘chum’) on the part of fund managers is subject to much debate. The NAPF (1990) 
Investment Committee concluded that the commercial pressures on fund managers, and the 
need to at least match index performance, meant that they were more likely to become risk 
averse and therefore show greater stability in their portfolio management19 and greater
policy and the use o f derivatives, in the latter case without necessarily changing the structure o f  the underlying 
portfolio.
19 Brealey, Byrne & Dimsou (1978) observed no relationship between overall market volatility and the 
increase in institutional ownership. Jones, Lehn & Mulherin (1990) found that volatility was lower for stocks
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turnover is, in any case, not associated with improved fund performance (Holbrook 1977). 
Nevertheless, Froot, Perold & Stein (1990) are concerned that foreshortened performance 
horizons on the part of money managers ‘may also have important implications for the 
research strategies they pursue ... which may in turn affect the magnitude of the information 
gap between shareholders and managers’ (p.24). Evidence for shortened horizons comes 
from a Bank of England (1987) survey of institutional fund managers, and Malkiel (1991) 
believes that in the US investor horizons shortened between the 1960s and 1980s. He relates 
this to both the rapidly rising importance of institutional fund managers in this period and also 
the dramatic increase in block trades on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in the same 
period20.
with low er institutional holdings but this result is not replicated in my own research (Chapter 3) or the 
findings o f  D em setz & Lehn (1985).
20 At the N Y SE  block trades are apparently normally defined at those in excess o f 10,000 shares. These 
increased from 3.1%  o f  market turnover in 1965 to 51.7%  in 1985 (Malkeil 1991, based on N Y SE  data).
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IV Summary
In this Chapter, I first reviewed how the Government's policy of wider share ownership in the 
1980s failed to halt a 30 year trend in the increasing proportion of personal equity-based 
savings and wealth being directed to collectively managed investment pools operated by 
professional fund managers.
The concentration of equity-based personal wealth under the control of institutional fund 
managers continued through the 1980s, despite the Government's privatisation-led ‘wider 
share-ownership’ programme, although claims that these two initiatives were or could be 
successfully connected became less assertive during the 1980s as the failure of privatisation 
investors to become shareholders through the secondary market became more and more 
apparent. The overwhelming factor, resulting in the dominance of the stock market by 
collective, centrally managed, investments has been the degree of fiscal privilege attached to 
pensions, employee share schemes and, more recently PEPs.
Whether the level of institutional ownership of a company has an impact on corporate 
performance is not clear, nor is it axiomatic that managerial entrenchment through high levels 
of stock ownership leads to a level of self-serving which negatively impacts corporate or 
stock market performance. This may be because corporate managers assess that they will lose 
more as shareholders than they are likely to gain as managers, although investors do react 
negatively to announcements of management entrenchment through other mechanisms (eg 
poison pills, payment of greenmail using shareholders' funds).
The other side of the coin is whether institutional ownership influences management choices, 
to the detriment of corporate performance and therefore long-term shareholder wealth. This 
is the issue of ‘short-termism’; that institutional shareholders place insufficient value on long­
term management plans and the resulting price signals from the stock market dissuade 
managers from making the necessary investments.
Evidence for such investor-driven pressure is contradictory and only weak at best; suggesting 
that it is impossible to create a predictive or reliable model relating corporate performance to 
overall levels of institutional ownership, or the proportion of shares held by managers of the 
company. However, it does appear that large minority shareholders (whether internal to the
Chapter 1: Ownership & Management 46
company or external) are seen as having a negative impact on corporate performance, 
signalled by the movement of share prices in response to such announcements. It may be that 
such stakes are seen as effectively blocking the actions of other shareholders, and the value of 
the company is discounted by investors accordingly.
However, the position of such minority shareholders is relatively unusual in the UK, and 
generally declines with the size (market capitalisation) of the company. Most UK listed 
companies show relatively dispersed ownership, but institutional investors dominate the share 
register. This Chapter has described some of the reasons for this domination of the ownership 
of listed companies by professional managers and the problems of aligning the interests of 
managers and shareholders to maximise shareholder wealth.
In Chapter 2 ,1 look at research which has been undertaken into the ways that shareholders 
seek to bring their influence to bear on incumbent management and the broadening issue of 
corporate governance.
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In this Chapter, I review previous work in the areas of corporate ownership, management and 
institutional influence. The Chapter is divided into two sections. Section I looks at issues of 
shareholder influence and control, whilst Section II reviews research in the field of corporate 
governance.
Shareholder ‘control’ is only guaranteed to be effective when one shareholder, or a group of 
co-operating shareholders acting 'in concert' together, control over 50% of a company's 
shares. In practice, few companies have majority shareholding patterns which conform to this 
model, but effective control can be achieved with far smaller proportions of a company's 
equity. Section I reviews the literature on patterns of voting, models of ownership and the de 
facto control of companies over different time periods through minority positions and 
transient coalitions.
Corporate governance is the process by which shareholders, and boards acting as their agents, 
seek to direct and control corporate managers so that they best pursue the interests of 
shareholders, in ways which avoid the differential treatment of shareholder groups and 
investor inequality.
The ultimate sanction against under-performing managers is for shareholders to permit the 
company to be taken over by a new external management team. UK companies are generally 
less able to protect themselves against this possibility than companies in the USA, which 
historically have been able to erect substantial barriers against hostile takeover, through the 
adoption of devices such as poison pills and the payment of greenmail to hostile shareholders. 
However, in both countries more subtle codes of corporate and shareholder conduct are 
tending to take the place of direct management shareholder conflicts and outright changes in 
ownership. In the UK in particular, great importance is now placed on company shareholder 
communications, but the benchmark standard of good corporate governance, the Cadbury 
Code, is not a prescriptive model of how company shareholder relationships should be 
conducted, nor was it in the remit of the Cadbury Committee to attempt to provide one.
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A Models of Shareholder Influence
Rohatyn (1993) believes that the focus in the USA on corporate governance and relationship 
investing arose from shareholder frustration with ‘management shortcomings and 
compensation pills and golden parachutes’ and ‘management unhappiness with their 
perceptions of shareholder short-term horizons ... which they classified along with 
arbitrageurs and speculators’ (p.30). This is a problem that still remains according to Poterba 
& Summers (1991), based on the results of a survey amongst 200+ large company CEOs.
Although there are strong similarities between perceptions about these issues in the USA and 
UK, the ability of US fund managers and other investors to work together has been severely 
constrained, until recently, under SEC regulations.
Such constraints have not operated in the UK, where fund managers have much greater 
flexibility in law in working with each other; the major practical constraints being the receipt 
of'inside information' and the need to make a full bid for the company if an (explicit) ‘concert 
party’ is formed which controls 30% or more of a company, under takeover rules.
The formation of shareholder coalitions is therefore permitted in the UK and coalition fund 
managers can effectively operate with few considerations beyond those that would normally 
apply in the routine course of their fund management business (eg dealing restrictions 
applying whilst in possession of inside information).
The relative informality of these coalitions means that the ‘market for control’ of UK 
corporations is very different to that in the USA.
Most US research in this field has focused on formulaic models of corporate control, many of 
them based on the original model of Berle & Means (1932), which viewed ‘management 
control’ as a natural conclusion to the continuing dispersion of ownership amongst large 
numbers of small shareholders and the progressive dilution of the size of their stakes.
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Such dispersion was viewed by Berle & Means as exogenous to the corporation, but as Leech 
(1987) has pointed out, many large US corporations, including many of those studied by 
Berle & Means and by those following their methodology (for example, Florence 1961, 
Gordon 1961, Wheelwright 1967, Lamer 1970 and Zeitlin & RatclifFe 1988) actively 
encouraged 'wider share ownership’ of their stock; factors endogenous to the corporation.
In other words, ownership dispersal was not just something that happened outside the 
corporation (because of the way shareholders dispersed their wealth and their estates were 
divided between beneficiaries, for example) but, in addition, internal strategic decisions taken 
by a corporation's management group also influenced the pattern of ownership. Such 
‘internal’ factors (ie decisions taken by the sponsoring Government Departments) also of 
course affected the (initial) pattern of ownership in the UK of privatised companies.
B Shares & Votes
Ideas of ‘ownership’ also crucially depend on the voting rights attached to shares. The 
principle of one share-one vote is of great importance to UK investors (see, for example, ABI
(1991), ISC (1991), CBI (1991)). The primacy of shareholders’ interests does not necessarily 
mean that companies should exclude the interests of all other stakeholder constituencies in 
their decision making, only that shareholders are the single most important group (Cope 
1992). In the USA, concerns about the unequal treatment of shareholders (following massive 
greenmail payments by Texaco and Disney, in particular) were a contributing factor to the 
formation of the Council of Institutional Investors (Machold 1988) and also depressed share 
prices (Kamma, Weintrop and Wier 1988). For example, Ryngaert (1988) found that 
management initiatives which restrict voting rights (one type of poison pill defense) have a 
negative effect on share prices when the company is perceived as a potential takeover target.
An alternative view of the relationship between shares and voting rights is held by Rydqvist
(1992), who believes that there is no social need to restrict a company’s choice of share 
structure and, in addition, at firm level there may not always be sound reasons for doing so. In 
fact, Harris & Raviv (1988) claim that the highest economic value will be achieved through 
the complete separation of voting and income rights.
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However, the reason why the one share one vote model is so common, and considered the 
norm by both companies and investors, is that its widespread adoption makes it easier for 
investors to price shares and make comparisons between companies. Pricing equities with 
identical economic claims and voting rights therefore facilitates the efficiency of the market 
and reduces investor uncertainty. These benefits, should in turn lead to a lower cost of capital 
for companies, excluding consideration of any discount or premium value that is placed by 
investors on companies where there are stakes granting minority or majority control to 
particular shareholders.
It is also extremely unlikely that the routine separation of the economic and voting rights of 
shares would be politically acceptable, because ‘once the pieces have been parcelled out 
nothing exactly corresponding to the conventional meaning of ownership or property 
remains’ (Dahl 1970, p. 132).
Levy (1982) found a positive relationship between ‘voting inequality’ and the voting rights 
premium for shares with more powerful voting rights.
Managers may issue debt (Harris & Raviv 1988) or dual class (differential voting) shares to 
help entrench their own position. Although Jeong & Noe (1993) found a positive relationship 
between management ownership of such shares and shareholder wealth for relatively modest 
holdings, this became negative as holdings increased. These findings are similar to those of 
Morck el al (1988) and Wruck (1989), but these studies only looked at ownership of shares 
with the same voting power. Stock market and shareholder resistance to the issuing of shares 
with other than one share one vote, and the valuation penalties that may be imposed on 
companies which do so by investors by investors, suggest that managers need to be think 
skinned to go ahead with equity issues that offer investors something other than one share 
one vote. Their reasons for doing so are likely to be the private benefits acquired through 
working for companies with non-standard voting structures, suggest DeAngelo & DeAngelo 
(1985), whose findings were later supported by Grossman & Hart who observed that ‘when 
deviations from one share one vote do occur, they do so in situations where the private 
benefits are large’ (p.200).
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This finding also supports the model of Stulz (1988), that there is an optimal level of insider 
ownership - which may not be that high. Although Sherman (1989) puts forward the case 
that, ‘ideally, a director’s investment in company stock should be great enough so that when 
faced with a decision in which the interests of the board and shareholder differ, the director 
will have every incentive to decide for shareholders’ (p.46). However, this articulation of the 
kind of incentive mechanism needed to ensure the alignment of the interests of managers (as 
agents) and shareholders (as principals) is made without any hint as to what the minimal level 
of managerial or board level shareholdings should be, and therefore cannot be compared with 
the empirical research of Morck et al (1988), Wruck (1989) on management ownership of 
shares in single share class companies and that of Jeong & Noe (1993) on dual class share 
ownership.
In the UK, the ABI and NAPF have indirectly addressed this issue by setting a limit for the 
rate at which shares can be allocated to employees (including directors) and therefore a cap 
on the dilution shareholders will suffer through the operation of these schemes (Richardson & 
Barnes 1991).
Voting rights are therefore valuable, both to shareholders to instigate change or block 
management proposals, and to management to entrench their position. In a theoretical paper, 
Harris & Raviv (1988b) find that ‘the simple majority rule along with one share one vote is an 
optimal governance scheme in the sense that the better management team is always elected’ 
(P-205).
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C Voting Behaviour
Despite the value placed on voting rights by investors, it is not always easy to get fund 
managers to vote, as Tegner (1993) recounts. Grossman & Hart’s (1988) theoretical model 
of voting behaviour is based on the assumption that each investor assumes that he cannot 
affect the outcome of corporate elections. The result, according to Harris & Raviv (1988) is 
that ‘in actual takeover situations, we almost always observe at least one investor large 
enough to behave as if his vote were significant’ (Harris & Raviv 1988, p.212)1. In the UK, 
despite extensive programmes by the ABI and NAPF to try to increase levels of institutional 
voting, only around one third of eligible votes are cast at companies AGMs, according to 
Mallin (1995) and almost all these are cast by proxy by institutions ranked in the top 20 of 
companies’ share registers. The Harris & Raviv (in the US) and Mallin (UK) research 
suggests that institutional investors do widely assume that their votes will make no difference 
to shareholder poll outcomes and this implies that the perceived value of voting rights 
normally lies substantially below voting costs.
However, the vast majority of shareholder votes are not about corporate takeovers, but about 
more routine matters, as surveyed by Lerman, Davis & Arnold (1993), who found that no 
shareholder proposals appeared on shareholder ballots of the 29 major UK listed companies 
surveyed and that ‘British law places significant obstacles in the way of shareholders who 
wish to submit proposals’ (p.42). See also Davis (1993) on this issue and Gillibrand (1993), 
who contrasts the difference between ‘show of hands voting’ by shareholders present at an 
AGM or EGM and the use by company Chairmen of proxy votes to defeat shareholders 
attending the meeting. Galbraith reflects thus on the position of the individual stockholder: 
‘his vote, if it is for management, is unnecessary and if against, futile. In other words, it is 
valueless’ (Galbraith 1978, p.84). This is a view shared by Rubner (1965).
This contrasts with the situation in the USA where, although directors do act as ‘gatekeepers’ 
on voting issues (Pratt & Zeckhauser 1985, Black 1990), institutional investors are routinely 
successful in having their proposals placed on ballot papers, although it appears that
1 One o f  the reasons no doubt why Grossman & Hart (1988, p .201) believe that ‘it is generally optimal for 
small shareholders to vote with management, and not to devote the time and effort to read proxy statements 
and form an independent v iew ’. This is a perspective shared by Grout (1987b, p .70), because ‘information is 
a public good [and] mutual funds [unit trusts] are able to spend less money per head researching into
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increasingly the issues they initially propose are successfully negotiated with management 
before the balloting process begins (IRRC 1993).
Voting by UK fund managers is now of considerable interest to their trade associations (for 
example, see NAPF (1991)) and, although some very large nominee holdings are not voted at 
all, the Institutional Shareholders Committee (ISC) found that the average proportion of 
votes cast by the top major shareholdings2 of 20 major UK listed companies had increased 
from 20% in 1990 to 34% in 1993 (ISC 1993b), insurance funds showing significantly higher 
voting levels than pension funds. The ISC believes that this trend is likely to continue and may 
even be assisted by changes in EC disclosure rules (ISC 1993c), although the slightly later 
work of Mallin (1995) involving a larger sample of companies did not reveal any significant 
increase in voting levels between her own and the second ISC survey.
In cases where fund managers support management proposals, votes will normally be cast 
without reference to the beneficial or underlying owners (for example pension fund trustees), 
although Shanagher (1992, p.3) believes that ‘local authority pension funds should .. make 
their own decisions on how to vote. They can't leave it up to the fund manager’. But the 
logistics of routinely obtaining voting instructions from beneficial/underlying owners on the 
basis proposed by Shanagher is seen by Easterbrook & Fischel (1983) as raising significant 
additional problems as ‘the costs of locating and transmitting information to widely scattered 
beneficiaries would be substantial [and] individual shareholders would have less incentive to 
monitor management than does one large institutional investor’ (p.426). The 
disenfranchisement of beneficiaries’ voting rights is also an issue which applies to PEPs, many 
employee share ownership and incentive schemes and private client stockbrokers which 
manage discretionary funds; in all cases voting power effectively rests with a professional 
group of fund managers or scheme trustees. This problem would also have applied to 
Redwood’s (1985) earlier proposal for the disaggregation of collective pension funds; the 
attachment of voting rights to individual actual or ‘virtual’ holdings would have presented the 
pensions industry with enormous administration costs and problems.
companies and yet produce ‘more’ information per head than individuals acting independently’ .
2 This group may not be exactly the same as the top 20 shareholders as multiple holdings by single fund 
managers were not consolidated before the information was submitted by participating companies to the ISC.
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Despite the encouragement of increased shareholder voting by the representative bodies of 
institutional fund managers and other quarters, not all companies appear to welcome active 
voting by their shareholders, even on routine matters. Laing (1990) for example, proposes 
that shareholders should only have voting rights after one year of ownership and that voting 
rights for each shareholder should be restricted - provided that eps grow at an agreed rate; a 
kind of ‘sweetened poison pill’ more in keeping with many US managers’ views of how 
shareholders’ rights should be constrained than those commonly held by the managers of UK 
listed companies and their institutional shareholders.
D Shareholder Control
This brings us onto the central issue of how shareholder control is organised and how it 
should be defined. One of the more restricted definitions is ‘the right to determine the 
management of corporate resources, ie the right to hire, fire, and set the compensation of top- 
level managers’ (Hanis & Raviv 1988a, p.57, Footnote 4), based on Jensen & Ruback 
(1983)). Scott (1990) points out that the owners of shares are the owners ‘merely of the right 
to receive an income and vote in corporate affairs’ and that, although shareholders do not 
own the assets of a company, they do have ‘the ability to determine the uses to which the 
assets are put [but] their power of control is dependent on the social context in which their 
legally defined property relations are founded’ (p.351).
How much control shareholders have over a corporation is to a large extent a function of the 
ownership structure. Berle & Means' typology of five types of ownership (owner controlled, 
majority controlled, legal control, minority and management control) led to similar studies 
(Gordon 1961, Lamer 1970) of major US corporations and also others in the UK (Florence 
1961), Chile (Zeitlin & Ratcliffe 1988) and Australia (Wheelwright 1967).
Stegler & Friedland (1983) describe the response in the 1930s to ‘The Modem Corporation’ 
as ‘astonishingly uncritical’ (p.258), and it is not surprising that their own research and that of 
many others has challenged the Berle & Means model of corporate ownership. This has been 
either on the basis of additional research (Stegler & Friedland investigated the relationship 
between ownership and measures of executive compensation and corporate performance) or
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a reworking of information about the ownership of companies included in Berle & Means’ 
original study.
In particular, Nyman & Silbertson (1978) argue that the belief that ‘the typical large modem 
corporation is viewed as being run by professional managers with little proprietary 
relationship with their firm’ (p. 77) is flawed, as was the methodology of Berle & Means, and 
therefore that of Lamer, Gordon and Florence based on it. Nyman & Silbertson’s specific 
criticism of Berle & Means is that the latter made the assumption that 39 out of the 43 
industrial companies in their sample were under management control, without having 
sufficient data to show this one way or another. Nyman & Silbertson quote three later studies 
(Goldsmith & Parmelee (1940), the NRC project (1939) and Perlo (1957)) which show that 
of the 39, a total of 33 had ‘centres of ownership’ (Nyman & Silbertson 1978, p.78) which 
should have precluded the classification by Berle & Means of these companies as being under 
management control.
Nyman & Silbertson put forward the case that ownership structures are too complex for 
‘arbitrary statistical criteria’ (p.78) to be applied to analyses of ownership: ‘any individual firm 
may be related to other corporations, banks, financial institutions, and family owners via 
complex patterns of shareholdings, interlocking directorates and kinship networks’.
Some of these patterns have been analysed by other researchers; for example Lundberg 
(1937) and Burch (1972)3 looked at patterns of family control, both finding higher degrees of 
family control and therefore lower levels of management control than suggested by Berle & 
Means. The more recent Patman Committee (1968) is reported by Nyman & Silbertson 
(1978) as showing banks becoming increasingly important trustee holders of corporate stock 
in the USA, while their own research in the UK of 250 companies, based on three criteria, 
showed that 56% of the companies in their sample had at least some degree of proprietorial 
interest and should therefore not be classified as being under management control.
Scott & Hughes (1976) similarly showed how the identification of control type depended on 
the level of analysis undertaken into the ownership of companies. Their own detailed and 
deep analysis into the ownership of listed Scottish companies showed far closer relationships
3 Although published iu 1972 Burch's data covered a 20 year period from 1951.
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in the ownership of listed Scottish companies than would be revealed from their top 20 
shareholders alone. Some of these connections were made through multiple (parallel) 
directorships and, as suggested by Fitch & Oppenheimer (1970), we ‘should not 
underestimate the power o f ... interest groups owning large blocks of shares or having seats 
on the boards of directors ... [because it is the] Board [that] controls finance, capital 
expenditure, dividends and broad objectives, and ... chooses the Chief Executive’ (Nyman & 
Silbertson 1978, p.77).
E Shareholder 'Coalitions'
The importance of institutional investors in the ownership and control of companies had 
already been recognised by Berle (1959) who suggested that ‘once the stages of majority, 
minority, and management control have been done through, a fourth stage of control, by 
fiduciary institutions, might be reached, through which dispersed stockholdings would once 
more become concentrated’ (Nyman & Silbertson 1978, p.91).
Berle’s proposed ‘fourth stage’ of control, which went beyond the original Berle & Means 
model, brings us closer to the realities of the present day and Scott’s model o f ‘constellations’ 
of shareholders providing the basis of ‘coalitions of interests’ which can exercise influence 
and possibly outright control over a corporation (Scott 1985, 1986, 1990). The mechanism 
for this control was earlier described by Blumberg (1975) as being through ‘behind the scenes 
alliances which can accumulate the necessary critical mass’ (Blumberg 1975, p.93). Scott 
found that ‘controlling constellations’ were made up, normally, of the UK's largest fund 
management groups. Inclusion within a controlling constellation depended on the shareholder 
(fund manager) being one of the largest 20 for a given company. On this basis, Prudential 
Assurance participated in 88 of the controlling constellations out of a possible 100 of the 
UK's top 250 companies which showed this type of control (Scott 1986 pp.64,100).
It is important to recognise that Scott's analysis of ownership is on the basis of all companies 
and thus contains a sub-set of listed companies (the focus of my own research) but is not 
wholly comprised of them. For example, of the 250 companies in Scott's research universe, 
13 were public corporations (seven of which have since been privatised and have been either 
partly or wholly replaced by listed companies), 38 were wholly owned by other companies,
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nine were under foreign exclusive majority control and 8 of which were mutuals. I estimate 
that of the remainder, at least ten were not listed in 1972 on the London Stock Exchange. 
The balance of 172 companies suggests that of the listed companies included in Scott’s 
analysis, around 60% were subject to constellation control.
On the basis of a computer-based network analysis of the relationships between 
constellations, Scott described the relationships between the 250 companies as a ‘polyarchy’ 
in which:
‘Large non-financial enterprises were able to play a leading part ... because the 
massive investment funds of their pension schemes enabled them to operate as 
financial intermediaries as well as industrial undertakings. As units of ‘finance capital’ 
they took their place alongside the more narrowly defined 'financial' enterprises. ... 
The results [of the analysis] show[ed] that controllers and investors were tied 
together into an extensive, diffuse, and cohesive structure. Prudential Assurance and 
the National Coal Board [with its pension fund], having the largest number of 
controlling participations, lay at the core of the network and were surrounded by 
circles of other participants to whom they were linked through intense and cyclical 
chains of connection' (Scott 1986, pp. 118/9).
A second source of influence over companies is through directors who sit on one or more 
company boards (multiple or parallel directorships). Scott investigated these ‘interlocks’ as 
well and found that of the 100 companies controlled through constellations, 88 were 
interlocked (ie through at least one director sitting on the board of at least one other company 
in the top 250).
However, the relationship between participation in the polyarchy of controlling constellations 
and director-based interlocks was weak and did not appear to be an indicator of underlying 
capital relations:
‘there was no one-to-one relation between the partial networks of capital relations 
and interlocks, though they had, of course, definite points of articulation. Both 
networks were extensive and diffuse, each being dominated by a large component of 
connected enterprises. The central enterprises in each network, however, were not 
identical.... Key positions in the network of interlocking directorships were played by 
the big four clearing banks, while the leading positions in the network of 
participations [in ownership constellations] were held by insurers and pension funds’ 
(Scott 1986, p. 119).
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For example: ‘the Prudential, which participated in 88 of the controlling constellations was 
interlocked with only five of the top 250 enterprises - and threeof these interlocks were with 
American subsidiaries’ (Scott 1986, p. 119). But, unlike the trend towards concentration in 
ownership by financial institutions, Scott & Griff (1984) found that the pattern of interlocks 
between directors of the top 250 British ‘enterprises’ has remained largely similar throughout 
this century (the reference years being 1904, 1938 and 1976; see table in Scott (1985, p.97)).
The finding that the pattern of interlocks did not tie in with the network of shareholdings can 
be contrasted with Scott’s earlier view, apparently based on Pfeflfer (1972, p.220) and 
Aaronvitch & Sawyer (1975), that ‘financial enterprises that participate in the controlling 
[equity based] constellations are able to put their representative on company boards’ (Scott 
1985, p. 109). Although the finding that commercial banks are strongly represented in the 
director networks supports the view that companies ‘will seek out the directors of financial 
enterprises as a way of enhancing their access to [debt-based] capital’ (Scott 1985, p. 109). A 
similar model of board representation is held by: Gordon (1945, pp.57,187), Peterson (1965), 
and Monsen, Chiu & Cooley (1986) and supported by the research of Zeitlin (Zeitlin (1974), 
Zeitlin & Ratcliffe (1988)), which found that the role of familial (kinecon) networks was 
critical to an understanding of corporate ownership in Chile.
Scott felt that the lack of shareholder representation on UK corporate boards ‘might make 
sense if fund managers had the necessary time and skills. But with a multitude of funds and 
managers and widely diversified shareholdings it must be unlikely that their managers can play 
the galvanising role the critics seek’ (Scott 1986, p.l 19). Ridley (1986) also described how ‘it 
is rare for pension fund managers to nominate directors to company boards’ (p.52).
Part of the reason for this may be the diversified nature of institutional investment portfolios, 
since ‘dispersed ownership gives individual owners little incentive to participate in decision­
making since any benefits are shared by all owners in proportion to their holdings [but that] 
greater concentration may produce [management] behaviour closer to profit maximisation’ 
(Leech & Leahy 1991, p. 1427).
A second reason is that ‘many large shareholders, particularly institutional investors, do not 
wish to have representatives sitting on the boards of companies in their portfolios [because
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of] the conflicts of interest that this would entail4’ (Oxford Analytica 1992, p.5). See also 
Denham (1993), who describes the situation in which fund managers' obligations to investors 
may conflict with requirements of institutions investing as ‘Type 2’, which is ‘not based on 
the premise of sustained long-term relationship’ and therefore does not require difficult 
judgements or consideration of management issues and as a result is ‘sporadic and episodic in 
nature’ (p.4).
This lack of association between directors and 'finance capital' is not found in Germany or 
Japan, where relationships between the two are close, although their governance systems are 
far from identical5.
4 Cowan (1989) describes how the Magellan Fund (one o f  the largest and most successful mutual funds) 
disinvested its holdings before Peter Lynch became an outside director o f a listed company prior to his 
retirement from Fidelity.
3 For discussions on the differences between the 'Anglo-Saxon' (U K  and U S) model o f corporate governance 
and those o f Japan and Germany see; Charkham (1994), Kallfass (1988), Kester (1991), Kester & Luehrman 
(1991), Lawrence (1980), Roe (1992), Schneider-Lenne (1992), Scott (1986), Zeigler, Bender & Biehler 
(1985).
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A Shareholder 'Oversight*
In the UK, the legal control of shares listed on the London Stock Exchange has now reached 
close to 80% (Chapter 3), thus the issue of oversight of corporate managers is one that must 
be primarily addressed by institutional investors.
One of the mechanisms through which fund managers can provide effective corporate 
‘oversight’, exert influence as they see fit, and take control of a company if the need arises, is 
through participating in an active coalition of shareholders, of the kind described and analysed 
by Scott. When formally constituted, such shareholder groups have been known in the UK as 
‘Investor Protection Committees’ (IPCs). As Matheson (1993) describes, ‘these usually 
involve conversations with management and its advisors and frequently have an influence on 
management decisions’ but ‘this low-key approach .. may have been taken too far in that it 
created a perception that the institutions almost invariably avoid confrontation, only taking 
overt action in extremis’ (p. 179).
But there is always a limit as to how much institutions will want to cooperate as they are in 
competition with each other (James 1986, Scott 1990) while the free rider issue is a major 
problem for fund managers actively involved in corporate interventions, both in terms of 
executive time and external costs (for example, see Black & Coffee (1993) for an account of 
Norwich Union’s involvement with Tace pic).
The circumstances in which investors will seek to influence a particular company are, as I 
describe in Chapters 6 (Shareholder Rights) and 7 (Instigating Change), firm specific, but 
there has been much interest in the general types of conditions that create an environment in 
which intervention may take place.
Zald (1969) felt that it was when strategic issues arose that controllers would strive to 
influence the board and to see that its wishes are carried through, although Scott believed 
(1985, pp.53,109) that the rarity of such intervention indicates that ‘in the generality of cases, 
.. shareholders are satisfied that their interests are reasonably well served’ (based on Nichols
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1969, p. 104). Shareholders prefer to operate through a process of ‘covert supervision’ 
(Glasberg 1981, Gogel & Koenig 1981) and there is ‘a widespread reluctance on the part of 
institutions to act in a positive way’ (Dodds 1989, p.24). Dodd also quotes (p.25) an 
anonymous UK fund manager as saying:
‘one of the problems is knowing when to interfere. It is difficult to assess 
whether the company is going through a bad patch or suffering from bad 
management9
and this was a concern repeatedly voiced by fund managers in my own research interviews.
But Monks argues that one of the primary reasons for shareholder passivity is the problem of 
collective choice and the diversity of investors' interests. This diversity is such that he believes 
that the real ‘challenge is to align different species of investors with attractive risk/reward 
alternatives for equity participation’ (Monks 1993c, p. 129) and that the increasing use of 
index funds highlights this issue (Monks 1993b), a subject also raised in Gordon & Pound 
(1993). Monks’ case is that because the management of index funds is so price competitive, 
ownership rights cannot be exercised in any meaningful way (eg through shareholder 
activism: Monks (1993c)). At the other end of the ownership/intervention scale, Monks has 
established his own investment fund based on a limited number of portfolio investments and 
high levels of shareholder activism (Monks 1993a).
Although the ownership structure of many listed companies suggests that professional fund 
managers possess a high concentration of power, lack of homogeneity in investors’ interests 
means that they do not behave as a monolithic group (Brancato (1991, 1993), Lowenstein & 
Millstein (1988))6. This point is also made by the City Capital Markets Committee (1977) in 
its submission to the Wilson Committee.
Evidence of diverse investment interests and approaches to the use of ownership rights 
include the reluctance of US mutual funds (Roe 1993) and pension funds (Dingen 1992, 
Monks 1993c) to participate in corporate governance and the finding that investors who are 
also trying to sell management financial services are likely to be less critical and independent
6 This poiiit is separate to the practical limits placed ou the formal use o f  this power through constrained 
voting opportunities, the relatively low  rates o f  participation in shareholder polls and associated issues 
disciLssed in Section II o f  this Chapter.
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(Brickley, Lease & Smith 1988). These and other self-imposed constraints undoubtedly 
contribute to the belief on the part of companies and others concerned with shareholder 
behaviour that (institutional) investors are very often seen to be intervening ‘too late’ in a 
corporation’s affairs (Monks & Minow 1991).
One view of this state of affairs is that intervention only takes place when the diverse interests 
of investors are sufficiently coincident that the benefits of participation in a shareholder 
coalition (UK) or, for example, to support for an anti-management proxy voting challenge7 
(USA) are greater than the expected value of free rider benefits. Such benefits may be 
garnered if other investors take the initiative in dealing with problem companies and 
management teams. ‘Such as the Prudential or M&G8, which are among the more active 
shareholders, [and allowed them] to .. use their vast resources to monitor a company 
themselves’ (Dodds 1989, p.26).
Artus (1990) confirms that, whilst it is possible for smaller fimd managers to treat shares as 
‘tradeable paper claims with little regard to the proprietary responsibilities attaching to the 
ownership of theses claims, this is not a position which is possible for the Prudential’ (p. 12), a 
position predicted by Fitch & Oppenheimer (1970). Paul Myners (1993) (formerly CEO and 
now Chairman of Gartmore) believes that fund managers will increasingly seen to take on 
ownership responsibilities because of the continuing trend of concentration within the UK 
fund management industry and also the ‘evident trend in many institutions to having the 
shares of fewer companies in their portfolio’ (p.2). Similar observations about US share 
ownership have been made by Brancato (1988, 1991,1993).
Black (1992d) believes that large holdings (by implication such as those held by the Pru, 
M&G, Gartmore and other major UK fund managers) may be associated with better 
corporate performance9, reinforcing the benefits to all shareholders of a committed corporate
7 A s discussed earlier, formal shareholder coalitions, o f  the kind described by Scott (1985, 1986, 1990) were 
effectively im possible to organise in the U S  until very recently due to the weight o f  regulatory filing?; and 
prior commitments o f  intent required by the SEC and the associated risks o f corporate and intra-shareholder 
litigation. The possible impact o f the recent changes has been reviewed by Black & Coffee (1993), using the 
U K  as a m odel. H ow ever, almost all the other research on U S companies described in this thesis is based on 
the expression o f  shareholder influence through the actual or threatened use o f the proxy voting process.
8 Directors o f  both these and other ‘active’ U K  fund managers were interviewed as part o f  m y qualitative 
research, described in Chapters 4 to 7.
9 Lelrn (1991) suggests that 'Because o f  . . .  capital market forces, it is likely that ownership structures will 
evolve in ways that are consistent with value maximisation. Ownership structures that are revealed to be 'sub-
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monitor, despite the fact that in such situations the power of the dispersed (non-monitor) 
shareholder group will be reduced.
Individual shareholders therefore have more power in the absence of concentrated ownership 
and/or a large monitoring shareholder (De Alessi 1973). De Alessi's view suggests that, if 
taken to an extreme, wider share ownership (the wide dispersal of corporate ownership 
amongst many private shareholders with small directly held stakes) may result in lower 
corporate performance and therefore smaller returns to investors.
This model is, of course, consistent with that of Berle & Means (1932) which saw 
shareholder atomisation and the dispersal of ownership as directly contributing to the rise of 
managerial shirking, self-dealing and other forms of economic expropriation of wealth from 
shareholders. In these circumstances Shleifer & Vishny (1986) suggest that it may pay private 
shareholders to 'reward' larger shareholders for their monitoring role with a higher level of 
dividends than would normally be required by private shareholders. (Private investors are 
generally believed to prefer capital gains to income, compared with institutions, some of 
which have strong views about the payment of dividends by the companies in which they hold 
stakes (M&G Group 1991)).
Index funds10, which may account for as much as 30%11 of US pension fund assets 
(according to fund managers I interviewed in New York), are not necessarily all passive 
owners, as an initial reading of Monk's analysis of their cost constraints would suggest. The 
most common reason given by index fund managers as to why the funds they manage should 
not participate in corporate governance processes is that index fund performance is measured 
on variance from the index and not performance relative to the index12 (Jenks 1988). Non­
optimal' result in depressed stock prices, which in  turn create strong incentives for more efficient ownership 
structures' (p .26).
10 Lowenstein (1991) suggests that index funds have grown in popularity because active funds were trading 
too m uch, incurring high costs and under-performing industry (market benchmarks) and that this over activity 
was itself a response to the criticism that major shareholders were 'unwilling to recognise any responsibility 
that went beyond immediate market gains'.
11 Lowenstein puts forward the case that the use o f  'indexing' is wider than this figure indicates as many fund 
managers are effectively 'closet' or 'shadow' indexing their funds in return for higher 'active' management 
fees.
12 H ow ever, Bowman (1991, p .34) comments that 'Our passive indexed core has shown consistently better 
market performance than our active external managers', so even though the performance measures may be 
different, index funds still outperform actively managed funds. Davis (1993) believes this discrepancy is less 
in the U K  than in other markets. Jensen (1968) finds no consistent out-performance o f (pension) funds after
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participation therefore provides the lowest cost route to the achievement of their index fund 
investment mandates.
The argument that index and other low participation funds should always wait for a free rider 
benefit is strongly countered by the trustees of CalPERS (California Public Employees 
Retirement System) and other activist index funds in the USA, on the grounds of the legal 
obligation to exercise their fiduciary duties and that these responsibilities are independent of 
the style of fund management practiced (see Hanson (1993), Sherman (1989) and Bowman 
(1991) for example). This argument is rooted in the ERISA legislation which requires US 
pension funds to consider their voting power as an asset and therefore to vote their shares as 
a matter of fiduciary responsibility. The approach taken by CalPERS is that this principle 
applies both to the formal exercising of shareholder rights (through voting) and the use of 
informal influence to seek to improve standards of governance, strategic management and 
business performance in those US companies in which its funds are invested. In practice, over 
the last ten years, CalPERS has focused its attention on between ten and twenty companies 
each year, these comprising its annual list of corporate governance ‘targets’.
An analysis of proposals made by Monks and others that CalPERS should become an 
investor in so called ‘corporate governance funds’ led to a detailed study of the performance 
of corporations targeted by CalPERS and others for some degree of shareholder activism. 
Gordon & Pound (1993) concluded that, through proxy challenges to the composition of the 
Board or corporate strategy, investors earn an average of 30.4% excess return following the 
announcement of the initiative, but that this did not depend on the result of the proxy vote. 
The key factor is presumed to therefore be the proxy challenge itself (particularly by a major 
and influential ‘activist’ fund like CalPERS) which ‘successfully galvanised corporate policy 
change’ (p.3). This finding suggests that latent (ie the threat of shareholder action, implied or 
explicit) and actual shareholder power are of a similar order in at least some circumstances.
The ownership structure of a firm will also affect the willingness of investors to become 
involved in corporate govemance-type initiatives, and the more diffuse the ownership the less 
likely this is to happen. ‘The large scale enterprise requires an ownership interest sufficiently 
large to encourage the owners to undertake the task of overseeing management and other
adjustment for risk and Kou & Jen (1979) found the same result for mutual funds.
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inputs and of setting a proper course for the enterprise’ (Demsetz 1988b, p.231). Demsetz 
believes that the increase in firm-specific risks (within the context of an investment portfolio) 
inherent from becoming a ‘controlling owner* of a specific enterprise are only taken on in 
return for a comparative advantage (in terms of risk-adjusted total investment returns).
Rather than make (crude) accusations of ‘insider trading’ against such owners, Demsetz 
monitored the trading activity in shares of companies where there was a controlling 
shareholder and found seven times the average (expected) level of trading. He argues that the 
introduction of legislation to limit such insider trading will therefore lead to a decline in 
corporate monitoring by controlling shareholders with large stakes. This is rather similar to 
the argument that the use of inside information leads to greater efficiency in financial markets, 
and that restrictions on the availability and use of such information increases investor risk, 
reduces the quality of price discovery and the efficient allocation and pricing of capital 
through market mechanisms.
In the UK, there is little doubt that the insider dealing laws and related stock exchange 
regulations are a major constraint to the close involvement of institutional fund managers in 
companies. For the largest fund managers, this issue appears to be a significantly greater 
constraint on direct action against a company or its board of directors, or their participation in 
a ‘coalition’ or informal grouping of (major) shareholders with similar objectives, than their 
lack of knowledge about a company or uncertainty about the quality of information that they 
possess.
The legal and moral hazard problems of a major shareholder using privileged (if not strictly 
‘inside’) information for private gain, the expropriation of shareholder wealth or self-dealing 
have led Coffee (1991) to propose that the optimal monitor will have: the ability to hold large 
stakes; the inclination to invest for the longer-term; and no substantial conflicts of interest. 
Black (1993) has also argued that SEC rules have unnecessarily restricted the institutional 
oversight of corporations through administrative burden, forcing institutions to be passive 
investors as a matter of political convenience (Black 1992e) and that such widespread 
passivity has not been driven by the needs of the investment community.
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However, the increasing size of institutional shareholdings means that institutional investors 
‘will be progressively impelled to give up their neutrality, in so far as the volume of stock they 
hold obliges them to shed the simple role of institutional investor’ (Scott (1985, p. 108) based 
on Chevalier (1969, p. 108), see also Baum & Styles (1965, p. 11)). Chevalier found that in 
around half the top 200 US corporations which had a shareholder group with ‘dominant 
influence’13, the groups were based on families and not on financial institutions. This can be 
contrasted with Scott’s findings in the UK that, of the 100 (out of a total universe of 250) 
companies with shareholder coalitions, families were only represented at all in 55 and that in 
only 7 of these was the family shareholding block 3% or more of the companies’ issued share 
capital14.
In this Section we have so far seen how, in practice, management can only be effectively 
challenged by ‘the occasional shareholder or group of holders who together possess a 
relatively substantial minority position that can serve as a base to offset the advantages 
inherent in management's position’ (Baum & Styles 1965, p. 12).
In the UK, explicit interventions in the affairs of companies by groups of shareholders 
working together as a coalition or IPC are relatively rare, but in both the UK and USA there 
is a general impression of shareholder ‘passivity’ in respect of many companies. Whilst Scott 
proposes that this is because shareholders are generally satisfied, it may be that the actual 
level of shareholder intervention is much higher but covert, as suggested by Nichols.
What is clear is that institutional fund managers are able to justify non-intervention and their 
non-participation in company specific shareholder coalitions on many different grounds. 
These may include legal constraints, the potential impact of becoming ‘insiders’ on portfolio 
performance, the limited if not negligible influence conferred by small shareholdings, and the 
restricted investment mandates attached to index funds.
13 ie  the other companies were not classified by Chevalier; in contrast Scott (1986) placed all the companies in  
his sample o f  250 companies in 9  control classifications, o f which 'Constellations' was the ninth and largest 
(100 companies).
14 A  further 4 6  companies out o f the 250 were judged to be under som e other kind o f  personal control: 7 
w holly owned; 15 with an exclusive family majority; 13 with secure minority family control; and 11 with 
limited minority family control. Of these, I estimate that only around 25 were listed in 1972, suggesting that 
there was significant fam ily influence (taking 3% as a threshold) in only around 32  out o f 125 listed 
companies (26% ), a proportion which has undoubtedly declined further in the last 20 years through the 
natural dispersion o f personal wealth and family Trusts and the creation o f  new equity (reviewed in Chapter
3).
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Equally, the trend for actively managed funds to reduce the number of companies in which 
they invest and correspondingly increase the size of their shareholdings in favoured 
companies, means that the size of stakes may force a more active approach to corporate 
oversight by fund managers than has typically been the case in the past.
B Takeovers
One of the most important reasons for increased greater corporate concern about the 
ownership and investment policies and the voting behaviour of institutional shareholders, and 
a major element in the ' short-termism' debate, has been the operation of the ‘market for 
corporate control’ through takeovers. Two delineations are needed at this point: the first is 
that debate over takeovers centres on those that are deemed to be ‘hostile’; the second being 
that the debate is almost entirely restricted to listed companies.
Many bids are categorised as ‘hostile’ simply because they are initially opposed by the Board 
and management team of the target company. There are two grounds for such opposition. 
The first is that extending the period in which a company is ‘in play’ may result in a better 
offer to shareholders for their equity in the company. Such improvements are often achieved 
when one or more other companies are willing to bid a higher price for control than that 
provided by the initial offer. Such alternative bids take time to organise and, in general terms, 
are more likely to be made if the target's incumbent management group and their advisors are 
able to extend the takeover timetable through the use of obfuscatory public relations, legal 
and regulatory devices.
The second is managerial entrenchment. Fear of losing their employment and associated 
benefits drives the incumbent management team to oppose a bid purely for reasons of self- 
interest and without particular regard to shareholder interests (supporting the managerialist 
model), although these may also be served by managerial resistance for the reasons set out 
above. Franks & Mayer (1992) found that these fears were rational; the turnover in directors 
of companies subject to successful hostile bids is over four times that of the turnover in 
friendly bids15. This finding suggests that managerial self-interests may be served by
15 Managerial self interest is also borne out by a company director I interviewed who commented (in respect
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supporting a ‘friendly’ bid for their company, but that a lower premium for control may be 
paid, sacrificing wealth of the current shareholders. Alternatively, managerial opposition to a 
‘hostile’ bid may serve shareholders better than managers in the long-run as a higher premium 
may be obtained for their control of the company. An alternative outcome is that managerial 
opposition to a bid is successful. Grossman & Hart (1980) show, in a voting/control model of 
the firm, that even if the directors do not appear to be acting in the best interests of 
shareholders, the ‘free-rider problem’ may mean that it may be impossible for them to be 
disciplined and replaced in a takeover bid.
The difference between the value of a company owned by a diverse and dispersed group of 
shareholders and that owned by a single, acquiring shareholder, is the bid premium. There is 
strong evidence that almost all the economic value of a takeover of a listed company to the 
acquiror (and its shareholders) is effectively paid to the shareholders of the target company, 
and this bid premium (abnormal stock market return) is of the order of 30% (Jenkinson & 
Mayer 1992)16. In effect, the premium is paid because of the improvements that the acquiror 
expects to make in the operating units or company acquired. These improvements are 
normally achieved (Hall 1990) although inevitably some acquirors pay too much when 
purchasing other business units.
The willingness of institutional investors to accept this bid premium is seen as evidence of 
their ‘short-term’ investment horizons and lack of willingness to ‘back’ incumbent 
managers17. In fact, around half of bids characterised as ‘hostile’ actually fail and the pre-bid 
share price performance of companies that are the subject of hostile and friendly bids are 
indistinguishable (Franks & Mayer 1992), supporting Jenkinson & Mayer's (1992) assertion 
that a large proportion of hostile bids are associated with the corporate strategy of the 
acquiring company rather than managerial failure on the part of the target company.
Jenkinson & Mayer also document a high and increasing level of direct institutional 
intervention in corporate activities in the UK which they believe, may be acting as a
o f another company involved in a number o f  hostile bids in the 1980s) that after a bid was announced the key 
to success was negotiating the personal pension arrangements and other 'pay offs' to directors o f  the target 
company and that once these had been agreed raising the offer and completing the takeover successfully was 
almost a matter o f  formality.
16 Jensen (1993) quotes a figure o f 41% for the U S.
17 In practice, institutions regularly back incumbent management and have played a major role in thwarting
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substitute for takeovers. They discovered that intervention is most commonly associated with 
announcements of poor corporate performance (for example, dividend cuts) and found in 
companies with limited corporate governance. Poor governance practices might, for example, 
be indicated by a small number or proportion of independent NEDs sitting on the board, or 
the roles of Chairman and CEO being combined.
The market for corporate control (through the mechanism of a hostile bid) can therefore be 
seen as one in which shareholders allow a management team to be replaced by one more 
competent, or which believes itself to be so.
This external control is now being replaced by shareholder intervention, in which shareholder 
‘exit’ is being replaced by ‘voice’ - ideas based on those of Hirshman (1970). The common 
feature of both is that the institutional investor is positioned as a kind of iong-stop’ on poor 
management performance (Charkham 1990) ie the choice between exit and voice is the 
exception rather than the rule.
Thompson, Wright & Robbie (1992) believe that corporate restructuring (buy-ins, buy-outs, 
mergers, acquisitions etc) have made a positive contribution to the performance of the 
‘mother’ company, without all the benefits being captured by the other party (as normally 
happens when a bid premium is paid for complete control), tying in with Charkham's belief 
that change in ownership is usually an unnecessary alternative to changing management 
(Charkham 1990).
Corporate governance and the widespread adoption of the ‘Cadbury Code’ are seen as 
providing a framework facilitating increased institutional ‘voice’, but in practice shareholders 
only interface with the Board of directors of a company, and not any deeper18. Gordon 
(1991) suggests a reason for this: to delve deeper into a corporation would invite self-serving 
by executive (inside) directors and senior managers of the firm, but the shareholder would not 
have sufficient information or control of the organisation to effectively monitor, let alone stop 
this happening. The implication is that to go ‘below’ board level in their governance of a
hostile takeovers (Brancato 1989).
18 One o f  the criticisms o f  the Cadbury code, particularly by 'unreconstructed industrialists' (Arthur 1993, 
p .94) such as Sir Owen Green is that the Code has little to say about the entrepreneurial growth and 
development o f  companies, a concern also shared by Jenkins (1993).
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company, shareholders will themselves become managers, introducing both legal problems (of 
fund managers becoming ‘shadow directors’ and risks of moral hazard19. With limited 
competence and information, close involvement in the management of a company risks 
volatile public returns (to all shareholders) and triggering excessive private returns being 
taken by the (remaining) incumbent management team through increased shirking of 
responsible decision taking and involvement in the management process and wealth 
appropriation. And, as Alchain & Demsetz (1988) point out, if the monitoring/controlling 
shareholder. sought to involve other shareholders in their managerial decision making 
processes, chaos would result.
C Non-Executive Directors
The independence of NEDs from the executive (inside) directors of the company, and 
therefore their ability to act independently of them and act more directly as agents of 
shareholders than incumbent management, has been questioned in many studies and also 
appeared to be the aspect of the Cadbury Code20 receiving the slowest and most reluctant 
compliance (NAPF 1993). But it should still be recognised that there have been major 
changes in corporate governance practices in the last 2/3 years (Conyon 1993).
In the USA it is the CEO who is normally responsible for appointments to the Board 
(Ricardo-Campbell 1993) whereas in the UK it is normally the Chairman, but in both 
countries there would appear to be ‘little scope for shareholder participation in the 
nominations process21’ (Main 1993, p. 161). In both the USA and the UK it may be effectively
19 A  problem that Shonfield (1965, p .381) identifies in particular with the shareholder representatives sitting  
on the Aufsichtsrat board o f  German companies, because i f  these shareholder representatives are to be skilled  
in controlling executive managers, they w ill themselves need to be good managers; in which case they are 
more likely to align themselves with the firm's management than act as effective monitors, a contradiction 
also recognised by Berle (1954). More recently and in the U K  Korn/Ferry (1992) found that most N E D s are 
also serving on the main boards o f  other companies and nearly one-third o f  the Chairmen o f  the U K 's largest 
listed companies had previously been full-time executives o f  the company, suggesting that N E D s are 
overw helm ingly a member o f  the management elite and will both personally identify with the issues being  
faced by executive members o f  the board and share many o f  their values in comm on. A  problem also 
recognised by Cadbury (1993b, p .8), w ho comments 'On the one hand w e require directors to have enough  
knowledge o f  the business to know what is going on. On the other w e require them to stand far enough back 
from the day-to-day management o f  the business to maintain their objectivity1.
20 See Cadbury (1993a, 1993b) for a personal summary o f  the Code (Cadbury Committee 1992b) by the 
Committee Chairman.
21 According to PIRC's research, a majority o f  FT-SE 100 companies have at least one position on the board 
which is insulated from regular election by shareholders (Simpson 1993).
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impossible for a director to be appointed without the support of the incumbent board, as 
Gillibrand (1993) found with Chloride and Monks with Sears Robuck. In many respects it is 
difficult to disagree with Harbrecht & Berle (1960, pi 1) that it is a ‘myth that the directors 
were elected by the stockholders though the undeniable fact is that they have been chosen by 
their predecessor directors as vacancies occurred for the last 30 or 40 years’ (quoted in 
Schonfield (1965, p.379), although there has been a marked shift in the composition of US 
boards towards outside directors (Lear 1984) and this has also happened more recently in the 
UK (Korn/Ferry 1992).
Some commentators argue that merely by agreeing to join the board of a company, and 
because of their underlying reasons for doing so, NEDs have sacrificed their independence 
from the company (Bacon 1988). But it should be noted that the unitary board structure of 
UK companies places less emphasis on the difference between executive and non-executive 
directors, than the German system of two-tier boards and the US emphasis on ‘inside’ and 
‘outside’ directors.
A proposal that the executive and non-executive director roles should be different in the first 
draft of the Cadbury Code was fiercely resisted by the Confederation of British Industry (CBI 
1992), the IOD (Morgan 1992) and others (Goodman (1993), Alexander (1990) and Jenkins 
(1993)) and did not appear in the final code (although specific roles are specified for NEDs on 
the Audit and Remuneration Committees). Hill (1993) found a high degree of consensus 
amongst both executive and Non-Executive directors that UK boards should be unitary and 
on the role of NEDs within the context of the structure and activities of the board (and its 
sub-committees).
In the USA, comprehensive attacks (Lorsch 1989, Lorsch & Lipton 1993, Mace 1986) have 
been made on the lack of independence of the boards of US companies and the corporate 
decline that some of these boards have overseen, often over a sustained period of time (for 
example, American Express, Westinghouse, Sears Roebuck, Eastman Kodak - Monks 
(1993)). Charkham (1988) calls this process ‘reciprocal mediocrity’ (p.767), in many cases 
the ‘slow slide in economic values’ Gordon (1993, p.36) being supported by internally 
generated reserves.
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How NEDs should be remunerated for their services is also a matter for debate. The ABI 
(1990) recommends that NEDs ‘should not, in normal circumstances, be offered participation 
in share option schemes, neither should they be entitled to any compensation on loss of office 
since such arrangements might impair their impartiality’, although how their interests should 
be most closely aligned with those of shareholders is not explained; in any case Trelawny 
(1993) believes that NEDs are ‘seriously’ underpaid for what they do. In contrast, and in 
respect of US outside directors, Geenan (1984) believed that, to precis, they are ‘paid too 
much for what they do, but not enough for what they should do’.
One of the problems for NEDs is the sources and availability of information, the ISC (1993a) 
stating that ‘it is important to ensure that throughout their period of office, NEDs have the 
same rights of access to information as executive directors’ (p.3). But this can be difficult 
when board meetings are controlled by the CEO and virtually all the information they receive 
is supplied by company personnel or special board committees (Winfrey 1993).
Directors are therefore likely to have considerable difficulty in knowing what information is 
not being made available to them and in any case do not wish to be seen as ‘trouble makers’ 
(Geenan 1984). In these circumstances, it can be difficult for directors to be sure that they are 
making the best business judgements and, in the USA, they may thereby be laying themselves 
open to litigation if they have not ensured that they are frilly informed before making a 
decision. However, and in contrast to the position in the USA, in the UK it is very difficult for 
shareholders to sue directors for failing in their fiduciary duties. Boyle (1987) feels that this is 
because the UK legal system lacks teeth to make directors accountable for their actions.
Meanwhile, Donaldson & Davis (1993) have raised the question of whether NED/outside 
directors make a difference to the performance of companies. After an extensive literature 
review they conclude that the case for NEDs is unproven. The studies they surveyed failed to 
yield consistent evidence in favour of NED/outside director dominated boards - in fact some 
studies show that executive boards are associated with superior performance and that they are 
no more likely to be associated with: bankruptcy, conglomerate diversification, under­
investment in R&D, corporate illegality or failure of fiduciary responsibility. Donaldson & 
Davis conclude that there ‘is no basis to prescribe that boards should be non-executive 
dominated’. As I have set out above, this is now the norm in the USA, fast becoming so in
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the UK and the governance role and professional independence of NEDs is a cornerstone of 
the Cadbury Code.
In my research interviews with company directors and Chairmen (executive and non­
executive) and fund managers, I investigated their views about the Cadbury Code and the role 
of NEDs, with specific reference to shareholders and the principle of the unitary board.
D Shareholder Communications
Regulators are keen that ‘price sensitive’ information is promptly disclosed to shareholders, 
other investors and the ‘market’ in general to avoid the creation of a ‘false market’ in a 
companies shares and decrease the period in which ‘inside’ information is not available to all 
market participants.
Companies listed on the London Stock Exchange are subject to continuing obligations to 
make routine disclosures to shareholders, including the publication of interim and preliminary 
results (so called ‘financial calendar’ announcements). They are also required to make non­
routine disclosures about proposed changes in the corporate and financial structure of the 
company, for example, rights issues, mergers and acquisitions. Such announcements are 
normally made through the Company Announcements Office of the Stock Exchange, and 
typically these are distributed through its electronic information service before stock exchange 
dealings start in the morning. Thus the information will be widely available to market makers, 
brokers and institutional investors and other information services when the market opens and 
large numbers of market participants will possess the same information.
As I discuss in Chapter 4, during 1993 companies became increasingly concerned that other 
types of information might be considered price sensitive and put out increasing quantities of 
information (in the form of extended announcements and press releases) through the Stock 
Exchange and other wire services, that would have been handled more informally in previous 
years. Profit warnings are announcements made to warn investors that current or near-term 
profitability is expected to fall below that previously indicated or public estimates being made 
by analysts.
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Given investors’ appetites for information, it is counter-intuitive that companies making 
advance announcements of falling profits should suffer a bigger decline in share price than 
those that 'surprise' the market with a later equivalent announcement (Kasznik & Lev 1993). 
This result suggests that investors penalise ‘good’ companies who provide forward 
information to their shareholders and effectively reward companies who keep ‘bad news’ 
private and for a longer period. Profit warnings are therefore not costless, and Kasznik & Lev 
found that the bigger the expectations gap being addressed by the companies which were 
‘advance communicators’, the worse investors reacted.
Despite this cost, managers may choose to alert investors early to signal their quality as 
managers (Trueman 1986) and thereby help protect their own position (management 
entrenchment) or avoid the threat of subsequent litigation, which could place personal 
liabilities on managers. Although Skinner (1992) failed to prove or reject these hypotheses, 
Frances, Philbrick & Skinner (1993) subsequently showed that in the USA early disclosure 
was not a deterrent to litigation and moreover, that firms involved in litigation tended to have 
made more disclosures (such as earnings announcements) than those not involved in 
litigation.
In the USA at least, the market fails to reward advance warning of'bad news' (made far more 
often than announcements of ‘good news’ (Skinner (1992)), possibly because investors 
believe that ‘there is no smoke without fire’ and that by making such announcements 
managers are self dealing in one way or another, rather than looking after the interests of their 
shareholders.
UK rules on the disclosure of price sensitive information which falls outside the continuing 
listing obligations require that the company itself makes the judgement about what 
information should be publicly disclosed, although Stock Exchange guidelines suggest that:
‘the more specific the information, the greater the risk of it being price sensitive. ... 
Companies which talk in general terms about their trading performance, prospects, 
strategy, and business environment, without providing financial figures are less likely 
to give price sensitive information but will assist the market in forming a more 
accurate impression o f the business’ (Stock Exchange 1993: my emphasis).
Chapter 2: Shareholder Influence & Governance 76
Companies need to walk something of a tightrope between these principles and even tighter 
legislation on the possession of inside information which came into effect on 1 March 1994 
(see Freshfields (1994) for a useful summary of the changes to the law under Part V of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1993).
These changes are occurring at a time when companies are increasingly looking to operate 
professional programmes of investor relations communications (see Sciteb (1993) for 
example). A number of leading industrialists have acted as figureheads (perhaps ‘bridgeheads’ 
would be a better description) for the improvement of industry/City communications - 
Toombs (1988, 1990) and Plastow (1990) being two of the most notable22. Pennie (1993) 
provides an interesting case history of a major US corporation undertaking its first 
shareholder meetings following a complex demerger.
In the UK, responsibility for investor relations often resides with the Finance Director, and the 
time involved in this has increased over the last five years23 according to Owen & Abell 
(1993). However it is perhaps not surprising that McBrides (1992) also found that Finance 
Directors considered the financial information contained in company annual reports to be 
more important than text-based descriptions of the company, products, services, performance 
and prospects.
Although formal (board level) responsibility may normally rest with Finance Directors, from 
my own research (see also Hill (1993)) it is clear that company Chairman and CEOs are also 
closely involved in ‘the merry-go-round of presentations, discussions and lunches’ 
(Holdsworth 1988), in keeping with Thompson’s belief that (for US companies) the whole 
board of a company should be involved in investor relations and that contact with 
shareholders should not always be delegated to the company's investor relations management 
group (Thompson 1993).
22 Another link between Sdteb, Toombs and Plastow is that all are concerned with the relationships and 
communications between engineering and technology-based companies, many o f which have high levels o f  
R&D expenditure. Representing institutional investors, the ISC (1992) has made recommendations to 
companies about their disclosure of R&D expenditure, reinforcing suggestions that in terms o f  information  the 
interests o f  shareholders and companies are becoming more aligned.
23 But is expected to remain stable over the next five.
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From my research interviews in the UK and USA it appears that the commitment of a 
significant amount of their time by company Chairmen and CEOs is more widespread in the 
UK24 than in the US. Melcher & Oster (1993) claim that, in the USA, institutional investors 
and corporations ‘are getting closer together’ and Pincus (1986) gives an intriguing one 
company example of the benefits improved company investor communications can bring, 
suggesting that an improved flow of information reduces investor risk and will thereby help 
increase the value placed on the company by investors.
E Analysts
Holdsworth (1988) makes the observation that there is ‘a continuous drip-feed of information 
to the market’ (p. 13) through frequent contact between companies on the one hand and 
investors and analysts on the other. The latter are singled out by Jacomb25 (1990) who says 
‘one of the most satisfactory means of communication is through investment analysts ... 
[who] are independent and their primary responsibility to investors. They have no particular 
axe to grind since their reputation depends on the successful interpretation of a company's 
results and prospects’ (p.56). Lavery (1988) suggests that analysts serve as effective middle­
men in the information flow between companies and investors and add great value in the 
process. But these beliefs were not widely shared by the fund managers that I interviewed 
(see Chapter 5).
Investors and analysts say that the most important influence on their judgement of a company 
is the quality and strength of management (Worcester 1990), and the most important 
component of this is the past (track) record of the management team and their assessment of 
the personal performance of executive directors and senior managers at meetings. However, 
restrictions on factual information disclosure at these meetings means that they are largely 
concerned with prospects, strategy, and business environment (Stock Exchange 1993), as I 
confirm in Chapters 4 and 5. Whatever the claimed utility of 'independent' analysts to the 
investment community, major companies and institutional investors place great emphasis on 
direct contact. In the USA it is claimed26 that conference calls to analysts are the 'vehicle of
24 In a case description o f  aspects o f B T ’s investor relations activities Merrill (1987) also confirms the need for 
commitment at this level.
23 At that time Chairman o f  BZW, so this is not a comment without vested interest itself.
26 Wall Street Journal 25 August 1993 p.C 2.
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choice' when companies wish to disclose ‘bad news’ (of the kind investigated by Kasznick & 
Lev (1993)).
The ‘value-added’ by analysts (particularly to the larger institutional investors) is also 
challenged by Taylor (1990), who believes that the low profitability and lack of a clear 
corporate strategy for their analysts' research product by brokers (many being members of 
large integrated investment houses) promotes ‘a herd mentality, encouraging] 
overproduction of reports that are frequently useless, and places strong pressure on analysts 
to work towards other forms of revenue for the firms, notably in the corporate finance arm’ 
(p.vii) which is more profitable than mainstream broking activities.
The loss of independence and increasing concerns about the quality of analysts' output 
(reports, presentations, meetings, telephone briefings) and also their lack of availability during 
corporate finance activities (for example; M&A, capital raising, about which there is growing 
awareness (Davis 1989)) is a major reason for the development of in-house research 
capability in the larger institutional investors. Although Arnold, Moizer & Noreen (1983) - an 
unpublished study quoted in Marsh (1990) - found that both UK and US analysts claimed to 
use multi-year horizons when making earnings forecasts, UK companies and US and UK fund 
managers that I interviewed believe that US analysts are now of generally higher quality.
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IV SUMMARY
In this Chapter I have reviewed how shareholders' rights may be used to influence managerial 
behaviour. Evidence about the value of voting power to shareholders is mixed; partly because 
opportunities for using this power are typically limited to relatively routine and non-strategic 
matters27. In the UK, levels of voting by institutional shareholders apparently increased in the 
early 1990s, but still only around one-third of available votes are cast, despite the many 
factors leading to the institutionalisation of share ownership in the UK and the legal control of 
UK and overseas fund managers over shares equivalent to around 80% of total stock market 
capitalisation.
In most companies, most shareholders’ voting rights, most of the time, are indeed ‘residual’. 
In addition to the low incidence of strategically important issues on which to vote, ownership 
is relatively dispersed and most shareholders do not expect their voting decisions to make any 
impact on the final voting outcome. Exceptions to this pattern of the trivialisation of voting 
rights and power occur, firstly, when a single shareholder or small group of shareholders 
control either a majority stake or a minority holding of the order of 30% or, secondly, a group 
of investors with far lower levels of holdings between them work together to exercise some
27 There are no hard and fast rules about which voting issues are considered "routine1 and those which are 
considered "non-routine' and only occasionally (for example a merger, major acquisition or a rights issue) are 
any o f  the latter linked to an issue o f  genuine strategic importance to the future o f  the company. Mallin (1995) 
classifies the most comm only found resolutions as follow!;:
Routine:
Approving auditors and their fees
Approving financial statements
Ratifying the proposed dividend
Approving a dividend reinvestment scheme
Authorising share repurchase
Authorising the issue o f  summary financial statements
Electing directors (but not always)
Non-routine
Authorising issue o f stock 
Dis-applicatiou o f  pre-emption rights 
Amending employee share plan 
Amending the articles 
Executive stock options 
Approving a merger 
Approving an acquisition 
Reduction o f shareholder rights 
Combined role o f  CEO and Chairman 
Directors' service contracts
This classification is very similar to that previously drawn up by the Investor Responsibility Research Centre 
(1993).
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control over companies by forming voting ‘coalitions’ of mutual interest. In certain 
circumstances, such groups of investors, typically consisting of companies’ largest 20 
shareholders but with holdings as little as 10% of a company’s shares between them, may be 
able to exercise effective voting control over a company - through the lack of interest of 
other shareholders in the voting process or ambivalence about the voting outcome (leading to 
non-voting or abstentions) or a diversity of views are held by other shareholders, which 
allows a coordinated coalition to determine the voting outcome.
However, in terms of boardroom representation, such coalitions seem to only be weakly and 
unsystematically represented. Thus the coalition model of shareholder control describes the 
irregular use of shareholder power rather than continuous influence over those strategic 
choices and boardroom decisions made by companies but which do not require formal 
shareholder approval.
The implications of these findings are that the degree to which managers pursue strategies 
favourable to shareholders substantially depends on managers’ own definitions of and beliefs 
about what constitutes acceptable behaviour, because many of their actions as managers and 
decisions as directors and senior executives will not be constrained by law or regulatory 
authorities on the one hand or shareholders on the other.
The outcome for shareholders therefore substantially depends on a delicate balance between 
mechanisms aligning the personal interests of managers to shareholders (the agency model of 
manager shareholder relationships) and the desire of managers to appropriate corporate 
wealth and earnings for their own ends (managerialism).
As voting mechanisms normally only provide shareholders with weak and uncertain power to 
influence incumbent management, two significant questions need to be asked. The first is 
whether shareholders, particularly institutional investors, exercise influence or strategic 
control over the companies in which they invest in other ways. The second is if alternative 
mechanisms are used, whether these require the formation of coalitions of the size envisaged 
by Scott.
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What is clear is that a substantial body of research supports the managerialist model, that 
managers will shirk, entrench their personal positions, and make private gains at the expense 
of shareholders. However, there are occasions where the ownership structure of the firm, 
problems of collective choice, and investor cooperation and coordination mean that 
shareholders are unable to effectively address this problem. The weight of evidence suggests 
that investors respond rationally to managerial behaviour, through the stock market, and price 
companies accordingly when managers are in a position to shirk or self-serve to the detriment 
of shareholder wealth.
In reviewing research in this area, it is important to realise that there are important differences 
in the way that shareholder power can be exercised in the UK compared with the USA. These 
include, in the UK, first, the almost universal respect for pre-emption rights and the principle 
of one share one vote, which together serve to maintain ownership equalities and continuity 
of ownership and shareholder influence. In the USA, the widespread adoption of poison pill 
defences and payment of greenmail to selected shareholder groups underlines very important 
differences between the two markets.
Secondly, in the UK, shareholders are able to coordinate their actions and communicate 
relatively informally with the only major constraints relating to the receipt of inside 
information and the rules surrounding the formation of concert parties (at an ownership level 
of 30%). In the USA, institutional shareholders have been severely constrained in their ability 
to act together, a regulatory burden that has only been lightened recently.
In the UK, the introduction of the Cadbury Code has provided a formal code of corporate 
governance, but Shareholder Protection Committees organised to formally coordinate the 
interests and influence of institutional shareholders, are now almost a thing of the past.
Mechanisms for the exercising of this influence need to be distinguished from the flow of 
information between companies and the investment community and the roles of non­
executive directors. These seldom have any formal relationships with shareholders but, 
according to the model set out in the Cadbury Code of corporate governance, are 
nevertheless are seen as representing the interests of shareholders. On behalf of shareholders 
non-executive directors are positioned to act as a kind of iong-stop’ on the actions and
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decision-taking processes of executive directors. This approach to corporate governance 
structure does not necessarily sit easily with either the unitary structure of UK boards or the 
concentration of institutional ownership found in many UK listed companies.
It is striking how many of the models of corporate, managerial and shareholder behaviour 
reviewed in this Chapter are based on assumptions about the way that shareholders and 
companies relate to each other and not empirical observation or research. What is missing is a 
description of how relationships between companies and shareholders are conducted in 
different circumstances, how key elements of these relationships change when shareholders 
seek to influence companies, and other factors which influence both company and shareholder 
behaviour in response to changing conditions.
This thesis sets out to answer these questions, through an empirical study of how companies 
and shareholders behave the way they do in the 'normal1 course of events (Chapters 4 and 5) 
and how shareholders work together in other than normal circumstances, when one or more 
of them believe that some form of active shareholder influence or intervention is required 
(Chapters 6 and 7).
The next Chapter (3) describes how the nature of share ownership in the UK has been 
changing in the UK over different periods, across the stock market as a whole as well as for 
sample groups of companies. This data underlines the steady rise in the ownership of shares 
by financial institutions and the narrowing of investment portfolios by many of the UK's 
largest fund managers, enabling internal resources to be increasingly focused on higher levels 
of corporate monitoring.
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In this Chapter, I analyse the ownership of 300 of the largest UK listed companies and 
the UK equity portfolios of the largest 50 fund managers investing in UK shares.
A Sources of information
The following sources of information have been used:
1 Government surveys
Since 1963, these have been undertaken and/or coordinated by the Office of National 
Statistics (ONS)1 on behalf of the Government, official committees (Diamond, Wilson) 
and also in association with the Stock Exchange and Proshare2. The most recent survey 
was published in 1995, providing the results of research undertaken in the last quarter of 
1994 by Fulcrum Research. This and the previous nine surveys were variously 
undertaken to provide estimates of share ownership by type of beneficial owner (the 
principle groups being pension funds, insurance companies and private investors) which 
would provide information about: the ownership of equities which could be compared 
with other official sources of information about the assets of pension funds and insurance
companies; changes in the structure of personal financial assets; and the development of
7
private share ownership in the UK (1981 survey onwards). The results of these surveys 
are reviewed in Section II.
2 Gavin Anderson
Gavin Anderson is an investor relations consultancy based in the City of London which 
provides a ‘ShareTrak’ service to listed companies. ShareTrak monitors the holdings of 
fund managers and compares these to their total investment (market shares) in the UK 
stock market. Information about the latter is obtained through questionnaires 
supplemented with other sources as required. ShareTrak has provided values of the UK 
equity portfolios of the largest 50 (‘Top 50’) institutional investors for the end of each 
year 1989 - 1995. This data is analysed in Section III.
1 Previously called the Central Statistical Office (CSO).
Chapter 3 - Share Ownership 87
3 Citywatch
This company specialises in the analysis of company share registers and has provided a 
database of approximately 34,000 institutional shareholdings in 297 of the largest UK 
companies (referred to as the ‘Top 300’ from this point). This data has been analysed to 
determine the structure of the equity portfolios of the Top 50 fund managers (Section 
IV) as well as the ownership of the Top 300 companies (Section V). The companies 
analysed ranged in market capitalisation from £32 billion (Glaxo Welcome) to £151 
million (Hickson) and in aggregate accounted for 82.6% of market capitalisation at the 
end of January 1996, the reference month for the Citywatch data3. Table 1.1 compares 
the profile of the Citywatch companies with the whole of the stockmarket at 31 
December 1995.
Table 1.1: Comparison of Top 300 companies with profile of Stock M arket
Stock
market
% Market value ‘Top 300’ 
companies
% market
Over £2 bn 90 67.7 83 92.0
£1 - 2 bn 67 10.5 67 100.0
£500 m - £ 1 bn 80 6.6 59 73.8
£100 m - £500m 422 10.7 88 20.1
Below £100 m 1,243 4.5 - 0.0
Total 1,893 100.0 297 15.6
Sources: Stock Exchange & Citywatch4 
4 Non-financial shareholdings
The Citywatch database only includes fund manager shareholdings and therefore 
excludes shareholdings controlled by commercial companies, directors, private trusts, 
families, charities and others. Information about these has been obtained from a number 
of sources, including the February 1996 edition of Company REFS (published by 
Hemmington Scott), Annual Reports and direct contact with Company Secretaries and 
Investor Relations Managers.
2 A private shareholder organisation financially supported by the Stock Exchange and DTI.
3 Data sources: Market capitalisations, Company REFS, February 1996; Market value, Stock Exchange 
Quality of Markets fact sheet, January 1996.
4 As the Citywatch data included all the FTSE 100 companies listed at the end of January 1996, the 
reason for difference between the number of Citywatch and stockmarket companies with market 
valuations above £2 billion is not entirely clear. Possible reasons include: differing treatments of the 
largely US owned SmithKline Beecham Equity Units and also HKSB’s HK$ denominated shares, which 
were excluded from the Citywatch sample as these duplicate £ denominated shares; the timing of 
takeovers; and differences in market capitalisation around the £2 billion point between 31 December 
1995 and end-January 1996.
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As indicated in Section I (Introduction), this Chapter is essentially an analysis of 
investment concentration. Section I, uses ONS data to describe the increasing dominance 
of the UK stock market by professional fund managers. In 1963, these accounted for an 
estimated 36% of the stock market, by the end of 1994 their holdings accounted for 76% 
of the market.
In Section II, the Gavin Anderson data shows that the largest 50 fund managers (‘Top 
50’) in each year 1989 - 1995 have consistently accounted for 50% or more of the value 
of the stock market. During this period market capitalisation increased some 75%, from 
£514 million to £900 million. Whilst the ‘market share’ of the Top 50 fund managers 
appears to have remained more or less constant over the seven year period, the value of 
the Top 50 fund managers’ holdings has increased by close to £200 billion.
However, these fund managers are not a homogenous group in terms of either their size 
or investment strategy. For example, at the end of 1995, the holdings of MAM 
accounted for approximately 4% of the stock market, the average market share of the 
Top 10 fund managers (including MAM) was just over 2%, the average for the Top 20 
around 1.5% and the Top 50 almost exactly 1%. These figures provide a clear indication 
of concentration in the ownership of shares in the UK, but a weakness of this kind of 
‘absolute share’ data is that it does not take into account the relative positions of those 
fund managers ranked amongst companies’ largest shareholders. This issue is particularly
' I
important when trying to understand the potential for active company-specific 
relationships (coalitions) between companies’ biggest shareholders. These relationships 
are likely to be different if the Top 20 shareholders all have equal shares (of say 2.5% 
each, totalling 50%) than if the largest shareholder controls close to 8% and the Top 5 
around 25% between them5.
5 This is part of the profile of the ‘Modal Company’ described in more detail in Section VI.
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Lorenz curves are used in this Chapter to chart the relationships between the 
shareholdings o f companies Top 20 fund manager shareholders, which on average 
control 47% of the shares o f the Top 300 companies6. The format for a Lorenz curve is 
that cumulative shareholdings are calculated. If all shareholdings are equal, the Lorenz 
curve will be a straight line. If  shareholdings are unequal the curve will be convex, the 
extent of the convexity reflecting the degree of inequality between shareholdings.
The Lorenz curve can provide a strong visual indication o f the relationship between fund 
managers and shareholders, for example - see Chart 1.2.
Chart 1.2 Examples o f Lorenz curves for the top 200 shareholdings 
o f Hermes, MAM, Gartmore and M &G_______________________
Lorenz curves 
Largest 200 holdings
Hermes
 MAM
Gartmore
— M&G
6 This and all the other averages shown in this Chapter are simple numerical averages of the sample 
group and are not weighted by market capitalisation.
Chapter 3 - Share Ownership 90
However, it is desirable to have a more precise method to analyse shareholder profiles. 
The Gini Coefficient is a measure of the inequality between market shares. In the context 
of this study, when all shares are equal, the Gini Coefficient is 0 (for example, 20 
shareholdings of 2.5%, or 100 holdings of 1%).
The Gini Coefficient of inequality has been calculated using the following standard 
formula7:
Gini = 1- (2 (1/n (Si + S2 + .........+ S„-i + S„/2)))
Where: S = shareholding as proportion of the total of n holdings,
n = number of fund managers/shareholders
Using this formula, maximum inequality is 1.0.
The Gini Coefficient is normally used as a measure of income inequality because of the 
interests of governments and economists in measuring income dispersal and the degree of 
inequality between, for example, the richest and poorest deciles.
The values of Gini for fund managers’ shareholdings across their 200 largest investments, 
range from 0.231 (Hermes) to 0.791 (M&G), as shown in Chart 1.2. The values for Gini
for Hermes and M&G reflect the generally known characteristics of their portfolios.
' /
Around 85% of the Hermes portfolio is indexed against the FT All-share index of around 
900 companies. In contrast, M&G’s portfolio is actively managed, focuses on a much 
smaller number of companies and a relatively high proportion of holdings are 
substantially overweight. Gini provides a way of quantifying these differences and 
comparing fund managers’ portfolios and companies’ shareholders on a consistent basis.
Although Gini provides a useful measure of investor inequality, the market shares and 
shareholdings of fund managers are treated as being of equal importance. Thus a 
difference of 1% between the size of the 19th and 20th shareholders (out of the Top 20) 
has the same impact on the value of Gini as a 1% difference between the largest and 
second largest shareholder.
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However, the qualitative research described in Chapters 4 to 7 suggests that this is not 
necessarily the case, and it is a company’s largest shareholders which are most likely to 
respond to under-performance and seek to influence the board or company. This 
indicates that the relationships between fund manager shareholders8 and the companies in 
which they invest are influenced by: the actual size of their shareholdings; the size of 
their shareholdings relative to other investors; and their ranking on the share register.
If these factors are to be quantified, additional weighting must be given to the 
shareholdings of companies’ largest shareholders, reflecting their shareholder ranking. 
The Herfindahl index (H) provides a measure which recognises the disproportionate 
power of higher ranking market participants and is calculated as the sum of the squares 
of the shares9. The shares are calculated in the same way as used for the Gini Coefficient 
(above).
When shares are equal, the value of H will be 1/n10. The maximum value for H is 1.0 and 
the values for the Top 300 companies analysed by Citywatch ranged from 0.055 (Reckitt 
& Coleman) to 0.394 (Bank of Scotland11).
The analysis of share ownership set out in this Chapter shows that a number of measures
of share ownership (absolute shareholdings, Gini and Herfindahl Index) are useful in
/
assessing the relationships between fund malnagers and the companies in which they 
invest. There appear to be very substantial differences between the equity portfolios of 
the Top 50 fund managers, which the ShareTrak data shows account for half the total 
capitalisation of the Stock Market.
7 This form of Gini corresponds to equation (10) in The New Pulgrave Dictionary of Economics (1987 
p.530). I am grateful to Dr Joanna Gomulka for her verification of this (see Acknowledgements).
8 For example, in a coalition.
9 These shares will only equal the actual % shareholding if all shareholders are included in the sample 
group. In this Chapter, only the 20 largest shareholdings in each company have been analysed. The 
share used in the calculation of Gini and the Herfindahl index is therefore as a % of the sum of the 
shareholdings of the sample group.
10 Ie. 0.05 for a sample of 20 fund managers/shareholders and 0.02 for a sample of 50.
11 The largest shareholder in the Bank of Scotland in January 1996 was Standard Life with 32.4%.
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There are also significant differences in the shareholder profiles of the Top 300 
companies, although these have also been used to develop the profile of a ‘modal’ 
company. The methodology used is set out in Section VI.
The analysis on non-fund manager (non-financial) shareholders (Section VII) uses data 
which is generally of lower quality than that obtained from Citywatch! Although there 
are formal requirements for the disclosure of directors and other shareholdings (at 3%) 
set out by the Companies Act and Stock Exchange Listing Rules, in practice companies 
interpret these in different ways and with varying levels of diligence12.
In Section VI, non-financial shareholders have been analysed if in January 1996 board 
holdings were 1% or more or other shareholders exceeded the 3% declaration level. 
Shareholdings have been classified as being; strategic (commercial), board, private, 
family, charitable, cross-holdings or government. A review of the ownership of the 110 
companies with non-financial shareholders passing one of the above thresholds suggests 
that strategic holdings in excess of 50% tend to be associated with below average fund 
manager shareholdings. This appears to be because shareholdings of this size reduce the 
‘free float’ of shares available to fund managers and other investors. Board stakes above 
10% are also associated with lower than average fund manager holdings and it appears 
that these can also be explained by a reduction in the free float.
A review of the relationship between company size and measures of shareholder 
concentration which excludes the 24 companies with strategic stakes over 50% and
12 The strength of the Citywatch analysis of company ownership is that the raw data is obtained directly 
from companies’ share registers and is therefore is not reliant on secondary disclosure by companies. 
However, a high proportion of the institutional shareholdings shown in company share registers are in 
nominee accounts. The use of these is widespread and extremely complex as institutional sliareholders 
typically operate a considerable number of nominee accounts and in most cases the names/designations 
of these cannot be directly related to either the controlling institutional investor or the underlying 
beneficiary. In addition, nominee accounts may be allocated to single clients (for example, an individual 
pension fund or investment trust) or to groups of clients (for example, all the investment trusts or private 
clients of the fund manager). Citywatch uses both computer programmes and a team of expert staff to 
monitor the use of nominee accounts by fund managers, in order to ensure that each holding on the 
share register is correctly allocated to the controlling institutional investor. This information is also 
matched against Section 212 notices issued by companies to identify the beneficial owners of 
shareholdings (the replies to which are a matter of public record) and the public information selectively 
provided by fund managers to clients and investors about their shareholdings. Keeping track of and 
reconciling these sources of information is very time consuming but essential if share registers are to be 
correctly analysed. I am therefore extremely very grateful to Citywatch for making the results of their 
analysis available to me.
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board holdings over 10% suggests an inverse relationship between company size and 
shareholder concentration.
The key findings from this Chapter are that both fund manager and company factors 
affect shareholder concentration and that this can usefully be measured in a number of 
ways. For most of the Top 300 companies analysed, their top 20 financial shareholders 
account for between one-third and half their issued shares. Amongst these investors the 
Top 20 fund managers are strongly represented, 13 of which were interviewed as the 
second component of my research (Chapters 4 to 7) into the relationship between 
shareholder ownership and influence on listed companies.
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Large scale studies13 of beneficial UK share ownership have been commissioned by the 
Central Statistical Office (CSO) annually since 1989, extending a series which began in 1963 
and which was undertaken at six to eight year intervals, until the current series began in 1989. 
The most recent survey was published in December 1995 and was based on share register 
data gathered at the end of 1994 by Fulcrum Research for the CSO.
When analysing this information, it is useful to separate the information published by the CSO 
(now the ONS) into two separate tables. Table n. 1 sets out the pattern of share ownership at 
sue to eight year intervals for the 31 year period 1963 - 1994. Table II.2 covers the sue year 
period 1989 - 1994. I have retabulated the results of the CSO surveys to clearly separate 
shares under the control of UK and overseas fund managers from those attributable to other 
types of investor.
The 31 year series (Table n. 1) shows that the proportion of equities under the control of UK 
fund managers has approximately doubled from 29% (1963) to around 60% (1994) over the 
period. This increase has been more or less mirrored by the decline in direct private ownership 
from 54% to 20.3%. However, the correspondence is not exact as, whilst UK institutions 
have increased by 30.8%, individual ownership has declined by 33.7%. Overseas, 
shareholders account for some of this difference, but the ‘other* category, which includes 
commercial cross-holdings and government holdings, has also declined (from 10.0% to 
3.6%).
The research by Fulcrum and ShareTrak (which carried out the share register analysis for the 
1992 and 1993 CSO surveys) indicates that a high proportion of the overseas holdings are 
under the control of professional fund managers and of these, approximately half are 
controlled by US-based investment funds. When holdings controlled by overseas fund 
managers are added to those for UK-based managers, the total increase since 1963 is from 
36.0% to 76.1%. On the basis of the 1994 survey, over three-quarters of the shares of UK 
listed companies are controlled by fund managers.
13 For the most recent survey (1994) Fulcrum analysed the beneficial ownership of 98,692 shareholdings 
in 207 companies.
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Beneficial Owner 1963 1969 1975 1981 1989 1994
Pension Funds 6.4 9.0 16.8 26.7 30.6 27.8
Insurance Companies 10.0 12.2 15.9 20.5 18.6 21.9
Unit Trusts 1.3 2.9 4.1 3.6 5.9 6.8
Investment Trusts 11.3 10.1 10.5 6.8 1.6 2.0
Other Financial Institutions 1.1 1.3
Total UK fund managers 29.0 34.2 47.3 57.6 57.8 59.8
Overseas Investors 7.0 6.6 5.6 3.6 12.8 16.3
Total fund managers 36.0 40.8 52.9 61.2 70.6 76.1
Individuals* 54.0 47.4 37.5 28.2 20.6 20.3
Others 10.0 11.8 9.6 10.6 8.8 3.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: CSO/ONS Surveys * Includes PEPs and employee share schemes 
1989 -1994
The pattern over the six year period 1989 - 1994 (Table 13.2) shows that in 1993 and 1994 
the long-term trend appears to have stabilised with respect to the proportion of shares 
controlled by the three largest groups; UK fund managers (around 60%), overseas investors 
(16%) and private shareholders (20.0%).
However, these figures almost certainly understate the level of control attributable to fund 
managers and overstate the role of private investors in the UK Stock Market. This is because 
the CSO surveys are of beneficial ownership and, for example, classify all PEP holdings as 
being attributable to individual investors. In practice, the majority of PEP funds are collective 
schemes operated by many of the same fund managers who are responsible for the 
management of pension funds, equity-based insurance funds, unit and investment trusts. 
Personal investment portfolios managed by private client stockbrokers are also included as 
individual holdings, although, as with PEPs, a proportion of these are managed on a 
discretionary basis and thus not under the personal control of the client or beneficiaries. 
Private discussions with Fulcrum, Gavin Anderson and the ONS suggest that reallocating 
PEP investments and private portfolios not under the direct control of the beneficiaries to 
fund managers would reduce the proportion of shares attributable to individuals to 17% -
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18% and correspondingly increase the total proportion of shares controlled by UK and 
overseas fund managers to around 80%.
Table II.2: Share ownership 1989 - 1994
Beneficial Owner 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Pension Funds 30.6 31.6 31.3 32.4 31.5 27.8
Insurance Companies 18.6 20.4 20.8 19.5 20.0 21.9
Unit Trusts 5.9 6.1 5.7 6.2 6.6 6.8
Investment Trusts 1.6 1.6 1.5 2.1 2.5 2.0
Other Financial Institutions 1.1 0.7 0.8 0.4 0.6 1.3
Total UK fund managers 57.8 60.4 60.1 60.5 61.2 59.8
Overseas Investors 12.8 11.8 12.8 13.1 16.3 16.3
Total fund managers 70.6 72.2 72.9 73.6 77.5 76.1
Individuals * 20.6 20.3 19.9 20.4 17.7 20.3
Others 8.8 7.5 7.2 6.0 4.8 3.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: CSO/ONS Surveys *Includes PEPs and employee share schemes
At the end of 1994, the value of the UK Stock Market was approximately £775 million. On 
the basis that around 80% of the market was controlled by fund managers at that time, the 
value of their UK equity portfolios totalled £620 million.
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III Top 50 Fund M anagers
Each year since 1989, Gavin Anderson has conducted a survey o f the major institutional 
investors in the UK Stock Market. The information obtained for the 50 largest fund 
managers (ranked for each year by value of their UK equity portfolios) is set out in 
Appendix A and summarised in Table III. 1.
T able III. 1 : V alue o f  Top 50 fund m ana gers equip y  portfolios (£  b illion)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Largest 17.6 21.9 21.0 24.5 31.7 38.0 38.0
Top 3 45.6 51.4 54.3 58.8 72.2 82.3 89.9
Top 5 66.8 71.4 77.5 84.3 109.2 116.2 127.6
Top 10 113.2 117.4 126.8 133.8 178.5 179.8 194.7
Top 20 169.6 176.0 198.7 212.2 275.8 271.1 293.4
Top 50 257.0 267.6 307.1 331.6 408.6 418.2 453.3
Market 514.9 450.5 536.3 624.4 810.1 774.6 900.3
Although takeovers have been leading to consolidation in the UK fund management 
industry14, this does not appear to be reflected in the share o f the market attributable to 
the Top 50 fund managers in the period 1989 - 1995 (Table III.2)
T able III.2 : M arket share o f Top 50 fund m anagers
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Largest 3.4 4.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 4.9 4.2
Top 3 8.9 11.4 10.1 9.4 8.9 10.6 10.0
Top 5 13.0 15.8 14.5 13.5 13.5 15.0 14.2
Top 10 22.0 26.1 23.6 21.4 22.0 23.2 21.6
Top 20 32.9 39.1 37.1 34.0 34.0 35.0 32.6
T op 50 49.9 59.4 57.3 53.1 50.4 54.0 50.3
Others 50.1 40.6 42.7 46.9 49.6 46.0 49.7
Total 100 0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Annual variations in the Gavin Anderson rankings and market share data may be 
attributable to the accuracy of information obtained from fund managers (effectively self- 
reporting), differences in timing and the way that portfolios are valued by the institutions 
involved. As described in Section II, pension funds are the biggest single source o f 
investment in the stock market. The Top 3 fund managers in 1989 were Prudential,
14 For example, the mergers of: Pearl/AMP; Scottish Mutual/Abbey National; Gartmore/NatWest; Hill 
Sam uel/ TSB and then Lloyds/TSB; BAT subsidiaries Eagle Star/Allied Dunbar to form Threadneedle; 
Axa/Equity & Law; BZW /W ells Fargo; Morgan Grenfell/Deutsche Bank; Royal Insurance/Sun Alliance.
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MAM and Schroders and are predominately pension fund managers. Although their 
rankings changed a number of times in the period 1990 - 1994, these were also the Top 3 
fund managers in 1995. The increase in market share of the Top 3 from 8.9% in 1989 to 
10.0% in 1995 represents a net gain of approximately £10 billion in funds under 
management. Correspondingly, other fund managers ranked in the Top 50 in 1989 have 
lost market share, an example being Henderson, which in 1989 had £4.3 invested in the 
stock market. This had risen to £5.4 billion in 1995, but if Henderson’s 1989 portfolio 
had maintained its relative value it would have been worth around £7.5 billion at the end 
of 1995. Press reports suggest that the bulk of Henderson’s £2.1 billion ‘shortfall’ was 
accounted for by the loss of pension fund management contracts (mandates) to fund 
managers such as Prudential, MAM and Schroders.
Chart III.3 illustrates the funds under management of the Top 50 fund managers 
investing in the UK Stock Market but, as suggested in Section I, this form of 
presentation makes it difficult to distinguish size effects (the Stock Market increased in 
value by 75% from 1989 to 1995) from structural changes in the relationships between 
fund managers.
In later Sections of this Chapter my analysis of fund manager portfolios focuses on the 
Top 20 fund managers. This group has been selected on the basis of their average 
shareholdings in Top 300 companies. Although there are a number of differences in the 
fund managers included in the latter group (based on Citywatch data) and the Gavin 
Anderson Top 20 (Appendix A), it is instructive to compare the profile of the Gavin 
Anderson Top 20 and Top 50 fund managers.
I have done this using Lorenz curves and through calculating the Gini values and 
Herfindahl Indices for the two groups of fund managers. A comparison of-the Lorenz 
curves shown in Chart III.5 (Top 20) Chart III.6 (Top 50) shows that the Top 50 curve 
is considerably more concave than that for the Top 20. This indicates that there is greater 
inequality in the market shares of those fund managers included in the Top 50 than those 
only appearing in the Top 20.
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The values of Gini quantify the relationship between these two groups o f fund managers 
(Table III.4) The values for Gini do not indicate a time trend (1989 - 1995), but this is 
suggested by the values for the Herfindahl Index, which is more sensitive to the market 
shares of the largest fund managers The values for 1994 and 1995 (average 0.0634) are 
higher for the period 1989 - 1993 (average 0.0593), suggesting that an increase in 
concentration has been taking place at the top o f the fund manager rankings. This is 
consistent with the aggregate gain in market share of 1.1% by Prudential, MAM and 
Schroders between 1989 and 1994.
Chart III.3; UK Equity portfolios (£ billion) of Top 50 fund managers (1989-1995)
UK Equity Funds under management 
Top 50 UK fund managers
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Table 111.4 Top 20/50 fund managers: concentration indicators15
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Gini (G i) FM20 0.23 0.24 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.24
Gini (Gi) FM50 0.35 0.35 0.33 0.33 0.37 0.34 0.34
Herfindahl FM20 0.059 0.062 0.058 0.059 0.058 0.064 0.063
Herfindahl FM50 0.030 0.031 0.029 0.029 0.031 0.031 0.031
15 Whereas the Gini values for the for the FM 20 and FM50 groups are directly comparable, this is not 
true for the Herfindahl Index. For example, i f  all the fund managers had equal market shares, the 
Herfindahl Index for the FM 20 group would be 0.05 and for the FM 50 group 0.02.
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Chart 111.6: Lorenz curves for Top 50 fund managers
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IV Investment portfolios of Top 50 fund managers
A Profile of Shareholdings
In this Section I analyse the holdings of institutional investors using information from the 
Citywatch database for January 1996. A total of 34,668 holdings were analysed (Table 
IV. 1).
Table IV. 1; Summary of shareholdings analysed
Shareholdings FT-SE 100 FT-SE 250 Total
>20.0% 2 10 12
15.0 - 19.9% 2 14 16
14.0 - 14.9% 1 12 13
13.0 - 13.9% 2 11 13
12.0 - 12.9% 5 10 15
11.0-11.9% 4 18 22
10.0 - 10.9% 5 20 25
9.0 - 9.9% 7 29 36
8.0 - 8.9% 5 33 38
7.0 - 7.9% 9 53 62
6.0 - 6.9% 17 67 84
5.0 - 5.9% 25 133 158
4.0 - 4.9% 54 168 222
3.0-3.9% 115 336 451
2.0 - 2.9% 309 679 988
1.0- 1.9% 1,002 2,148 3,150
0.5 - 0.9% 1,902 2,444 4,346
0.0 - 0.49% 11,594 12,998 24,592
Total 15,060 19,183 34,243
ADRs 63 56 119
Sepon 98 208 306
Total analysed 15,221 19,447 34,668
Of these shareholdings, only 116 (0.3%) of the total were over 10% and 6.3% (2,155 
shareholdings) over 1% - see Tables IV.2 and IV.3.
Table IV.2: Number of shareholdings by size
Shareholdings FT-SE 100 FT-SE 250 Total
> 10% 21 95 116
5.0 - 9.9% 63 315 378
3.0-4.9% 169 504 673
2.0 - 2.9% 309 679 988
1.0- 1.9% 1,002 2,148 3,150
0.5 - 0.9% 1,902 2,444 4,346
<0.5% 11,594 12,998 24,592
Total 15,060 19,183 34,243
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Table IV.3: Proportion of s tareholdings jy size
Shareholdings FT-SE 100 FT-SE 250 Total
> 10% 0.1% 0.5% 0.3%
5.0 - 9.9% 0.4% 1.6% 1.1%
3.0-4.9% 1.1% 2.6% 2.0%
2.0 - 2.9% 2.1% 3.5% 2.9%
1.0- 1.9% 6.7% 11.2% 9.2%
0.5 - 0.9% 12.6% 12.7% 12.7%
< 0.5% 77.0% 67.8% 71.8%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
B ADRs
Of the 34,668 holdings analysed, 119 were classified as American Depository Receipts 
(ADRs) for which no further information on the ownership was available from the 
Citywatch database. ADRs are a form of share ownership geared to the requirements of 
domestic US investors and investment funds16. It appears that those companies with the 
highest proportion of their shares in the form of ADRs are those with a substantial 
proportion of their business interests in the US (Table IV.5). However, in January 1996, 
only ten companies had ADRs equivalent to 10% or more of their issued share capital 
and two-thirds (65.3% - 77 companies) had ADRs equivalent to less than 1% of their 
issued shares (Table IV.4).
Table IV.4: Ana ysis of ADRs
ADR holding Companies %
>50% 1 0.8%
20 - 49.9% 3 2.5%
10- 19.9% 6 5.1%
5 - 9.9% 6 5.1%
3 - 4.9% 8 6.8%
2 - 2.9% 6 5.1%
1 - 1.9% 11 9.3%
< 1% 77 65.3%
Total 118 100.0%
16 ADRs are registered and traded in the US in US$ and often have rights equivalent to a multiple of the 
underlying shares (for example, one ADR being equivalent to three UK listed, £ denominated shares). 
ADR programmes are typically managed by US banks on behalf of UK companies to provide liquidity 
to their US shareholders and US investors, some of which are only able to purchase shares with US 
listings.
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Table IV.5: Companies with ADR holdings over 2%
Index Company Holding Ranking
1 FTSE250 Danka Business Systems 74.81 1
2 FTSE100 Vodafone Group 37.02 1
3 FTSE100 Reuters Holdings 26.86 1
4 FTSE250 Willis Corroon Group 25.53 1
5 FTSE100 Hanson 19.69 3
6 FTSE250 Medeva 16.46 1
7 FTSE100 BP 16.43 1
8 FTSE250 INVESCO 14.05 1
9 FTSE250 Nynex Cablecoinms 12.24 1
10 FTSE100 Glaxo Wellcome 10.21 1
11 FTSE100 British Airways 9.26
12 FTSE250 Cordiant 9.26 1
13 FTSE100 ICI 9.11
14 FTSE250 General Cable 8.86 1
15 FTSE100 British Steel 7.76
16 FTSE100 BSkyB Group 5.68 1
17 FTSE250 WPP Group 4.16 3
18 FTSE100 Rentokil Group 3.71 1
19 FTSE100 Zeneca Group 3.67 3
20 FTSE250 Telewest Communications 3.65 1
21 FTSE100 Cable & Wireless 3.57
22 FTSE100 Grand Metropolitan 3.45 1
23 FTSE250 Body Shop International 3.30 3
24 FTSE100 National Westminster Bank 3.00 4
25 FTSE100 LASMO 2.66 4
26 FTSE250 Lonrlio 2.56 2
27 FTSE250 SEEBOARD 2.27 6
28 FTSE100 Southern Electric 2.12 5
29 FTSE100 British Telecom 2.01 5
30 FTSE100 Cadbury Schweppes 2.00 6
C Sepon
Another 297 holdings were classified as Sepon (Stock Exchange Pooled Nominees). In 
January 1996 this acted as a holding account operated by the Stock Exchange for share 
transactions in progress17. Because of their role in Stock Exchange trading, Sepon 
accounts exist for every listed company, the average holding being 1.66%. 
Approximately half of all Sepon holdings were below 1% (Table IV.6). However, nine 
companies had Sepon holdings above 5% when their share registers were logged by 
Citywatch in January 1996 (Table IV. 7). As with ADRs, these unregistered holdings 
have been excluded from the analysis set out in rest of this Chapter.
17 Sepon is no longer used under the CREST system.
Chapter 3 - Share Ownership 104
Table IV.6 : Analysis of Sepon holdings
Companies %
5.0 - 9.9% 9 3.3%
4.0 - 4.9% 13 4.3%
3.0-3.9% 28 9.2%
2.0 - 2.9% 30 9.9%0sas1o 69 23.0%
Below 1.0% 148 49.3%
Total 297 100.0%
Tab e IV.7: Companies with Sepon holdings over 5%
Index Company Holding
1 FTSE250 London Merchant Securities 8.67
2 FTSE250 Welsh Water 7.41
3 FTSE250 First Leisure Corporation 7.32
4 FTSE 100 Williams Holdings 6.58
5 FTSE100 Reed International 6.10
6 FTSE250 Monument Oil and Gas 5.58
7 FTSE250 Stakis 5.33
9 FTSE250 Transport Development Group 5.03
D Fund manager portfolios
Table IV. 8 summarises the portfolios of the 50 largest fund managers investing in UK 
equities using data from the Citywatch database. Unlike the Gavin Anderson data, this 
analysis is not based on portfolio values but the average size of each fund managers’ 
holdings in the 297 companies included in the Citywatch database. The number and 
average shareholdings have been separately calculated for FTSE 100 companies (all of 
which were included in the Citywatch database) and those in the FTSE Mid-250 index 
(the maximum therefore being 197 companies out of 250). Table IV.8 sets out this 
information. The product of the number of companies in which the fund manager has 
stakes and the average shareholding is the weighted average holding for each index 
group (FTSE 100 and FT250)1*.
At the end of 1995, companies in the FTSE 100 index accounted for 75.5% of Stock 
Market capitalisation and those in the FTSE Mid-250 index 18.0%, a total of 93.5% of
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market capitalisation (Stock Exchange Fact Book 1996). For FTSE-350 companies 
alone, the proportional market values were therefore 80.7% (75.5/93.5) and 19.3% 
(18.0/93.5)
The aggregate value of the 297 companies comprising the Citywatch database was 
£774.9 billion at the end of January 1996 (Appendix G), equivalent to 84.5% of market 
capitalisation at that time (Table IV. 8) and the proportional values for FTSE 100 
companies (80.5%) and FTSE 250 companies (19.5%) were very close to those 
calculated for the market as a whole at the end of December 1995.
Table IV.8: Value of Citywatch companies
Companies Value (£ million) Proportion
FTSE 100 623,585 80.5%
FTSE 250 151,293 19.5%
Total Citywatch 
Top 300'
774,878 100.0%
Stock market 917,300 84.5%
The Citywatch ratio (80.5:19.5) has been used to calculate the weighted average holding 
for the holdings of the largest (by average size of shareholdings) 50 fund managers 
included in the Citywatch database (Table IV.8). The aggregate market shares of the 
Largest and Top 3, 5, 10, 20 and 50 fund managers shown in Table IV.8 closely with 
those calculated using the Gavin Anderson end 1995 survey of portfolio values (Table 
IV.9).
Table IV.9 Fund managers’ share of Stock Market value: 
Comparison of Gavin Anderson survey and Citywatch data
Gavin Anderson 
(end 1995)
Citywatch 
(Jan 1996)
Largest 4.2 4.5
Top 3 10.0 10.6
Top 5 14.2 14.9
Top 10 21.6 22.7
Top 20 32.6 32.7
Top 50 50.3 47.9
18 For fund managers with the maximum number of holdings in each index group the average and 
weighted average holdings will therefore be identical (for example, Prudential, BZW, Legal & General 
and Hennes).
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FT-SE 100 FT-SE 250 Weighted
Rank Fund manager Number Avg. % Weighted
average
Number Avg. % Weighted
average
Top 300
1 MAM 100 4.66 4.66 196 4.03 4.01 4.53
2 Prudential 100 3.03 3.03 197 3.44 3.44 3.11
3 Schroder 97 2.93 2.84 194 3.26 3.21 2.91
4 Standard Life 99 2.50 2.48 159 2.23 1.80 2.34
5 PDFM 99 1.84 1.82 196 2.72 2.71 1.99
6 BZW 100 1.91 1.91 197 1.95 1.95 1.92
7 Legal & General 100 1.78 1.78 197 1.85 1.85 1.79
8 Hermes 100 1.52 1.52 197 1.55 1.55 1.53
9 Threadneedle 97 1.39 1.35 94 2.19 1.04 1.29
10 Fleming 98 1.21 1.19 194 1.66 1.63 1.27
11 Gartmore 98 1.12 1.10 195 1.99 1.97 1.27
12 M&G 80 1.16 0.93 123 2.95 1.84 1.11
13 Scottish Widows 83 1.46 1.21 113 1.02 0.59 1.09
14 Morgan Grenfell 99 0.94 0.93 195 1.26 1.25 0.99
15 Norwich Union 83 1.27 1.05 122 0.93 0.58 0.96
16 AMP 89 1.04 0.93 134 1.56 1.06 0.95
17 CIN 80 1.27 1.02 55 2.01 0.56 0.93
18 Sun Life IM 88 1.11 0.98 129 1.03 0.67 0.92
19 ESN 97 0.95 0.92 154 1.08 0.84 0.91
20 Co-operative Ins. 98 0.86 0.84 179 1.16 1.05 0.88
21 NatWest 100 0.83 0.83 194 0.88 0.87 0.84
22 Sun Alliance 96 0.84 0.81 134 1.00 0.68 0.78
23 HSBC 100 0.75 0.75 196 0.80 0.80 0.76
24 Hill Samuel 98 0.76 0.74 173 0.92 0.81 0.76
25 Scottish Amicable 98 0.74 0.73 121 0.93 0.57 0.70
26 Royal Insurance 99 0.67 0.66 195 0.67 0.66 0.66
27 Equitable Life 94 0.69 0.65 137 0.90 0.63 0.64
28 Friends Provident 96 0.58 0.56 163 1.04 0.86 0.62
29 Universities SSS 98 0.60 0.59 197 0.52 0.52 0.57
30 Lloyds 100 0.55 0.55 175 0.74 0.66 0.57
31 Baring 83 0.63 0.52 118 1.19 0.71 0.56
32 Clerical Medical 83 0.56 0.46 123 1.44 0.90 0.55
33 British Gas PF 95 0.60 0.57 109 0.80 0.44 0.55
34 GRE 96 0.59 0.57 103 0.78 0.41 0.54
35 Shell PF 97 0.53 0.51 196 0.52 0.52 0.51
36 General Accident 71 0.79 0.56 71 0.79 0.28 0.51
37 BP Pension Fund 97 0.52 0.50 156 0.62 0.49 0.50
38 Axa Equity & Law 95 0.54 0.51 96 0.79 0.38 0.49
39 Sun Life Canada 71 0.63 0.45 66 1.95 0.65 0.49
40 Newton 94 0.45 0.42 137 0.71 0.49 0.44
41 Abu Dhabi 61 0.75 0.46 41 1.49 0.31 0.43
42 Baillie Gifford 49 0.74 0.36 85 1.55 0.67 0.42
43 Henderson 97 0.34 0.33 165 0.64 0.54 0.37
44 Capital 39 0.92 0.36 35 1.07 0.19 0.33
45 National Provident 83 0.38 0.32 83 0.77 0.32 0.32
46 Cazenove 93 0.33 0.31 153 0.39 0.30 0.31
47 Kleinwort 98 0.31 0.30 196 0.26 0.26 0.30
48 Fidelity 65 0.30 0.20 101 1.16 0.59 0.27
49 Singapore 86 0.29 0.25 85 0.40 0.17 0.23
50 Foreign & Colonial 84 0.23 0.19 58 0.60 0.18 0.19
All Average 90 1.03 0.95 142 1.32 0.99 0.96
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Although there is a close similarity in my analysis of the Gavin Anderson and Citywatch 
data, four fund managers ranked in the top 20 by Gavin Anderson (Appendix A) have 
significantly lower rankings on the basis of the information obtained by Citywatch from 
company share registers. The four fund managers are the State investment funds of Abu 
Dhabi, Kuwait (KIO), Saudi Arabia (SAMA) and Singapore. My analysis of the 
Citywatch data places Abu Dhabi in 41st place and Singapore in 49th position, with the 
KIO and SAMA ranked outside the Top 5019
When the four State funds are excluded from the Gavin Anderson rankings for the Top 
20 fund managers for (Appendix A.2), there is a close relationship between the Gavin 
Anderson and Citywatch rankings for end 1995 - January 1996 (Table IV. 10). Although 
there are differences in ranking positions with the Top 20, the only difference between 
those included in the Citywatch and Gavin Anderson Top 20 rankings is that Citywatch 
places Co-op Insurance in 20th and NatWest in 21st positions and these are reversed by 
Gavin Anderson.
Table IV .ll: Fund manager rankings
Rank Citywatch Gavin Anderson
1 MAM MAM
2 Prudential Prudential
3 Schroder Schroder
4 Standard Life PDFM
5 PDFM Standard Life
6 BZW BZW
7 Legal & General Legal & General
8 Hermes Hermes
9 Threadneedle Gartmore
10 Fleming Threadneedle
11 Gartmore Norwich Union
12 M&G Scottish Widows
13 Scottish Widows Fleming
14 Morgan Grenfell M&G
15 Norwich Union AMP
16 AMP CIN
17 CIN ESN
18 Sun Life IM Morgan Grenfell
19 ESN Sun Life IM
20 Co-operative Ins. NatWest
19 The differences in these rankings of the four State funds may be due to a number of reasons, the most 
likely being that some of the funds attributable to the four State funds by Gavin Anderson have been 
allocated to domestic fund managers by Citywatch.
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E Size of shareholdings
Across the 297 companies in the Citywatch database, the Top 20 fund managers account 
for 5,128 holdings (Table IV. 12), equivalent to 87.2% of the maximum of 5,940 (297 
companies x 20 fund managers). This compares with an average of 77.8% for the Top 50 
fund managers (calculated from Table IV. 10, the average number of shareholdings being 
232), confirming the tendency evident in Table IV. 10 for smaller fund managers to hold 
shares in a smaller number of companies.
Ta ble IV.12: Top 20 fund managers shareholdings by size (num )er of companies)
% shareholdings <0.5 0 .5 -0 .9 1.0- 1.9 2.0-2 .9 3 .0 -4 .9 5 .0 -9 .9 > 10.0
1 MAM 37 36 49 35 52 58 37
2 Prudential 50 15 36 40 93 70 2
3 Schroder 89 26 29 37 48 43 19
4 Standard Life 14 16 91 91 44 2 0
5 PDFM 142 35 39 26 22 23 21
6 BZW 2 17 181 82 26 2 0
7 Legal & General 8 19 185 79 20 1 0
8 Hermes 5 23 270 10 2 0 1
9 Threadneedle 44 38 56 23 21 7 2
10 M&G 81 21 36 11 28 18 8
11 Fleming 103 56 60 26 33 11 3
12 Gartmore 115 46 52 28 26 24 3
13 CIN 14 28 57 26 9 1 0
14 Scottish Widows 67 39 49 25 13 3 0
15 AMP 54 48 72 34 14 2 0
16 Norwich Union 91 31 49 19 10 5 0
17 Morgan Grenfell 127 59 61 25 17 9 1
18 Sun Life IM 82 49 52 20 11 3 0
19 ESN 21 106 113 9 0 0 0
20 Co-operative Ins 62 102 91 15 6 0 1
Totals 1,208 810 1,628 661 495 282 98
Of the 5,128 shareholdings, 2,018 (38.9%) are smaller than 1% and 3,164 (61.7%) 
larger than 1%. (Table IV. 13). There are marked differences in the profile of fund 
managers holdings in Top 300 companies. The Top 20 fund managers account for more 
than two thirds (66.9%) of holdings over 2.0% and three quarters (73.6%) of all 
holdings over 3.0% (Table IV. 13).
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All holdings Top 20 FMs Proportion
> 10% 116 98 84.5%
5.0 - 9.9% 378 282 74.6%
3.0-4.9% 673 495 73.6%
2.0 - 2.9% 988 661 66.9%
1.0- 1.9% 3,150 1,628 51.7%
0.5 - 0.9% 4,346 810 18.6%
<0.5% 24,592 1,208 4.9%
Total 34,243 5,182 15.1%
Whilst 12.3% of MAM’s holdings are above 10.0%, no other fund manager approaches 
this proportion of holdings above 10.0% (Table IV. 14). Other fund managers are notable 
for having more than 15% of their holdings above the 3% level. In addition to MAM, 
these include Prudential, Schroder, Standard Life, PDFM, Threadneedle, M&G, Fleming 
and Gartmore.
Ta )le IV.14: Analysis of Top 20 fund managers’ shareholdings
< 1.0% > 1.0% > 3.0% > 5.0% > 10.0%
1 MAM 24.0 76.0 48.4 31.3 12.2
2 Prudential 21.2 78.8 53.9 23.5 0.7
3 Schroder 39.5 60.5 37.8 21.3 6.5
4 Standard Life 11.6 88.4 17.8 0.8 0.0
5 PDFM 57.5 42.5 21.4 14.3 6.8
6 BZW 6.1 93.9 9.0 0.6 0.0
7 Legal & General 8.7 91.3 6.7 0.3 0.0
8 Hermes 9.0 91.0 1.0 0.3 0.3
9 Threadneedle 42.9 57.1 15.7 4.7 1.0
10 Fleming 54.5 45.5 16.1 4.8 1.0
11 Gartmore 54.8 45.2 18.0 9.2 1.0
12 M&G 50.2 49.8 26.6 12.8 3.9
13 Scottish Widows 54.1 45.9 8.2 1.5 0.0
14 Morgan Grenfell 62.2 37.8 9.0 3.3 0.3
15 Norwich Union 59.5 40.5 7.3 2.4 0.0
16 AMP 45.5 54.5 7.1 0.9 0.0
17 CIN 31.1 68.9 7.4 0.7 0.0
18 Sun Life IM 60.4 39.6 6.5 1.4 0.0
19 ESN 51.0 49.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
20 Co-operative Ins. 59.2 40.8 2.5 0.4 0.4
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However, any comparison between these and the other Top 20 fund managers also needs 
to take into account the size of their portfolios, measured by their share of the stock 
market, as set out in Table IV. 10. These shares have been used to calculate the size of 
shareholdings at which they are two, three and four times overweight. These are simply 
multiples of the fund managers’ market weightings. A holding larger than market 
weighting is described as ‘overweight’ and one below their market weighting as ‘under­
weight’. The multiples for overweight holdings are set out in Table IV. 15 below.
Market Twice Three Four
Fund manager weighting times times times
1 MAM 4.53 9.06 13.59 18.12
2 Prudential 3.11 6.22 9.33 12.44
3 Schroder 2.91 5.82 8.73 11.64
4 Standard Life 2.34 4.68 7.02 9.36
5 PDFM 1.99 3.98 5.97 7.96
6 BZW 1.92 3.84 5.76 7.68
7 Legal & General 1.79 3.58 5.37 7.16
8 Hermes 1.53 3.06 4.59 6.12
9 Threadneedle 1.29 2.58 3.87 5.16
10 Fleming 1.27 2.54 3.81 5.08
11 Gartmore 1.27 2.54 3.81 5.08
12 M&G 1.11 2.22 3.33 4.44
13 Scottish Widows 1.09 2.18 3.27 4.36
14 Morgan Grenfell 0.99 1.98 2.97 3.96
15 Norwich Union 0.96 1.92 2.88 3.84
16 AMP 0.95 1.90 2.85 3.80
17 CIN 0.93 1.86 2.79 3.72
18 Sun Life IM 0.92 1.84 2.76 3.68
19 ESN 0.91 1.82 2.73 3.64
20 Co-operative Ins. 0.88 1.76 2.64 3.52
Table IV. 16 shows the proportion of each fund managers’ holdings which are 
underweight (< 1.0 times) and overweight (>1.0, > 2.0 and > 4.0 times). The fund 
managers are ranked by the proportion of shareholdings more than two times 
overweight.
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Table IV.16: Number and proportion of overweight holdings
(Ranked by % of holdings > 2x overweight)
Fund Number of Overweight holdings (%)
manager companies >1.0 times > 2.0 times > 4.0 times
1 Hermes 240 77.2 1.3 0.3
2 Standard Life 100 38.8 3.5 0.8
3 BZW 145 46.8 3.5 0.3
4 Legal & General 184 59.0 3.5 0.0
5 ESN 172 69.1 4.8 0.0
6 Co-operative Ins. 153 55.2 12.3 1.4
7 Prudential 167 54.6 15.0 0.0
8 MAM 114 37.5 15.5 1.6
9 Threadneedle 83 43.5 16.2 6.3
10 Scottish Widows 85 43.4 16.3 2.6
11 Norwich Union 84 41.0 17.1 5.4
12 Sun Life IM 90 41.5 17.5 3.2
13 PDFM 96 31.2 18.5 9.7
14 Schroder 121 41.6 18.6 5.5
15 Morgan Grenfell 123 41.1 18.7 5.0
16 Fleming 115 39.4 20.9 5.5
17 CIN 86 63.7 22.2 0.7
18 Gartmore 123 41.8 23.8 10.2
19 AMP 125 55.8 24.1 2.2
20 M&G 94 46.3 30.5 13.3
The analysis set out in Table IV.16 shows that although MAM is the largest fund 
manager, its portfolio contains a smaller proportion of overweight holdings than other 
fund managers (ie those ranked nine and above in Table IV. 16).
The proportion of holdings more than two times overweight provides a measure of 
portfolio concentration, which can be augmented by the use of the Gini coefficient. This 
has been calculated for each Top 20 fund manager’s largest 100 and 200 shareholdings 
and also all their shareholdings in the 297 companies comprising the Citywatch database. 
Companies in which there are no holdings have been treated as 0.0% in the Gini 
calculation. The values of Gini for fund managers’ holdings in the 297 (Top 300) 
companies and their largest 200 and 100 holdings are set out in Table IV. 17. The fund 
managers have been ranked for each category of shareholdings and also an average 
ranking calculated. This has been used to group the fund managers into four groups and 
the Lorenz curves for each group of fund managers are shown in Charts IV. 18 - 21.
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T able IV.17: C oncentration  indices for Top 20 fund m anagers
G ini C oefficient G ini rankings Average
Group Rank Fund m anager 300 200 100 350 200 100 Ranking
1 1 Hermes 0.231 0.075 0.108 1 1 2 1.3
1 2 L&G 0.297 0.123 0.094 2 2 1 1.7
1 3 ESN 0.442 0.136 0.108 4 3 3 3.3
1 4 BZW 0.298 0.150 0 . 1 2 1 3 4 5 4.0
1 5 Prudential 0.484 0.206 0.117 5 5 4 4.7
2 6 Standard Life 0.501 0.241 0.213 6 6 8 6.7
2 7 MAM 0.575 0.344 0.199
00 8 6 7.3
2 8 Co-operative Ins. 0.508 0265 0.230 7 11 8 3
2 9 AMP 0.632 0.362 0.209 10 9 7 8.7
2 10 Schroder 0.652 0.414 0.229 12 11 10 11.0
3 11 Morgan Grenfell 0.622 0.413 0.280 9 10 14 1 1 . 0
3 12 Fleming 0.651 0.436 0.288 11 12 15 12.7
3 13 Sun Life IM 0.707 0.480 0.279 14 14 13 13.7
3 14 Scottish Widows 0.728 0.514 0.265 15 15 12 14.0
3 15 Gartmore 0.681 0.469 0.294 13 13 16 14 0
4 16 CIN 0.744 0.542 0.213 18 17 9 14.7
4 17 Threadneedle 0.737 0.529 0.337 16 16 18 16,7
4 18 Norwich Union 0.758 0.568 0.295 19 18 17 18.0
4 19 PDFM 0.738 0.581 0.388 17 19 20 18.7
4 20 M&G 0.791 0.625 0.385 20 20 19 197
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Chart IV. 18; Lorenz curves - Group 1 fund managers (Gini values)
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Chart IV. 19: Lorenz curves - Group 2 fund managers (Gini values)
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Chart IV.20: Lorenz curves - Group 3 fund managers (Gini values)
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Chart IV.21: Lorenz curves - Group 4 fund managers (Gini values)
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V Top 300 Companies’ institutional shareholders
The importance of the Top 20 fund managers in the ownership of Top 300 companies is 
also evident when the position of these fund managers in companies’ share registers is 
examined. A summary of the analysis is presented in Table V .l. This shows the number 
o f times Top 20 fund managers are found amongst the five largest shareholders o f the 
Top 300 companies. In 247 companies (83.2%) the largest shareholder is also a Top 10 
fund manager and there is not a single company in which one o f the Top 5 fund 
managers is not one of the Top 5 shareholders (Appendix B).
T able V .l:  F ive largest fund m anager holdings in T op 300 com panies
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th In top 5
Fund m anager Largest Second Third Fourth Fifth Total
Prudential 53 47 38 23 20 181
M AM 73 34 21 20 14 162
Schroder 43 40 23 12 10 128
Standard Life 5 14 30 25 18 92
PDFM 38 15 11 8 7 79
T otal top 5 only 212 150 123 88 69 642
% o f tota l (297) 71.4% 50.5% 41.4% 29.6% 23.2% 43.2%
BZW 2 8 10 29 29 78
M&G 17 10 16 8 8 59
Flem ing 5 7 18 13 8 51
Gartmore 10 18 7 10 15 60
L&G 1 3 9 18 27 58
T otal top  5  only 247 196 183 166 156 948
%  o f  to ta l (297) 83.2% 66.0% 61.6% 55.9% 52.5% 31.9%
Threadneedle 5 15 9 9 5 43
M organ Grenfell 3 7 6 9 7 32
Norwich Union 5 2 7 7 5 26
Scottish W idows 1 7 6 7 8 29
Hermes 0 1 10 8 13 32
AMP 1 3 6 7 4 21
Sun Life IM 1 5 4 4 5 19
CIN 0 3 3 5 3 14
Co-operative Ins. 1 1 1 1 2 6
ESN 0 1 0 1 2 4
Total 264 241 235 224 210 1174
%  o f tota l (308) 86.3% 78.8% 76.8% 73.2% 70.7% 19.8%
Although Prudential has the highest number of Top 5 positions (181), MAM is most 
often the largest shareholder (73 companies). This means that in a quarter (24.5%) of 
Top 300 companies, MAM is the largest shareholder. In 37 companies, MAM’s 
shareholding is in excess of 10%.
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Chart V.2: Proportion o f Top 300 companies in which Top 10
iind managers are ranked amongst the five largest financial shareholders
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VI Model of modal company
Companies in the Top 300 exhibit a wide range of Top 20 shareholder profiles. Although 
these could be directly aggregated to create an average profile, an alternative approach is 
to identify companies which most closely match the most common profile of Top 300 
companies.
Table VI. 1 shows the distribution of the largest shareholdings in the 297 companies for 
the largest and Top 3, 5, 10 and 20 shareholders. For each the modal range is 
highlighted. Twenty companies match the modal group for all the shareholder rankings 
(ie at the 1,3,5,10 and 20 levels). The profiles of these companies are set out in Table 
VI.2.
Table VI. 1: D istribution o f shareholdings
Actual Financial shareholders
num bers Largest Top 3 Top 5 Top 10 Top 20
> 75% 0 0 0 0 4
70 - 74.9% 0 0 0 0 2
65 -69 .9% 0 0 0 1 12
6 0 -6 4 .9 % 0 0 0 4 15
55 - 59.9% 0 0 1 4 39
50 - 54.9% 0 1 0 8 30
45 - 49.9% 0 0 4 20 59
40 - 44.9% 0 2 7 44 38
35 - 39.9% 0 6 20 53 40
30 - 34.9% 2 9 31 60 19
25 - 29.9% 1 35 59 40 15
20 - 24.9% 8 44 77 34 12
15 - 19.9% 13 93 48 17 6
10 - 14.9% 73 69 41 9 4
5 - 9.9% 35 6 3 2
< 4.9% 55 3 3 0 0
Total 297 297 297 297 297
ChartVI.3 provides a representation of the modal profile for each of the largest 20 
shareholders, which together account for 47% of the modal company’s shares. Chart
VI.4 illustrates the complete profile o f the modal company, whilst Chart VI. 5 shows the 
Lorenz curve for the Top 20 shareholders (plotted to 100.0 instead of 1.0) and the 
cumulative shareholdings, with the largest shareholder ranked 1st (using a reverse X scale 
to match the format of the Lorenz Curve).
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Chart VI.3: Shareholder profile of modal company________
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Chart V1.5: Lorenz curve for modal company
Shareholder profile of modal company 
Cumulative shareholdings and Lorenz curve for top 
20 shareholders
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C om pany FTSE
Index
Largest Top 3 Top 5 Top 10 Top 20 G in i Herfindahl
Index
1 A llied Domecq 100 7.23 17.99 22.62 32.60 45.46 0.34 0 .077
2 Berkeley 250 6.07 16.46 23.06 34.23 49 .14 0.36 0 .067
3 Blue Circle 100 9.49 17.43 23.05 34.37 46 .34 0.30 0.084
4 Courtaulds 100 6.02 17.42 24.01 34.14 48.24 0.34 0.071
5 D e La Rue 100 9.84 17.89 22.52 31.82 45.28 0.38 0 .087
6 EM AP 250 7.97 18.22 23.74 32.37 45 .47 0.34 0.079
7 Hepworth 250 7.78 16.45 24.14 34.73 48.31 0.28 0 .072
8 IMI 250 5.59 15.29 22.84 35.02 48.22 0.30 0.068
9 Land Securities 100 7.69 19.03 24.77 34.70 46.06 0.36 0.086
10 Laporte 250 6.70 17.36 23.80 35.18 48.63 0.30 0.072
11 Rank 100 6.75 18.48 24.57 35.43 48.36 0.34 0.075
12 Smith & Nephew 100 7.50 16.39 22.17 34.35 49.71 0.32 0 .068
13 Southern Water 250 9.24 17.30 23.57 35.12 47.02 0.32 0.082
14 Stakis 250 8.36 17.68 24.06 34.84 47.93 0.34 0 .077
15 Standard Chartered 100 6.46 15.84 22.66 32.36 45.91 0.36 0.070
16 Tate & Lyle 250 7.15 16.33 23.37 34.06 46.17 0.34 0 .074
17 T hom  EMI 100 9.50 17.39 23.71 33.80 46.19 0.34 0.084
18 W essex Water 250 7.99 16.93 23.18 33.26 45.53 0.34 0 .077
19 WPP 250 6.93 16.72 23.29 33.80 45 .99 0.34 0.075
20 Yorkshire Electricity 250 7.48 15.20 22.05 33.00 45.71 0.32 0.072
A verage 7.59 17.09 23.36 33.96 46.98 0.33 0.076
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VII Non-financial shareholders
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This Chapter has so far focused on the equity portfolios and shareholdings of fund 
managers in the Top 300 companies. In this Section, I review the position of non-fund 
manager shareholders. For ease of expression, these are referred to as non-financial 
shareholders.
The analysis of non-financial shareholdings in Top 300 companies has been based on 
information:
• Published in the Hemmington Scott Company REFS directory for February 1996. 
This contains details of all directors’ shareholdings and other shareholdings over the 
declaration level of 3.0%.
• Included in company annual reports.
• Obtained directly from companies to supplement the above, particularly where there 
are ambiguities in the published information.
The analysis of the 297 companies in the ‘Top 300’ set out below comprises companies 
in which:
• The directors in aggregate owned 1.0% or more of the shares.
• Other (non-financial) shareholders owned 3.0% or more of the shares.
In 187 companies (63%) neither of these conditions were satisfied. A summary of 
director and other holdings is set out in the TableVII.l. Details of these holdings are 
provided in Appendix E.
Table VII. 1: Number of non-financial shareholders
Type No. Com panies
Strategic 44
Board 36
Private 13
Fam ily 5
Charity 5
C ross-holdings 2
Governm ent 2
U nclassified 3
Total 110
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Table VII.2 sets out the full analysis, in which private holdings and those apparently 
attributable to members of founding families have been aggregated, as there is not 
necessarily a clear distinction between these when the holdings in individual companies 
are examined in detail.
Table V II.2: N on-financial shareholdings (% )
Type % of total
Strategic 14.8
Board 12.1
Private / Family 6.1
Other 4.0
None 63 0
Total (297 Companies) 100.0
A Strategic shareholdings
The 44 holdings which have been classified as ‘strategic’ are attributed to companies that 
are not institutional investors or fund managers. Many of these holdings are long-term 
and/or reflect the ownership of the companies before they were listed on the Stock 
Exchange. Companies in the latter category include Gartmore20, Telewest 
Communications, Vendome, Nynex Cablecomms and General Cable Other long-term 
holdings in January 1996 were those o f SHV in Calor21 and Sophus Berendsen in 
Rentokil22. In each of these examples, the non-financial shareholder controlled over 50% 
of the issued equity (see Appendix E. 1).
An analysis o f the holdings of Strategic non-financial shareholders is set out in Table
VII. 3, together with the average holdings of the largest and Top 3 and 5 fund manager 
shareholders in each o f the companies in each group. It is noticeable that the fund 
manager holdings are substantially lower in those companies where the non-financial 
shareholder controls in excess of 50% of the shares.
20 In January 1996 Gartmore, itself one o f the Top 20 fund managers, was 75% owned by French 
banking group Indosuez, but Gartmore was subsequently acquired by NatWest and their fund 
management operations merged under the Gartmore identity.
21 One o f the case history companies (Chapter 9). SVH subsequently took full control o f  Calor.
22 Although this stake was subsequently reduced follow ing the acquisition o f BET by Rentokil to form 
the Rentokil Initial group.
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The simplest explanation for this is that the fund managers’ shareholdings reflect the 
volume of shares available to them and other shareholders net o f those under the control 
of the strategic investor. These available shares are often referred to as the ‘free float’. 
With an average strategic holding of 63%, only approximately one third of the shares in 
these companies are available to other investors. If their actual holdings are expanded by 
the same factor (three), the fund managers’ holdings are broadly consistent with those of 
other companies with strategic investors2^ , and indeed the average across all 297 
companies included in the Citywatch database
Table VII.3: Strategic and fund manager shareholdings
Strategic
Investors
x CAO/
Number
companies
1 A
Average
Holding
/T~> 7 Q
Largest Top 3 Top 5
Fund
7 7 n
managers’ holdings
H a n>50%  
20 - 50%
10
10 32.72
3 Jy 
10.39
7.26
17.47
y.87
21.56
10 - 20% 13 15.32 8.57 17.75 23.25
< 20% 11 5.94 7.12 16.14 21.49
All Strategic 44 27.85 7.44 14.90 19.39
All companies 297 8.82 18.02 23.88
Adjusted > 50% (Expansion factor 2.73) 9.25 19.82 26.95
B Board holdings
Thirty six board shareholdings above the threshold of 1% are detailed in Appendix E. Of 
these shareholdings, 14 are larger than 10% (Appendix E.5) and 22 between 1% and 
10% (Appendix E.6).
Table VII.4: Iloard and und mana ger shareholdings
Board
Holdings
Number
companies
Average
Holding
Largest Top 3 Top 5
Fund managers’ holdings
> 10% 14 31.70 6.42 12.03 15.80
< 10% 22 4.95 9.58 19.96 26.58
All Board 36 14.62 8.41 17.02 22.58
All companies 297 8.82 18.02 23.88
Adjusted > 10% (Expansion factor 1.46) 9.37 17.56 23 07
23 The actual expansion factor to take account o f the reduced free float is 2.73 (100/36.6). The adjusted 
figures for the Top 3 and Top 5 shareholders are several points larger than the average for com panies 
with strategic shareholders <50%  and the Top 300 company average. Testing for the significance o f  this 
difference would involve resolving a number o f methodological issues which are not intended to be 
within the scope o f the current analysis.
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Although the threshold of 10% has been used to analyse these holdings, no board 
holdings were identified between 10.0% and 17.0%. The larger board shareholdings 
therefore ranged from 17% (Lord Rothermere’s shareholding in the Daily Mail and 
General Trust) to 56.4% (Steven Rubin’s shareholding in Pentland). In both these cases 
and eight others, the dominant board shareholder is also the Chairman.
The profile of non-financial shareholders in companies with board holdings below 10.0% 
appears to be broadly similar to the average of the 297 Citywatch companies. However, 
but the average fund manager holdings (Largest, Top 3 and Top 5) are lower when 
board holdings exceed 10%. This can also be accounted for by the free float effect 
described for large strategic shareholders (Table VII.3 and Appendix E.l). When the 
appropriate expansion factor is applied24, the adjusted holdings broadly match those for 
the Top 300 (Table VIM).
Making allowance for the long-term effect of substantial strategic (>50%) and board 
(>10%) holdings on the basis of the reduced free float of shares available to other 
investors appears to explain the lower than average holdings of fund managers in these 
companies.
C Financial and non-financial shareholdings
I
In 32 out of the 44 companies with a strategic shareholder the strategic shareholder has a 
holding bigger than that of the largest fund manager(Table VII.5). However, this 
dominance is only found in 20 companies when the holdings of the Top 5 fund managers 
are combined.
Table VIL5: Analysis of strategic and fund manager shareho
Strategic
Investors
Number
companies
Largest Top 3 Top 5
Fund managers’ holdings
> 50% 10 10 10 10
20 - 50% 10 10 9 9
10 - 20% 13 9 4 1
< 20% 11 3 1 0
NFS bigger 44 32 24 20
dings
24 In the case o f  large board holdings, the expansion factor is 1.46 (100 /68 .3 ).
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A similar pattern applies when board shareholdings are analysed. In 18 out of the 36 
companies, the board shareholder(s) have shareholdings bigger than the largest fund 
manager. This dominance is only found in 11 companies when the holdings of the Top 5 
fund managers are combined.
Table VII.6: Analysis of >oard and fund manager shareholdings
Board
Holdings
Number
companies
Largest Top 3 Top 5
Fund managers’ holdings
> 10% 14 13 11 11
< 10% 22 5 0 0
NFS bigger 36 18 11 11
Combining the data set out in Tables VII.5 and VII.6 shows that in only 48 companies 
out of 297 (16.2%) is there a strategic or board shareholder with a shareholding bigger 
than the largest fund manager shareholder. When the shareholding of the largest strategic 
or board shareholder is compared with those of the Top 3 and Top 5 fund managers, the 
numbers fall to 35 (11.8%) and 31 (10.4%) respectively.
If it hypothesised that it is a companies Top 3 or Top 5 shareholders which are the most 
likely source of countervailing influence to an otherwise dominant strategic or board 
shareholder, it would appear that the balance of power between financial and non- 
financial shareholders is only likely to be an issue in 10% to 12% of companies. Put the 
other way round, this means that fund managers are likely to be the dominant source of 
influence in 88% - 90% of companies if the views and actions of the Top 3 or Top 5 
shareholders coincide or are actively coordinated through a form of coalition.
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VIII Concentration and Capitalisation
From the analysis of strategic and board shareholdings in Section VII, it appears that 
large shareholdings by these two groups tend to depress the shareholdings of fund 
managers through reducing the free float o f shares available to them and other investors. 
This effect appears particularly strong for strategic holdings in excess o f 50% (average 
63.38%) and board holdings over 10% (average 31.7%). The 24 companies comprising 
these two groups have therefore been excluded from the analysis of market capitalisation 
and concentration indices summarised in Table VIII. I25.
Table Vffl.1:
Market capitalisation and concentration indices of Top 300 companies
Number Av. Cap. Fund Managers Gini Herfindahl
Companies £  million Largest Top 3 Top 5 Top 10 Top 20 Index
> £10bn 17 17,860 5.62 11.96 16.48 24.66 34.72 0.29 0.073
£5 - lObn 22 7,083 7.13 14.01 18.51 27.07 37.60 0.32 0.085
£3 - 5bn 24 3,670 9.03 16.43 21.56 30.91 42.40 0.36 0 .100
£2 - 3bn 16 2,442 8.89 16.15 21.56 30.73 42.33 0.34 0.085
£1 - 2bn 64 1,436 8.28 18.30 24.34 34.82 47.56 0.35 0.086
£500m  - £ lb n 53 731 9.93 20.74 27.40 37.93 50.35 0.38 0.094
< £500m 77 359 10.57 21.54 28.51 39.81 52.49 0.39 0.099
Total
Average
‘ 273 774,878
8.82 18.02 23.88 33.75 45.37 0.37 0.092
For each index of shareholder concentration, there is a clear inverse relationship between 
company size and concentration. The Top 20 fund manager shareholders of companies 
with market capitalisations over £10 billion on average control around one-third of 
shares (34.72%). In contrast, the Top 20 fund manager shareholders of companies with 
capitalisations below £1 billion on average control more than half their shares (51.86%)
This trend can be interpreted in terms of market capitalisation tending to inhibit the size 
o f shareholdings because of the value of the shareholdings involved. The analysis set out 
in Tables VIII. 2 and VIII. 3 supports this view as the size effect is strongest the higher 
ranked the shareholder. Table VIII.2 shows the average size of shareholdings, whilst
25 Although the average Strategic shareholding in the 20% - 50% band (Table VII.3) was 32.72, this 
does not appear to be associated with below average fund manager shareholdings. The 10 com panies 
involved have therefore been included in the analysis o f market capitalisation set out in Table VII 1
Chapter 3 - Share Ownership 126
Table VIII.3 compares the average shareholdings of holdings of fund managers and their 
rankings (1, 2 & 3, 4 & 5, 6-10 and 11- 20).
Table Vm .2: Average shareholdings (%)
1 2 & 3 4 & 5 6 -1 0 11-20
> £10bn 5.62 3.17 2.26 1.64 1.01
£5 - lObn 7.13 3.44 2.25 1.71 1.05
£3 - 5bn 9.03 3.70 2.57 1.87 1.15
£2 - 3bn 8.89 3.63 2.71 1.83 1.16
£1 - 2bn 8.28 5.01 3.02 2.10 1.27
£500m - £lbn 9.93 5.41 3.33 2.11 1.24
< £500m 10.57 5.49 3.49 2.26 1.27
A comparison of Table VIII.2 and Table VIII.3 shows two aspects of the size effect. 
Table VIII.2 shows that size of shareholding is inversely related to size of shareholding 
for all shareholders ranked in the Top 20 as for each group of shareholders (ranked 1, 2 
& 3, 4 & 5, 6 - 10, and 11 - 20) the average shareholding declines with higher market 
capitalisations. This is consistent with the summary shown in Table VIII. 1.
Table VIII.3 shows a second effect, that the smaller the market capitalisation the more 
the largest shareholders are prepared to hold compared with others. The largest 
shareholders of companies with capitalisations below £1 billion are prepared on average 
to hold eight times the holdings of those ranked 11 - 20. The ratio for companies with 
capitalisations over £10 billion is 5.6. These results are consistent with the relationship 
between market capitalisation and the size independent measures of concentration (Gini 
and the Herfindahl Index) shown in Table VIII. 1.
Table VIII.3: Comparison of larger shareholdings with those ranked 11-20
1 2 & 3 4 & 5 6 -1 0 11-20
> £10bn 5.59 3.15 2.25 1.63 1.00
£5 - lObn 6.77 3.27 2.14 1.63 1.00
£3 - 5bn 7.86 3.22 2.23 1.63 1.00
£2 - 3bn 7.66 3.13 2.33 1.58 1.00
£1 - 2bn 6.50 3.93 2.37 1.65 1.00
£500m - £lbn 8.00 4.35 2.68 1.70 1.00
< £500m 8.34 4.33 2.75 1.78 1.00
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In this Chapter, I have reviewed the ownership of UK listed companies. This provides 
the context for the qualitative research through interviews with 120 fund managers, 
companies and other groups described in Chapters 4 to 7.
The analysis of ownership shows that there are substantial and significant differences in 
fund managers’ equity portfolios. The principle factors are the funds invested in UK 
shares, the number of companies in which stakes are held and the distribution of these 
shareholdings in terms of under and over-weighting.
Across the 50 largest fund managers analysed, the average number of companies in 
which they held stakes was 232 out of a maximum of 297 (the Top 300). It is evident 
that the number of companies in which fund managers have shareholdings is significant, 
but the distribution of shareholdings is probably more so. These can be analysed in terms 
of the distribution of shareholdings by actual size and relative to each fund manager’s 
market weighting and values of Gini and the Herfindahl Index. The values of Gini are 
closely related to the shape (convexity) of the Lorenz curve, which provides a visual 
representation of the distribution data.
The analysis of data about the market shares of the Top 50 fund managers and the Top 
20 fund manager shareholders of the Top 300 companies shows that the Top 10 or 20 
fund managers play a key role in their ownership. There is a concentration in ownership 
and within the fund management industry which means that the Top 10 fund managers 
dominate the Top 5 positions in many companies’ share registers.
The data provided by Citywatch has also been used to develop the profile of a modal 
company, the profile of which closely matches the average. These analyses show that the 
Top 20 fund manager shareholders of many companies control close to half their shares 
and the Top 10 shareholders control approximately one-third.
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Concentration of ownership is inversely related to company size, both the absolute and 
relative size of companies’ largest fund manager shareholdings are lower in high 
capitalisation companies.
In only 10% - 15% of companies substantial shareholdings of strategic non-financial 
investors and the board are larger than those of companies largest fund manager 
shareholders. These non-financial holdings may provide a source of countervailing power 
to that of their financial (fund manager) shareholders.
In 85% - 90% of companies the key shareholder relationships will be with a relatively 
small number of major fund managers which dominate their ownership.
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I Introduction
Factors leading to the growth of institutional control of UK listed companies were reviewed 
in Chapter 1, Section II (Narrowing Share Ownership) and the impact of these changes 
analysed in detail in Chapter 3 (Changes in UK Share Ownership).
Chapter 1, Section HI (Management, Ownership & Performance) reviewed two major 
models of management behaviour, principal agent and managerialism, and related these to a 
number of studies of corporate performance and investor returns under different ownership 
conditions. Interest in the behaviour of managers and under what conditions they appear to 
act either as faithful agents of their shareholder masters (principal agent model) or as self 
interested appropriators of shareholder wealth (managerialism) has been widespread, and not 
only amongst academics. Investors have also become increasingly concerned with how best 
to align the interests of the employed manager with the wealth interests of the equity owner. 
In the USA, this concern was triggered in the 1970s and particularly in the 1980s by 
dissatisfaction with the widespread use of management entrenchment techniques such as the 
payment of greenmail and use of defensive poison pills against hostile investors. More 
recently, in both the USA and the UK, shareholders and investor organisations have focused 
their attention on boardroom salaries and compensation packages, both because of their total 
value and the problems involved in aligning the links between corporate performance and 
executive compensation.
In the UK, the Greenbury Committee (Greenbury 1995), recommended significant changes to 
the structuring and reporting of boardroom pay but did not support the proposal made by 
some shareholder groups and commentators that shareholders should have the right to 
directly vote on the value of directors’ compensation packages at companies’ AGMs.
Chapter 2 reviewed the role of voting power and behaviour as mechanisms for the exercising 
of shareholder power, but concluded that the range of voting opportunities available to UK 
shareholders was restricted, infrequent and failed to provide a mechanism for milder forms of 
shareholder influence on relatively routine, but still strategically important, boardroom 
decisions and standards of corporate behaviour.
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The analysis in Chapter 3 shows that share ownership is becoming more concentrated in the 
UK. In addition to the net shift in legal ownership from private investors to professional fund 
managers, two significant changes are taking place within the fund management industry. The 
first is that the UK’s largest fund managers are gaining market share from smaller 
competitors. The second is the narrowing of portfolios and concentration of investment funds 
on a smaller number of companies than has been the case in the past. This data suggests that 
active fund managers are gaining confidence in their investment strategies and are increasingly 
prepared to invest larger sums in fewer companies in the pursuit of their investment 
objectives. Although growth is taking place in indexed equity funds, this partly reflects a 
growing polarisation of the fund management business to either indexed funds or actively 
managed, relatively concentrated portfolios and away from broad-based semi-indexed 
portfolios.
However, it is important to note that these assessments are relative because, although actively 
managed portfolios typically contain shares in 100+ companies and seldom fewer than 60 
companies, this is still many more than would be required to reduce company-specific risk to 
a de minimus level. It is often considered that a portfolio of 20 shares is sufficient to eliminate 
all but a very small amount ofcompany-specific risk from a portfolio. The issue for active fund 
managers is therefore less about the impact of company-specific investment decisions on 
overall portfolio performance than the increase in company specific risk that is associated with 
substantial stakes relative to the total value of the funds which are managed (normally 
described in terms of investment over- or under-weighting relative to the market or a 
benchmark index).
Little research appears to have been undertaken to reconcile the weakness of formal vote- 
based mechanisms as a source of shareholder influence with the increased willingness of the 
UK’s largest fund managers to increase company specific investment risk, through 
concentrating their investment funds on fewer companies than has historically been the case.
As I concluded at the end of Chapter 2, what is lacking is a description of how fund managers 
bring influence to bear on companies when the need arises (for example, during periods of 
faltering corporate performance or managerial competence, or declining investor confidence
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or increasing concern about past or planned strategic decisions), but formal vote-based 
mechanisms of influence or control are not available to shareholders.
My investigation of this issue is described in this (Chapter 4) and the next three Chapters (5,6 
and 7). These report the findings from the 120 interviews I undertook with companies, fund 
managers and others. For a description of the methodology of these interviews see Appendix 
B, which also includes a list of everyone I interviewed.
This Chapter describes, first the processes through which investment policy is set and 
investment decisions are taken by fund managers and, second, the issues that institutional 
shareholders take into account when setting investment policy and making company-specific 
investment decisions.
Section II (Investment Policy) looks at how fund managers establish broad investment 
policies, whilst Section HI (Investment Decisions) discusses the factors involved when 
investing in specific companies and analyses some of the repercussions of investment 
decisions, in terms of the size of the holdings which may result.
Section IV (Types of Shareholder) places the preceding material in the context of companies’ 
policies towards different types of shareholders; domestic and non-UK institutions and private 
and employee shareholders.
Chapter 5 looks at the way that companies manage the flow of information to investors, 
whilst Chapter 6 reviews practical issues concerned with voting rights and procedures.
Chapter 7 describes the way that fund managers instigate change in companies, with 
apparently little reliance on voting procedures or on shareholder coalitions of the size 
envisaged by Scott.
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II Investm ent Policy
A Passive vs Active Fund Management
This Section looks at factors influencing investment policy in actively managed UK equity 
portfolios. However, before doing so, it is important to review some of the issues surrounding 
the passive management of index funds.
A.i Passive fund management: formal and shadow indexing
Indexed funds were estimated by a number of fund managers that I interviewed (in 1993) to 
account for 15-20% of UK equities invested by pension funds and therefore around 6% of the 
total UK equity market.
Such estimates of the split between actively managed funds and those which are formally 
indexed, are complicated by the widespread adoption of investment policies which are very 
close to market weighting (in terms of the proportion of the fund invested in individual 
companies) but which are not 'officially’ indexed as an explicit investment mandate.
Such investment strategies are known as 'shadow’ or closet indexing. In practice this is 
impossible to achieve across the whole stock market (of some 2,000 or so listed companies) 
and no fund manager even attempts to do so. Instead, the term is normally applied to funds 
which consistently show performance close to that of a market index (for example the FT-SE 
100) because they are invested in a high proportion of the companies in that index with near 
market weightings.
The focus on the FT-SE 100 index is probably more pervasive amongst pension funds than 
many life funds, which will typically be invested across 200+ companies, in which case the 
reference benchmark is likely to be the FT-SE-A 350 index (comprising the FT-SE 100 and 
FT-SE Mid 250 indices) or possibly the FT-SE-A All-Share index for very broad portfolios.
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Whether 'shadow indexing’ is a sound investment strategy depends on one’s perspective. 
Larger active fund managers I interviewed were very critical of other fund managers who, 
they believed, were effectively 'shadow indexers’, but who appeared to be claiming to their 
clients to be running much more actively managed funds.
One reason for this criticism is that if an implicitly indexed shadow fund only performs as well 
as its benchmark index, the money might as well have been invested in an indexed fund in the 
first place. (Thus shadow fund managers also come under attack from indexed fund managers 
who would like their business).
Another criticism of shadow indexing is that active funds cost more to run and that these 
costs are included in the fund management charges ultimately bome by the underlying 
investors and beneficiaries. Costs associated with the running of index funds are much lower 
(relating to administration, cash management and compliance rather than fund management as 
normally understood: asset allocation, research, corporate monitoring, stock selection etc) 
and these savings need to be passed on to investors/ beneficiaries if indexed funds are to meet 
investors’ performance expectations. In contrast, a fund which is effectively indexed in all but 
name will carry higher expenses and provide below index investment returns, to the detriment 
of investors/beneficiaries.
However, if trustees do not wish to place all their funds under a (single) active fund manager, 
there is the option of investing a proportion of their funds under indexed management (maybe 
as much as 75% or 80%) and the balance with an active fund manager.
There are indications that trustees of pension funds are becoming more aware of these issues 
and that this is one of the driving forces behind the rapid increase in mandates acquired by the 
largest active fund managers on the one hand and the growth in indexed funds on the other.
Chapter 4: Fund Management 135
A.ii Active fund management
Active fund management is a term commonly used by fund managers and companies to 
describe fund managers who typically run portfolios which comprise no more than around 
100 companies; actively trade these portfolios over the economic cycle; will go substantially 
overweight in companies they favour; may not hold any shares in companies they do not 
favour - even if these are major companies and widely held by other fund managers; and take 
a very active interest and are well informed about the companies in which they invest.
The fund managers most often identified as having this approach were the large independent 
pension fund managers: Mercury, UBS, Gartmore and, to a lesser extent, Newton and Baillie 
Gifford.
Schroders is the largest independent pension fund manager which is not seen as being 
‘aggressive’ in its style; its reputation is closer to that of the major life companies (Prudential, 
Norwich Union, Legal & General, Standard Life) which, although active in their ‘ownership’ 
of companies, are seen as operating broader and more stable portfolios.
B Measuring Portfolio Performance
Measures of success in the management of UK equity portfolios clearly depend on the 
investment objective. If a fund is indexed, then normally the lowest cost and minimum 
variance from the benchmark index will be the goals. If consistent out-performance of the 
index is the objective of an actively managed fund, but performance only matching the index 
is achieved, higher costs mean that the net return to investors will be below that of the index.
In practice, the return on actively managed funds is volatile both in absolute and market- 
adjusted terms - few fund managers can hope to consistently out-perform the reference index. 
A realistic alternative may be to seek above average performance in some years but to accept 
that index matching is only possible in others. In this scenario, the fund manager’s objective is 
to minimise the risk of below index performance but do better whenever possible - perhaps 
every two or three years. In terms of risk, this strategy is about avoiding the downside and
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maximising the upside, but with the overall return more than compensating for the increased 
overall volatility of the fund’s returns.
This kind of active management is typical of more 'conservatively’ run funds such as those 
run by in-house pension fund managers, life funds and independent pension fund managers 
such as Schroders.
What sort of out-performance do these funds claim to achieve? The pension fund managers I 
interviewed felt that out-performance of 1-1.25% was achievable with some kind of 
consistency. Greater out-performance (perhaps 1.5-2%) was achievable over a number of 
years, but sooner or later this would be offset by a year or two of low (if not under) 
performance, bringing the average closer to 1-1.25%.
These kinds of variances can become a crucial factor in the selection of pension fund 
managers. The choice of active fund manager for many pension fund trustees and their 
advisors is increasingly between ‘slow and steady’ (implying annual performance of around 
1% above benchmark) and ‘better in some years, but overall less consistent’. In practice, the 
choices of pension fund trustees, advised by specialist consultants, have been remarkably 
consistent over the last few years, with most new mandates going to the ‘big four’: Gartmore, 
Mercury, Schroders and UBS. Smaller fund managers which have gained size rapidly as a 
result of their above average performance and acquisition of new mandates include Newton 
and Baillie Gifford.
C Asset Allocation
Asset allocation is the process by which a fund manager sets a framework for the investment 
strategy of its funds. Asset allocation is most often associated with a 'top down’ approach to 
investment, by which the selection of individual companies is only made after detailed 
consideration of other issues, such as economic growth, business cycles, expected returns 
from different classes of investment and developments in different business sectors.
Asset allocation is widely used to provide an investment framework, although the detail and 
complexity of allocation models differ between fund managers.
Chapter 4: Fund Management 137
C.i Class of asset
Equities are only one of several types of investment made by fund managers running 
'balanced portfolios’. Balanced portfolios will normally contain a mixture of fixed interest 
investments, equities, cash and property. Whether this is true for an individual portfolio will 
depend on the mandate under which fund managers operate. Trustees of pension funds and 
life funds will, for example, be responsible for deciding the asset allocation (with the 
assistance of consultants) if this decision is not made for them by the manager of their 
balanced portfolio.
Trustees will normally want to be involved in the asset allocation as this is a key decision in 
any balanced fund - and this will typically form part of the quarterly reporting cycle.
Over the last thirty years very significant changes have taken place in the asset allocation of 
pension funds. In an average balanced fund, the proportion of UK fixed interest investments 
has fallen from over 50% to around 6%, whilst the proportion invested in equities has 
increased from less than half (47%) to over three-quarters (77%).
Within equity portfolios there has been a systematic swing towards overseas investments, 
which in 1962 were insignificant (below 1%), but now have risen to 21% of balanced funds. 
In the 1970s property accounted for up to 20% of the average pension fimd. Now the figure 
has fallen to around 7% and may well decline further, despite the fact that the value of 
investments may rise in the near-term in response to recent rights issues and rising property 
prices.
C.ii Geographic distribution
For an equity fund manager, granted a worldwide mandate, the proportion of funds invested 
overseas, and in which markets, can be a critical decision in determining overall investment 
performance. For example, investing in the Japanese market at the 'wrong’ time is said to 
have seriously affected Fleming’s performance record and led to a decline in its overall fund 
management business.
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Conversely, different timing by Gartmore of its funds’ investments in the Japanese and Far 
Eastern markets, enhanced their overall performance and helped build the reputation of 
Gartmore as a bold and successful fund manager.
Not all major asset allocation decisions are market specific; a decision to shift portfolio 
weightings towards smaller companies and away from large capitalisation stocks can be 
undertaken on a worldwide basis. Similarly, a move towards healthcare or utilities, or away 
from defence industry-based companies could be taken in every market. In reality these 
decisions are complex, and also need to take into account factors such as exposure to 
overseas markets (estimated to be in excess of 40% for FT-SE 100 companies), economic 
growth in these, and currency factors.
C.iii Industry sector
The choice between industry sectors, such as healthcare, utilities and defence, introduces the 
third level of asset allocation. In selecting sectors in which to invest most heavily, fund 
managers will try and choose those which they believe will benefit from changes in the macro 
(national and international) economic cycles and which are expected to offer the greatest 
gains in value in the fixture.
This ‘counter-cyclical’ approach may be the strongest test of a fund manager’s investment 
abilities and will also have to be supported by the nerve of its clients. Indeed, it is arguable 
that the success of major fund managers in getting their sector ‘bets’ right, often against the 
general investment trend, has led to the growth in the funds under their management. Several 
fund managers had internally researched this issue, typically suggesting that half or more of 
their out-performance was due to asset allocation decisions.
However, the bigger the bet, the bigger the risk of mis-forecasting the performance of a 
market or sector. Swings in overall investment return (volatility) are one of the indications 
that ‘big bets’ are being taken, even if the average overall return is higher than that achieved 
by other fund managers. Amongst pension fund managers, Gartmore and UBS are seen as 
being amongst the boldest in their making of such asset allocations although, through size
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alone, changes in Mercury’s allocations are seen as having a larger overall impact on the 
ownership of companies.
Some competitor fund managers believe that, sooner or later, one or more of the largest 
independent pension fund managers will get their ‘bets’ wrong to such a degree that their 
performance will suffer; sufficiently for their reputation to become tarnished and for their 
clients to seek other managers for their funds.
Although this may be wishful thinking on the part of competitors, and there may indeed be 
practical limits to the size of a single fund manager operating in the UK market, (in which 
case, of those fund managers generally categorised as aggressive, Mercury is the closest to 
the hypothesised ‘limit’) it is not clear that success in asset allocation will be the limiting 
factor. The leading fund managers I interviewed would (not surprisingly) argue to the 
contrary, that they are building up expertise in asset allocation which will provide increasing 
competitive advantage and that the growth in the availability of appropriate derivative 
instruments provides the opportunity to cost-effectively hedge asset allocation decisions, 
which were illiquid or too expensive in the past.
C.iv Portfolio tilting
The term ‘portfolio tilting’ describes the impact of industry sector or market allocations on 
the overall structure of a portfolio; in a sense the degree of the ‘bet’. The higher the ‘tilt’ in a 
portfolio towards a particular group of companies, currencies or classes of share (eg 
convertibles), the more the overall performance of the portfolio will depend on the 
performance of these companies’ shares relative to the market.
For example, a portfolio consisting of ten industry sectors, with 10% of the portfolio in each, 
would be entirely neutral to the market if this also represented the weightings of the sectors in 
the market. If a fund manager felt that the healthcare sector was set to under-perform over 
the next year, but that construction was due to out-perform, one option would be to sell all 
the healthcare shares held (to achieve 0% exposure) and double the value of construction 
shares held (to 20%). This would represent a huge tilt on the portfolio away from healthcare 
towards construction.
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This, albeit simple, example illustrates the kind of sector allocation decisions that many active 
fund managers are now taking, often with the help of derivatives to achieve ‘synthetic’ tilting 
which allows the underlying portfolio to be maintained (but in many cases the extent of the 
portfolio tilt will only be of the order of 1-2%).
It is also important to recognise that portfolio management within an asset allocation 
framework is, and needs to be, a continuous process. For example, if the value of the 
construction sector goes up by 50% but all other sectors remain as they were, a portfolio with 
20% in construction will outperform the index by 10% but also end up with a 27.3% 
exposure to the sector - far beyond the original allocation.
The checks and balances that need to operate around asset allocation are therefore complex, 
involving the constant monitoring of market and portfolio values, risk factors, volatility, 
industry trends and economic growth.
Asset allocations are normally made by a senior group of portfolio managers and/or executive 
directors (depending on the type and size of organisation), usually on a monthly basis. All 
available information will be brought together when making the key allocation decisions, and 
the experience of those involved will be crucial to the outcome. However, the close 
relationships between members of most fund management organisations allows changes to be 
made almost at any time in the light of new information.
Fund managers vary considerably in how closely they require their portfolio managers to 
follow the agreed allocation. An example given in one interview was that portfolio managers 
would normally be expected to bring their funds into line with the ‘model’ portfolio within a 
day or two, with a tolerance of up to 1%.
D Managing Cash Flows
Fund management, whether active or indexed, needs day-to-day management to match the 
cash requirements of investors or beneficiaries with the profile of the funds under 
management.
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All portfolios are subject to inflows and outflows of funds. Even ‘closed end’ funds, such as 
investment trusts, will be in more or less continuous receipt of dividends from companies in 
which they have invested, against which must be set management charges, payments of 
dividends to shareholders and reinvestment of net income into new investments.
‘Open ended’ funds such as life and pension funds and unit trusts, may also receive additional 
funds from investors.
Responding to the investment implications of these cash flows is the responsibility of portfolio 
managers. One of the limiting factors within a fund management organisation is the span of 
responsibilities that can be held by each portfolio manager. When interviewed, pension fund 
managers typically thought that the practical limit was generally around 10 or 12 independent 
(segregated) funds. In other types of fund (particularly life funds, unit and investment trusts) 
the ratio will be lower - funds may well be run on a 1.1 basis by portfolio managers.
Alternatively, there may be a team of portfolio managers working on a single fund (although 
in the management structure one fund manager will always have overall responsibility).
The cash flows out of life and pension funds are in great part predictable, because they are 
subject to existing obligations to investors, policy holders and pensioners. Clearly market 
intelligence about investor behaviour can provide valuable advance information to a fund 
manager about likely future cash inflows and also help guide the optimal asset allocation for a 
fund.
Chapter 4: Fund Management 142
D.i Unit trusts
Unit trust managers face the biggest problems in matching investor behaviour and day-to-day 
portfolio management. As ‘open-ended’ funds, investors can decide to buy new units at any 
time. If there are no off-setting redemptions by other investors, these new units will expand 
the total funds of the unit trust and the additional cash will need to be promptly invested by 
the fund manager if performance is to be maintained.
In practice, unit trust managers are able to net redemptions (sales) of units against purchases, 
but much of a unit trust’s manager’s time is still spent dealing with the investment 
repercussions of the volatile, externally based, cash flows to and from investors. These 
normally need to be matched on a daily basis (although there will be buffering cash balances) 
and shares held by the unit trust bought and sold accordingly.
Unit trust managers I interviewed quoted portfolio turnover rates of 200 - 300% in a year. 
These compare with a typical pension or life fund, and many investment trusts, of 20 - 25% a 
year or less. However, the gross rates of turnover for unit trusts are misleading: few unit 
trusts will be completely reorganising their entire portfolio two or three times a year, as these 
figures might imply. Within a unit trust, typically containing shares in 80-100 companies, 
there will be much lower volatility around ‘core’ holdings than shorter-term investments.
Dealing and management costs are also proportionately higher for very active funds like unit 
trusts and the pressures on the fund managers are severe. Unit trust values are quoted daily in 
newspapers and performance comparisons made across a range of timescales (and often in 
competitors’ advertising).
Fund managers at life companies claimed that their investment philosophy, when managing 
unit trusts in-house, was very similar to that of their main life funds in terms of asset allocation 
and stock selection. Nevertheless, all unit trust managers will be subject to at least some of 
the pressures that I have outlined above.
Through 1993 and early 1994, the rate of new investment into unit trusts far exceeded 
redemptions and the size of the unit trust sector expanded considerably. Much of this was
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invested by unit trust managers in UK equities. More dramatic increases were experienced by 
mutual funds in the USA, leading Henry Kaufman (previously Chief Economist of Goldman 
Sachs, New York) to predict that the short-term nature of much of this retail investment 
would increase the overall volatility of the US equity and fixed income markets, and therefore 
the cost of these kinds of funding for companies.
The UK fund managers of unit and investment trusts who I interviewed were of the opinion 
that retail investors in their funds were very different in their expectations and investment 
horizons. Holders of shares in investment trusts were seen as ‘under-standing what investing 
in shares is all about’ and as being much closer to the ‘traditional’ share owner than the unit 
trust investor. In contrast, investments in unit trusts (particularly those not linked to a regular 
savings plan) are seen as much more volatile.
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III Investment Decisions
The ‘top down’, asset allocation driven, approach to equity investment, which is used by 
many UK fund managers, still requires the selection of individual companies in which to 
invest. The role of the portfolio manager is to select companies and implement buy and sell 
programmes within the framework of his (or her) firm’s asset allocation guidelines, the 
resources of the fund (which may also include debt if the fund is geared) and the investment 
mandate.
In practice, fund managers vary widely in the degree of flexibility they allow their portfolio 
managers. In this Section I discuss some of the most important factors which influence policy 
towards stock selection and some of the issues which arise from these.
A Internal Guidelines
Fund managers operate a range of policies which seek to influence or control the presence of 
individual companies in their portfolios. Some fund managers have regularly reviewed ‘black 
lists’ of companies, which portfolio managers will not be allowed to hold under any 
circumstances. A number of fund managers I interviewed described how the Maxwell
companies (Mirror Group and Maxwell Communications), Polly Peck and British &
(
Commonwealth had been on their black lists - often placed there by senior directors, or 
portfolio managers or fund trustees on the basis of personal experience.
The number of companies on fund managers’ black lists appears to be relatively small, but 
they are often placed there on the basis that ‘no way would one of our directors allow any 
company connected with Maxwell to be bought by one of our portfolio managers’.
Possibly more widespread is the use of ‘grey lists’. These are generally produced within a 
fund management team rather than imposed from above. Grey lists typically consist of 
companies about which portfolio managers have growing concerns whatever their apparent 
short-term prospects. Grey lists are reported as working more through peer pressure than
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management diktat, and represent the result of a mixture of fundamental analysis and ‘gut’ 
feel from those with personal experience of the company or its directors.
‘White’ lists contain those companies which a portfolio manager must invest in, often with a 
minimum weighting specified (eg BAA, 0.75%). A portfolio manager will have discretion to 
go above this level if he or she wishes, but other parameters may also have the effect of 
constraining the maximum investment (eg no more than 1% in any one company).
Life fund managers and in-house pension fund managers explained that, amongst the top 30 
or 50 companies, there was little question that at least some shares would be held in their 
funds on the basis that:
‘some companies will never be out of our portfolio, the only question is one of 
weighting’.
The degree of weighting (level of investment relative to a company’s market capitalisation 
divided by total market capitalisation or the aggregate capitalisation of all the companies 
included in a reference index) they were referring to was typically plus or minus 20% (120% 
to 80%) or, at most, 30% (130% to 70%).
This is a far smaller variance than that allowed by the larger independent pension fund 
managers; who can be seen to be regularly vaiying their holdings between de minimus levels 
and over-weightings of three or four times.
A.i Percentage limits
All fund managers had established boundaries setting the maximum aggregate shareholding 
that they would take in an individual company. The highest level, even for the largest fund 
managers, was generally 15%. Beyond this level they claimed that they would feel 
‘uncomfortable’ and that the holding would be of an ‘inappropriate’ size.
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Holdings of this order are most common amongst smaller capitalisation companies, but there 
are indications that the proportion of big stakes (10% plus) in large capitalisation companies 
has also been increasing.
Few holdings above 15% are found in companies which cannot be explained as a result of a 
‘strategic’ investment by another company, usually operating in a related business, or as being 
due to the aggregation of founder/family holdings.
A.ii Size of company
Portfolio managers are given much greater freedom over their investments in smaller 
companies than large, but many fund managers do not invest directly in ‘small companies’ at 
all. Smaller companies may be defined either in terms of market capitalisation or membership 
of a market index.
Minimum market capitalisations of £25 million or £50 million were the most frequently cited 
by larger fund managers. Minimum capitalisations of £250-350 million were quoted amongst 
smaller (non-specialist) fund managers.
Policies towards investment outside these ‘small company’ limits varied; some fund managers 
had no exposure at all. Others invested either through specialist in-house smaller company 
funds or through specialist funds run by other fiind management groups (although there is a 
strong aversion to giving other fund managers fees for managing specialist portfolios).
Except in the cases of relatively specialist fund management groups, M&G being the most 
notable example, it is clear that smaller companies (however defined) are seen as making a 
minimal impact on overall portfolio performance. Even at a 15% ownership level, the 
contribution made is almost of no consequence to most portfolios and fund managers; with 
the exception of those specifically geared towards smaller companies.
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A.iii Weighting
Fund managers apply widely different limits to the degree to which they will be prepared to 
overweight individual companies in their portfolios. This is an issue which may be influenced 
by company size. Smaller fund managers, who may feel uncomfortable with going 
significantly overweight in a large capitalisation company (which in value terms may represent 
a substantial portion of their managed funds), appear to find this less of a problem with 
smaller capitalisation companies. For example, a fund manager with a maximum over­
weighting of (say) 20% in a ‘Top 50’ company may have a policy of not going more than 
100% overweight in a company in the Mid-250 index, but will be happy to go above this level 
for the right company below the Mid-250.
By taking this approach, fund managers may be trying to balance out the impact of their 
decision-making on investment performance, because they need to invest more heavily in 
smaller companies to achieve the same potential contribution to fund performance as would 
be achieved through a much smaller stake in a larger company.
This model also assumes that the fund manager is at least as well informed about smaller 
companies as it is about large companies; certainly in respect of the latter it is unlikely to have 
any competitive information-based advantage compared with other, larger and better 
resourced fund managers. One of the problems associated with this approach is the risk of 
low correlations with (capitalisation weighted) market indices, which may not be tolerated by 
investors and beneficiaries even if there is long-term out-performance. (This approach to fund 
management is similar to that used by private shareholders who decide to invest in companies 
almost irrespective of their market capitalisation, but the amount they invest is based on how 
well informed they feel about the company compared to others).
Many funds have a limit to the proportion of an individual fund that may be invested in a 
single company. This may be imposed by the fund manager as a matter of prudence, by the 
trustees, or directors of a fund. Maximum proportions of 2.5% and 5% were quoted in a 
number of interviews.
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A.iv Regulation
External regulations may also impose limits on the size of a stake that any individual fund 
manager may hold in companies in particular industries, examples being banking, media and 
defence.
The Banking Act effectively restricts the maximum single holding of a single investor to 10%. 
Although certain changes came into effect from 1/1/94 to the rules governing the ownership 
and cross-ownership of broadcast television companies, restrictions still apply to the 
maximum stake that may be held by certain investors.
At the time of their flotations, ownership by 'overseas’ investors was restricted to 15% in 
defence companies Rolls Royce and British Aerospace (BAe); subsequently these limits were 
increased to 25% and, more recently, to 49%.
A.v Divergence
The greater the freedom of portfolio managers within a fund management group, the greater 
divergence there will be in the returns from the portfolios they manage. Mercury, which is 
seen as allowing its portfolio managers more freedom than many others, is also thought to 
have the widest spread of investment returns.
Conversely, Schroders is seen as allowing far less flexibility and, as a result, it also has the 
reputation of delivering the most consistent returns across its different funds; both year-on- 
year and within the same year.
The divergence of portfolio returns from funds with similar, if not identical, investment 
objectives is substantially a function of the strictness with which asset allocation and stock 
selection requirements are imposed on portfolio managers, in turn reflecting the style and 
internal culture of the organisation. Greater freedom will allow ‘star’ portfolio managers to 
perform well, but also runs the risk that less successful portfolio managers will significantly 
under-perform; increasing the divergence of returns and possibly dragging down the fund 
manager’s average performance over a given time period.
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A.vi New mandates
Fund managers described the process of taking over a pension fund portfolio as normally one 
of rationalisation, involving the realignment of the portfolio (to match the new manager’s 
asset allocation model and stock selections and a reduction in the number of companies in the 
portfolio).
The shares in a portfolio which no longer meets the target profile of the fund (which will have 
been agreed in principle with the fund’s trustees as part of the appointment process) will 
either need to be transferred to another fund (with different investment objectives) or sold.
One fund manager claimed to regularly monitor changes in pension fund management 
mandates, as the resulting realignment of shareholdings could provide buying opportunities 
amongst the companies being rapidly sold out of the portfolio by the new fund manager.
A number of companies also mentioned that they had seen share stakes ‘follow’ a portfolio 
manager who had changed jobs, moving from one fund manager to another. This would not 
necessarily happen immediately, but does highlight the personal discretion of individual 
portfolio managers (particularly outside the FT-SE 100 universe of companies).
B Liquidity
One of the major concerns of fund managers is the liquidity of a company’s shares. Although 
there are technical definitions of liquidity, fund managers I interviewed spoke more loosely of 
liquidity first as a broad indication of how easy it would be to buy or sell a company’s shares 
in normal market conditions, when the shares are being regularly traded and priced, and 
second where there are active institutional buyers and sellers in the market and when 
conditions were unfavourable; in the event of a 'worst case’ scenario.
The latter condition might arise, for example, if bad news had been announced about a 
company and other fund managers were willing to sell at increasingly lower prices in order to 
clear their positions. In an absence of willing buyers, trades may prove impossible to execute,
Chapter 4: Fund Management 150
as market makers show prices at volumes which are too small to be of use to fund managers 
and are unwilling to take significant positions beyond the trade sizes shown in their quotes.
This is more often a problem with small companies (for which even in stable markets there 
may be limited institutional interest) and there is little likelihood of new investors coming into 
the market at a time when the news is bad and other major shareholders, who will be assumed 
by other investors to be better informed than themselves, are known to be selling.
Fund managers are very concerned to take liquidity issues into account when planning their 
overall investment strategy and weightings in different market sectors. Smaller companies are 
widely regarded as having lower liquidity than large companies. In the absence of other 
information, market capitalisation is a rough guide to likely liquidity in normal market 
conditions. Liquidity issues (ie constraints on selling a company’s shares) are seen as one of 
the primary factors leading to close relationships between smaller companies and their larger 
institutional shareholders (ie the normal option of selling a company’s shares in times of 
management or market under-performance or corporate distress is replaced by higher and 
more explicit levels of shareholder monitoring than would normally be the case).
Liquidity in some smaller company shares is so low that only one market maker is willing to 
quote prices. Alternatively transactions are made through the matching of individual orders 
through the SEATS system. Factors seen by fund managers as increasing the liquidity of 
shares include a spread of shareholders and share-holdings amongst institutional investors, the 
issuing of new shares and the strength of the London market in block trading.
The liquidity of recently floated companies was believed to fall (sometimes dramatically, 
particularly for small companies) after flotation. However, the preference of institutions for 
buying shares in the primary (new issue) market may now be changing and is almost certainly 
becoming more selective. One fund manager thought that the mere availability of new issues 
(of bonds and equities) had been a major influence on institutional investment strategies and 
their use of cash over the last few years; ie investment strategy was supply and not demand 
driven:
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‘Fund managers have a great tendency to buy what we are sold - it’s as simple 
as that. It explains why we bought a lot of bonds last year but this year are 
buying more equities. You don’t need a big theory to explain something as 
simple as that.’
B.i Breadth of shareholdings
The diversity of shareholders and shareholdings amongst institutional investors is seen as 
making a significant contribution to liquidity in a company’s shares. Companies whose shares 
are ‘tightly’ held were seen by fund managers as likely to be less liquid than those with a 
broader spread of shareholders.
This is because a larger group of shareholders would be expected to contain a higher 
proportion of marginal buyers and sellers than a small 'fan club’ of institutions (controlling the 
same percentage of shares), each of which would retain a large part of their holdings as a 
‘core’ investment.
Conversely, companies which are not positioned in a portfolio as a long-term holding will be 
traded more actively. One fimd manager gave the example of Shell as being a company that 
would always be traded in and out of a portfolio at the margin, but British Steel as a cyclical 
stock towards which sentiment would change steadily over the economic cycle, as therefore 
would the pattern of institutional holdings.
As these examples demonstrate, the relationships between liquidity and shareholder profile are 
extremely complex, but both fund managers and companies believe that the level of ‘core’ 
holdings by institutional investors and holdings by directors’, their families and other private 
investors are amongst the most important factors in determining liquidity.
One company I interviewed had expected its share register to contract when it joined the FT- 
SE 100 index, but found the opposite to be the case. It believed this to be because indexed 
funds had to buy the company’s shares and, also, fund managers who had previously paid 
little attention to the company were now doing so.
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B.ii New share issues
The issuing of new shares (through rights issues) by already listed companies was seen as 
adding liquidity and marketability to a company’s shares.
One company had deliberately used the issue of a convertible bond (which was also 
structured to be particularly attractive to European investors) to increase the proportion of its 
shares held by European institutions (on conversion). The conversion of bonds has made a 
significant contribution to the total number of shares issued by major UK companies in the 
last ten years.
B.iii Block trades
One of the ways in which fund managers can avoid undermining their own sell programmes is 
through block trading. This refers to the sale or purchase of a large number of shares in a 
single company. Typically at least several times bigger than the Normal Market Size (NMS) 
quoted by market makers, block trades are priced according to private negotiation. Smith 
New Court is reported as being the biggest intermediary in block trades on the London 
market.
From a company’s point of view, block trades can reduce or even eliminate a serious 
imbalance in supply and demand for its shares and thus potential instability (volatility) in the 
company’s share price. How the block is resold (intact or broken up by the broker/market 
maker), the identity of the vendor and that of the eventual purchasers) are all factors which 
will affect the ownership profile of the company.
When discussing the contribution of block trades to the overall liquidity of the market, it is 
important to distinguish between what are known as ‘programme trades’ in London and 
‘program trading’ which is particularly associated, in New York, with the activities of index, 
quant and hedge funds.
Block trades in London normally only involve a change in the ownership of a single company; 
the risk to the broker is therefore company specific. In contrast, programme trades by a fund
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manager involve a ‘bundle’ of shares in companies, all or many of which will not be disclosed 
to the broker. Programme trades typically take place when an institution is remodelling part 
of its portfolio of shares. This may occur as a result of a change in asset allocation (affecting 
the composition of many portfolios) or changes in portfolios which have recently been 
acquired for management.
C Declarable Stakes
A fund manager with UK equity funds equivalent to in excess of 3% of the total market will 
naturally find that a high proportion of its stakes will be above the 3% level. The Prudential 
(for example) has several hundred holdings above 3%, as do many of the other larger fund 
managers. In contrast, a smaller fund manager, with a portfolio equivalent to 1% of the 
market, would need to be more than 3 times overweight in a company before the stake was 
declarable.
Smaller fund managers are less comfortable with the idea of holding declarable stakes in 
companies, as may be their clients. As a result, several fund managers applied a limit of 3% to 
their stake in any one company. It would also appear that some pension fund trustees have 
included in their fund management mandates a restriction that they do not wish to hold (or be 
directly associated with through participation in a non-segregated ‘house’ pension fund) 
declarable stakes.
This requirement may become quite complicated to administer if a number of fund managers 
are acting for a single pension fund (for example an indexed and two actively managed funds), 
who will therefore need to be aware of each other’s portfolios (remembering also that an 
indexed fund manager may not actually hold shares equivalent to those in the reference index, 
but be achieving the indexation through the use of derivatives).
The reasons for this sensitivity to holding declarable stakes would appear to be both external 
and internal.
C i External factors
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Trustees are wary of the balance of investment risk and reward involved in being particularly 
exposed to an individual company. In turn, fund managers want to avoid exposures that they 
know are likely to concern a fund’s trustees, particularly as there may be little likelihood of 
gain in terms of overall fund performance. (These sort of issues will, in any case, normally 
form part of the fund manager’s investment mandate from the trustees and be regularly 
reviewed with them).
Pension fund tmstees are also sensitive to the public profile that their investments may have 
with their contributors and pensioners. A pension fund known to be a major (ie over 3%) 
shareholder in a failed or failing company could find this extremely damaging to the 
confidence of its members. Trustees understandably wish to avoid the problems that may arise 
if they are seen as being responsible for appointing a fund manager whose judgement has 
proved inadequate: whatever the underlying investment issues that might be involved or the 
overall returns achieved by the fund.
C.ii Internal factors
A portfolio manager who takes a larger than normal stake in a company will need to be 
confident that this will be recognised internally as a sound and justifiable (defensible) decision. 
As the size of a stake gets larger (in terms of percentage of a company’s issued equity or the 
size of the fund) so a portfolio manager needs to be increasingly confident that the size of the 
stake will be justified by the expected rewards, after taking into account the risks involved.
Fund management organisations are close knit, and the internal checks and balances on 
investment are both based on social relationships and formalised within the organisation’s 
reporting structures. Many fund managers feel that they are not paid to make risky decisions; 
but that they are paid to make sound, and therefore defensible, decisions.
D Aggregation of Shareholdings
Although all fund managers place some restrictions on the maximum proportion of companies 
they can hold in their portfolios (typically around 15%), the size of the aggregate holding is
Chapter 4: Fund Management 155
not an objective in itself. One of the largest pension fund managers described this issue in the 
following terms:
‘People think that we set out to have holdings that large, but in fact we don't - 
it's the effect of all the separate decisions our fund managers have made about 
the holdings in their portfolios. But we only really take a close interest in the 
total when it reaches 10% of a company, when the investment committee has to 
authorise it to go further, but the maximum is always around 15%, beyond 
which we would never want to go, however attractive the company.’
One major institutional fund manager operates a 'buy list’ of around 200 companies; but a 
company on this list would not suddenly appear in every portfolio of every manager. Instead, 
portfolio managers would gradually buy shares in the company, adding to existing holdings 
and introduce the shares to new portfolios as market conditions and the requirements of 
individual portfolios allowed.
Fund managers described ‘buy programmes’ as taking anything from two months to two 
years, during which time share purchases would be made at many different prices. A number 
of fund managers were happy buying into a falling market on the basis that the average cost 
of the shares was falling, increasing the gearing of the original decision when prices started to 
rise. However, this kind of sustained buying takes considerable nerve and as many fund 
managers would prefer to buy in a rising market, showing profits on earlier purchases as the 
buy programme progresses. Conversely, selling shares into a rising market takes conviction as 
profits are apparently being given to other investors.
Nevertheless, these differing investment strategies do not explain all share register movements 
and companies were often perplexed by the way certain fund managers appeared to buy and 
sell their shares with completely the wrong timing; selling at the bottom and buying at the top, 
whilst others followed more ‘conventional’ wisdom, building their stakes around a low in the 
share price and selling out near a peak. However, ownership, as signalled by an analysis of the 
share register, may not reflect the underlying position of the fund manager if derivatives are 
also being used to enhance or hedge equity positions.
Whilst buying programmes may take place over many months, once a fund manager had 
turned bearish on a share, sell programmes were reported as being much more rapidly
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executed. Other fund managers seek, as a matter of course, to execute both buy and sell 
programmes in as short a space of time as possible - typically only one or two days, even for 
significant (+1%) stakes in a company.
Fund managers differed greatly in their views about their ability to ‘exit’ from a company 
under different market conditions. For many, liquidity issues were seen as putting a major 
constraint on their willingness to invest in a company above a certain level.
Others were bolder in their assertion that
‘it is always possible to get out of a share if you need to’
and virtually dismissed market liquidity and the size of their shareholdings as restricting their 
ability to manage their portfolios in the way they would want to.
The crux of these differences of opinion is probably one of timing; to sell a large holding just 
before a share price falls (the first may of course trigger the second) may be smart, but to try 
to sell when other major shareholders are doing the same thing can be a major problem.
One international fund manager had analysed its investment timing across different markets 
and had found that it bought and sold shares too early (ie share prices continued to fall after a 
buying programme had been instigated and prices continued to rise after sell programmes had 
been completed) but also that this was probably the best that could be achieved given the size 
of the stakes involved.
Companies are very sensitive to the gradual building of holdings by fund managers, which 
then may be rapidly sold. Mercury was seen as the most ‘dangerous’ in this respect. Almost 
every company that I interviewed which had Mercury as a significant shareholder was wary of 
the damage that the disposal of a substantial shareholding by Mercury could have on the 
company’s share price. This is, of course, the opposite side of the coin of the out- 
performance claimed by so called 'aggressive’ fund managers.
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E Monitoring of Shareholdings
All but the smallest companies regularly reviewed their share register. The widespread use of 
nominee accounts in the UK means that the share register itself provides only limited 
information about the ownership of the company, as all institutional fund managers routinely 
hold shares in nominee accounts. These are also used widely by private client stockbrokers to 
facilitate the administration and operation of discretionary accounts (in which the broker 
makes buying and selling decisions about a client’s portfolio) and also for non-discretionary 
accounts and dealing services (the major exception being Sharelink).
Many corporate brokers and specialist consultancies supply their clients with a shareholder 
identification service, which attempts to match the holdings set out in the share register to 
fund managers and beneficial owners. Typically the holdings of each fund manager will also 
be compared with their expected market weighting, based on their total funds invested in the 
UK equity market. These analyses can be used to identify institutions which are ‘under’ and 
‘over-weight’ and inform, for example, the management of investor relations programmes or 
the pre-marketing of a rights issue.
To many companies and fund managers there is an anomaly in the way that institutional 
holdings are declared in the UK. This arises from the way that companies are able to identify 
their ownership but are under no obligation to disclose this information to their other 
shareholders; and the fact that fund managers are obliged to declare holdings above 3% to the 
Stock Exchange, but only if they believe that they have an 'interest’ in the shares. Stakes 
declared in this way must also be published by companies in their annual reports.
Under EC legislation which came into effect in 1993, fund managers are now required to 
declare holdings above 10.0%, even if they do not have an 'interest’ in the shares. Of all the 
major fund managers, Mercury is alone in apparently routinely (at the time of my research) 
taking the view that it did not have an interest in the shares it manages for its clients, under 
the terms of the Companies Act (1985). This is reported to be on the grounds that it does not 
have an interest in the shares because it is neither the beneficial owner (in common with all 
other fund managers) nor does it routinely hold the voting rights for the shares in its 
investment portfolios.
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However, Mercury does not seek to disguise or hide the size of its holdings from the 
companies in which it invests. In normal circumstances Mercury and many other fund 
managers will, at 1:1 meetings with companies, update them about the size of their aggregate 
holding (but not the allocation of shares between individual funds). Although useful to 
companies, this method of disclosure has the weaknesses that it is: informal; driven by the 
timing of meetings, which may only take place once a year or less frequently and that the 
information is not generally available to other shareholders or investors.
The operation of share register analysis is normally supplemented by the issuing of ‘Section 
212’ notices by companies (although corporate brokers will administer these as part of their 
service), or ‘quasi’ 212 letters which extract the same information about beneficial ownership 
without the continuing disclosure requirements of the subsequent sections of the Companies 
Act (1985). These continuing requirements are seen by some companies as administratively 
burdensome and the issuing of 212 notices as suggesting a level of distrust between 
themselves and their (major) shareholders.
Companies which fear a hostile takeover or stake building by another company have few 
qualms about issuing Section 212 notices in order to discover the beneficial ownership of 
their shares. However, the administration of these notices and the ability of respondents to 
reasonably delay reply, can prove a problem for companies rapidly seeking information about 
their ownership, particularly if a takeover bid is feared or in progress.
Chapter 4: Fund Management 159
IV Types of Shareholder
In company interviews I asked what, if any, objectives had been set or agreed for the 
ownership of the company. In this Section I also review the views companies had about their 
current ownership and what, if anything, they were seeking to change.
A Institutional Shareholders
With few exceptions, companies felt that ‘in an ideal world’ they would not want any 
individual institution to hold more than around 7-8% of their shares, although in individual 
cases they felt ‘comfortable’ with specific institutions who held 10% or more. In almost all 
the cases the institutions mentioned in this context were either the larger life funds or M&G.
Fund managers which companies felt least comfortable with holding levels in excess of 7-8% 
included Gartmore, UBS and Mercury. Although the portfolio managers at Mercury were 
widely viewed as being very professional and knowledgeable about the companies in which 
they invested, the investment strategy of Mercury was seen as being very active; this is from 
where the 'danger’ was felt to come.
Companies did not object so much to stakes (in excess of 7-8%) being acquired or built up by 
Mercury or other large active fund managers; the problem arose in the perception that, sooner 
or later, that stake of this size (or a significant tranche) would be sold, with an unknown effect 
on the share price.
In general, it is the potential short- to medium-term effect on the company’s share price, 
rather than the longer-term ownership structure of the company, which is of the greatest 
concern to companies; except where a company felt that the movement of a stake might 
increase the risk of a takeover or the power of a potential bidder.
In one interview a Finance Director calculated that a 4% stake (not large for many fund 
managers) in his company was equivalent to two months’ customer turn-over in the 
company’s shares. Concerns about ‘loose stock’ appeared to be greatest with smaller
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capitalisation companies. Large companies were more likely to feel that the low level of 
hostile takeovers in the early 1990s meant that there were fewer fears now about 'where the 
stock ended up’ if a sizable stake was sold.
A.i Ideal shareholder profiles
Companies differed about what they saw as their ‘ideal’ (UK) institutional shareholder profile. 
A minority of companies felt that it was best to have a small number each owning ‘around 
4%’.
‘I want a small group of institutions, who have big enough stakes to take their 
shareholding seriously and who also know that they are one of a small group of 
the most important shareholders from my point of view9
is how one company Mid-250 CEO expressed the benefits of a concentration in institutional 
ownership.
Other companies felt that a shareholder profile which matched 'the market’ would be ideal, 
one in which fund managers’ shareholdings would be proportional to their total UK equity 
investments. However, this view was tempered by the belief that such an objective would be 
impossible to achieve in practice. The main constraints were seen as: the way individual 
institutions invest; the resources required to achieve a broader shareholder profile; and 
continuing concentration in the ownership and fund management of UK equities.
Around half the companies I interviewed felt that their current profile was about right, except 
that almost all of these also had concerns about individual institutions controlling more than 
7-8% of their shares. Apparent satisfaction with the 'status quo’ needs to be viewed in light of 
the inability many companies feel to significantly influence where their shares are held.
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B Private Shareholders
Most companies felt that they were also unable to influence the proportion of their shares held 
by private shareholders, or the number of private shareholders, and that the long-term decline 
in private share ownership was set to continue. A major reason for this was seen as being the 
attractiveness of collective investments such as investment trusts, unit trusts, PEPs, insurance 
policies and pension funds, of which the last three enjoy fiscal benefits which are not available 
to direct private shareholders, and all provide easy mechanisms for diversifying company 
specific risks when investing in equities.
In fact, many companies felt that private shareholders should invest through such collective 
investments and not directly in companies:
‘Few private shareholders know or understand enough and [also] have enough 
money to sensibly invest directly in the market’
commented a FT-SE100 company Chairman. It is a view that was held by many companies 
and (inevitably) by all the fund managers with whom I discussed this issue.
Many privatised companies have a very large number of private shareholders with minimum 
sized holdings - generally matching the allocation they received at the time of the flotation 
(plus any applicable loyalty/customer bonuses).
B.i Shareholder dealing services
A number of companies had run, over the last couple of years, low cost share dealing services 
for their private shareholders, normally for a relatively short period, such as a month. The 
impact of these schemes was generally found to be to concentrate ownership amongst private 
shareholders. Although the number of private shareholders selling shares was, in each case, 
greater than those buying, the number of shares involved was roughly equal and therefore the 
overall proportion of shares held by private shareholders remained approximately the same.
Although none of the companies professed disappointment with this result, for some the 
original objective appeared to have been to manage a decrease in either the number of private
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shareholders, the proportion of shares held by them, or both. Generally, these schemes appear 
to achieve less than companies hope, although through their own and other companies’ 
experiences there is now greater awareness of the likely outcome.
B.ii Costs
With very large private shareholder registers, companies were very conscious of the costs 
involved in producing and mailing annual reports, interim reports and dividend cheques. 
Several commented that these costs exceeded the value of the dividends paid to private 
shareholders with small or the smallest holdings. One company has instituted a cost reduction 
programme in servicing private shareholders in the same way as it has in many other parts of 
its business; aiming at a 15% decline each year. One saving, of not sending private 
shareholders a copy of the interim report, had not resulted (it was claimed) in a single 
comment or complaint.
B.iii Private shareholders as advocates
Several privatised companies felt that, although the numbers involved were not of their 
making, private shareholders provided a foundation for background awareness in the 
community about the company’s activities, which if necessary could be channelled into wider 
support for its activities.
Examples given concerned planning permission and environmental issues, although only one 
of the companies I interviewed had actually tried to enlist shareholder support on a specific 
(regulatory) issue. The results of this attempt, amongst both institutional and private 
shareholders, were apparently negligible and disappointing. This suggests that for other 
companies too both private and institutional shareholders are likely to be of limited value in 
regulatory and political lobbying.
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B.iv Private shareholders as customers
Privatised companies with large numbers of direct customers had mixed experiences when 
seeking to build closer relationships with their customer/shareholders. Three specific 
examples were:
• A regional utility generated a very high level of response to a shareholder survey.
• Promotions selling products (linked to the company’s services) at 'preferential’ prices 
produced a very low response from shareholders.
• Private shareholders, who were also direct customers, were more loyal than shareholders 
who did not have any prior relationship with the company. The proportion of shareholders 
who are also customers is therefore now greater than in the period immediately after 
flotation.
Overall, privatised companies felt that they had far too many private shareholders in relation 
to the proportion of the companies owned by private shareholders and compared with other 
non-privatised companies. However, they also appeared to be very concerned to follow what 
they believed to be 'best practice’ in private shareholder communications and relationships, 
specifically with respect to their annual reports, the handling of shareholder enquiries and 
AGMs.
B.v Annual reports
Privatised companies in particular felt that it was very important to present information in the 
annual report with the private shareholder in mind.
‘Our Annual Report is written for our private shareholders while almost 
everything else we do is for the institutions’
is how an executive director of one of the privatised utilities described its approach, although 
others remain concerned with the high levels of costs (per copy and total) involved. This was 
particularly the case if the volumes involved did not warrant producing a ‘short form’ Annual
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Report to more cost effectively meet the limited information requirements of private 
shareholders.
B.vi Shareholder enquiries
Many privatised companies, particularly the direct utilities, are used to handling a large 
number of telephone calls and letters from private individuals and have applied these 
techniques to deal with their private shareholders. The efficient management of shareholder 
queries was seen as an extension of their customer relations and call handling systems.
A second benefit was having a single focal point for shareholder queries as a way of avoiding 
other parts of the organisation becoming clogged with telephone calls and shareholder 
enquiries.
B.vii AGMs
Privatised companies feel that it is important to take the planning and management of their 
AGMs very seriously and devote substantial resources to the event; in one case the cost came 
to over £1 million, excluding substantial amounts of internal management time. There is a 
feeling in these companies that the AGM is a showcase; particularly amongst regional 
privatisations in terms of their local community and media. However, the initial enthusiasm 
for AGMs amongst privatisation shareholders appears to be declining. All the privatised 
companies I interviewed reported falling attendances. In response, there has been a general 
scaling back in the size of AGM 'events’ for shareholders.
C Employee Shareholders
Almost all the companies operated executive option schemes and many also organise 
'sharesave’ schemes for their staff. Employee share ownership was widely supported, but was 
seen as a separate issue to the ownership of the company’s shares by private individuals who 
had no prior relationship with the company. A number of companies had got close to the 
ABI/NAPF recommended maximum of a 10% distribution of shares to employees (over a ten 
year period) through a combination of their option and sharesave schemes.
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A high proportion of shares acquired through the exercising of executive options are reported 
by companies as being sold more or less immediately. Companies commented that executive 
options are treated as an addition to income and are not therefore held as a continuing 
investment in the company. The funds released through the exercising of options by directors 
and senior executives were more typically used to reduce mortgages, pay for school fees or 
add to pension plans.
Only one company appeared to have a specific policy of wanting senior executives to hold 
significant personal stakes in the business. On this issue, opinions held by other companies 
were divided as to whether an executive (or Director) should be obliged (in effect as a 
condition of employment) to hold a significant proportion of his wealth in his employing 
company. This is an idea that has gained some currency in the USA but has not been 
developed in the UK.
The major arguments against the requirement for such stakes were described as: a dislike of 
coercion in respect of an individual’s private finances; the problem of much lower levels of 
personal wealth in the UK amongst middle and senior managers; and the financial risks of 
placing personal wealth in the company of employment.
Arguments in favour include the closer alignment of personal and corporate goals beyond the 
exercise date of the original option. Many directors with significant personal stakes in the 
company they work for have held these since the foundation of the company, or since their 
own company was taken over. Relatively few have joined a company and then invested 
significant private wealth into the company through the acquisition of shares. However, one 
of the CEOs I interviewed had done just that, and felt that he was
‘far tougher as a shareholder than a CEO’
but that the circumstances involved were unusual.
Nevertheless, this example highlights another issue, one that separates the way staff acquire 
shares through 'sharesave’ and similar schemes, and the operation of executive options, in
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which the executive places no money at risk until the option is exercised (and even then only 
briefly through the use of special broking services). In contrast, sharesave schemes require 
staff to contribute on a regular basis, normally through payroll deduction. The continuing cash 
commitment made by employees (admittedly some of whom will almost certainly also be 
directors and senior executives) through these schemes is of quite a different kind to the 
operation of executive option schemes.
Despite the widespread support and implementation of executive options and employee 
sharesave schemes amongst the companies, there is little independent evidence that corporate 
performance is enhanced through their operation. In fact the opposite may be the case, since it 
appears that companies do not fully cost or value the net impact of such schemes on 
shareholder wealth (the balance between possible short-term improvements in performance 
against long-term equity dilution), although shareholders are becoming increasingly 
concerned about the operation of executive option and other incentive schemes.
D Foreign Shareholdings
The third category of non-UK fund manager shareholdings I discussed with companies were 
those held by overseas fund managers.
In general, only the FT-SE 100 companies had significant foreign holdings. Two, (SmithKline 
Beecham and Shell) had two classes of share, one of which was primarily held by UK 
domestic institutions, the other by US fund managers (and in the case of Shell, also by 
Continental investors).
The range of foreign shareholdings amongst the FT-SE 100 companies ranged from up to 
40% to a de minimus level. Outside the FT-SE 100 there were few significant overseas 
investors; a level of 5% or less appeared to be typical for a Mid-250 company. Definitions of 
foreign shareholdings are complicated for two reasons.
First, many non-UK institutional investors acquire their shares through the London market. 
This is typically the pattern with major US funds, which prefer to hold shares traded in the 
most liquid market. Even UK companies with American Depository Receipts (ADRs) find
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that a high proportion of their US investors hold ordinary shares (ie those traded in the 
London market) because of the liquidity issue. Secondly, many foreign owned fund managers 
manage their UK equity portfolios through London offices (in the case of Templeton, 
Edinburgh) and the decisions about these holdings will be taken in the UK. Meetings between 
companies and these fund managers will typically be held in London.
When companies refer to 'foreign’ holdings they generally refer to the location of the 
portfolio manager making the investment decisions about their shares, rather than the legal 
domicile of the fund or its underlying investors. US institutions hold the highest proportion of 
foreign holdings of UK listed companies. To service these investors many large UK 
companies visit the USA at least once a year to meet their shareholders and other US 
institutions known to invest in UK equities. A small number of the companies had an 
executive based in New York to liaise more closely with US fund managers than is possible 
from London.
D.i US investors
Amongst the largest companies I interviewed, there is only a weak relationship between 
proportion of sales and shares held in the USA. The ratio is always less than one and more 
typically 0.5 or less (eg 40% of sales in US, less than 20% of shares held by US institutions). 
It appears that the smaller the company (measured by market capitalisation or sales revenue) 
the lower this ratio and that shares will tend to be held amongst a relatively small group of US 
institutions which have a particular focus on non-US/UK companies. However, the pattern is 
idiosyncratic; a number of UK utilities are seen as particularly attractive to US investors, not 
because they have sales in the USA, but because the regulatory environment in the UK is seen 
as offering higher investment returns, particularly to US funds specialising in, or tilted 
towards, utility stocks.
Currency risks are higher for US fund managers investing in UK companies as the portion of 
their sales in the US falls. UK companies selling/operating worldwide are therefore less likely 
to be held in US portfolio than more focused Anglo-American groups, in which US exposure 
and US$ revenues will also be much more visible to US investors.
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I found that large UK companies, with a relatively high proportion of their worldwide sales 
revenue in the USA, generally wanted to increase the proportion of their shares held in the 
USA, although the prospect of achieving a match (ie a ratio of 1:1) was seen both as 
unrealistic and as unnecessary. Medium-sized (Mid-250) companies had few ambitions of this 
kind, although one, with extensive defence interests, felt that a higher proportion of US 
shareholdings, assisted by a New York listing, might help generate a more favourable 
relationship with the US Department of Defense when seeking business.
Although around 100 UK companies are listed on the New York Stock Exchange, only one 
(Shell) is included in the S&P 500 index. This is one of the factors driving Shell’s 
shareholdings in the USA as S&P index funds will have to hold the shares.
In contrast, and although the logic appears somewhat convoluted, not being included in the 
S&P 500 was not seen as a disadvantage amongst those companies with whom I discussed 
this issue, on the basis that a portfolio manager could afford to take more of a risk with a non- 
S&P 500 stock, precisely because it was not included in the index.
US listings were seen by those companies who had them as providing important credibility 
and a link with US investors. It also means that accounts had to be filed with the SEC which 
met US accounting and disclosure standards and which therefore better met the information 
needs of US analysts and fund managers than their UK reports and accounts.
The reputation of US fund managers as 'long-term’ investors is mixed; some companies saw 
them as being loyal shareholders, others as short-term and volatile. A CEO of a FT-SE 100 
company commented about his previous experience of two of the US’s largest fund managers 
during a hostile takeover bid:
‘once your shares are in their hands you’ve had it. You only know that at the 
end of the day they will win and you will lose*.
Despite the lack of a consistent view about the ‘loyalty’ of US fund managers to UK 
companies, UK companies with experience of dealing with US analysts (buy and sell-side) 
generally hold them in high regard, believing that they focus on the core business issues with
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greater precision and more directly than UK analysts. A FT-SE Mid 250 Finance Director 
saw this as a great advantage:
‘US analysts and investors are much more interactive and you can use this to 
get your message across in the way you want; it can be much more difficult in 
the UK where the response is usually much more muted*.
Nevertheless, US fund managers, as well as a number of UK companies, also pointed out that 
even when dealing with US investors in the United States, UK listed companies are bound by 
UK disclosure rules. The amount of information they can give US investors and analysts is 
sometimes less than expected, giving the impression that UK companies have something to 
hide. This can create the perception amongst US investors of increased company specific risk 
- even without taking into account currency risks involved when investing in a non-US 
company with substantial non-US$ earning streams.
Other UK companies had considered listing in the USA but had not done so. In a number of 
cases the costs and logistics involved in a US listing were seen as offering very few benefits, 
for two reasons:
Firstly, US institutions preferred to buy in the London market, and those that were prohibited 
from buying foreign listed securities were unlikely to buy shares in the company anyway.
Secondly, the only advantage to listing in the USA would be if the sector was consistently 
more highly rated in the US than the UK, but opportunities for investor arbitrage in secondary 
markets mean that this is seldom the case for long for larger companies and sectors that are 
well established in both markets. (The raising of primary market capital for new ventures and 
technologies, and the reported difficulties of doing this in the UK compared with the USA is a 
separate issue).
D.ii Continental & Japanese investors
Japanese investors were not seen as long-term holders of non-domestic shares, even if these 
were specifically issued to Japanese investors, for example through a special placing at the 
time of a listing in Tokyo. It appears that listings in Japan and other European markets
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(Zurich, Frankfurt, Paris, Amsterdam) are regarded by companies much more as providing 
greater visibility to: local fund managers; the business community generally (which may 
include customers); and in political and regulatory circles, than being essential to the investor 
relations or shareholder strategy of the company.
‘From a shareholder point of view there is no point in us being listed in Tokyo - 
the holdings there are now minimal, but if we pulled out it would send 
completely the wrong signals’
is how the Investor Relations Manager of one of the largest FT-SE 100 companies described 
the reason for maintaining a Japanese listing.
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V Summary
This Chapter sets out key aspects of the fund management process, distinguishing between 
the setting of investment policies and company-specific investment decisions. In reviewing 
these it is important to remember that fund management organisations are not a homogenous 
group and that there are also important differences between the types of fund they control. 
For example, pension funds represent the largest single source of investment in the London 
Stock Market, accounting for around one third of total market capitalisation. The beneficial 
owners of these funds are current and future pensioners of the employing/funding 
organisations, but control of the pension funds is (or should be) arms’ length and in the hands 
of trustees who have defined fiduciary duties which, in general terms, can be described as 
legal responsibility for the safe keeping and sound investment of the funds for which they are 
responsible.
There is growing awareness amongst such trustees, and the various consulting organisations 
that advise them, that the active management of equity portfolios is only a sound investment 
policy if fund performance compensates for the costs and risks involved. The fact that 
broadly-based equity portfolios, possibly containing shares in several hundred companies, 
rarely consistently out-perform market indices has led to a realignment of investment 
mandates (reviews often take place on a three or five year cycle) and a consequent 
polarisation of investment mandates towards either genuinely low-cost indexed funds or 
active fund managers who manage relatively concentrated equity portfolios.
There are substantial problems in comparing the investment performance of different types of 
fund and public awareness of the performance of funds other than unit trusts, investment 
trusts and some pension funds is relatively limited. The performance of many types of 
insurance funds is all but impossible to ascertain on even an annual basis, reducing fund 
manager accountability.
Despite important differences between the ways in which different types of fund are managed 
and the skills of individual portfolio managers and fund management groups, many of the 
disciplines they follow (or attempt to) are rather similar.
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In this Chapter I have set out the principle factors influencing both the setting of fund policies 
and company specific investment decisions. This analysis emphasises that the investment 
strategies of institutional fund managers are portfolio based and depend on a wide range of 
economic, industry, country-based and market assessments before company-specific issues 
are taken into account. There are exceptions (generally known as 'stock pickers’) to the 'top 
down’ management of equity portfolios but this is the most pervasive approach to fund 
management and even stock pickers will take these factors into account at some stage in their 
assessment of a company they have picked from the 'bottom up’.
The evidence from this Chapter is that fund managers take into account a great many factors 
and sources of information when assessing whether they should invest in a company, increase 
or decrease the size of an existing holding or disinvest altogether. Many of these factors are 
internally driven within the fund management organisation and by the very business of fund 
management itself.
Descriptions of the relationships between shareholders and the companies in which they invest 
clearly need to take these issues into account, as most definitely neither shareholders as a 
whole nor institutional fund mangers should be regarded as a homogeneous group.
/
The differences between fund management organisations are crucial to understanding why 
and how different institutional shareholders seek to influence the companies in which they 
invest and no model of shareholder influence can be complete without taking these issues into 
account.
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I Introduction
Having reviewed key aspects of the process of fund management in the last Chapter, I now 
turn my attention to the flow of information between companies and shareholders.
Over the last ten years, this flow has increased hugely. Following the ‘Big Bang’ in 1986, 
many previous practices, which may be described with hindsight as limited and somewhat 
arcane, were gradually replaced by more frequent, direct and organised communications 
between companies and shareholders.
In this Chapter I review this process and the emergence of a defined group of ‘best practices’ 
in investor relationship management. These cover a wide range of issues, but the biggest and 
most important change has been the establishment of regular meetings between companies 
and their major shareholders; generally taking place at least once a year.
Nevertheless, not all the fund managers I interviewed believed that such contact with 
companies is useful or that it would have any significant impact on the performance of their 
portfolios. Others believe that such contact is vital to the process of fund management, as 
personally assessing the executive directors of the company is crucial input to the investment 
decision.
The fund managers which hold the latter point of view tend to be larger and more aggressive 
in the management of their portfolios than other investors. How well fund managers know 
and assess the senior managers of a company influences their attitude towards the exercising 
of ownership rights.
In Chapters 6 and 7 I look at contrasting ways in which these ownership rights may be 
expressed and used. Chapter 6 looks at the exercising of formal ownership rights, including 
voting and attendance at shareholder meetings. Chapter 7 looks at the informal use of 
shareholder power to influence and if necessary control companies in which the fund manager 
remains a shareholder.
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II Improving Communications
The companies and fund managers I interviewed showed great consistency in their belief 
that, over the last five years, there had been a huge improvement in the quality of 
communication between companies, their shareholders and other investors. Over this period 
many companies have developed policy frameworks for the conduct of their communications 
and contact with investors, particularly institutional shareholders.
Many companies described the traditional 'brokers lunch’ as having rapidly died out at the 
end of the 1980s.
‘Nobody would ask any difficult questions. All that would happen is that they 
[the fund managers] would go back to their offices after lunch and place orders 
with the broker’
is how a senior fund manager described what he knew to be common practice in the years 
leading up to and more briefly after the ‘Big Bang’ in October 1986.
The combination of the Big Bang and the Stock Market crash the following October focused 
the attention of brokers, many under new ownership, on the most profitable parts of their 
business. In the new UK and US financial conglomerates that emerged from the Big Bang, 
post-crash profits from broking alone were dwarfed by those to be made in market making 
and corporate advisory work. As a result, analysts started to shift their focus from the 
interests of their external clients (fund managers) to their internal clients: the market makers 
and corporate finance departments.
The conflicts of interest which started to develop were increasingly visible to fund managers, 
who realised that more and more of the information and investment advice they were 
receiving from analysts reflected internal vested interests.
‘Before I pretty much used to buy what the brokers told us to, now you can 
often tell the state of a market maker’s book by what his analyst says’.
(Large life fund portfolio manager)
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In many fund managers’ eyes, the role of brokers’ analyst as a reliable intermediary was 
becoming systematically compromised by changes in the organisations they worked for, and 
analysts could no longer be trusted to have their client’s (the fund managers) interests at 
heart.
‘Institutions turned from being clients to being customers’
is how one fund manager described the sea change that went through the market in the mid to 
late 1980s.
Two other important and associated changes started to take place at this time:
Firstly, the growing amount of direct contact between fund managers and companies; once 
started this process was seen as mutually beneficial to both sides. It has now reached the stage 
where many companies will see their top 20 or 30 shareholders at least once a year, without 
the direct involvement of a broker.
Secondly, the development of in-house analysis skills and resources by fund managers, in 
many cases by individual portfolio managers taking responsibility for a number of business 
sectors. Some fund managers operate a dual role analyst and portfolio manager matrix 
structure. This appears to be more common than maintaining separate in-house, buy-side 
analyst teams, whose role is to support the investment decisions of portfolio managers with 
more objective and possibly better quality information than that arriving from brokers. Whilst 
this may generally be achievable, it is more likely that the most skilled analysts in each sector 
lie outside fund managers’ organisations and that fund managers will therefore continue to 
depend on these external 'stars’ for investment ideas and advice.
The distinction between the role of the portfolio manager and buy-side (institutional) analyst 
disguises a much broader shift towards increased self-sufficiency in fund management 
organisations, which also became more professional and systematic in the management of 
their portfolios during the late 1980s.
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Whilst fund managers were establishing closer links with the companies in which they 
invested and starting to by-pass their traditional dependence on brokers and their analysts, 
companies were also finding it increasingly important to keep their shareholders informed in 
an organised way.
They did so partly out of fear. In the late 1980s the number of takeovers of listed companies 
rose dramatically and there was growing concern amongst an influential, but largely informal, 
group of company Chairmen and CEOs that the apparent 'short-termism’ of institutional 
investors was, at least in part, caused by a lack of contact with and detailed knowledge about 
the companies in which they had invested.
At the same time, research amongst hand managers showed that there was a positive link 
between a portfolio manager’s familiarity with a company and their favourability towards the 
company as an investment.
‘Investor relations really took off in the City when companies realised that they 
simply had to get their act together when dealing with the institutions, or risk 
being taken over’
is how a director of a large independent pension fund manager described the genesis of many 
of the investor relations practices and protocols which are now almost universal amongst 
listed companies. However, their development was gradual and fund managers were not well 
disposed to companies:
‘who suddenly decided to start talking to us because they thought that they 
were about to be taken over’. (As above)
When such problems arose for companies they probably did so for at least one of the 
following three closely connected reasons: a relatively low level of initial information and 
understanding of the company, its markets, operations, objectives and strategy; the lack of 
prior relationship between the company’s management team and portfolio managers - a lack 
of personal familiarity; and lack of confidence in the quality and credibility of new information 
that was being provided by company management.
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The Investor Relations manager of a FT-SE 100 company described a takeover in 1989 in the 
following terms:
‘Up until 1989 we had hardly bothered with our shareholders. Just before we 
made our takeover bid for the other [listed] company we started having one-to- 
one meetings with institutions.
Institutional support for the takeover was organised at the last minute; 
subsequent feedback showed that fund managers had found the meetings very 
un-informative and the whole process badly handled. After that experience we 
realised that we had to start doing things properly9.
During the second half of the 1980s there emerged a growing consistency in the way 
companies approached the management of shareholder relationships and therefore about the 
key elements and protocols of any ‘standard’ investor relations programme. Such 
programmes require two types of resource: the time of senior management to meet with 
institutional investors; and support to arrange these meetings and handle day to day liaison 
with fund managers, analysts and the media.
Many larger companies appointed dedicated managers to provide the necessary support, 
although their position in the organisation varied; from being located with Corporate Affairs, 
to reporting directly to the Finance Director, or Company Secretary.
Other companies, without the requirement for a dedicated manager, treated the investor 
relations role as part of another job (eg Chairman, Finance Director, Corporate Affairs or 
External Relations Manager/Director, or Company Secretary). In many cases an external 
investor relations consultancy was also appointed to provide support and a broader 
experience than would be available from within the company alone.
During the 1980s, investor relations gradually ‘came of age’ and principles of ‘best practice’ 
in various circumstances (results announcements, rights issues, bids and defences) rapidly 
consolidated from 1986 onwards. Not all companies adopted these at the same rate, but the 
appointment of internal resource (either dedicated or part-time) and the use of specialist 
external agencies, combined with the regular movement of people between agencies and 
companies and board-level networking through interlocking directorships, led to the
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widespread and rapid adoption of a new model for the management of company investor 
relationships.
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III Managing Investor Relationships
In this Section I look at the management of investor relationships from the point of view of 
both companies and fund managers. Fund managers vary greatly in the kind of relationship 
they seek with companies and how much emphasis they place on ‘quality of management’ as 
an investment indicator. Analysts are an important source of'hard’ information for many fund 
managers, but US analysts and fund managers think that their UK counterparts are too 
concerned with 'soft’ investment issues such as 'quality of management’.
I then look at the role of NEDs as agents of fund managers in their monitoring and 
governance of companies; the relationship appears to be more distant than that assumed by 
the Cadbury Committee. However, I start with a review of how companies organise the flow 
of information to shareholders and the financial community.
A Financial Calendar
The backbone of a listed company’s ‘financial calendar’ investor relations activities consist of 
the announcement of interim (half-year) and preliminary (full-year) financial results, issuing its 
annual report, and holding an AGM.
Large companies normally have two results (interim and prelim) meetings each year, attended 
by institutional investors, analysts and sometimes the media as well (although not necessarily 
at the same time). Smaller companies typically only hold meetings when they announce their 
prelim results and those large companies announcing results quarterly will not normally hold 
meetings for the first and third quarters.
Providing that a public announcement is made when any other price sensitive information is 
released, such information may be released at any time. In practice, listed companies report 
that they normally try to avoid making price sensitive announcements during the 'close 
periods’ which precede the announcement of their financial results, even though there is no 
formal Stock Exchange requirement for them not to do so.
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Many companies also reduce to a minimal level the amount of contact they have with 
shareholders, analysts and the media during these periods. This is generally done to avoid the 
risk of an accusation of 'leaking’ price sensitive information during particularly sensitive 
periods of their financial year. Instead, announcements which would otherwise be made are 
usually ‘held over’ to be included with financial calendar results announcements. One of the 
reasons for this is to combine ‘good news’ items together to maximum effect or offset poor 
news (eg last year’s results) with some 'good’ news (eg what we are now doing about them); 
both examples of news management.
Outside close periods many companies run and take part in programmes of meetings with 
institutional investors. In terms of the relationship between the institutional ownership and 
influence over companies, the most important of these are 1:1 meetings held between 
companies and their major shareholders. The scheduling of these follows each company’s 
financial calendar, meetings normally starting within a week of the release of the company’s 
half and full year results, although the majority of annual meetings with shareholders (the 
normal interval) take place after the latter.
Although 'traditional’ brokers’ lunches were described by many of the fund managers and 
company directors that I interviewed as being 'a  thing of the past’, some are still held. 
However, they have been substantially replaced by small meetings to which a number of the 
broker’s institutional clients will be invited. Several of the companies I interviewed had also 
taken part in multi-company brokers’ seminars based around particular industries or 
investment themes; brokers mentioned as having organised such events included Hoare 
Govett, SG Warburg and SBC.
B Company Objectives
The companies I interviewed all had very similar objectives for their investor relations 
programmes, reinforcing the view that a consistent set of practices were widely adopted in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. These objectives can be summarised as:
Firstly, to ensure that investors, analysts and the media are well informed about their 
company. By 'well informed’, companies generally mean:
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• What the company does.
• Its past performance.
• The company’s objectives.
• Its strategy for meeting these objectives.
Secondly, to create opportunities for portfolio managers and buy-side analysts to meet 
directors (and sometimes other senior executives).
Thirdly, to deal with specific issues which are of particular interest or concern to fund 
managers and analysts.
Investor relations effort and resources are normally only targeted at a company’s largest 
shareholders (typically the top 20) with any degree of intensity. Fund managers outside this 
group will be seen less regularly and the relationship will be much weaker. Some companies, 
usually with support from their brokers), also target larger fund managers without holdings, 
to encourage a wider spread of ownership in the institutional sector. Existing shareholders 
may also receive particular attention if they are seen as being underweight in the company’s 
shares (revealed by comparing their holding with their overall investment in the UK equity 
market).
B.i 1:1 Meetings
In a 1:1 meeting, two or three directors of a company, normally consisting of the Chairman, 
CEO and Finance Director, will typically meet up to half-a-dozen portfolio managers and the 
buy-side analyst (if there is one) at a fund manager’s office.
Although the level of contact between fund managers and a company is largely driven by the 
latter’s financial calendar and investor relations programme, few companies will refuse to 
meet with fund managers at other times, whatever the size of their holdings, if specifically 
asked to do so. In practice fund managers seldom ask for meetings outside the normal annual 
pattern, unless there is a particular reason to do so, for example, by the company making an 
‘unexpected’ announcement.
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However, in these situations the company may well have already contacted its major 
shareholders ('best practice’ in investor relations management suggesting that it should do 
so), to see if they would like a briefing in advance of the formal announcement. Fund 
managers who accept this invitation will normally become insiders and unable to deal in the 
company’s shares until the public announcement is made.
Whether or not the invitation is accepted depends on whether a fund manager is prepared to 
be locked into the company’s shares, based on its expectation as to whether the performance 
of its funds will benefit from such a constraint. This will also partly depend on whether or not 
the fund manager thinks it knows what the expected announcement (and therefore the inside 
information) will be about. On this issue one portfolio manager commented:
‘we usually know what companies will want to talk to us about before they even 
ask to come and see us’
When such ‘one-off meetings occur, they will normally take place only with a company’s 
largest shareholders, typically the top five or six at most. These are the only shareholders that 
are likely to consider that in the long run the information they will receive, in relation to the 
size of their stake, will be more valuable than the potential short run cost of being made 
insiders. The exceptions to this rule are index funds, for whom the value of information about 
specific companies is investment neutral, but in any case only the largest index funds are likely 
to be contacted by companies, or their advisors.
Overall, the fund managers involved in these exercises will tend to be the largest - because 
they are more likely to have large holdings and therefore will also be the shareholders with 
whom the company is already in most regular contact. Companies can also be wary of how 
they deal with fund managers:
‘It’s no good asking fund managers for their views about what you should do; 
they will see it as a sign of weakness.’
(Finance Director FT-SE Mid 250 company)
‘It’s very important not to give specific commitments or promises: but it is very 
important to let them know what you are generally thinking and what your 
strategy is.’ (CEO FT-SE 100 company)
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Fund managers also commented on the difference in dealing with small and large companies. 
They expected large companies (by which they generally mean the top 350) to 'know the 
rules’ when dealing with institutional investors and not, for example, to give them price 
sensitive information without warning. Smaller companies were seen as prone to do this; 
particularly those whose Chairmen or CEOs have no outside experience of dealing with 
institutional investors (for example through being NEDs of larger companies).
B.ii Response to feedback
Companies report that fund managers are becoming increasingly direct in their line of 
questioning in 1:1 meetings (which were frequently reported as being polite but 'robust’), 
through which their major areas of concern become very clear. Few directors admit that these 
meetings have any significant impact on the way they run their company. Those that did 
tended to come from smaller companies and those which realised that future institutional 
support, in the shape of funding rights issues, would depend on the board effectively 
addressing the issues raised by the fund managers.
Most companies appear to respond, at least initially, to negative feedback from major 
shareholders with plans to improve the quality of their presentations and the way information 
is provided. The problems are seen as cosmetic rather than as substantive; the quality of 
communication rather than a management issue. The Chairman of a FT-SE Mid 250 company 
commented:
‘no fund manager has ever raised an issue which we haven’t already thought of 
and been through.’
Statements of this kind, and the views expressed by directors of many of the other companies 
I interviewed, defend the independence of the company from its shareholders and the right of 
the company’s directors not to take their views on board.
This perceived right to distance the management of a company from the demands of its 
shareholders may be rational and not, as one might suspect, an example of managerial self- 
serving - after all, managers are invariably better informed than shareholders. Nevertheless, 
when planning changes in the company which will require shareholder approval or finance
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there is little doubt that directors are very much more concerned to have the support of their 
major shareholders and will listen to them more closely.
In situations such as these, Chairmen, CEOs and other directors with experience of regularly 
meeting with institutional shareholders, did not disagree with the proposition that ‘feedback’ 
(as a mechanism for informal influence) from fund managers formed part of the backcloth 
against which the board directed the company.
The final formal sanction shareholders have against the board of a company is to withdraw 
their support for the directors, vote against the proposals of the board, and refuse to authorise 
increases in authorised or issued share capital or commit their investors’ funds to rights issues.
Few company boards wish to test the resolve of their major shareholders to this extent, even 
if they are aware that the views and negotiating stance taken by the company’s major 
shareholders may not be that widely held amongst others. However, the fact that institutional 
shareholders are widely seen to ‘vote together’ on many issues and occasions (when they 
think it really matters that they should do so) renders the board of a company almost 
powerless when confronted with organised institutional opposition to its proposals or 
continuance.
This is consistent with my finding that companies appear to rank the importance and potential 
influence of institutional shareholders on the basis of the size of their shareholding. Other 
important factors include the length of time the fund manager has been a significant 
shareholder and their respect for key portfolio managers, analysts and/or directors working 
for the fund management organisation.
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C Fund Managers’ Objectives
Regular contact with a company’s management team should mean that fund managers are 
well informed about a company’s business strategy and the key factors and risks involved. In 
their meetings with companies, fund managers will also want to update their understanding 
and knowledge of:
• Their company’s plans in progress and those planned for the future (R&D, product/ 
service launches, major contracts etc).
• How these relate to the previously stated strategy and objectives of the company (fund 
managers are particularly wary of managers who 'do not stick to their knitting’ and 
attempt to diversify into activities and competitive environments outside their mainstream 
business areas).
• The expected benefits to the company’s shareholders (although fund managers will not ask 
for and indeed will refuse to be given information about near-term earnings or dividends 
which could be construed as price sensitive or inside information).
Each of these types of information can be thought of as 'hard’ inputs into the investment 
decision. Much of this material, if not all, is likely to be already in the public domain, although 
not all will have been specifically directed at the financial sector.
Many company announcements about product development, marketing initiatives, new 
contracts, capital investment etc will only go to the trade press as they are not judged to be 
price sensitive by the company (ie of de minimus importance to investors). The issue for the 
informed investor is therefore that of understanding how all these pieces fit together rather 
than the availability of new information itself.
Fund managers also use meetings with companies to assess the ‘soft’ investment criteria of 
the quality of management. They can only do this reliably across a number of meetings and 
over a period of time; one of the reasons why, in the 1980s, companies apparently often 
found it difficult to establish credibility or to feel that they were building shareholder ‘loyalty’
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from a single meeting, or even after a year or more of starting to meet their major 
shareholders 'regularly’.
Fund managers said that they used the following factors to assess quality of management:
• How well do the managers know their business?
• Do they know their markets?
• Have they got a clear sense of direction and strategy?
• Are they working for themselves or their shareholders?
• How credible are they?
• Do they do what they say they are going to do?
These assessments are mostly made through personal contact and at 1:1 meetings, when a 
fund manager’s line of questioning can test issues in a way which they believe would be 
‘inappropriate’ (from both their own and the company’s point of view) at meetings involving 
other fund managers, analysts or the media.
Other sources of hard information, which fund managers described as important when 
assessing a company and its management team, include the fund manager’s own market and 
economic intelligence and its ability to put an international perspective on a company’s 
performance and the management team’s ambitions and business strategy (the ‘credibility’ 
factor).
None of the companies I interviewed mentioned, without prompting, that the fund managers 
they saw were also very likely to be meeting with their competitors, suppliers and customers. 
In contrast, fund managers report that the information obtained in these other meetings is 
very useful because it enables them to judge whether deteriorations in performance are due to 
exogenous, market-based factors or endogenous management failures; assess whether 
managers are taking full advantage of the opportunities available to the company and have the 
necessary competence to do so; and put in a market context statements made by directors and 
other senior executives of the company about their customers, competitors, trends in the 
company’s key markets, and the likely impact of these on the company’s future performance 
and business prospects.
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The larger pension fond managers gather this information on a world-wide basis. A director 
of one of the UK’s largest pension fond managers gave this account of a meeting with the 
CEO of a FT-SE Mid 250 company:
‘We knew his markets were in trouble in the US because I had recently seen his 
biggest US competitor, which was having problems and between them they 
have around half the market There was no hint of any problem when I had a 
meeting with the company; they only finally admitted there was a problem 
when the prelim results came out a couple of months later9.
Over time, fond managers therefore accumulate a mass of information about companies, their 
activities, strategies, customers and competitors and the sensitivity of the company’s 
performance to market and economic forces. This provides them with a continually updated 
database of information about companies, augmented by and placed in the context of their 
assessment of the management teams.
In addition, investments in smaller companies (below the FT-SE Mid 250) are often handled 
by specialist portfolio managers. They are used to dealing with the managers of smaller 
companies, with whom they will often have closer and more frequent contact than their 
colleagues dealing with large companies.
Except in the kind of circumstances reviewed in Chapter 7, fond managers were consistently 
of the view that their role in meetings was not to tell companies what to do. Many fond 
managers were very adamant on this point, putting forward arguments which included: their 
expertise is in managing investment funds, not operating companies; they do not have the 
credibility to tell company management what to do; they do not have the time or resources to 
get involved with companies.
Although it is clear that most fond managers have few reservations about making their views 
known to companies when they feel the need to do so, the relatively low level of contact 
between companies and many of the small and medium sized fond managers means that 
company directors get very little feedback from these shareholders about the way they are 
seen to manage their business.
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Because companies focus the limited senior management time which is available for investor 
relations activities on the company’s largest shareholders, a second outcome is that smaller 
institutional shareholders tend to have much less personal contact with a company’s directors, 
particularly the CEO.
Personal judgement about quality of management’ was therefore seen as a less important 
factor when assessing a company for investment by many of the smaller fund managers that I 
interviewed. This might be expected to have a potentially damaging effect on their investment 
performance, and therefore to be of considerable concern to them. In fact, it is the opposite 
which appears to be the case. It is clear that the views fund managers hold about the value of 
personal contact vary considerably. My interviews with fund managers suggest that they can 
be described in terms of three ‘types’ on the basis of their beliefs about the value of direct 
contact with company management. I have called these types ‘contact seekers’, ‘pragmatists’ 
and ‘sceptics’.
C.i Contact seekers
These fall into two categories. The first includes major fund managers with active stock 
picking investment strategies (particularly the major pension and life fund managers). They 
have a strong belief that assessing the quality o f management is one of the most important 
contributors to an investment decision. The second comprises smaller fund managers with 
active investment strategies who believe that regular contact with company managers is an 
efficient way of keeping informed about a company. Their focus is more on information, and 
getting this first hand, about the company’s activities, markets and strategy, rather than 
‘quality of management’.
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C.ii Pragmatists
‘Pragmatic’ fund managers have a more detached view of the value of close contact with 
company managers. Unlike ‘contact seekers’, they do not believe that regular close contact 
with company directors is always necessary to assess their quality as managers. In many cases 
actions (or rather, company performance) speak louder than words. These fund managers 
place relatively more emphasis on other sources of information, not least companies’ Annual 
Reports, which they believe reward ‘forensic’ examination. Two comments summarise the 
position of this group:
‘We have these meetings because companies want them; it’s not clear how many we 
would have if companies didn’t ring us up to arrange them.’
(Major life fund manager)
‘There is no point in meeting the Chairman or Chief Executive of a FT-SE 100 
company because their impact on the business is minor; it’s all the managers 
beneath them who are doing the work and who will make the difference. Meeting 
smaller companies is completely different; there you know that the person you are 
meeting really runs the business.’ (Unit trust manager)
C.iii Sceptics
These tend to be smaller life and pension fund managers who believe that close contact with a 
company is either detrimental to investment performance, a risk sometimes expressed in terms 
of:
‘getting too close clouds the investment decision’
(Smaller life fund manager)
or adds no real benefit to investment performance.
This view is also held by a number of in-house pension fund managers. It could be argued that 
‘sceptic’ fund managers are making a virtue out of a necessity; they have adapted their 
investment strategy to deal with the lower level of contact they have with company 
management, a result of the way companies organise and prioritise their investor relations 
programmes.
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A second factor is that all fund managers, but particularly pension fund managers, are more 
conscious of performance than they have been in the past. (This is at least partly a function of 
increasing levels of comparative information being available and used by fund trustees, 
professional advisors and also retail investors.)
With increasing external performance measures and internal cost pressures, 'sceptic’ fund 
managers are looking more closely at their own internal resources, the allocation of these to 
different types of investment decision and the impact these decisions have on investment 
performance.
Sceptic fund managers are those which have come to the view that the value of close 
management contact is limited because the time and effort involved is disproportionate to the 
reward. The biggest impact on the performance of their funds is that of asset allocation: fond 
managers typically suggested that half or more of their performance is based on asset 
allocation.
It is clear that fund managers who have undertaken and believe this kind of analysis will seek 
to focus a substantial part of their internal analytical resources, investment expertise and 
experience to asset allocation decisions. They will therefore tend to see stock selection and 
direct company contact as second and third order priorities respectively.
‘The top down approach, if done properly, makes stock selection almost the simplest 
part of the process. At the end of the day, if your asset allocation and industry sector 
weightings are right and by the time you’ve taken a couple of other factors like 
currency into account, there won’t be that many companies to choose between - and 
it probably won’t make much of a difference which one you choose anyway.’
(Life fund manager)
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C.iv US perspective
The US fund managers I interviewed felt that UK institutions placed excessive emphasis on 
‘quality of management’ as a criteria for investment. They were seen as paying insufficient 
notice to ‘stochastic’ factors when making stock selections, or timing buy or sell 
programmes; eg information about company and market prices, volumes, volatility, price and 
earnings momentum and other factors.
UK companies with US investor relations programmes also report US fund managers as very 
much more ‘numbers based’ than their UK counterparts. This was one of the two main 
differences that companies commented on between the UK and US investment communities.
The second was the very strong focus on key business issues. ‘Business drivers’ was a term 
repeatedly used by US fimd managers when being interviewed, but it hardly occurred in any 
UK interviews. One US buy-side analyst, with a major US fund manager and with close 
personal experience of dealing with UK companies (as an investor) and UK brokers (as a 
client) felt that UK analysts:
‘often seem to be focusing on the latest news story rather than the parts of the 
company’s business that are making the biggest profits and where the real 
growth lies’.
It is arguable that the combination of a focus on ‘numbers’ and the key ‘business drivers’ in 
the USA has both led, and been supported by, the widespread use of computer modelling. 
This, in turn, has allowed the development of longer-term forecasting (typically five to seven 
years ahead) by US analysts, compared with the UK where few analysts are reported as 
forecasting more than two years ahead.
Several UK companies thought that the longer forecasting horizons of US analysts also led 
US institutions to take a longer-term view of their investments. This is partly because the 
extended time frame enables them to take a view about the performance of a company across 
an economic cycle, whereas UK analysts are more concerned with companies’ positions and 
prospects within the current cycle.
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When confronted with this viewpoint, UK fund managers were more dismissive than their US 
counterparts about the benefits of longer forecasts, on the grounds that investment decisions 
were still taken by US fund managers on the basis of what is expected to happen in the next 
year or eighteen months and not much longer, and that the accuracy of models deteriorates 
sharply over longer time periods. US models are sufficiently unreliable beyond a two year 
time horizon for the additional information to be almost valueless in terms of investment 
decision making.
On the basis of my interviews with both fund managers and analysts it appears that the use of 
'quant’ modelling is growing amongst UK sell-side analysts. This output is probably being 
focused most towards the requirements of'quant’ based portfolio managers, who are able to 
successfully integrate company specific forecasts and analyses within their broader asset 
allocation and hedging strategies.
From the point of view of companies, the widening use of'quant’ techniques to aid equity 
portfolio management is a mixed blessing. Although analysts and fund managers will 
potentially have a more stable framework in which to analyse companies, there is an increased 
risk that the models will produce similar results and trading signals in response to the same 
input information; for example, eps momentum, sales growth forecasts based on the same 
standard industry data sources, or balance sheet benchmarks. As companies, through their 
investor relations and shareholder information programmes, seek to ensure that all analysts 
are as fully informed as possible about the company’s business profile, key markets, profit and 
growth drivers, so the risk of convergence in analysts’ financial models increases.
D Brokers & Sell-side Analysts
Brokers’ analysts are an important audience in investor relationships because of their direct 
links to: market makers and institutional sales forces, when these are part of the same financial 
conglomerate; fund managers as institutional clients; and sometimes also the media.
Investor relations managers and directors find that dealing with the information needs of sell- 
side analysts takes a substantial part of their time; routinely dealing with five - ten calls a day
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amongst the largest companies (but many times that number following announcements by the 
company or when there is important news about the company’s industry/markets).
Awareness of the need to avoid giving away price sensitive information to analysts was a 
point of concern to many of the companies and all the investor relations managers/directors I 
interviewed.
The Investor Relations manager of a large FT-SE 100 company described the situation as:
‘Walking on a tightrope - you have to be very close to the centre and know almost 
everything that is going on in the company, but at the same time, the way you have 
to use this information is often by not telling them things. At the same time you 
cannot afford to mislead them in anyway, although this may often appear to be only 
a matter of semantics.
For example, you cannot say ‘no announcement will be made’. Instead you have to 
say ‘no announcement has been made’, even when you actually know that an 
announcement is going to be made in five minutes’ time. Ignorance is now no 
defence against misleading investors, but analysts understand the rules of the game 
as well as we do and don’t blame you afterwards.’
In all the interviews I conducted with companies, a great deal of caution was expressed about 
the way that information should be provided to investors and analysts, but particularly the 
latter. There was concern that increased attention to information disclosure issues would lead 
companies to become much 'tighter’ in the disclosure and availability of information, and that 
this would lead to lower stock market 'efficiency’ and in turn eventually to more volatile 
share prices.
The full-time Investor Relations managers I interviewed claimed to now be focusing a 
significant part of their time on the need to clarify and explain information provided by the 
company to investors; not in providing new information. However, there is always risk at the 
margin and, for example, most Investor Relations managers were well aware that all their 
telephone conversations with analysts were taped (by brokers’ internal compliance/ 
surveillance units).
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D.i Forecasts
The relationship between analysts and companies becomes particularly difficult when brokers’ 
profits forecasts are involved. A significant problem for companies is seen as how to deal with 
analysts’ forecasts which are known to be inaccurate and 'out of line’ with their own. Two 
techniques are commonly used .
Firstly, to suggest that the errant analyst compares his/her forecast with that of other analysts; 
with a view to guiding them to compare their forecast with those of analysts who have not 
made the same mistake(s) or incorrect assumptions.
Secondly, to go through the analyst’s assumptions and correct those where a factual error has 
been made and the information is already in the public domain.
But investor relations managers cannot afford to be seen to be ‘marking’ analysts’ forecasting 
models or 'massaging’ figures in the right direction (which was often described as having 
been common practice in the 1980s, often undertaken by Finance Directors on the basis of a 
'nod and a wink’).
D.ii Profit warnings
In the more closely defined and monitored regulatory environment which now exists, the 
more restricted fine tuning that now has to be used by investor relations managers and finance 
directors can only work to a certain degree.
It cannot deal, for example, with gross discrepancies (perhaps of more than 5%) between the 
internal expectations of companies and those of the market (eg those made by sell-side 
analysts; fund managers’ own forecasts are not in the public domain).
Companies now believe that if analysts are seriously out in their profits forecasts (eg by more 
than 5%) they have no alternative but to issue ‘trading statements’ or ‘profit warnings’, 
particularly if expectations are running too high.
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Most companies felt that there were relatively few analysts, out of all those covering their 
sector(s), who really understood their business. One company had to make a ‘downbeat 
trading statement’ at its AGM because the only analyst who really understood the sector was 
on maternity leave. A similar problem can arise when analysts ‘go over the Chinese Wall’ to 
work with corporate finance departments/ merchant banking units (see Chapter 6), but profit 
warnings and trading statements are seen by companies as very blunt instruments for dealing 
with the problem of analysts making misguided public forecasts.
Companies which felt less vulnerable to these problems were those:
• Publishing quarterly results, instead of only announcing at the interim and prelim stages. 
Quarterly results provide a faster and more consistent flow of information about the 
company’s performance and trends in the industry sector(s) in which it operates, helping 
reduce the variance in analysts’ forecasts, investor uncertainty and risk.
• Which were in industries with high sector visibility, such as oil, where reliable information 
about the major ‘drivers’ on their profitability are readily available.
• Which are focused in their business activities. Conglomerates and those operating across a 
number of markets/industries felt that it was difficult for analysts to understand how each 
business was doing and get the mix of their business right when forecasting the overall 
performance of the company.
Those companies which felt more vulnerable to misleading forecasts from analysts included 
those in capital goods industries, where the timing of orders, deliveries and payment terms 
could have a major impact on the financial results in any given period, and sectors where 
there was considerable uncertainty about earnings right up until the end of the financial year 
(for example: merchant banking, where a single transaction can have huge impact; and 
retailing, where the annual sales cycle is very uneven).
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E Corporate Governance
E.i Non-Executive Directors
When interviewing company directors and fund managers I was interested in discovering if 
non-executive directors (NEDs) provided a link between the company and shareholders. This 
issue was raised in the Cadbury Report, but in my interviews I found little evidence for direct 
relationships between institutions and NEDs, except when the position of the NED was also 
Chairman of the company.
Fund managers claim that they broadly support the recommendations of the Cadbury Report 
that: the roles of Chairman and CEO should be separated in a company; and that NEDs 
should act as a check and a balance on the activities and plans of executive directors and 
therefore the company.
Amongst larger companies I found no evidence that NEDs were acting in any specific way as 
representatives of fund managers. However, fund managers specialising in smaller companies 
(M&G was quoted in several interviews) were believed to have regular contact with directors 
they had ‘placed’ on the Boards of companies in which they held significant (eg +10%) 
stakes.
Apart from the Chairman (who may be executive or non-executive), fund managers 
consistently expressed their wish to work only with executive directors and to deal with issues 
and problems in as straight-forward a way as possible. Many of the fund managers with 
whom I discussed this issue were uncomfortable with the idea of using NEDs as sources of 
information or as go-betweens. They felt that to involve ‘third party’ NEDs in a dialogue 
would send confusing signals to the executive directors and senior managers, and run the risk 
of becoming excessively complicated and time consuming.
The only circumstances in which a NED might be used as a go-between is if the 
Chairman/CEO was a combined role - and the person occupying it was the problem. Many 
NEDs I interviewed felt that their role was relatively limited and generally over-estimated by 
Cadbury; the ‘policeman’ role envisaged for them by the Cadbury Committee was not
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practical or credible. In contrast, they felt that the main contribution by NEDs to a Board was 
to question the assumptions of the executive directors and act as a catalyst for new ideas and 
developments.
The practical limit to the NEDs role was seen as being set by the executive directors, who 
controlled almost all the information received by the NEDs and thus the ‘agenda’ of board 
discussions on any particular issue. Equally, NEDs did not wish to have an ‘intermediaiy’ role 
with shareholders on the grounds that they do not know enough about the company to 
represent its interests to institutional shareholders without the support of executive directors 
and to do so would be ‘going round the back’ of the Chairman and executive directors, about 
which they would feel very uncomfortable - except in the most unusual circumstances.
The view of NEDs of their limited external role complements the preference of fund 
managers to deal only with company chairmen and executive directors. Nevertheless, fund 
managers support the internal board role for NEDs set out in the Cadbury Code. In many 
cases they will know at least some of a company’s NEDs through the executive positions they 
hold on the boards of other listed companies.
E.ii Cadbury
Companies expressed broad support for the recommendations of the Cadbury Report and the 
Cadbury Code. Many companies believed that either they already complied with the Cadbury 
Code or would do shortly; several were in the process of establishing their Audit Committee 
when interviewed.
Smaller companies were inclined to express a belief that Cadbury was really more relevant to 
larger companies than small companies; but few expressed any opposition to the Code as 
such and it was felt that the vast majority of companies would have no problem with 
complying with almost all aspects of the Code.
Several of the more 'entrepreneurial’ Chairmen and CEOs felt that Cadbury was designed to 
constrain companies, rather than help drive them forward.
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Successful companies are often led by people with a huge amount of drive and 
vision; they sometimes get things wrong and sometimes break the rules, but 
that’s where the real growth has to come from - its sometimes difficult for the 
institutions to realise th a t They risk throwing the baby out with the bath 
water’. (Chairman/CEO of a smaller company).
The majority of the fund managers who I interviewed felt that Cadbury provided a useful 
reference framework to use if  governance-type issues became a concern to them, but some 
expressed reservations and felt that the Cadbury Code offered very little of substance. One life 
fund manager commented:
‘Cadbury is like motherhood and apple pie; there’s really not much in it that 
you could disagree with’
and this general reaction to Cadbury was also made by other life and pension fund managers 
(large and small). Others felt that the Cadbury Committee had been established for the wrong 
reason: no code could have stopped 'criminals’ such as Maxwell and Nadir. Yet more felt 
that such behaviour would be less likely in future, providing that other members of the board, 
and NEDs in particular, were doing their job properly; but they also felt that the real issue was 
effective monitoring by shareholders.
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IV Summary
In this Chapter I have reviewed the flows of information between companies and their 
shareholders. The distinction between the public disclosure of information (for example, 
through the Stock Exchange Announcements Office or in a company’s annual report) and 
what takes place when companies are in direct contact with major institutional investors is 
very important to an understanding of shareholder influence and mechanisms of shareholder 
control over UK listed companies.
Since the mid-1980s, direct contact between companies and institutional shareholders has 
increased dramatically. Both sides report substantial benefits from improvements in 
shareholder communication practices and the professionalisation of investor relations as a 
management activity. As a result, the role of brokers has changed and brokers are no longer 
regarded as crucial to the relationships between companies and their major shareholders, 
either from the point of view of logistics or the processing of company and market 
information by their analysts.
Although brokers remain facilitators of company shareholder relationships, particularly those 
involving smaller institutional investors, and the distribution of the vast output of the City’s 
sell-side analysts is a substantial business in its own right, many of the larger fund managers 
have established their own in-house (buy-side) teams of analysts. The advice and output of 
these analysts (who may also be portfolio managers in their own right) is tailored to the 
specific requirements of (other) portfolio managers, with whom they work closely and by 
whom they are seen as impartial. In contrast, many fund managers believe that the advice and 
reports that they receive from brokers’ analysts are compromised by the needs of market 
makers, in-house proprietary trading units and corporate finance departments, all of whom 
typically work alongside sell-side analysts, particularly in the large integrated brokers which 
dominate the London market.
One-to-one meetings between companies and major shareholders have to stay clear of 
information that might be deemed ‘price sensitive’ for both directly regulatory reasons and 
because many fund managers have a strong aversion to be being made ‘insiders’. Instead, 
strategic and broader business issues are discussed. This gives fund managers a good feel of 
both the company’s business and the capabilities of the management team. Assessment of
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management competence is a key factor in evaluating companies for investment for many of 
the fund managers that I interviewed.
However, these meetings are not all one way. Through the line of questioning adopted by a 
fund manager’s analysts and portfolio managers a company will quickly become aware of 
how well informed a particular fund manager is about the company and key areas of concern. 
In turn, fund managers may use these meetings to try to send specific messages to companies 
about their concerns - and they expect companies to keep to any commitments they have 
made in these meetings.
Although many companies also believe that good investor relations is a two-way process and 
that it is important to constructively use the feedback they obtain from fund managers, in 
practice the signals that they receive from fund managers can be and are interpreted in 
different ways. In some circumstances, company managers may choose to completely ignore 
the feedback they get in one-to-one meetings with their major shareholders, although more 
frequently this information is used to modify their investor relations programmes, but not the 
objectives of the company, its strategy or its day-to-day management.
Equally, many fund managers do not wish to be seen to be telling a management team how to 
run their company and will therefore adopt a relatively low-key approach, unless they have 
particular concerns and wish to raise the level of influence that they have over the company.
Nevertheless, and as I describe in Chapter 7 and the Composite Case History which forms 
Chapter 8, meetings between companies and fund managers are a crucial vector for informal 
shareholder influence. This influence is likely to be mild if a company performs well and its 
management team is seen by shareholders as competent and to be making sound strategic 
decisions.
Companies identified the factors that would increase shareholder influence as being the level 
of shareholding, the length of time the investment had been held by the fund manager and 
their respect for their opposite numbers in the fund management organisation.
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These are crucial factors in determining shareholder influence, but do not depend on groups 
of shareholders working together in structured or even semi-structured coalitions. Nor are 
these issues directly related to the role of NEDs on companies’ boards which, except in some 
smaller companies, are independent of the ownership structure (supporting Scott’s earlier 
finding that in the UK ownership and director networks are not interlocked).
Finally, the exercising of shareholder influence as a result of closer relationships between 
companies and their major shareholders appears to be substantially independent of the issue of 
voting power, which is reviewed in the next Chapter (6).
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I Introduction
Chapter 4 (Fund Management) described the key processes of fund management, whilst 
Chapter 5 (Information Flows) reviewed certain aspects of the relationships between 
companies and shareholders, distinguishing between the formal and informal exchange of 
information. Chapter 5 also highlighted the opportunities that one-to-one meetings provide 
for major institutional shareholders to send signals to corporate managers about particular 
areas of concern, either explicitly (discussed more in Chapter 7), or implicitly through their 
line of questioning and response to information provided by managers at the meetings.
This analysis provides a framework against which to review the attitudes of fund managers to 
their formal ownership rights as shareholders in a company. From the point of view of this 
study of shareholder ‘Ownership and Influence’, the most important of these rights is the 
possession of voting power, which (with few exceptions, because UK listed companies 
widely adhere to the principle of one share one vote) is proportional to the number of shares 
held. The voting power attached to a shareholding normally rests with the legal owner of the 
shares (ie either the fund manager or private shareholder), but in some cases voting control 
may be held by the beneficiaries or their fiduciaries (for example, pension fund trustees).
As the fund management industry is relatively fragmented (although slowly becoming less so 
as a result of the trend to concentration described in Chapter 3), institutional shareholders 
have long felt the need to coordinate their interests, for example to influence legislative and 
regulatory changes. During the 1970s and early 1980s there was also a growing need to 
coordinate their actions and interests in respect of their holdings in individual companies.
Section II of this Chapter (Shareholder Protection) reviews the role of bodies which represent 
the interests of fund management organisations and which are concerned with maintaining the 
ownership rights of institutional shareholders. Up until the mid-1980s, two of these 
organisations (the Association of British Insurers [ABI] and National Association of Pension 
Funds [NAPF]) were regularly involved in establishing company specific Investor Protection 
Committees (EPCs) to coordinate and represent the interests of institutional shareholders 
when dealing with companies and their banks and financial and legal advisors. Although IPCs 
were normally formed only in response to, often severe, problems arising at individual
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companies, in certain situations they can be seen to be broadly equivalent to the shareholder 
coalitions described by Scott.
It is also important to recognise that IPCs were normally only organised by the NAPF and 
ABI in response to impending or actual corporate collapses (or in some cases controversial 
financing, merger or takeover proposals) and that they therefore did not provide a mechanism 
for milder forms of shareholder influence or continuing relationships between institutional 
investors and the vast majority of listed companies.
IPCs were therefore formal shareholder coalitions developed by institutional investors 
through their representative bodies specifically to dealing with ‘problem’ and sometimes 
severely dysfunctional companies. Operating under the umbrella of the ABI and/or NAPF, 
which also provided administrative and secretariat support, IPCs provided a framework for 
investor cooperation and coordination which overcame many of the practical, free rider, 
moral hazard and other problems that would normally be encountered when trying to 
coordinate the interests of competing organisations.
Despite these apparent advantages, IPCs were increasingly seen as slow, unwieldy and 
bureaucratic by the UK’s largest fund management organisations, which in the mid- to late 
1980s started to have much greater and regular direct contact with companies and (in 
particular) their executive directors.
Section II reviews the declining involvement of institutional investors in IPCs and how IPCs 
have been replaced by more informal relationships firstly between companies and their major 
shareholders, and secondly between the UK’s largest fund management groups.
Improved communications, increased confidence in the value of regular direct contact and the 
cumulative direct acquisition of information about companies, led to both closer personal 
relationships between companies and their major shareholders and a continuity which had 
previously been lacking. These changes meant that fund managers were subject to fewer ‘out 
of the blue’ corporate collapses and rapid and unexpected deteriorations in companies’ 
finances. Against this background and supported by general improvements in corporate 
performance during the mid- to late 1980s, relationships between companies and institutional
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investors also became more sensitive to each others’ concerns. Compared with this new and 
emerging model of best practice in the management of investor relationships (described in 
Chapter 5), IPCs appeared very blunt and increasingly unsatisfactory instruments for the 
representation of shareholders’ interests.
The same concerns are voiced by institutional shareholders about the use of voting rights 
(Section ID), particularly at AGMs and other shareholder meetings (Section IV).
Section HI reviews the attitudes of institutional investors to the use of their voting rights, the 
reasons why, for example, AGM voting averages only one-third of issued capital and the 
wider concerns that many fund managers and some companies have about voting behaviour.
Despite pressure from organisations such as the ABI and NAPF to vote their shares, 
fund managers are still reluctant to exercise their rights to attend shareholder meetings. 
Instead votes are usually cast by proxy and not in person by a member of the fund 
management organisation - for reasons discussed in Section IV.
Finally, Section V reviews some of the conflicts of interest that may exist between companies, 
their shareholders and advisors. In certain circumstances these conflicts undoubtedly inhibit 
the exercising of shareholder rights and less formal modes of influence.
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II Shareholder Protection
This Section reviews the role of four of the key organisations (NAPF, ABI, ISC and PERC) 
involved in coordinating the policies and actions of investors, before discussing broader issues 
of shareholder rights.
A Shareholder Organisations
A.i NAPF & ABI
The two leading organisations, representing the interests of institutional fund managers as 
investors, are the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) and the Association of 
British Insurers (ABI). The NAPF has amongst its members many of the UK’s largest 
companies and their pension funds (only some of which are managed in-house), but it is a 
smaller organisation than the ABI, which represents and supports insurance companies in 
many aspects of their business, not just fund management. A number of the UK’s largest 
insurance companies, which also have pension fund interests, belong to both organisations.
Most companies included in my research had little or no contact with the ABI or NAPF. That 
contact which had taken place had generally involved larger (FT-SE 100) companies and was 
restricted to seeking the approval of changes to, for example, the terms of preference or 
convertible shares or share option schemes. In most of these situations the 'service’ provided 
by the ABI and NAPF, in coordinating the responses of their members, was seen as efficient 
and easy to deal with.
In a number of cases, all relating to share option schemes, matters had become more 
complicated because the companies concerned had proposed the use of performance 
measures other than share price (for example, eps growth). Many of these issues were 
subsequently dealt with in guidelines published towards the end of my programme of 
interviews.
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A.ii Institutional Shareholders’ Committee
In contrast to the company and fund manager-based membership of the ABI and NAPF, the 
Institutional Shareholders’ Committee (ISC) is an umbrella body for other organisations 
involved in investor protection, shareholder rights and related issues. There are no direct 
‘corporate’ members of the ISC, but both fund managers and companies may be members of 
the organisations which comprise the ISC (and some fund managers may be members of 
several).
The membership of the ISC includes the ABI and NAPF, the Unit Trust Association (UTA), 
the Association of Investment Trust Companies (AITC), the Asset Management Committee 
of the British Merchant Banking and Securities Houses Association, and the Bank of England 
in an advisory/observer role. The ISC’s membership encompasses a very high proportion of 
the UK fund management industry, but did not (at the time of my research in 1993) include 
PIRC, which represents a number of public sector pension funds in the UK and USA, or any 
body specifically representing the interests of charities.
The role of the ISC has changed significantly over the last few years, with the 
coordination/spokesman role, particularly the publication of policy statements, becoming 
more complex and difficult as the less controversial and broader matters have been dealt with, 
and the interests of the different member bodies and those of their own memberships have 
diverged on more specific issues.
A.iii Policy development
In terms of the creation of recommendations and policies for investors and codes of conduct 
for the management of shareholder relationships, the main roles of the ABI and NAPF, 
sometimes jointly, and on other occasions in conjunction with the ISC, have been to: produce 
general policy statements as guidance for their members and companies; coordinate the 
interests of their members when dealing with issues of shareholders rights and the negotiation 
of changes to these rights; coordinate their members’ interests when dealing with more 
complex matters of corporate rescue, reconstruction and re-financing.
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In support of these goals and to help introduce consistency in the application of their 
guidelines, the NAPF and ABI have produced a number of discussion papers and policy 
statements about shareholders’ rights and responsibilities. These have increasingly focused on 
‘Cadbury’ type governance issues, for example:
• Directors’ remuneration, employment contracts and share schemes.
• The composition of boards and the re-appointment and selection of directors.
• Voting on shareholder resolutions.
Both the NAPF and ABI have a significant number of fund manager members which are 
themselves listed on the Stock Exchange. In the NAPF’s case there are also listed company 
members representing the interests of their pension funds.
A.iv PIRC
Pensions & Investment Research Ltd (PIRC) is an independent company which represents a 
significant number of UK and overseas local authority public sector pension funds.
The NAPF, ABI and PIRC support their members with 'corporate governance’ information 
services about major UK companies, identifying, for example, where shareholder resolutions 
do not meet their own guidelines or those of the Cadbury Code. PIRC is also focusing 
resource on identifying companies’ political and charitable contributions and environmental 
policies.
An additional dimension to this issue is that many local authority pension funds are managed 
by independent fund managers, which may themselves be quoted companies and members of 
the NAPF or ABI.
For many local authority pension funds, the voting power of their shareholdings will lie with 
their fund managers, as part of their investment management mandate, rather than with the 
fund’s trustees. As PIRC provides voting recommendations to its members as part of its 
information service, it is likely that the trustees of public sector funds will increasingly seek to
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use their voting power directly, on a company by company basis, rather than automatically 
leaving all voting decisions to their appointed fund managers.
B Response of Companies
Amongst many of the companies that I interviewed there was a growing frustration with the 
growth of corporate governance 'interest groups’ (of which PIRC is seen as one) and the 
demands that groups of shareholders and their representatives are putting on companies for 
additional information and meetings, in addition to sometimes seeking changes in corporate 
policies on issues as diverse as defence contracts, the employment of minorities and 
environmental issues.
Even in large companies the resources available to deal with these requests are limited and, in 
the current climate, further policy statements and standards produced by politically inspired 
shareholder groups are seen as providing diminishing returns, either through unnecessary 
repetition of principles which are already included in the Cadbury Code, or by making 
growing demands on companies, to which they are likely to become increasingly resistant.
The growth of 'corporate governance’ and the demands it is making on management time 
was particularly strongly felt by Finance Directors, who are also responsible for the 
implementation of changes in financial reporting standards. The combination of the Cadbury 
Code and new accounting standards were seen by companies as making huge improvements 
in the accountability of their boards to shareholders and the accuracy of information provided 
to shareholders in financial statements. In contrast, fund managers and analysts are more 
sceptical that either the Code or the introduction of additional accounting standards will make 
that much of a difference to the quality of the information they receive:
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‘At the end of the day, if companies want to hide information from shareholders 
they will succeed in doing so. In fact, the information in Annual Reports is probably 
worse now than it used to be. New [accounting] standards may have increased the 
amount of information available, but companies are also getting better at hiding the 
things they want to. Only by crawling through the notes have you even a hope of 
working out what they might be trying to hide. The job of the analyst has got more 
difficult not easier, despite appearances to the contrary.’ (UK Analyst)
Nevertheless, companies report that fund managers are starting to use the Cadbury Code as a 
framework through which to address governance issues, but only about those with which 
they are particularly concerned (for example, joint Chairman/CEO roles or limited 
representation of NEDs on the board or on certain board committees).
B.ii Cadbury ‘II’
Companies were also concerned about the development of recommendations by the 'Cadbury 
IP Committee, which at the time of my interviewing programme was expected to start work 
in the Summer of 1995, but is now expected to start work in the Autumn of 1995. They are 
resistant to further changes in Stock Exchange-backed 'corporate governance’ standards, 
both because of the resources required and the risk of unrealistic expectations about how 
much these initiatives may lead to changes in corporate or board behaviour or improvements 
in performance.
Opinions were divided as to whether there should be a 'reduced’ Cadbury Code, for 
companies below a certain size threshold (say below the FT-SE Mid 250 Index), or for those 
whose shareholders vote (perhaps annually) that the company can follow a reduced code.
The Cadbury Committee resisted calls for this kind of arrangement, but in practice the focus 
of organisations like the ABI, NAPF and PIRC is strongly towards the UK’s largest listed 
companies. The information services they provide to members are unlikely to cover more 
than the top 250 or 350 companies; for the very practical reason that these account for 80- 
90% of Stock Market capitalisation and an even higher proportion of many institutional 
investment portfolios. Below the top 350 companies it is likely that, for most investors, effort 
expended on company specific governance issues provides fast diminishing returns in terms of 
overall portfolio performance.
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C Investor Protection Committees
Up until the mid-1980s, the ABI and NAPF report that they were regularly involved in 
establishing company specific Investor Protection Committees (IPCs) to coordinate and 
represent the interests of institutional shareholders when dealing with companies and their 
banks and financial and legal advisors. Operating under the umbrella of the ABI and/or 
NAPF, which also provided administrative and secretariat support, IPCs provided a 
framework for investor cooperation and coordination which overcame many of the practical, 
free rider, moral hazard and other problems that would normally be encountered when trying 
to coordinate the interests of competing organisations. IPCs were formal shareholder 
coalitions developed by institutional investors through their representative bodies specifically 
to dealing with 'problem’ companies and can therefore be regarded as broadly equivalent to 
some aspects of the shareholder coalitions described by Scott.
However, they failed to provide a mechanism for milder forms of shareholder influence, 
regular contact or continuing relationships between institutional investors and the vast 
majority of listed companies. In addition, IPCs were increasingly seen as slow, unwieldy and 
bureaucratic by the UK’s largest fund management organisations, which in the mid to late 
1980s started to have much greater and regular direct contact with companies and (in 
particular) their executive directors.
The formation and running of IPCs is not a matter of public record and it is likely that, as of 
1995, only a few are in operation. Those that do exist are likely to be involved in coordinating 
the interests of shareholders, banks and other debt-holders and balance of interests between 
these groups. An example of a company surrounded by this kind of grouping is Eurotunnel, 
where cash flow problems and massive debts have regularly threatened to overwhelm the 
interests and rights of different shareholder groups.
The NAPF and ABI maintain their interest and involvement in the maintenance of 
shareholders’ rights and improvements in corporate performance through standing 
committees concerned with issues of corporate governance. Unlike IPCs, these are not
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company specific. The ABI also has a number of sub-committees which are responsible for 
the development of policy in areas such as directors’ contracts and share option schemes.
Both organisations may also create ad hoc committees to address specific issues raised about 
particular companies, but these do not operate on the same basis or level or for the same 
duration as IPCs. Instead many of the issues considered by the ad hoc groups will be 
relatively technical in nature (for example to approve a change in the rights attaching to a 
particular class of share).
How are these ad hoc committees formed and how do they operate? The process normally 
starts either because a company believes that working through the NAPF or ABI will be 
preferable to dealing with each of its major shareholders separately, or because one of these 
shareholders feels that the best way of dealing with a problem would be through an organised 
group of investors, but they do not see their own organisation taking a leadership role in this.
Once the ABI/NAPF have identified the need for an ad hoc committee, they will normally 
consult the company’s top three or four shareholders (possibly more, if the shares are widely 
held amongst institutional investors). Before the first meeting of the IPC the internal support 
team at the ABI/NAPF will have established the company’s position on the key issues. Other 
roles of the support team may include: administration of the committee’s meetings and 
activities; liaising and meeting with companies; keeping other shareholders informed, as 
requested/required; and minimising the workload of the fund managers’ involved in the 
committee - although there will always be some (and even that is often too much according to 
a number), when ‘a few phone calls’ will achieve the same result.
This point of view expresses an apparently growing dissatisfaction with the intermediary role 
taken by the ABI and NAPF. Whilst this may be useful to smaller institutional investors, 
major fund managers give the impression that they see the role of intermediaries (such as the 
ABI, NAPF and also brokers) as increasingly irrelevant to their interests.
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D Personal Networks
There is also a belief amongst senior fund managers that, from the shareholders’ point of 
view, it is far better to deal on ‘important matters’ directly with a company. I found that, on 
substantive issues, companies reported that they also increasingly want direct contact with 
their shareholders and not to work through an intervening committee process.
However, criticisms of the case committee approach by some fund managers, on the grounds 
that the operations of the ABI and NAPF have become too cumbersome for dealing with 
companies where action needs to be fast, in order to secure the best interests of shareholders, 
need to be put in the context of the past value of IPCs to the same fund managers. There is 
little doubt that their past participation in IPCs has enabled a group of senior fimd managers 
to develop their own personal networks and protocols for dealing with a whole range of 
issues: it is almost inevitable that these will work faster than a committee.
Although these relationships are now substantially removed from the archetypal worlds of 
'old boy networks’ and London clubs, fund management remains a relatively small and close 
knit community in which successful portfolio managers are able to build their careers through 
moving from one organisation to another and getting to know their colleagues and 
competitors in different situations over a number of years. The process by which successful 
portfolio managers reach the top of the tree may be more meritocratic than in the past, but at 
the same time operation of these 'behind the scenes’ personal networks is neither transparent 
nor accountable to other shareholders.
The ability of these networks to operate, through a powerful combination of past experience, 
precedent, personal relationships and confidentiality, is probably the major reason why IPCs 
are now significantly less common than they were in the 1980s. There are two further 
reasons:
Firstly, as guidelines are produced by the NAPF, ABI, ISC and other bodies, companies are 
more easily able to structure and present their proposals to shareholders in terms covered by 
these guidelines. Secondly, fund managers claim to be taking a more proactive role in
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identifying potential problems within companies; before they require the attention of a 
grouping of a company’s major shareholders (whether informally or through an IPC).
E Shareholders’ Rights
E.iRights issues
The normal mechanism through which listed companies raise additional equity capital is the 
rights issue, in which each existing shareholder receives rights to subscribe additional capital 
to the company in direct proportion to the number of shares already held.
Thus, if existing shareholders take up their rights (by subscribing to all the new capital that 
they are offered), the ownership profile of the company will not change. Many fund managers 
claim to more or less automatically take up rights issues, unless there are specific reasons why 
they do not wish to invest further in the company. A shareholder who does not wish to invest 
further capital can sell and transfer its rights to another shareholder.
The acquisition of additional rights, and their subsequent exercise, therefore provides 
shareholders and other investors with a way of increasing their investment in the company, 
should they wish to do so. Another method is through sub-underwriting an issue, which 
provides fund managers with fees and therefore lowers the cost of any additional investment.
E.ii Pre-emption rights
Pre-emption rights preserve shareholders’ proportional ownership of a company, even when 
new shares are issued to raise additional capital and are considered an important ownership 
right by fund managers. One of the reasons for this is the ability they give to fund managers to 
influence company policy through control of its equity capital. Informally, this control is 
exercised through their ability to reject a rights issue before any formal announcement. Pre­
emption rights therefore prevent a company sidestepping the concerns of existing 
shareholders when it raises new capital.
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Fund managers will normally insist on the preservation of their pre-emption rights, but under 
ABI/NAPF guidelines companies are (normally) allowed to:
• Distribute up to 10% of new shares to staff through option and sharesave schemes over a 
ten year period.
• Issue up to 5 or 10% of their shares through ‘platings’. These are normally used to finance 
acquisitions. In many cases a placing will effectively put the additional shares in the hands 
of many of the same fund managers who would have subscribed (and underwritten) a 
rights issue. From the point of view of companies, placings are less expensive to organise 
than rights issues, as investor risk, underwriting costs and professional fees are reduced.
The preservation of pre-emption rights and the requirement that companies must seek the 
approval of their (major) shareholders for a placing outside the normal guidelines, are 
powerful mechanisms through which fund managers can control the ambition, risk and 
funding of listed companies.
Several fund managers commented that their resistance to certain companies’ proposals for 
rights issues had stopped the companies from making what would have been disastrous 
acquisitions in the USA in the late 1980s. This vindicates the view of many fund managers 
that their selective use of pre-emption rights, to prevent rights issue-based equity funding, 
helps constrain managers’ ambitions to those projects which are most likely to enhance 
shareholder value.
Companies do not always share these views, particularly those which feel constrained by the 
‘conservatism’ of UK fund managers towards companies in the high technology, computer, 
communications and bio-technology sectors. These typically require large amounts of capital 
to help fund R&D, marketing programmes and projects with long pay-offs, for which existing 
shareholders may be reluctant to subscribe.
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III: Voting
For many shareholders, institutional and private, the right to vote on shareholder resolutions 
is one of their key rights as part-owners of a company.
A Board Control
Shareholders can, however, only vote on resolutions which are put to them by the board of 
directors. The voting agenda is therefore set by the company, its directors and the board in 
pursuit of their own interests and not, in normal circumstances, by the shareholders.
Issues put to shareholders are therefore almost entirely predictable and are driven by a 
combination of the Companies Acts, companies’ Articles of Association and the Stock 
Exchange’s listing requirements. The approval of accounts; re-appointment of directors 
(generally by rotation), the (re-) appointment of auditors, approval of executive and employee 
share schemes and the right of the company to repurchase its own shares, being the most 
common. These are normally voted on at a company’s Annual General Meeting.
Other resolutions presented to shareholders may include the creation and issuing of new 
shares to raise additional capital (rights issues) and the approval of a takeover of or merger 
with another company.
A.i Shareholder resolutions
For shareholders to propose a resolution of their own, a group must first organise to show 
that at least 100 support the resolution, or that they represent at least 5% of the company’s 
equity. Only then must a board accept the resolution, but a further barrier is that all costs 
associated with the additional resolution must be bome by the proposing shareholders.
It is therefore not surprising that the fund managers I interviewed could not recall a single 
instance when a group of shareholders had organised themselves in this way and obliged 
directors to propose a resolution against the will of the board.
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This is in contrast to the situation in the USA, where it is not unusual for resolutions to be 
successfully proposed by shareholders. Once approved by the Securities & Exchanges 
Commission (SEC), the board of a US company is obliged to treat a shareholder proposed 
resolution in almost exactly the same way as one prepared by the board itself. Crucially, the 
cost of circularising shareholders is bome by the company, not the shareholders) proposing 
the resolution.
In the UK, an institutional shareholder has no reason to become involved in this expensive, 
cumbersome and adversarial process when, behind the scenes and in private discussions with 
a company’s board, its brokers and merchant bank, pressure can be put on a company in ways 
which avoid public discussion of the fund manager’s proposals, external costs, and do not 
require any other shareholders to be involved. One life fund manager summarised the 
situation as:
‘why bother to force a vote when the mere threat of one will bring a company into 
line’.
B Voting by Institutions
In the late 1980s and early 1990s institutional investors were subject to public criticism for 
failing to cast their votes on even those issues most routinely put to shareholders. The public 
perception of this apparent abandonment of ownership rights became a matter of some 
concern to the key institutional shareholder groups (NAPF, ABI and ISC), who believed that 
the reputation of their members and that of the fund management industry was being 
undermined, particularly amongst directors of listed companies, with whom they were 
regularly dealing.
The NAPF, ABI and ISC therefore initiated a campaign to encourage fund managers to use 
their voting powers. Based on the unpublished results of the 1993 ISC Voting Survey (using 
detailed returns from some 20 major companies) this campaign appears to have been 
relatively successful. The ISC Survey showed that, amongst the companies included, the
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proportion of votes cast on shareholder resolutions had increased from around 25% to 35% 
between 1990 and 1993.
Institutional investors are not short of advice as to how they should establish voting policies 
or vote their shares at the AGM’s of individual companies. The ABI, NAPF and PIRC all 
provide information or specific recommendations to support the voting decisions taken by 
their members. However, amongst these three organisations, there is not always a consensus 
about how shares should be voted to best represent the interests of the beneficial owners. 
Mallin (1995) suggests that the issues which institutions and their advisory organisations are 
most likely to regard as contentious are those ‘which might result in a deterioration of 
shareholders’ rights, or too much power being vested in a particular individual, or excessive 
rewards to management’.
Thirty seven of the major UK listed companies surveyed by Mallin provided details of the 
votes cast by their largest 20 shareholders. The results can be broadly compared with the 
earlier surveys carried out by the ISC across 20 companies. This found that 70% of insurance 
companies ranked in the Top 20 voted their shares; the Mallin survey gave a figure of 77.6%. 
A greater increase was found amongst pension funds, from 44% (ISC, 1993) to 72.4% 
(Mallin), showing that formal voting processes and procedures amongst the UK’s larger 
pension fund managers have caught up with those of the insurance sector. However, the 
average voting level of 35% across a larger sample of companies and shareholders suggests 
that smaller institutional shareholders (those ranked outside the Top 20) and many private 
shareholders are not voting at all. In other words, voting control effectively lies with those 
fund managers which already have closest contact with companies, through the prioritising of 
investor relations programmes to companies’ ‘major’ shareholders, and greatest informal 
influence behind closed doors.
In addition, the UK’s largest active managers of equity portfolios are those institutions most 
likely to have disclosable stakes (of above 3%) in listed companies. Mallin found evidence of 
a connection between the disclosable stakes of institutional investors such as Prudential and 
Standard Life and the overall level of voting in the companies in which they held those stakes. 
This suggests that not only are those declarable stakes being voted, but that the presence of 
these large 'lead’ investors on a company’s share register encourages others to vote as well.
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However, it is not clear how declarable stakes held by fund managers such as Standard Life, 
Prudential (and MAM) are associated with ownership by other institutional investors or the 
size of the company.
The UK’s biggest institutional fund managers are large organisations in their own right, and 
therefore have the resources to fund the systems and infrastructure to support the organised 
voting of the shares they control. It is clear that the major UK pension fund managers have 
now found this worthwhile because of the near doubling of their voting between the 1993 
ISC and Mallin surveys. The most likely source of pressure for change has been from the 
beneficial owners of the shares they manage. Services such as those run by the ABI, NAPF 
and PIRC provide a ready source of information to pension fund trustees and others about 
voting issues. This improved information flow has undoubtedly had a significant impact on 
the voting behaviour of the UK’s largest pension funds, insurance companies and other 
institutional investors generally - which are those fund managers most often found in the Top 
20 of companies’ share registers.
Smaller fund managers are likely to have found it more difficult to systematise their voting 
procedures and mechanisms for seeking guidance from the beneficial owners (if this is 
required) before voting on contentious issues. Two other voting barriers identified by Mallin 
are, first the perceived value of voting by fund managers whose stakes are small and secondly, 
the widespread use of nominee accounts. These were cited by 31% of companies as 
presenting a significant problem in the voting process. At the very least, the use of nominee 
accounts can slow down the distribution and return of voting papers to the point at which the 
requirement for filing 48 hours before the AGM is missed and this is a particular problem for 
private shareholders.
In most cases nominee accounts can be directly related to the investing institutions, and many 
brokers, investor relations specialists and independent services exist to match nominee 
accounts against the legal owner (the fund manager) and beneficial owner(s) (for example, a 
company pension scheme) of a particular block of shares. Additional delays can occur when a 
fund manager does not have authority to vote shares on either some or all the issues being put 
to shareholders. In many cases fund mangers have established either the right to vote on all 
issues or for all those for which they plan to support the proposals being made by the board.
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In my own interviews I asked fund managers who claimed not to routinely vote on 
shareholder resolutions why they did not do so. With the exception of Mercury (which I 
discuss below) fund managers normally control the votes for the shares they hold in portfolios 
on behalf of their clients. This control will normally be included in the management mandate 
granted by the trustees (in the case of life and pension hands and unit trusts) or the directors 
of the fund (in the case of investment trusts).
These mandates may give total discretion to the fund managers in their use of voting rights 
but it appears that, even if this is the case, fund managers will normally seek the trustees’ (or 
directors’) approval before voting against the recommendations of the board of directors of a 
company in which they are invested.
Thus, where the fund manager supports a board’s recommendation, the logistics of casting 
votes should be relatively simple, although in practice the detail of administering voting rights 
for an actively traded portfolio can be both complicated and time consuming.
Voting agaimt a board’s recommendations therefore normally requires that the fund manager 
writes to the trustees of each of the funds it manages, in which the particular company’s 
shares are held, to explain its recommendation to vote against the board. Replies are 
administered and chased (normally within a relatively short time period) and additional 
questions from trustees dealt with; replies are then collated and aggregated into a final vote. 
An aggregated vote may not all be one way; a number of fund managers reported that it 
would not be exceptional for them to submit a proportion of their votes for and the balance 
against resolutions proposed a company.
For a pension fund manager with a hundred or more clients, the logistics of communicating 
with trustees, chasing them for their decisions and administering the whole process can 
approach what was described in one interview as 'nightmare’ proportions, particularly when 
there is little time available.
Fund managers who had looked at this issue estimated the cost of administering a single 
shareholder vote at around £80-100, the equivalent of up to £10,000 for a manager
Chapter 6: Shareholder Rights 222
responsible for 100 funds. If each portfolio contains the shares of an average of 150 
companies, the minimum costs that will be incurred in exercising a single shareholder vote for 
each company will be of the order of £1.5 million a year (on the basis of one set of resolutions 
being proposed at the time of each company’s AGM).
From the fund managers’ point of view, these costs either have to be absorbed internally, 
reducing the profitability of their business, or included in their fund management charges. An 
added problem, if the costs are to be included in the charging structure, is that the 
administration of a vote is independent of the number of shares in a holding or portfolio. The 
total costs involved are therefore independent of the aggregate number of shares controlled 
by the fund manager. The outcome is that:
Firstly, to maintain equity between clients, smaller clients will be charged a higher proportion 
of their fund value for the administration of their voting rights than clients with larger funds. 
Secondly, clients of smaller fund managers will tend to be charged more than those of larger 
fund managers.
It is therefore not surprising that the fund managers who will incur the highest costs in 
organising voting rights, because of the large number of separate (segregated) pension funds 
under management, have been amongst the slowest to do so. Unless the process can be 
systematised, for example by the fund manager controlling votes in all circumstances with no 
formal or moral requirement to refer to fund trustees or directors, the costs involved in doing 
so may be unjustified in all but the most exceptional circumstances; a takeover for example.
But from the point of view of trustees, beneficiaries, investors and directors of investment 
trusts, if all voting rights were to be given automatically to a fund manager, one of the key 
rights of equity ownership will have been lost. In any case, not all fund managers believe that 
they need to or even should control the voting rights of the shareholdings they manage on 
behalf of their clients. The director of a large pension fund manager commented:
‘we have been appointed by our clients as managers of their money, not as 
owners of companies'.
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C Declaration of Holdings
There is a second aspect of voting power, set out in the Companies Act, which relates to the 
declaration of shareholdings. This only requires fund managers to declare their holdings above 
3% i f  they control the votes for these shares. In practice, most fund managers declare their 
holdings above 3%, even if they do not necessarily control voting rights in all circumstances. 
However, one of the UK’s largest fund managers, Mercury, does not routinely declare 
holdings above 3%, on the grounds that it does not control the votes for these shares.
From Mercury’s point of view, non-declaration of holdings is entirely consistent with its 
highly focused objective of fund management for the benefit of clients and not on its potential 
responsibilities as a part- owner of many UK listed companies. Indeed, it could be argued that 
Mercury has grown to become one of the UK’s largest fund managers partly because of its 
dedication to portfolio management and its avoidance of expending scarce management 
resource on time consuming ownership issues, beyond those directly relevant to its role as a 
portfolio manager.
C.i Voting dilemmas
However, conflicts do sometimes arise when pursuing this strategy. Although Mercury had 
(in 1993) the policy of not declaring share-holdings above 3%, on occasions voting powers 
will be required to discharge its responsibilities as a fund manager. Thus, in the Granada/LWT 
take-over Mercury will have had to go through the process of seeking voting powers from 
each of its clients; firstly, to vote its Granada shares to make the offer to LWT shareholders 
and authorise the rights issue necessary to fund the acquisition, and secondly to vote its LWT 
shares to accept the bid.
The complexity of this situation, in which Mercury was effectively making a strategic decision 
about the structure of the UK television industry, was seen by other fund managers as a 
function of Mercury’s size in the UK fund management industry (a problem of success rather 
than failure) and more specifically, due to its policy of taking large stakes in companies it 
most favours ie its aggressive style of fund management.
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D Companies’ Views on Voting
Why do companies want their shareholders to exercise their voting rights? After all, if a 
board’s proposals are not controversial and fund managers are known to be supportive, the 
costs of administering votes will be unnecessary to the outcome. Three reasons were put 
forward by companies for their concern that shareholders, particularly institutions (being the 
largest shareholder group), should vote: to establish a regular pattern of voting amongst 
supportive fund managers; to ensure that shareholder resolutions, requiring a certain 
proportion of total votes to be cast, were passed; as being symbolic of the quality of 
ownership their institutional shareholders felt towards the company.
D.i Establishing a pattern of support
In the past, many UK companies appear to have been happy with relatively low levels of 
voting by their institutional shareholders. However, there is also growing awareness that, over 
the last five years or so, US institutions have been increasing the use of their voting power, 
both on 'routine’ matters requiring shareholder approval and more forcefully to promote 
strategic and boardroom changes in major companies.
In the 1980s US institutions were focused on domestic companies, but in the early 1990s their 
influence started to extend out of the USA, to markets and companies in which they had 
significant investments. UK companies became aware of this developing interest both directly 
through meetings with their US shareholders and because a number of large US public sector 
funds joined the UK-based shareholder group PIRC.
As institutional investors have become more concerned about corporate governance issues, 
their willingness to use their voting power to seek change has increased. Although in the UK, 
neither fund managers nor pension fund trustees are obliged to vote, it is likely that companies 
will increasingly want them to do so, in order to establish supportive voting blocks in the 
event that another group of shareholders will oppose a board resolution or support a hostile 
bid.
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However, the public profile of adversarial shareholders can often appear far greater than their 
actual (direct) voting power or support amongst other shareholders. A wise board will want 
to be well informed about the views of its shareholders and will generally prefer not to put 
forward a resolution rather than run the risk of a public defeat. In any case, a board will also 
normally be aware of its position in advance of a shareholders’ meeting through its possession 
of proxy votes for and against each resolution.
D.ii Minimum voting requirements
There are times when companies need a certain proportion or number of shares (out of the 
total issued share capital) to be voted, rather than only to establish a simple majority of those 
cast at a shareholders’ meeting.
These situations may arise when a particular class of shareholder, for example holders of 
convertible shares, needs to approve changes to the terms of the issue. A number of the 
companies I interviewed described the exceptional effort required to obtain the required 
number of votes (perhaps representing a minimum of two-thirds or three-quarters of those 
issued) to approve such changes, even when it was entirely clear that the change was in both 
the investors’ and company’s interest.
Numerous phone calls were required to persuade fund managers to vote; they appeared to be 
extremely reluctant to make the effort or to organise their clients’ votes to ensure that 
resolutions were successfully approved.
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‘Fund managers vote when they think its important or in their interest to do so, but 
they are not necessarily so keen when it’s only in the company’s interest - despite 
the fact that you’d think that this should amount to the same thing. If you are a 
small company it can be difficult to get them to focus on you, make any sort of 
decision and get the paperwork sorted out. I had to get quite tough with a couple of 
our major shareholders to get them to vote and on time - which is crazy when it’s 
actually in their interests to do so.’ (Chairman, smaller company)
D.iii Shareholder commitment
The third reason for companies seeking increased voting by fund managers is more of a moral 
issue. Directors and senior executives are not infrequent witnesses to the way that, on the one 
hand, institutional investors use their powers ‘behind the scenes’ to force management or 
strategic changes in companies but, on the other hand, typically show low levels of voting and 
public support for companies, for example through attending and participating in AGMs.
Some directors are strongly of the view that fund managers should always use their voting 
power and through doing so publicly (for example at AGMs) declare their role in the 
ownership of companies. Although in theory laudable, one of the practical problems with this 
approach is the need to distinguish between: voting by the show of hands; the voting power 
of individual fund managers; and the use of the proxy system, through which voting is 
anonymous.
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IV: Shareholder Meetings
Every listed company, in common with all other registered companies, is obliged to hold an 
AGM at which specified items of business must be transacted. All shareholders are entitled to 
attend the meeting, at which three of the most important activities are:
1 The board giving an account of its management of the business in the preceding 
financial year.
2 The right of shareholders to ask questions of the board.
3 Shareholders voting on resolutions put to them by the board.
Section I of this Chapter reviewed the kinds of resolutions that boards put to shareholders at 
an AGM. Similar resolutions may also be put to shareholders at additional Extraordinary 
General Meetings (EGMs) during the course of a year. For example, EGMs may be held to 
approve a rights issue or a takeover, when the timing does not coincide with that of the 
AGM. Two features of these meetings are that very few shareholders attend compared with 
the size of the share register and those that do so are overwhelmingly private shareholders 
and not institutional investors, particularly at AGMs. Normally EGMs are very sparsely 
attended by both types of shareholder, most votes being cast by proxy.
Proxy votes are often described as being ‘in the Chairman’s pocket’, but in practice they are 
seldom needed by the board of the company to support the resolutions it has put before 
shareholders. This is because if) by a show of hands, the majority of shareholders present at 
the meeting support the resolution this is normally sufficient to pass the resolution.
Only if one or more of those shareholders present demand a formal poll will a vote take place 
weighted by size of shareholding. In these circumstances, proxy votes held by the Chairman 
and others, plus those votes cast by shareholders present, will be counted and determine the 
outcome. Companies report that this happens very rarely, but that the number of occasions 
when a full shareholder vote is taken (of those present or represented at a meeting) is 
increasing.
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A Concerns about Confidentiality
By not attending shareholder meetings fund managers are not required to vote by the show of 
hands or to disclose their voting intention in any other way - nor to run the risk that they may 
need to justify their position in public to other shareholders.
A problem for fund managers with a close knowledge of a company is that the binary choice, 
of voting for or against a shareholder resolution, lacks subtlety when dealing with the 
company, its board of directors and what are likely to be complex management and strategic 
issues. Fund managers, when they have the interest and resources to do so, far prefer to deal 
with companies on a one-to-one basis and to be able to make their views known to the 
company privately. This also enables them to respond more directly to the information 
provided by directors. In Chapter 7 ,1 describe this process as being largely conducted ‘behind 
closed doors’.
Conversely, few company Chairmen would appear to welcome the implications of a major 
shareholder speaking out, or voting against a resolution, at a shareholders’ meeting. Although 
one doubted whether:
‘many fund managers would actually have the guts to stand up and be counted 
if this meant that they were going to be faced by an aggressive CEO’
That said, many companies feel that major shareholders should attend AGMs and other 
shareholder meetings as a demonstration of their commitment to ownership of the company’s 
shares; a similar issue to that put forward by companies about voting itself. Those few fund 
managers who do attend AGMs often do so as 'guests’ of the Chairman, taking the role of 
observers and not shareholder participants.
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B: Risk of Investment Jeopardy
Just as directors run risks if their proposed resolutions are defeated, so fund managers fear 
that their voting behaviour may give a dangerously misleading impression of their underlying 
confidence in a company or its board of directors.
If a major shareholder with 3%, 5% or more of a company was known to have opposed a 
directors’ resolution, the conclusion may be drawn by outsiders (and relayed through investor 
information services and the media) that the institution concerned is likely to dispose of all or 
part of its holding in the near future. These expectations may, in turn, undermine the share 
price or increase volatility. If the fund manager concerned was planning to institute a sell 
programme, it is more likely that it would be selling into share price weakness rather than 
strength.
In these circumstances, the exercising of voting rights as shareholders would conflict with the 
investment role of fund managers and their fiduciary duties to investors in their fimds.
When significant shareholdings are voted against the proposals of incumbent management, 
the potential for misunderstandings is considerable and will be exaggerated if institutional 
voting decisions are disclosed (and perhaps justified as well) in the public forum of a 
shareholders meeting. The risks are seen by many fund managers as outweighing any public 
benefits, but the issue of who resources this additional involvement is also significant.
C Resource Constraints
Although a number of senior fund managers support the principle that AGMs and other 
shareholder meetings should be more useful to both companies and shareholders, how this 
increased involvement is to be resourced remains an unresolved problem.
On a purely practical basis, although many companies hold their AGMs in London, where 
many fund managers are also located, the time involved in preparing for meetings, travelling 
to them, attending and participating, and subsequent internal reporting would be considerable. 
A minimum time commitment of half a day would be likely to be typical - yet none of the
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senior fund managers I interviewed would have anything like this time available on a regular 
and consistent basis; certainly not across a typical portfolio containing at least 100 companies. 
Time is seen as one of the key resource constraints on fund management teams, particularly in 
the April-June quarter when the majority of prelim announcements are made, annual reports 
published (containing a mass of additional information for forensically inclined analysts) and 
AGMs held.
For many fund managers, the choice would appear to be either to send a relatively junior 
member of the fund management team or for nobody to go at all - the current situation. Many 
senior fund managers would feel uncomfortable sending more junior members of their team 
to a shareholder meeting, because they themselves would also need to be closely monitored 
and their freedom of action carefully defined and controlled.
If the intention was to take a public stance on a substantive issue (ie. opposing or criticising 
management) the more senior fund manager would almost certainly wish to attend and take a 
personal role. If the role was merely to observe, what value would there be in this unless 
some valuable information was disclosed?
If this happens, the AGM is not the forum for the first announcement, as not all shareholders 
would (under Stock Exchange disclosure requirements) have simultaneous access to the same 
information. To force all shareholders (or their proxies/ representatives) to attend would 
require additional legislation and place resource constraints on the fund management industry, 
which it is currently not placed to handle.
Alternatively, this could give rise to a new class of activist intermediary. The problems here 
are of moral authority, agent control, cost and the creation of an additional link in corporate 
ownership.
There seems to be no easy way out of this conundrum. If fund managers are to spend more 
time at public shareholder meetings, the value of their time will need to be funded by their 
clients. If this funding is not available, attendance will incur additional and irrecoverable 
overheads. This may lead to a reduction in the quality of fund management services, as
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valuable internal resources are switched from an implicit to an explicit monitoring role, 
through increased public participation in shareholder meetings.
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V: Conflicting Interests
In the preceding Sections of this Chapter. I have described some of the ways fund managers 
may exercise their power as shareholders of listed companies; through working together as 
members of investor organisations (Section I) and voting (Section ID), although not by taking 
part in AGMs and other shareholder meetings (Section IV).
This Section reviews three types of constraint operating on fund managers, which serve to 
limit their freedom of action as shareholders.
A Pension Fund Managers
Pensions funds are either managed in-house or independently and externally by third party 
fund managers. Sources of business for these independent fund managers will either be in the 
public sector (for example local authorities) or private sector; the bulk of the latter business 
coming from quoted companies and the remainder from the unquoted sector. Three key 
elements of pensions fund management as a business are:
Firstly, that the largest quoted companies tend to have the largest pension funds, although 
some of the largest funded schemes are (or were) public sector based; coal (CIN), the Post 
Office (Postel), British Rail, and electricity (ESN), each of which have well over £5 billion in 
assets. However, other major public sector pension schemes are unfunded and therefore do 
not have any invested assets, liabilities being met out of current Government receipts. Major 
unfunded public sector schemes include those for defence and health service employees, and 
the state pension itself.
Secondly, funded schemes will normally be invested broadly across the UK equity market, 
typically in 200 or more companies (although some of these investments may be indirect 
investments, through specialist smaller company or overseas funds, for example).
Thirdly, that the independent pension fund managers have multiple clients, whilst in-house 
fund managers have only one.
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With this pattern of ownership it is inevitable that the larger independent managers will 
control portfolios which hold shares in client companies. But as a pension fund manager, 
what are the issues involved when considering whether to intervene as an investor in the 
affairs of a company which is also a client? Clearly a corporate client, although strictly 
speaking only the indirect source of pensions fund management business (because in law the 
fund and its trustees are independent and separate legal entities from the company) will not 
appreciate coming into conflict with the manager of its own pension fund.
Fund managers with whom I discussed this issue argued that each case would have to be 
treated on its own merits, but claimed (as one might expect, in the view of their fiduciary 
responsibilities) that the balance of factors would always be towards the interests of all the 
funds in which the company’s shares were held.
In these kind of circumstances, pension fund managers will clearly prefer to sell a company’s 
shares rather than come into conflict with the board of a client company. However, fund 
managers will also not want to be put in a position where selling a client company’s shares (in 
order to avoid a potential conflict of interest) may help undermine the company’s share price 
at what may be a critical time for the company.
Pension fund managers try to avoid this problem by not building up significant stakes in client 
companies where conflicts may arise. Holdings in client companies will therefore tend to be 
more cautiously managed than others, placing implicit constraints on the structure and 
holdings of their portfolios.
B Corporate Finance Departments
A second source of sensitivity for fund managers occurs when the corporate finance arm of 
the same financial conglomerate is involved in a transaction involving a company held in the 
fund manager’s portfolios.
This is not the same issue as the regulatory requirement for ‘chinese walls’ between the 
corporate finance departments, broking arms and the fund managers of financial
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conglomerates. Instead, the problem, raised in a number of interviews, is more to do with 
client expectations than the regulatory environment. It occurs when the decision of the fund 
management organisation is seen as not supporting the interests of a client of the corporate 
finance unit. For example, the voting of shares held in a target company against a bid by a 
client of the corporate finance department.
In these situations there is the risk of confusion on the part of the bidding company, as to 
whether 'its’ bank is totally supporting its bid for the target. The same issue may arise if a 
corporate finance client wishes to raise funds through a rights issue, but the fund management 
arm will not provide additional funding because it does not believe that this will be meet its 
fiduciary duties to its own investment clients.
One fund manager described this problem as:
‘more trouble than it is worth. Experience has shown us that it often would be 
better if our funds didn’t hold any shares in corporate finance clients rather than 
have to deal with the misunderstandings that sometimes occur when we sell shares.’
The same fund manager felt that the buying of shares in a client company of the corporate 
finance department ran the opposite risk - of being misunderstood as indicative of ‘support’ 
rather than an objective investment decision.
!
On this issue, it should be noted that although merchant bank SG Warburg (SGW) remains 
majority shareholder of Mercury Asset Management, the successful separation of the two 
companies (each of which has a Stock Exchange listing) is indicated by the lack of conflict 
that companies and other fund managers see between the two organisations. Neither 
companies or fund managers expect that Mercury or SGW would necessarily support the 
activities of the other (as recent events have shown) - but this is seen as a problem in other, 
integrated groups, as is the taking of proprietary positions alongside those of fund 
management clients.
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C Interlocking Directorships
In Chapter 5 ,1 described the limited role of NEDs in acting as a link between companies and 
shareholders. There are, however, many cross-linkages between companies through 
parallel/multiple directorships. In addition, in many listed companies both NED and executive 
directors act as trustees of the company’s pension scheme.
An example of the conflicts that may arise is when a fund manager, on behalf of all its 
investment clients, decides to vote its holdings against the share option scheme of a company, 
a director of which is also a trustee of one of the pension funds managed by the fund 
manager.
Pension fund managers are sensitive to overlapping roles and coincident relationships of this 
nature when considering contentious or adversarial action against an under-performing 
company, or the sale of a large block of shares. Not least because their actions may need to be 
accounted to company directors and pension fund trustees common to both; as in the 
example above. Particularly sensitive are issues of executive remuneration, the terms of share 
option schemes and the compensation paid to directors and senior managers for loss of office. 
One of the benefits from shareholder organisations (such as the ABI and NAPF) establishing 
a common code for contentious issues such as these, is that some of the potential conflicts 
can be diffused (or at least depersonalised) by reference to independently established 
standards.
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VI Summary
It appears that institutional fund managers do not behave as shareholders ‘should’, according 
to models which rely on voting and other formal powers as a source of shareholder control. I 
have described in this Chapter how, for the most part, they are reluctant voters and seldom, if 
ever, attend AGMs. They have also reduced their dependence on the role of intermediaries. 
Brokers and the activities of organisations such as the ABI and NAPF are markedly less 
important now than they were ten years ago.
Rather than relying on formal mechanisms of shareholder control, companies’ major 
shareholders want to meet and deal directly with management. With regular contact and the 
building of personal relationships, formal systems of control are less important than direct 
influence.
In the past, IPCs were used by institutional shareholders to represent and coordinate their 
interests at both industry level and in response to problems within specific companies. These 
too have been all but been abandoned, underlying the determination of major fund managers 
to deal directly with the management of the companies in which they hold investments.
In the past, some aspects of IPCs resembled the coalitions of shareholders proposed by Scott, 
when he considered how shareholder influence would be brought to bear on companies 
where there was no significant minority shareholder (with a stake in excess of 10%). 
However, the resemblance is limited because IPCs were essentially crisis-driven by 
companies’ deteriorating finances, a collapse in management or ill-considered takeovers or 
mergers, and often a combination of these.
IPCs were therefore the exception rather than the rule and were often confrontational with 
incumbent management. They did not provide the basis for continuing, non-confrontational 
relationships between companies and shareholders, in which issues of concern would be 
discussed and could be dealt with before they became a problem on the scale which would 
have previously triggered the establishment of an IPC.
The evidence from this and earlier Chapters is that companies’ major shareholders place little 
reliance on their formal powers and rights as shareholders. Instead, the nexus of power lies
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within one-to-one meetings with companies. These are 'off the record’ and subject only to the 
legal constraint that the fund manager must suspend dealings in the company’s shares (or at 
least 'ring fence’ those portfolio managers and analysts attending the meeting) if it is given 
(deliberately or inadvertently) price sensitive information by the company.
The importance of these meetings to the exercising of shareholder influence is fully 
appreciated, the reasons for fund managers’ relative lack of interest in voting and total 
ambivalence towards shareholder meetings (in any but exceptional circumstances) becomes 
clearer.
Voting power remains a latent source of shareholder control because this is only needed at as 
‘last resort’. In practice few companies have chosen to directly confront the voting power of 
their institutional shareholders. The balance of power in company shareholder relationships 
therefore lies in informal influence rather than the regular use of direct voting control.
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I Introduction
From the account of company shareholder relationships given in Chapters 5 and 6 it is clear 
that informal mechanisms of shareholder influence are routinely far more important and 
significant to shareholders than formal voting powers or the opportunity to attend shareholder 
meetings.
In this Chapter, I review the actions of shareholders and the issues they consider when they 
need to instigate strategic or management changes in a company. In these situations, the 
mechanisms shareholders use to influence companies change significantly, but develop from 
the informal relationships described earlier.
The instigation of strategic or management changes by institutional shareholders may typically 
be triggered by:
• The announcement of poor financial results for the current period below market forecasts, 
particularly if related to business activities or risks not previously disclosed or discussed 
with fund managers.
• A bearish trading statement or a profits warning about future performance, particularly if 
these indicate that a prior deterioration in the company’s performance has not been 
arrested over the timescale expected by the fund manager on the basis of previous 
discussions with management.
• Plans being announced which contradict previous statements made or assurances given by 
the company to the fund manager.
It is more likely to be the discrepancy between expectations and assurances, on the one hand 
and actual events on the other, than the shorter-term availability of new information per se, 
that is likely to trigger the serious consideration of intervention by fund managers. This 
underlines the significance of the adage that ‘the market does not like surprises’.
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Many more interventions will be considered than are ever instigated. Among major fund 
managers, with a history of intervention, the ratio is possibly as high as ten to one, indicated 
by the number of companies which may be of ‘concern’ at any one time, compared with the 
number where some kind of specific action is being taken.
The material contained in this Chapter is based on material from many of the interviews I 
undertook (see Appendix I). In some of these interviews ‘off the record’ accounts were given 
of recent corporate situations in which the fund manager (or company) had been involved. In 
order to capture this additional material, I have created a case history, based on the different 
accounts given to me. This case history forms Chapter 8, and should be read as a composite 
account and not a disguised case history of one company alone.
This Chapter is organised into four main Sections. Section II (Taking Action) describes the 
ways in which institutional investors work with companies and advisors to instigate the 
changes that they believe are necessary. These may include instigating changes to improve 
corporate performance or significantly influencing corporate strategy, financing or investment 
decisions, and board membership, the roles of executive directors and other senior managers. 
Institutional shareholders prefer to instigate such changes informally and confidentially 
‘behind closed doors’.
Through this process 'lead shareholder’ will nopnally emerge, who will usually also be the 
largest institutional shareholder in the company. The costs of taking this role include 
management time and usually also becoming an ‘insider’ with access to privileged information 
which precludes dealing in the company’s shares. The role of the lead shareholder, the ways 
in which they work with companies and other shareholders, and the constraints under which 
they operate are described in Sections HI (Role of Lead Shareholder), IV (Implementing 
Changes) and V (Constraints on Involvement) respectively.
Chapter 7: Instigating Change 241
II Taking Action
In the face of a corporate deterioration, fund managers will normally seek to become better 
informed about the company’s situation so that they can identify the cause(s) of the problem, 
clarify their own position, and evaluate the courses of action open to them. They will then 
seek to send 'signals’ to the company about their concerns, either directly through one-to-one 
meetings, via the company’s broker or merchant bank, or, very rarely, briefing the media.
A Meetings with Management
The first step would normally be to meet with the directors of the company to discuss the 
situation; companies will normally also want to do this in order to ensure that their (major) 
shareholders are as well informed as possible about the circumstances that have arisen. At this 
meeting the fund manager may be reassured about the nature of the problem and that no 
further action (on its part) is required - at least for the time being, or remain concerned about 
the company’s current performance or future prospects, or be dissatisfied at the quality of 
information it is receiving from the company or the performance of the company’s directors.
‘We met the Chief Executive a couple of times after the results were announced, but 
we became increasingly unhappy with his performance and the quality of 
information we were getting - it was becoming very clear that things were not going 
to change unless we did something.’ (Life fund manager)
B Company Chairmen
A second source of information about a company’s management team is the Chairman, who 
may well be seen alone by a fund manager in order to help it determine whether the problem 
arises because of the competence of the management team (endogenous factors), or the 
characteristics of the particular business sectors in which the company operates, about which 
the fund manager may believe it is under- or mis-informed (exogenous factors).
At this point the Chairman (even if he has been involved in prior meetings with the fund 
manager) may believe that it is (still) the quality of communications between the company and
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fund manager that is causing the problem, and seek to correct this as rapidly as possible 
through, for example, arranging further meetings and briefings.
Particular problems arise for the fund manager if the Chairman and CEO are the same person 
(the separation of the positions being a key recommendation of the Cadbury Committee) or 
share the same weaknesses in their management of the company or in their relationships with 
the company’s major shareholders.
In these circumstances the fund manager may seek contact with a NED of the company, but 
only i f  the fund manager feels unable to make a clear assessment of the company’s 
circumstances in its own right.
C Corporate Brokers
A second mechanism for fund managers to send signals to a company is through the 
company’s corporate broker, which acts both as a financial advisor and as a conduit of 
information between the company and its shareholders and investors (‘the market’) on a 
wider basis. Some corporate brokers (notably Cazenove) are seen by fund managers and their 
corporate clients as particularly good in this role, with sensitive antennae to the mood of the 
market towards a company, but as important is knowing what to do with the information 
obtained.
To operate effectively for their clients, brokers need to be particularly responsive to feedback 
from major shareholders. Conversations between broker and fund manager may well be short 
and ‘coded’, but both sides should understand the issues at stake. Inevitably, not all brokers 
do get the message with the directness intended. If this happens, and the fund manager 
remains concerned about the company, the fund manager is likely to be much more direct in 
voicing its concerns, or may go to the company’s merchant bank if it feels that the 
circumstances demand this.
The company’s broker should be particularly concerned if similar signals are being received 
from a number of major institutional shareholders. These will also need to be placed against 
the background of analyst (and to a certain extent media) comment about the company and its
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business sector(s) and in the light of the additional information the broker has (on a privileged 
basis) about the company.
D Working ‘Behind Closed Doors’
At this stage the role of informal networking between senior fund managers may start to 
become important. This network is close and the communication channels are always 
available for informal ‘soundings’.
Senior fund managers I interviewed expressed a strong preference for not working through 
the NAPF or ABI committee systems as they saw them as being too slow and cumbersome.
‘In half a dozen phone calls I can find out everything I need to know’
(CEO of pension fund manager)
Fund managers are firmly of the belief that their negotiations with companies are better held 
in private, ‘behind closed doors’ than in the public domain. The reasons are that: decisions are 
taken faster; many options may be explored, but shareholder uncertainty is controlled as 
negotiations are confidential; legal liabilities are minimised and costs controlled until 
negotiations are concluded; a cooperative approach can be more easily maintained, 
minimising conflict between the board of a company, individual directors and the company’s 
major shareholders.
The informal networks that exist between fund managers are important in helping them clarify 
their positions, partly through judging the position of other fund managers in terms of their 
assessment of the problem(s) the company is facing (are their own beliefs and judgements 
about the company shared by other large shareholders?); the likely nature of any external, 
shareholder based, intervention that might be necessary; the role of individual fund managers 
in this intervention.
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D.i Divergent interests
If other fund managers do not share its concerns, the fund manager may elect:
• To do nothing, but wait to see whether the situation improves.
• To reduce its exposure to the company through selling all or part of its holding. Many of 
the small and medium sized fund managers that I interviewed believed that it is never a 
good investment decision to hold onto shares once a company’s performance has 
significantly failed to meet expectations. These fund managers felt that to delay the 
inevitable decision to sell would only result in lower overall investment performance, 
through increasing the likelihood that the shares would be sold into a weakening market 
and by delaying the opportunity to switch the funds into a company with better prospects.
• To on its own seek to instigate the changes it believes are necessary. This is only likely if 
the holding is either substantial (ie in excess of around 8%, depending on the size of 
company), or if the stake held is significantly bigger (by perhaps 3 - 5%) than that of any 
other shareholder. In practice, these two criteria are likely to coincide.
D.ii Common interests
It is, however, much more likely that there will be a consensus amongst a company’s major 
shareholders that there is a problem. This does not necessarily mean that awareness of the 
problem will be confined to this core group alone as a considerable amount of information 
may already be in the public domain and subject, for example, to comment by analysts and the 
media. Instead, the key to the consensus lies first in the informal agreement amongst members 
of the core group that action needs to be taken, and secondly on the likely nature of any 
solution.
A fund manager which is a member of the core group of shareholders and which takes part in 
this consensus building has two options. It can take the lead in instigating change in the 
company. This is most likely if the fund manager is a company’s largest shareholder or, if it is 
not in this lead position the fund manager can support another which does takes the lead role.
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III Role of Lead Shareholders
One of the most significant findings from my interviews was the apparently common 
occurrence for just one fund manager to take the lead in dealing with a company, its financial 
advisors (broker/merchant bank), and bankers. The lead role is normally acquired informally 
after discussion with other major shareholders of the company. Normally, but not always, this 
'lead shareholder’ will also be the largest shareholder.
In specific situations, and probably arising more often with larger companies, these 
responsibilities may be shared amongst a company’s largest shareholders (but still not 
normally more than three or four), however one fund manager will normally still take the lead 
in dealing with a company, enabling the company’s major shareholders to speak with a single 
voice.
Many small and medium sized fund managers recognise that the small size of their 
shareholdings means that they will only ever have a very limited ownership role and that their 
influence on companies will not be significant. Instead, other fund managers will almost 
always have larger stakes and it is the views of these managers which will shape events, not 
their own.
The relationship between lead and other shareholders depends on the absolute and relative 
sizes of the shareholdings involved. A lead shareholder with a stake significantly larger than 
other investors in the same company will be able to operate more independently than one 
whose shareholding is only slightly larger than others.
Shareholders outside the core group of a company’s top three or four shareholders may 
choose to make their views known to the company or, alternatively, remain at arms length to 
the activities of the lead and other major shareholders which comprise the core group. Those 
which remain distant from the process are likely to see their role as strictly limited to fund 
management and:
4not trying to tell managers what they should be doing or trying to run their companies 
for them9 (Pension fund manager)
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In addition to believing that they should not get involved in the affairs of individual companies 
these arms’ length investors are also likely to see the 'extended’ ownership role sometimes 
taken by other fund managers is misguided.
A Smaller Companies
It was also reported by fund managers that they are less likely to get involved in instigating 
changes in smaller companies than with large companies, unless they were definitely the 
largest shareholder. This focus occurs because smaller companies tend to have more 
concentrated share registers, in which fewer fund managers will have significant stakes, (but 
these stakes will tend to be larger in % terms than those held in larger companies) and the 
value of stakes held in smaller companies is lower than those held in large companies; the 
reward in terms of the impact on the performance of investment portfolios will therefore tend 
to be lower.
Purely on a cost/benefit basis, smaller companies are more likely to find themselves dealing 
with a single shareholder; a situation in which all the agency costs of dealing with that 
company will need to be absorbed by a single fund manager, justified by the size of its stake.
‘It’s only worth getting involved if we have a significant stake’ (Life fund manager) 
was a comment typical of many fund managers’ views about smaller companies.
The institutions involved in intervention will, in any case tend to be the larger fund managers. 
The smaller the fund manager the more likely it is that mother fund manager will have a 
bigger stake. Exceptions to this general rule arise when a fund manager specialises in smaller 
companies (like M&G), and is therefore more likely to have the largest stake in a company 
than fund managers with larger UK equity portfolios.
As discussed in Chapter 6 (Section I: Shareholder Protection), the role of formal committees 
to coordinate the response of major shareholders to the problems of individual companies has 
declined to negligible levels over the last ten years. Formal groupings are organised, but their
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purposes are more specific and often short term unless a company’s ownership amongst 
institutional investors is such that no single fund manager has a particular interest in leading an 
informal grouping of other shareholders.
B Position of Other Shareholders
Other shareholders do not lose any formal ownership rights through a lead role being adopted 
by the another shareholder. For example, there was no suggestion in any interviews that 
voting rights would be transferred to the lead (or another) shareholder. However, the course 
of negotiations with the company will clearly be mostly shaped by the lead shareholder, which 
will also be under an informal 'networking’ obligation to keep other major shareholders, 
particularly those in the core group, informed as much as they require.
Clearly, the adoption/acceptance of a lead shareholder strategy by other shareholders requires 
that they have confidence in the ability of the lead shareholder to act in their best interests. 
Institutions which were described as amongst the ‘safest pair of hands’ in such situations 
include Prudential, Norwich Union and Legal & General, although Gartmore and Standard 
Life were also mentioned in a number of interviews as reliable ‘lead shareholders’.
Although other major shareholders may not always entirely agree with all aspects of the 
strategy adopted by the lead shareholder in dealing with a company, they will normally be 
kept informed of progress and possibly also have the option of voting on the final outcome, 
particularly if this involves divestment, financial restructuring or a rights issue.
Depending on the company’s circumstances, major shareholders may also agree informally to 
maintain their holdings to avoid creating a bear market in the company’s shares, which may 
hinder any reconstruction. However, shareholders outside the core informal ‘support’ group 
may well sell anyway and cause the share price to slide. Most fund managers have a strong 
desire to leave their options open, as to if and when they sell shares in a company.
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IV Implementing Changes
The desire for investment flexibility will be much higher than normal when a company is 
known to be under financial pressure or in the process of being restructured by another group 
of shareholders. This is one of the reasons why speed of action is seen by fund managers to be 
very important in dealing with distressed companies.
A Need for Speed
The smaller the number of parties involved, the faster issues can be discussed, agreed and 
decisions can be made by the company, its advisors and major shareholders. From the 
company’s point of view, and that of their advisors, dealing with a single lead shareholder 
also minimises communication and coordination costs and gives a clear focus and decision 
point in the negotiating process.
Although to outsiders, fund managers can appear very slow in their response to companies 
‘getting into trouble’ this perception can only refer to activities that are in the public domain. 
An ‘outsider’ can only guess when fund managers start to apply pressure on management (of 
the kind described in the composite case history which forms Chapter 8).
Fund managers with a history of corporate intervention felt that they were getting much 
better at identifying problems at companies before they became major. This was contrasted 
with cases in the 1980s when, despite long periods of corporate decline, no action had been 
taken by shareholders against the boards or management of companies like Distillers.
B Reducing Shareholder Uncertainty
When a company undergoes some kind of restructuring under the influence of its major 
shareholders, most other shareholders will lack information about the progress of negotiations 
and therefore about the likely outcome.
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The ‘behind closed doors’ approach normally adopted by some of the UK’s leading fund 
managers, and the wish of many others not to become ‘insiders’, means that there will only be 
very limited and incomplete information available to them. Such uncertainty may lead to 
wildly different valuations by analysts, uninformed shareholders, and other investors (eg debt 
holders) in the company, on the basis of their different expectations about the likely 
outcomes.
The volatility in share price that may result and accompanying speculation can rapidly 
undermine the flexibility of fund managers in dealing with the company; covenants may be 
breached and banks may become uncooperative in negotiations about the company’s future. 
(One of the benefits of a share suspension is that equity market-based problems of this kind 
are eliminated for a period.)
C Avoiding Publicity
Fund managers with experience of corporate rescues and reconstructions felt that one of the 
very worst outcomes was for information about their negotiations with individual directors 
and about the future of the company to become public knowledge - until a final course of 
action had been agreed.
As media stories about disputes between boards and shareholders sometimes indicate, the 
issue becomes not whether directors will stay with the company, but the terms on which they 
will leave. However delicate discussions may be in private, the situation inevitably becomes 
adversarial once personal views and positions become public knowledge, hardening 
negotiating positions. Several described the process in terms of ‘never again’, so time 
consuming, adversarial and removed from the core fund management activity had events 
become.
Although to be seen to be ‘getting tough’ with under-performing companies might be thought 
to enhance the reputation of certain fund managers amongst the general public, from the point 
of view of the fund management side of these organisations, any potential retail benefits are 
seen as insufficient to offset the additional costs and time involved.
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Despite these problems, fund managers are quite prepared to ‘go public’ if they feel that there 
is no other option. The threat to do so is normally the final informal sanction that fund 
managers are able to exercise over the boards of companies. Whilst there is a sense of 'pour 
encourager les autres’ when a fund manager takes a public and adversarial position against 
incumbent management, their arrival at this point is a complicated process and not one which 
is undertaken lightly.
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V Constraints
A Internal Resources
Fund managers recognise that getting involved in a company’s affairs can be very time 
consuming and may, at the end of the day, produce no overall result better than if the fund 
manager had remained a passive investor, or, alternatively, sold its holding at the first sign of 
trouble. As more and more time is incurred dealing with a company, senior managers found 
their role increasingly difficult to justify to their colleagues. Few directors or senior portfolio 
managers can justify the time and expense involved in becoming closely involved with a 
company, to either their investors, internal management peer group, or shareholders in their 
fund management business.
The effective use of portfolio and senior managers’ time is therefore a key consideration when 
deciding whether to try to instigate change in a company, explaining quite simply why the 
fund managers most often associated with intervention are also amongst the UK’s largest.
For smaller fund managers, the issue is clear: the time commitment involved is simply not 
available. The role falls to larger fund managers, who have more experience of negotiating
with the boards of companies, banks and professional advisors and other shareholders - one
/
of which will, in any case, almost certainly have the largest shareholding.
B Becoming an ‘Insider’
One of the costs of becoming closely involved with a company undergoing change is that the 
fund manager becomes an insider, because privileged information is acquired about the 
company’s affairs. Having this information is crucial to sensible discussions and negotiations 
with the company and its advisors but, whilst this information is not generally known, dealing 
in the company’s shares would be a criminal offence.
If only one fund manager is involved in negotiations with a company, only their client 
portfolios will suffer this constraint. The benefit to other fund managers is that, although they
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lose a negotiating position with the company, they retain full flexibility with regard to their 
shareholdings in the company.
The cost to the lead shareholder of this arrangement is that all their portfolios are locked into 
the company’s shares; unless an internal ring fence has been established around the 
negotiating team. However, a potential dis-benefit of a ring fence is that portfolio managers 
outside the fence but within the same fund management organisation may sell the company’s 
shares, actually reducing the proportional benefits captured by the fund manager’s own 
portfolios and clients.
Given all these constraints, why are some fund managers more likely to commit management 
time to the rescue/reconstruction of a company than others? If size was the only factor, major 
fund managers such as Mercury, Schroders, UBS and Gartmore would be expected to be 
much more frequently involved in corporate change than they and others report.
C Tax Considerations
Tax is probably the biggest single factor. Pension fund managers are able to buy and sell 
shares without tax liabilities being incurred by their funds. This is not true for life companies, 
which are constrained by tax liabilities on their life funds (Capital Gains Tax (CGT)), without 
the benefit of indexation or private investor style annual capital allowances, and also on their 
general funds (Corporation Tax).
The lack of an indexation allowance for life companies is particularly important; in many cases 
their core equity holdings have been held a long time and are worth far in excess of the 
original purchase price. The sale of one of these holdings may mean close to one-third of the 
current value of the stake being lost through CGT liabilities.
One outcome is that if a life fund manager expects a share to fall in value by less than a third, 
maintaining the holding is preferable to selling because if dividends are maintained the yield on 
the share will increase substantially while if all the ‘bad news’ is discounted in the lower share 
price then there is only ‘upside’ left in the new price.
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These factors apply to all UK life funds. It is therefore not surprising that life fund managers 
are more often seen as ‘long-term holders’ and are more likely to be involved in the 
instigation and control of management and strategic changes in under-performing companies.
Of the larger life companies, the Prudential and Norwich Union are the two most strongly 
associated (in the minds of many companies and fund managers that I interviewed) with 'high 
profile’ and public confrontations over the management of particular companies. The 
Norwich Union is strongly associated with the ‘Tace’ case of a few years ago. At the time of 
interviewing in 1993, the Prudential was publicly involved in determining the future of the 
Chairman and Chief Executive of Spring Ram.
D Underlying Investment Strategy
The broad portfolios of life funds, typically of 200 or more companies also mean that, if they 
disinvest from a company, the choice of alternative investments is more restricted than it 
would be for more narrowly based portfolios. Although this is true of any fund, one life fund 
manager put this in terms of investing in UK equities as a ‘zero sum game’.
The significance of this remark was that the logical outcome of a policy of always disinvesting 
when companies 'got into trouble’ would result in lower overall corporate performance in the 
UK (or at least in the listed sector). Although it should always be possible to find other 
companies in which to invest, this becomes a strategy of diminishing opportunities as the 
range of suitable candidates for investment becomes restricted, and the number and 
proportion of unsuitable companies (due to their continuing poor performance) rises.
With large, diversified funds, major life fund managers see themselves as investing in 'UK 
pic’, where consistently 'running away’ from companies in trouble will result in a pool of 
fewer and fewer 'good’ companies in which to invest, reducing the overall return to investors 
in the long-term.
In making these judgements life fund managers are focusing on absolute rather than relative 
performance; on the real returns to their policy holders rather than fund performance against 
market-based benchmarks, as is the case with pension funds.
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In contrast, the views of pension fund managers are company specific. There is no sense of a 
‘moral crusade’ - and often the very opposite. These fund managers feel little or no obligation 
to try to improve the economic performance or welfare of 'UK pic’ or even of listed 
companies in aggregate.
In contrast to the wider perspective adopted by some of the largest life fund managers, the 
focus of the independent pension fund managers is almost exclusively on the narrower 
interests of clients and the owners of the fund manager (in that order), not on becoming 
members of ‘the good and great’ or of ‘the City establishment’. With their broader portfolios 
life fund managers consider it almost inevitable that at least some of the companies in which 
they invest ‘will go wrong’ - in which case corporate intervention may be necessary.
Pension fund managers with more focused portfolios are more likely to see their holding of a 
company which ‘goes wrong’ as a failure of their investment strategy (was the original 
research and investment decision of sufficient quality? Was sufficient attention paid to any 
warning signs?).
Even the most successful fund managers cannot have a 100% track record of successful 
intervention, but the large independent pension fund managers that I interviewed claimed far 
lower rates of active intervention in companies’ affairs than the larger life companies (typically 
fewer than ten a year compared with the life companies’ 20 or 30).
E Position of Indexed Funds
Legal & General (L&G) and Postel (since renamed Hermes) are regarded as two of the 
leading UK indexed fund managers. Both also have active funds under management, although 
the proportion of active funds is higher for L&G.
The interest of L&G and Postel in the relative performance of companies in their indexed 
funds appears inconsistent with the very concept of indexation. In pursuing interventionist 
policies with under- performing companies, L&G, Postel and other index fund managers will
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incur internal ‘agency’ costs which, even if successfully expended, will do nothing to improve 
the performance of their indexed funds against the mandated benchmark index.
For index fund managers there are two potential benefits from their shareholder interventions: 
absolute (real) improvement in the performance of their indexed funds - although (nominal) 
performance relative to other indexed funds will not be enhanced; and improvement in the 
performance of their actively managed funds which hold shares in those companies subject to 
successful intervention.
Moreover, if their active funds are overweight in these companies, then a relative 
improvement in performance of the active funds may occur. This result is analogous to what 
might be called the ‘CalPERS effect’, in which the benefit of pro-active involvement in a 
company’s affairs is spread amongst all the funds under management. In CalPERS’ case this 
can be thought of as internal 'free riding’, although other investors will also clearly benefit.
Compared with L&G, Postel, one of the largest investors in UK equities of which a high 
proportion are indexed, is seen as having a greater interest in the overall performance of'UK 
pic’ than individual companies. This may be explained most simply by the higher proportion 
of its equity funds which are indexed.
Broad based initiatives are, however, difficult to implement. Just before my programme of 
interviews started in 1993, the Chief Executive of Postel sent a letter to Chairmen of FT-SE 
100 companies about his concerns over directors’ contracts running longer than two years. 
Initial public support from other fund managers for this initiative appeared to be muted, but it 
is possible that Postel’s purpose was a wider one - to give notice to the countiy’s largest 
companies that Postel would be ‘minded’ to vote against resolutions which it felt acted 
against the interests of shareholders.
Whilst matters such as directors’ contracts are clearly linked to wider concerns about 
corporate governance, the ownership issue is that the UK’s largest indexed fund manager has 
given notice to companies that it will actively seek to exercise its ownership rights in areas 
which have previously been seen as uncontroversial by many UK fund managers.
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VI Summary
In Chapter 3 I analysed the shareholder profile of a ‘modal’ Top 300 company and found that 
the largest holding was 7.6%, those ranked from two to five averaged 3.95% and those 
ranked from six to ten 2.1%. This progression continues through the share registers of the 
companies which I have analysed; those holdings ranked between eleven and twenty averaged 
1.3%.
The top five shareholders of a modal Top 300 company control close to a quarter (23.4%) of 
the shares and those in the top ten just over one-third (34%) (see Chapter 3, Charts VI.3 and 
VI.4).
The voting power conferred by this concentration of ownership is not the source of 
shareholder influence, although it remains a ‘last resort’ and may be required to pass 
shareholder resolutions supporting corporate recoveries and reconstructions (for example, 
rights issues and mergers).
I have extensively described how informal mechanisms are used by institutional shareholders 
to influence corporate managers, their strategic decisions and decision making processes. If 
companies fail to meet investor expectations, the option to sell holdings is always, in theory, 
available. In practice this may neither be possible or necessary. Fund managers may consider 
it advantageous to maintain their investment in a company but to instigate changes which will 
restore corporate performance, focus corporate strategy, or otherwise improve the financial 
position of the company. Achieving these goals may also involve changes to the senior 
management team.
Regular and close contact between a company and its major shareholders creates a more or 
less continuous flow of information about companies, particularly if they report quarterly and 
other sources such as brokers’ analysts are taken into account. Problems are more likely to be 
identified in advance and catastrophic corporate collapses avoided. Shareholders increasingly 
have the opportunity to react sooner rather than later, providing greater opportunity to 
preserve shareholder wealth in both the short and long-term.
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Triggers for shareholder intervention typically include unexpected news about corporate 
performance, the financial position of a company or its strategic direction. However, it is 
important to recognise that shareholder intervention is not signalled by a sudden or step 
change in the relationship between a company and its major shareholders. Instead, 
intervention develops from and is contiguous with the informal relationships which already 
exist between companies and their institutional shareholders.
Similarly, there is no hard and fast point at which increasingly strong shareholder influence 
over the course of events becomes actual control over a company. In practice, control is more 
likely to be exercised by a company’s banks than its shareholders (or groups of them) acting 
alone, although shareholders will want to ensure that their interests are well represented when 
banks are arranging a corporate reconstruction or rescue.
However, most companies do not reach such a catastrophic state of affairs but are subject to 
milder forms of influence through major shareholders working together. They do not do so as 
coalitions as large as 20 shareholders but in much smaller groups. The problem of 
coordination is solved by one of a company’s major shareholders taking the lead role in 
dealing with the board and senior managers of the company, their advisors and other 
shareholders.
Invariably this lead shareholder is also the company’s largest shareholder, who will expect to 
keep closely in touch with companies’ other ‘core’ shareholders. These will normally 
comprise the other top three, four or five shareholders, but the degree of contact between the 
lead shareholder and these and other, non-core, shareholders declines with the size of their 
holdings. The organisations involved in these groupings are almost always drawn from the 
UK’s largest fund managers (see Chapter 3, Table V.l and Chart V.2). This is a small world 
in which personal relationships are important, the key directors and portfolio managers are 
well known to each other and the level of cooperation available is likely to be high.
Nevertheless, fund managers do not wish to bear unnecessary costs or be given price sensitive 
information if this can be avoided. There is a sense of'pass the parcel’, in which the role of 
the lead shareholder almost always ends up with the largest shareholder, but also a strong
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feeling that early intervention reduces the internal agency costs borne by the lead shareholder 
and is also very likely to maximise long-run shareholder returns.
This model of shareholder influence emphasises the importance of informal mechanisms and 
alliances between companies’ major, core, shareholders. It is a model in which the use of 
shareholders’ formal ownership, particularly voting rights are of limited significance. When 
considering the mechanisms of shareholder influence on UK listed companies it is also 
important to recognise firstly how small the core influence group is likely to be (seldom more 
that five or six fund managers) and secondly that the key and disproportionate, ‘extended’ 
ownership role is normally taken by companies’ biggest shareholder, despite the fact that 
these shareholders normally only hold sub-minority positions in the company.
Models of investor behaviour which assume a commonality of interests, or a homogeneity of 
decision processes, or which do not take into account the role of informal mechanisms are 
therefore of limited value.
Chapter 8: Composite Case History
I Introduction
II Case History
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I Introduction
A huge amount of material was gathered in the interviews summarised in the preceding 
Chapters (4 to 7). However, this analysis of factors which influence company shareholder 
relationships fails to capture many of the comments and disclosures that were made with 
respect to individual companies, fund managers and the personalities involved.
This is because the interviews were undertaken on the basis that none of these specific 
comments would be attributed or published in my thesis. Yet there is no doubt that this 
material is extremely pertinent and provides an important bridge between the relatively 
general statements set out in Chapters 4 to 7 and the case histories of CEO resignations 
which are summarised in Chapter 9 and set out in more detail in Appendix K.
To provide this bridge I have created a ‘Composite Case History’. This is based on the many 
company and fund manager specific references made in interviews but which could not be 
used or quoted directly because of the issue of confidentiality. The Composite Case History 
that forms this Chapter describes the progression of shareholder intervention in a company in 
which a number of management and financial problems emerge. These become of increasing 
concern to the company’s major institutional investors and eventually undermine their 
confidence in the executive directors, leading in turn to the resignation of the Finance 
Director, CEO and Chairman over a period of months.
In this Composite Case History I have deliberately not sought to describe a company which 
has undergone some kind of catastrophic failure. Instead the situation is one in which fund 
managers have become increasingly concerned about the performance and direction of a 
company, but have nevertheless decided to remain shareholders.
The case history describes the relationship between a major institutional shareholder 
'INVEST Fund Management’ and a company 'EXPANSION pic’.
INVEST Fund Management is intended to be one of the major life or pension fund managers, 
which has held shares in the company for a number of years, gradually increasing its 
aggregated stake and the number of funds with holdings in the company.
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EXPANSION pic is a Mid-250 manufacturing company with a major subsidiary company in 
the US, although the greater part of EXPANSION’S turnover and profits are still derived 
from the UK market.
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II Case History
March 1994
a Results announcement
EXPANSION pic announces its annual results for the year ending 31 December 1993 in 
March 1994. The results are in line with the forecasts of the major brokers’ analysts.
In keeping with its normal investor relations programme, a few days after EXPANSION’S 
announcement of its preliminary results, the CEO and Finance Director of EXPANSION 
have one-to-one meetings with the company’s major shareholders to review the results. 
Before this meeting the fund managers all receive a number of brokers’ reports reviewing 
EXPANSION’S results and updating their forecasts for the next year or two. INVEST, being 
a major fund manager, has its own analyst (who is also a junior portfolio manager) covering 
EXPANSION and other companies in the same sector.
His internal report highlights issues which INVEST’s other hand managers should raise with 
the directors of EXPANSION.
b Review meetings with the company’s major shareholders
At the review meeting, INVEST’s fund managers ask about the cautiousness of the trading 
statement made by the CEO at the time of the results announcement. They ask for the CEO’s 
personal assessment of the factors involved and how the board will deal with any potential 
problems.
The answers are satisfactory, and it is agreed that EXPANSION will meet with INVEST 
when the next set of results are announced - these will be the 'Interims’, to be released in 
early August.
June 1994
c Unexpected trading statement
However, in June the company makes an unexpected statement about its trading position, and 
warns that analysts have overestimated the growth in a number of the company’s key 
markets. Analysts quickly mark down their forecasts for the six months trading to June 1994
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and the following year, although these vary somewhat as the company has not been very clear 
about where the problems are in the group.
d Briefing of major shareholders
Immediately the trading statement is released to the Stock Exchange, the Chairman of 
EXPANSION calls the company’s largest shareholders. He offers to meet them to answer 
any questions that they may have about the statement. The share price is falling as he makes 
these calls and, on the basis of a number of telephone calls from financial journalists, it looks 
as if the next day’s newspapers will be running bear stories on the company.
A meeting is scheduled with INVEST for the next day. This is attended by the Chairman, 
CEO and Finance Director of EXPANSION and INVEST’s Head of UK Equities, as well as 
a number of INVEST’s portfolio managers. INVEST asks for clarification about the reasons 
for the rapid deterioration in EXPANSION’S performance over the last couple of months. 
INVEST is looking to be reassured about EXPANSION’S future prospects and the 
management team’s control of their business. The meeting is tough for EXPANSION’S 
directors, but they have known the portfolio managers and the Head of UK Equities at 
INVEST for a number of years and feel that the meeting turned out all right in the end.
The worst also seems to be over in the Stock Market - by the end of the meeting (which 
lasted nearly the whole morning) EXPANSION’S share price has recovered to its previous 
levels. A number of other fund managers (not apparently INVEST) appear to have used the 
opportunity to acquire shares in the company.
e Uncertainties remain about business prospects....
After the meeting with EXPANSION, the portfolio managers at INVEST remained more 
concerned about EXPANSION’S trading position than the company appreciated. Although 
not discussed directly at the meeting with EXPANSION, and on the basis of its internal 
forecasts, INVEST believes that EXPANSION may need to raise additional funds through a 
rights issue over the next 12 months. This would be particularly likely if the UK economy did 
not pick up as much as the EXPANSION management team was forecasting; they had 
seemed too optimistic at the meeting and were not allowing for the kind of lower growth 
rates that INVEST’s own economists were projecting for the rest of 1994 and into 1995.
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f  ... and about the management team
The fund managers at INVEST also have deeper concerns, that the CEO was losing touch 
with the underlying performance of the company’s North American business. There is also a 
second worry; that this weakness may not be appreciated by the Chairman, who was also at 
the meeting. In addition, when assessing EXPANSION’S requirements for working capital 
over the next two or three years, the Finance Director appeared to be assuming that the North 
American business would be cash generative. The foundation for this judgement appeared to 
be the CEO’s own assessment of the US market.
At this stage, INVEST believes that the company’s business is fundamentally sound, but that 
the company may not be being managed as well as it could. It is not entirely clear whether the 
management team is following a strategy which is really in shareholders’ interests; there 
appear to be other agendas relating to the North American business which have not been fully 
explained. However, EXPANSION operates in a sector favoured by the fund manager’s asset 
allocation model and the company has had a good track record; the share price has doubled 
against index and sector benchmarks over the last two years and dividend growth has been 
consistently above average. Although EXPANSION provides good exposure to the sector, 
the quality of its S earnings remain a worry.
g Concerns voiced to the Corporate Broker
A few days later, after an internal meeting about EXPANSION, INVEST’s fund managers 
are offered a line of stock in EXPANSION by the company’s own broker. At the earlier 
meeting, INVEST has already taken the decision not to increase its funds’ exposure to 
EXPANSION until the performance of the US business is clearer. The Head of UK Equities 
personally declines the broker’s offer, but mentions the concerns his analyst and fund 
management team have about EXPANSION’S US business, and also their doubts as to 
whether the board of EXPANSION have fully grasped the implications of a downturn in the 
US market coinciding with lower than expected growth in the UK.
This is no casual comment on the part of INVEST, but is intended as a deliberate signal to the 
company’s broker; who also understands the significance of that kind of message when it 
comes from one of a company’s major shareholders.
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h The Corporate Broker responds
The next week, one of the directors of the broker telephones INVEST’s Head of UK Equities 
to suggest that it might be useful if the CEO of EXPANSION arranged a meeting with 
INVEST to clarify any issues outstanding since the last meeting.
INVEST uses the next meeting to make quite explicit its concerns about the risks involved in 
the US market. In response, EXPANSION’S CEO makes a strong case for expecting an 
improvement in the US market, but some of his key assumptions are at variance with 
INVEST’s own assessment of likely US demand. Although all seems to go well at the 
meeting, by this stage INVEST is convinced that EXPANSION’S CEO has become 
unrealistic in his assessment of the company’s prospects in the US.
July 1994
i Major shareholder makes concerns increasingly specific
Shortly afterwards, the Chairman of EXPANSION telephones INVEST 'to keep in touch’. 
INVEST’s Head of UK Equities uses the call to make clear that he is becoming increasingly 
concerned that unrealistic expectations about the US market may start to affect the 
company’s overall performance.
j Another unexpected announcement
The Chairman agrees to 'take these issues on board’, but the following week EXPANSION 
announces three small acquisitions in the US to add to the existing business.
Although no new shareholder funding is required for the acquisitions, INVEST and a number 
of other fund managers believe that the price paid is too high (as a multiple of exit earnings) 
and that the fit with the existing business is strategically weak.
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k Shareholders exchange views
Shareholder approval is required for the transaction, but before filing its vote, INVEST 
contacts two of EXPANSION’S other major institutional shareholders to sound out their 
reactions to the announcement.
Although there is no formal meeting or decision, EXPANSION’S three major shareholders 
agree amongst themselves that they have similar concerns about the company’s direction, but 
the other shareholders are happy to leave INVEST to raise these directly with the company. 
If the need arises they will become involved, but at this stage see no need to do so, as 
INVEST is by now the company’s biggest single shareholder and is already dealing with the 
company on the key issues.
August 1994
1 Major shareholders start to set the agenda
Before the EGM to approve the purchase of the US companies, INVEST has a meeting with 
EXPANSION’S Chairman and CEO, making it clear that if the new businesses are not rapidly 
and successfully integrated as part of the US business, INVEST may become a seller of the 
company’s shares.
By this stage the Chairman is seriously concerned - this is not the only conversation that he 
has had of this kind over the last month, and despite having recently visited the US 
operations, he has some lingering doubts about the planned acquisitions. In addition, if 
INVEST were to dispose of its shares in the company, EXPANSION’S share price could be 
depressed for a considerable time - even without allowing for what other major shareholders 
might do.
m Share price responds positively
Nevertheless, with more than enough votes cast in support of the US acquisitions and, with 
the help (after all) of slightly better than expected Interim results, the Chairman is able to 
secure shareholder approval at the EGM and the acquisitions go ahead as planned. Around 
three months later, the company organises a two day visit by analysts to the US operations, in 
order to show how well the new companies are being integrated. The brokers’ analysts return 
from the US, but by then the company’s share price has already started to rise - and a number
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of US institutions have also become buyers. EXPANSION’S share price, which had been 
drifting downwards for a month or two, is revitalised and outperforms the market over the 
next month.
November 1994
n But more speculative funds start to acquire shares
INVEST’s analyst is relieved to find that EXPANSION’S new US subsidiaries are doing 
better than expected. It also looks as if the benefit of integrating the new companies is going 
to be felt in the current financial year, on the back of a number of new orders. Nevertheless, a 
number of INVEST’s portfolio managers use EXPANSION’S share price strength to lighten 
their share stakes; the asset allocation model suggesting that exposure to the sector should be 
decreased. Selling shares in EXPANSION provides a mechanism for doing this without 
disturbing other holdings. Meanwhile, at EXPANSION, the success of the US strategy and 
the rising share price is seen as an opportunity to raise additional funds and to purchase one of 
EXPANSION’S major US competitors.
December 1994
o Company fails to keep major shareholders informed
EXPANSION makes an announcement of this intention a month later, with the news that 
detailed negotiations are under way with its target company. The share price rises in response 
to this news, but then falls back as analysts brief their clients on the likely size of a rights issue 
and possible earnings dilution (depending on the final terms).
INVEST’s portfolio managers sell more of their shares in EXPANSION and continue to do 
so, even though the share price is weakening as the market absorbs the implications of the 
rights issue and a significant shift in the company’s business mix to the USA.
January 1995 
p Rights issue
Two weeks later, EXPANSION’S CEO and Chairman visit INVEST and other major 
shareholders. They are accompanied by EXPANSION’S merchant bank and they brief 
shareholders on a planned rights issue to support the planned acquisition. It is intended that 
this will be finalised, subject to shareholders approval, in the next week or so.
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After the meeting, the Head of UK Equities at INVEST indicates to the merchant bank that 
its doubts about the company’s plans remain - and that, as a current seller of the company’s 
shares, INVEST may not want to take up its rights or seek an underwriting position on the 
issue.
q Other shareholders
The merchant bank is concerned about this attitude, particularly as, although no other 
shareholders have indicated that they would be taking a similar position, a number of serious 
concerns had been raised at other meetings. There is a danger that other institutions might 
take their lead from INVEST, before making a final decision.
r Unexpected problems
Meanwhile, in preparation for the planned rights offer, auditors are verifying the financial 
position of EXPANSION’S US subsidiaries. They discover that the accounting treatment of a 
number of major orders has been bought forward by the US management. Further 
investigation reveals that none of these orders have been contractually confirmed by 
customers.
As a result, the financial position of EXPANSION’S US subsidiary is weaker than expected, 
and additional capital will be required in the near future, even without the planned acquisition. 
News of the accounting problems (bad news travels fast) appears to have reached 
EXPANSION Inc’s banks, which are requesting additional information before extending the 
company’s short-term borrowing facilities. In addition, negotiations with the target company 
have run into some unexplained final delays; the vendor’s management and advisors appear to 
be holding back on completion.
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February 1995 
s Short-term holders sell
News of these problems reaches London, triggered by US shareholders selling their recently 
acquired stock in EXPANSION. Market makers price the stock down, and brokers sense that 
the planned acquisition may not go ahead. A number of analysts quickly produce sell notices 
on the back.of these rumours and fax them to favoured clients. Institutional investors who 
recently bought shares in the company sell as fast as they can into a falling market, but there 
are few buyers.
By the end of the next day the share price falls 20% and becomes very volatile, as market 
makers and short-term traders look to minimise their losses. The negotiations with the US 
vendors have now seriously stalled (part of the price was to be settled in the company’s 
shares and subject to a one year lock up clause). EXPANSION’S merchant bank makes a 
brief announcement that the planned acquisition and rights issue will not go ahead as planned. 
EXPANSION’S directors, who had been negotiating the US purchase, return the same day to 
the UK, the CEO amongst them.
t Major shareholders meet
Later that day the merchant bank arranges separate meetings at its offices with 
EXPANSION’S Chairman and CEO and the company’s she major institutional shareholders; 
four are able to attend including INVEST. The c>ther shareholders have asked to be kept fully 
informed.
At the meetings the shareholders are told that the Finance Director has resigned with 
immediate effect; the accounting irregularities in the US are positioned as his sole 
responsibility, as were a series of problems (which are only now emerging) with the three 
small companies which were recently acquired as part of EXPANSION’S US acquisition 
strategy.
As far as the Chairman and CEO are concerned, the discovery of problems in the US are 
likely to only be short-term. As soon as the situation in the US subsidiaries has been clarified, 
EXPANSION intends to make a rights issue to continue funding EXPANSION Inc and 
remove the problem of high levels of short-term S borrowings. At the meeting it is also
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mentioned that a number of additional funding requirements had now been identified in the 
UK and that these would also be met within the scope of the proposed rights issue.
The fund managers attending the meeting express their concerns about the additional cash 
requirements, and also seek clarification on the funding required for the UK operations.
March 1995
u First management changes
The following day, the Finance Director’s resignation is announced, triggering the share price 
to fall a further 10% by the end of the week. Meanwhile, the leading shareholders have been 
in touch with each other and agree again that INVEST should take the lead in dealing with 
EXPANSION and its merchant bankers. This will continue to be with the implicit support of 
the other shareholders and on the understanding that INVEST would keep them fully 
informed of the discussions.
v Major shareholder sets the agenda
INVEST meets privately with EXPANSION’S merchant bank and indicates that the 
proposed rights issue will only be supported by the company’s major shareholders (the six 
involved at this stage represent nearly 30% of the company’s equity) if the CEO is replaced 
immediately and the Chairman takes responsibility for CEO role until a new CEO is 
appointed.
A third condition for shareholder support of the rights issue is that all further plans for 
expansion in North America are dropped and one of the main board Directors takes day-to- 
day control of the US business for at least a year. If the Chairman is unable to accept these 
conditions the shareholders will seek the appointment of a ‘caretaker’ Chairman with 
immediate effect.
w Completely new management team
Within a few days, and after discussion with his NEDs, the Chairman of EXPANSION agrees 
to these conditions. Within a month, a new CEO and Finance Director are appointed, and a 
larger than previously planned rights issue is fully underwritten by the company’s major 
shareholders.
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September 1995 
x New chairman
Around six months later the Chairman announces his retirement and his successor, a manager 
with long-experience in the US market, is appointed with the full support of all 
EXPANSION’S major shareholders.
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I Introduction
In Chapters 4 to 7, I describe the circumstances which may lead institutional 
shareholders to try to influence companies in which they have invested and the factors 
which may affect their success in doing so.
The major features of this analysis are:
1 Trigger factors
Institutional shareholders only normally bring pressure to bear on companies after a 
period of operational or financial under-performance. Intervention is therefore typically 
triggered by the announcement of poor financial results, or a deterioration in the share 
price, or both of these in combination. But fund managers are aware that relying on these 
indicators alone can mean that they ‘act too late’ and that this can lead to intervention 
after too long a period of financial/Stock Market under-performance. At the same time, 
public awareness, through press reports, of intervention by institutional investors is likely 
to lag and underestimate the degree to which private pressure may have been brought to 
bear on a company, in ‘behind closed doors’ meetings with major shareholders and in 
advance of any press stories or public announcements.
2 Private vs public
This issue is a key feature of shareholder intervention. Only if private pressures have 
failed to produce results are companies’ shareholders likely to ‘go public’ and make their 
views more generally known through the media. Even these briefings are often on an ‘off 
the record’ basis. This means that financial/City journalists may be well informed about 
the position being taken by a company’s shareholders, but by convention and in their 
own long-term interests are unable to name the actual institutions involved in newspaper 
articles. These conventions are well understood by all the parties which may be involved 
(company, fund managers, journalists). Comments in the financial press to the effect that 
a ‘company’s major shareholders are known to be unhappy’ may well, therefore, be more
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informed about the views and positions of the institutions involved than might first 
appear to be the case.
3 Role of major shareholders
It is normally companies’ major shareholders that are involved in these activities, the 
most important role being taken by the ‘lead shareholder’. This will normally be the 
largest institutional investor. In these circumstances other institutional investors may 
support the position and activities of the lead shareholder, but will tend to take a 
secondary role. The most likely exceptions occurring when the largest shareholders have 
similarly sized stakes in a company and they feel that their individual interests are best 
represented by dealing directly with management.
A Methodology
In earlier Chapters (4 to 7), I set out how the system of shareholder intervention, lead 
shareholders and shareholders coalitions operated at the time (1993-4) the research 
interviews were undertaken amongst companies, fund managers and others with 
knowledge of structure and functioning of these relationships.
In this Chapter, I review public evidence of shareholder influence and relate this to the 
evidence from the interviews.
The degree of influence shareholders bring to bear on a company can vary widely. As set 
out in Chapters 4 to 7 and in the Composite Case History (Chapter 8), a range of factors 
are involved and include:
1 The extent and period of under-performance.
2 The degree to which companies’ major shareholders perceive this to be due to 
internal factors (management failure) and external industry factors, outside 
managements’ control.
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3 The assessment of the quality of senior management; principally the CEO, Finance 
Director and Chairman, with whom institutional fund managers have the most 
contact.
Pressure may also be brought to bear on a company through Non-Executive Directors 
(particularly if the Chairman is executive or also the CEO), through a company’s broker 
or merchant bank.
As described in Chapters 7 and 8, CEO replacement is a strong indicator of shareholder 
intervention in a company’s affairs. Forcing the resignation of the CEO from an under- 
performing or poorly managed company is effectively the last resort for shareholders 
who have sought to make their views and concerns known to a company, but have failed 
to see these acted upon. In an under-performing company, the immediate resignation of 
the CEO with no advance warning to investors1 therefore strongly suggests that 
shareholders had lost confidence in the CEO and that decisive action was taken by the 
board in response to pressure from shareholders.
The removal of the CEO from a board through an immediately effective and previously 
unannounced resignation is therefore a strong indicator of shareholder intervention. In 
this Chapter, I identify:
1 Instances in which shareholder pressure on the board of a company has played a 
role in the removal of the CEO.
2 The institutional investors which may have been involved in this process.
1 The announcement of a CEO’s resignation would normally be considered price sensitive information 
and therefore effectively require immediate disclosure to shareholders and other Stock Market 
participants through the Stock Exchange Regulatory New Service (RNS) once the resignation had been 
confirmed. In around half the companies analysed (see later) the RNS announcements gave advance 
warning of a forthcoming resignation, in a number of cases several months ahead. These suggest a 
process of natural succession. The announcement of an immediately effective resignation strongly 
suggests the breakdown of the relationship between the board and CEO and, this Chapter suggests, 
between the CEO and the company’s major shareholders, signalling strong shareholder influence on the 
board and affairs of the company.
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From the accounts given by both institutional fund managers and companies 
(Chapters 4 to 7), shareholder intervention is most likely after a period of financial and/or 
investment under-performance. Appropriate measures of under-performance include:
1 Reported financial results.
2 Share price performance.
3 Total shareholder returns.
It was decided that the selection of companies would be based on total shareholder 
returns (TSR) as these most directly relate to shareholders’ interests2. The information 
about shareholder returns was obtained from the London Business School Risk 
Measurement Service (RMS). Appendix J provides details of the initial sample of 150 
companies which announced the resignation of their CEOs in 1995.
A three-tier selection process was used to identify companies for a more detailed analysis 
of their ownership and events (through press reports) of key events in the period leading 
up to the resignation announcement.
B Selection of 1995 for Research
The first stage of the selection process involved identifying all those companies which 
announced the resignation of their CEO (or equivalent position) in 1995. This year was 
chosen for the following reasons.
1 Information on ownership
This is the first year in which reliable and regularly updated data on the ownership of 
listed companies was available. The source of ownership data was Citywatch, which
2 It has subsequently been suggested that it would have been more appropriate to have selected 
companies using annual abnormal returns (risk adjusted TSRs). A comparison of the abnormal and 
actual total shareholder returns for 14 of the case history companies is provided in Table VI.3. On 
average, abnormal returns are 10% - 20% lower than actual returns, suggesting that that if the same 
return threshold had been used (-15%) the use of abnormal returns may have increased the number of 
companies selected as case histories, depending on the size of companies involved and the timing of the 
announcement of their CEOs resignation.
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made its huge database of fund management holdings in listed companies available for 
this research project (see Chapter 3)3.
In contrast to other sources of information about the ownership of listed companies, 
Citywatch’s analysis is updated monthly for the largest 350 companies listed on the 
London Stock Exchange. A third factor favouring the use of Citywatch as the source of 
ownership data is that it was made available in Excel spreadsheet format, making it 
particularly easy to manage and analyse. In addition to Citywatch and Jordans, a third 
source of ownership information, Fulcrum Research, was also considered, but as 
Fulcrum’s analysis is undertaken on behalf of listed companies (its clients), issues of 
confidentiality and the ownership of data and ownership analysis became a problem.
2 Ability to access Press comment
The review of press comments about the companies selected for detailed analysis as case 
histories required the use of a comprehensive source, preferably on-line. Although the 
use of FT-Profile was the preferred choice, it proved more practicable to use the 
McCarthy CD ROM system available to Alumni of the London Business School. This 
essentially provides the same information as FT-Profile and the ease of selecting press 
stories (using simple search terms consisting of the names of companies and their CEOs) 
from McCarthy and the ability to print out the selected information greatly facilitated the 
analysis. Through McCarthy, stories were obtained from leading business and financial 
papers including the: Financial Times, Times, Daily Telegraph, Independent, Guardian, 
Daily Mail, Mail on Sunday, Sunday Telegraph and Investors Chronicle.
3 The key difference between Citywatch and other possible sources (such as Jordans) is that Citywatch is 
£>le to match nominee holdings with a high degree of accuracy and consistency to the fund manager 
responsible for the investment. In contrast, Jordans' data includes many nominee holdings which are 
\ery difficult to consistently match to individual fund managers. The Jordan’s database is also 
irregularly updated and data for any particular period may be a year or more out of date.
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3 Annual reports and other sources of information
Other sources of information about companies were also more readily available for 1995 
than previous years, including company annual reports (those for smaller companies are 
generally not available from the companies nor from Libraries); Company REFS and the 
Corporate Directory (both published by Hemmington Scott).
4 Post-resignation share price performance
The selection of companies using 1995 as the ‘base’ year meant that a minimum of one 
year’s worth of additional information was available about the companies and their TSR 
performance after the resignation of their CEOs.
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II Selection of Case History Companies
A three stage selection process was used to identify companies for detailed analysis as 
case histories. These were as follows:
1 Companies with below average TSRs in 1995.
2 Elimination of companies with market capitalisations which fell below £10 million in 
the 12 months before the resignation announcement.
3 Selection of companies whose CEOs left the company on the day of the 
announcement (or effectively so).
These stages are described in more detail below.
A Shareholder Returns
Information about shareholder returns was obtained from the Risk Measurement Service 
(RMS) Quarterly Reports published by the London Business School. These provide the 
actual annual returns for each listed company (the TSR). In 1995 a portfolio matching 
the composition of the All-share Index would have provided investors with a TSR of 
approximately -15% and this figure has been used to distinguish between companies with 
above and below average shareholder returns in 1995.
Of the 150 companies announcing the resignation or reassignment of their CEOs in 1995, 
69 had prior year TSRs below -15%. The companies with TSRs better than -15% are 
listed in Appendix J.8. The unweighted4 average TSR of the 150 companies was -16.0%.
4 The RMS Portfolio return for the All-Share index is weighted by market capitalisation.
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Table 11.1 TSRs of companies announcing 
resignation of CEOs in 1995____________
TSR No. of companies
Better than +15% 26
0% to +14% 31
0% to -14% 24
-15% to -29% 22
-30% to -49% 26
W orse than -75% 21
Total 150
Total worse than -15% 69
B Smaller Companies
The group o f 69 companies with TSRs below -15%  was reduced by eliminating those 
whose capitalisations had fallen below £10 million during the preceding year5. Appendix 
J.7 provides details of the 22 companies eliminated from the research group for this 
reason. These companies were eliminated:
1 To reduce the number of case history companies to a manageable number.
2 To maintain a balance between the sizes of companies (by market capitalisation)
included in the final case history group.
3 Because of the limited availability o f information about the ownership of smaller 
companies from Citywatch.
This left a group of 47 companies meeting the following selection criteria.
1 Announcement of CEO resignation in 1995.
2 Below average TSR in 1995.
3 Market capitalisation above the £10 million threshold.
The 47 companies operated in a wide range of industries (Table II.2).
5 This selection was made using information about companies' market capitalisations from the RMS 
Quarterly Reports and 1995 issues o f Company REFS.
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Table n.2 Analysis of Stage 3 companies by industry sector
FT-SE 100 Mid 250 Smaller Cap Larger Fledgling Total
Business
support
services
Waste
Managemen
t
British Data 
McDonnell
Coda 
MR Data 
OIS International
6
Chemicals Hickson Sutcliffe Speakman 2
Construction/
builders
merchants
Costain
Mowlem
Bellwinch 
Lovell (YJ) 
Raine
5
Distribution CMA
Ross
2
Engineering/
electrical
Powell
Duffiryn
Kenwood Hampson Industries 
OMI International
4
Food /drink JLI Group 1
Furniture
manufacture
Cornwell Parker 
Sycamore Holdings
2
Healthcare/
Pharmaceuticals
Biotrace
Intercare
2
Insurance/
Banking
General
Accident
Hambros Heath (CE), 
Rathbone
PWS Holdings 5
Leisure Rank Hornby
Wembley
3
Media News
Internationa
1
Cordiant Avesco 3
Printing/
Stationery
Platignum 1
Property Bradford
Property
Conrad Ritblat 2
Retail Kingfisher Lloyds
Chemists
Asprey 
Austin Reed 
WEW
Rhino
Upton & Southern
7
Telecoms British Telecom 1
Transport United Carriers 1
Total 4 6 12 25 47
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C Resignation Announcements
The resignations of the CEOs from the 47 companies were then analysed to determine 
the circumstances leading to the announcement. The resignations were categorised on 
the basis of the timing and subsequent position of the CEO.
In 22 companies, the resignation was immediate (ie on the day of the announcement or 
immediately afterwards). In the other 25 companies the announcement was effectively 
advance notification of the CEO’s forthcoming resignation. At this stage two other 
companies were added to the analysis group: Cable & Wireless and Calor. These were 
the only other FTSE 100 and FTSE Mid-250 companies (respectively) which announced 
the immediate resignations of their CEOs in 19956.
In 10 out of the 24 companies, the announcement of the resignation of the CEO was 
accompanied by the announcement that the resigning CEO’s responsibilities were to be 
taken by the companies’ chairmen. In seven companies the announcement of the CEO’s 
resignation was accompanied by news of the appointment of a new CEO from outside 
the company (an external appointment). In the other seven seven companies, the CEO 
was replaced by a director (other than the chairman) or a member of the senior executive 
management team with immediate effect (Table II.3).
Table IL4: Analysis of immediate CEO resignations
FTSE-100 Mid-250 SmallerCos Fledgling
Chairman Kingfisher Kenwood
Mowlem
Homby
JLI
MR Data 
OMI
Platignum
Raine
United Carriers 
Upton & Southern
Immediate 
- Internal
Bradford Property 
Calor
Lloyds Chemists 
Powell Duffryn
WEW Group Central Motor 
Auctions
Immediate 
- External
Cable & Wireless News International Hickson
McDonnell
Biotrace 
Intercare 
Rhino Group
6 The TSR of Cable Wireless was +7% in the year to the announcement and that of Calor +3%.
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III Ownership of Case History Companies
The primary source of information about the ownership of companies was the Citywatch 
database. This was used to identify the 24 case history companies’ major institutional 
shareholders the month before the resignation and six months afterwards. This analysis 
established:
1 The Top 10 fund managers in the month preceding the CEO resignation.
2 The holdings of these fund managers six months later.
3 The Top 10 fund mangers six months later.
This information is set out in Appendix K.
In most cases there was little change in the identity of companies’ Top 10 shareholders 
or the size of their holdings over this period. Company REFS and annual reports were 
used to identify any other large non-financial shareholders7.
This information was then used to categorise the source of potential shareholder 
influence. The categories were:
1 A coalition of fund managers. These typically consisted of three or four fund 
managers with combined holdings of between 10% and 20%8.
2 The largest fund manager shareholder. At the time of the CEO’s resignation, these 
holdings were typically 20% or more.
7 Information about non-financial shareholders is not included in the Citywatch database - also see 
Chapter 3.
8 Where these combined holdings were particularly concentrated (for example, in the case of Kingfisher, 
MAM and Prudential held 14.1% of the company between them) or large (in the case of Homby, six 
fund managers held 55%), or a combination of these, it was judged that a shareholder coalition may 
have operated. The composition of these coalitions and the circumstances (as reported in the press) 
surrounding the resignation of the CEO led to an assessment of the likely composition of the coalitions. 
The smallest coalition (consisting of Scliroders, Prudential, MAM and Standard Life) occurred in the 
case of Cable & Wireless - a combined holding of 11.7%.
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3 A majority (> 50%) non-financial shareholder.
The summary of the ownership for each case history company is set out in Table III. 1 
and a summary by type of control in Table III.2.
Table IP.1: Major shareholders in case history companies
Case
History
Company Type of control Lead shareholder(s)
1 Cable & Wireless Coalition9 Schroder (3.8%) 
Prudential (3.0%) 
MAM (2.8%) 
Standard Life (2.1%)
2 Kingfisher Coalition MAM (8.1%) 
Prudential (6%)
3 Bradford Property Trust Largest fund manager Board (19.0%) 
Schroder (7.5%)
4 Calor Group Majority shareholder SVH (51%)
5 Lloyds Chemists Coalition Board (10.1%) 
Baring (7.5%) 
Gartmore (5.6%) 
Prudential (4.0%) 
PDFM (2.8%)
6 News International Majority shareholder News Corporation (81%)
7 Powell Dyffryn Largest fund manager M&G (12.7%)
Morgan Grenfell (6.4%) 
BZW (6.09%)
8 Hickson International Largest fund manager PDFM (20.9%) 
AMP (8.9%) 
M&G (8.4%) 
Britannic (7.1%)
9 Kenwood Coalition Schroder (7.6%)
MAM (4.95%)
Baillie Gifford (4.5%) 
Scottish Widows (4.3%)
10 McDonnell Coalition Fidelity (10.0%) 
Prudential (8.7%) 
MAM (8.1%)10
9
Cable & Wireless (Case History No.l): The largest shareholder was the German telecommunications 
group VEBA, however based on contemporary press accounts, the role of VEBA in the resignation of 
James Ross is assumed to be neutral and therefore the dominant source shareholder influence will have 
been the company’ largest shareholders, as above.
10 McDonnell Information Systems (Case History No. 10): Although MAM had a stake of 8.12% in the 
period immediately before the resignation of Jerry Causley in July 1995, by January 1996 this had been 
reduced to 0.09%. This suggests that MAM may not have been supportive of the moves which led to his 
resignation or the appointment of his successor. The role of MAM in a coalition alongside Fidelity and 
Prudential, both of which subsequently increased their holdings, is therefore open to doubt.
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Case
History
Company Type of control Lead shareholder(s)
11 Mowlem Largest fund manager PDFM (23.7%)
Morgan Stanley (15.3%)
12 WEW Group Coalition11 Fidelity (9.9%) 
Gartmore (5.7%) 
PDFM (4.7%) 
Schroder (4.7%)
13 Biotrace Coalition Baring (7.8%) 
Gartmore (5.0%) 
British Gas PF (3.6%) 
Newton (3.4%) 
Hermes (2.8%)
14 Central Motor Auctions Majority shareholder Myers family > 50%
15 Hornby Coalition Morgan Stanley (10.2%) 
M&G (10.0%)
Electra Fleming (9.9%) 
Hermes (8.6%)
Citicorp (8.28%)12 
L&G (7.8%)
16 Intercare Insufficient information available
17 JLI Largest fund manager M&G (14.1%) 
Aberforth (6.0%) 
Schroder (5.8%) 
Framlington (4.8%) 
Postel (4.69%) 
L&G (4.6%)
18 MR Data Group Coalition L&G (8.0%) 
Universities (6.4%)13 
Baring (5.4%)
19 OMI International Second largest 
fund manager
NatWest (13.6%) * 
MAM (12.3%)
20 Platignum Insufficient information available
21 Raine Coalition Scottish Amicable (8.6%) 
PDFM (8.0%)
Gartmore (7.0%)
22 Rhino Group Major shareholder Electronics Boutique 
(29.9%)
23 United Carriers Largest fund manager PDFM (18.5%)
11 WEW (Case History No. 12): Although not included in the Citywatch analysis (probably because it 
was not classified as a fund manager by Citywatch at that time) Warburg Pincus appears to have had a 
stake of 28.1 % at the time of Peter Carr’s resignation (Company REFS, November 1995 edition). An
article in the Mail on Sunday (29 October 1995) also refers to Warburg Pincus having a stake of 28%.
12 Hornby (Case History No. 15): Although Citicorp has been identified by Citywatch as having a 
shareholding, this was identified as being attributable to an unidentified client account. It is therefore 
unlikely that Citicorp took any direct role in influencing the resignation of Keith Ness.
13 OMI International (Case History No. 19): By August 1995 NatWest had reduced its stake from 
13.64% to 6.16%, suggesting that it may not have played a major part in the resignation of the CEO. It 
is more likely that MAM, with a holding of 12.31% that was maintained, had the greatest influence.
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Case
History
Company Type of control Lead shareholder(s)
Fidelity (7.8%) 
MAM (7.8%)
2 4 Upton & Southern Insufficient information available
Table UL2 Types of control of case history companies
Type of control Companies (Controlling shareholder)
Largest 
hand manager
Bradford Property Trust (Schroder) 
Powell Dyffiyn (M&G)
Hickson International (PDFM) 
Mowlem (PDFM)
JLI (M&G)
MR Data Group (L&G)
OMI International (MAM)
United Carriers (PDFM)
Coalitions Cable & Wireless (Schroder, Prudential, MAM, Standard Life) 
Kingfisher (MAM, Prudential)
Lloyds Chemists (Baring, Gartmore, Prudential, PDFM) 
Kenwood (Schroder, MAM, Baillie Gifford, Scottish Widows) 
McDonnell (Fidelity, Prudential, MAM)
WEW Group (Fidelity, Gartmore, PDFM, Schroder)
Biotrace (Baring, Gartmore)
Hornby (Morgan Stanley, M&G, Fleming, Hermes, L&G) 
Raine (Scottish Amicable, PDFM, Gartmore)
Major or
majority
shareholder
Calor Group (SHV)
News International (News Corporation) 
Central Motor Auctions (Myers family) 
Rhino Group (Electronics Boutique)
Insufficient
information
Intercare 
Platignum 
Upton & Southern
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IV Press Comment
Using the McCarthy CD ROM database, a detailed review of press comments in 1995 
relating to the circumstances leading to each CEO’s resignation was carried out. Extracts 
of key articles are included in Appendix K. Table IV. 1 summarises this information.
Table IV. 1 Summary of case histories based on press comment
Case Company Press comment/summary
1 Cable & 
Wireless
Resignation of subsidiary Mercury CEO Duncan Lewis triggers 
investors’ concerns about corporate strategy. Boardroom dispute 
between Chairman (Lord Young) and CEO (Ross) develops & 
institutional pressure to resolve differences. Deputy chairman 
arranges meetings with institutions and non-executives. Ross & 
Young resign.
2 Kingfisher Halving of share price during 1994, which ends with unexpectedly 
poor Christmas results from Woolworth and Comet chains. 
Institutional investors lose faith in executive management. CEO 
Alan Smith resigns January 1995, role taken by Chairman and 
former CEO Geof Mulachy.
3 Bradford
Property
Retirement of John Burgess, after 18 years as Managing Director 
(CEO).
4 Calor
Group
September 1995: 16% fall in half-year profits. 8 November 1995, 
profits warning and resignation of Howard Robinson announced. 
Robinson criticised for focusing too much on international 
expansion and not problems in UK market.
5 Lloyds
Chemists
Lloyds founded and run by Allen (Chairman) and Peter Lloyd 
(CEO) 1994: Superdrug chain fails to respond to growing 
competition. 8 March 1995 closure of 105 stores and loss of 750 
jobs announced at cost of £13.4m; shares fall 25%. June 1995 
Peter Lloyd resigns due to stress/ill health.
6 News
International
Controlled by Rupert Murdoch through parent company News 
Corporation. CEO Gus Fisher fired for misjudging purchasing 
contracts for newsprint at a time of shortages & rising prices; 
circulations and advertising revenues reduced.
7 Powell
Dyflryn
Retirement of Bill Andrews, 59, after 19 years as CEO.
8 Hickson
International
New Chairman (James Hann) appointed October 1994. 
Succession of trading and other problems early 1995. March 
1995, dividend cut and ‘investors becoming impatient’. April 
1995, appointment of new Finance Director. November 1995; 
meetings between Hann and fund managers (PDFM, Prudential, 
M&G). 6 November 1995, Kerrison resigns and £13m 
restructuring charge announced.
9 Kenwood September 1995: shares below 1992 flotation price. CEO led 
1985 MBO from Thom EMI, but moves to take ‘bigger job’ at 
C&J Clark. Succeeded by Tim Beech, Finance Director.
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Case Company Press comment/summary
10 McDonnell Floated in 1994. 2nd profits warning January 1995, Finance 
Director resigns. March 1995; 150 job losses and uncovered 
announced. In talks with institutional shareholders. August 1995: 
3rd profit warning, losses forecast, shares fall 30% to one quarter 
of flotation price, CEO resigns.
11 Mowlem £32m loss announced September 1995, plus continuing failure to 
dispose of City airport, unexpectedly costly legal dispute, 
disposals and 700 job losses. Share price 10% of 1989 high. New 
Chairman appointed 1994. CEO resigns October 1995.
12 WEW
Group
1994; rights issue at 56p. June 1995; Profits warning. October 
1995; Nationwide chain of 80 ‘What Everyone Wants’ discount 
stores announce 20% fall in like-for-like sales, concerns about 
retail format. 8 November 1995; joint Chairman and CEO Peter 
Carr becomes Non-Executive Director, resigns completely 
December 1995.
13 Biotrace 25 November 1995: Share price fell from 64p to 42p on 
announcement of profits warning of losses of £1.5 million, blamed 
on expansion costs and fierce competition, and immediate 
resignation of CEO Brian Levett.
14 Central
Motor
Auctions
Company controlled by Myers family. September 1995; profit 
warning, shares fall 15%, CEO George Inch resigns as 
shareholders lose enthusiasm for Inch’s strategy of electronic 
auctions and vehicle re-marketing services.
15 Hornby Profits warning December 1994, followed by announcement of 
60% fall in profits March 1995. Dividend cut. October 1995, 
boardroom ‘shakeup’ after ‘larger institutional investors decided 
... that Mr Ness had to go’.
16 Intercare CEO and Finance Director organise MBO of Intercare’s major 
subsidiary and resign from Intercare board.
17 JLI February 1995: Profits warning and factory closure 
announcement followed by resignation of CEO and management 
reorganisation. CEO role taken by Executive Chairman.
18 M R Data 
Group
Document management company with history of boardroom 
shakeups. 25 April 1995; shares fallen 60% in last year. CEO 
fired by Chairman John Redmond. 1 June 1995; profits warning, 
shares fall to lowest ever level. New Chairman appointed, 
Redmond fired.
19 OMI
International
Rights issue at 37p end 1994 followed by two profit warnings. 
Chairman and CEO Gil Williams resigned with immediate effect 2 
March 1995. Acting Chairman says ‘shareholders and the board 
had lost confidence’.
20 Platignum January 1995: Losses announced of £1.4 million and interim 
dividend passed. Share price fell from 250p in 1987 to around 8p 
in August 1995, when market capitalisation was £2 million. CEO 
and Finance Director both resigned on 8 August 1995.
21 Raine 9 March 1995; housing, construction and shopfitting group Raine 
announces profit warning, cut in dividend to 0.5p (but still 
uncovered). Pre-tax profits fall by two-thirds. Shares fall by one-
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Case Company Press comment/summary
third. Chairman Peter Parkin takes on CEO role as well. 10 April, 
Parkin resigns following pressure from institutional investors.
22 Rhino
Group
Specialist video games group with 112 ‘Future Zone’ stores. 6 
January 1995; profits warning, shares fall to 17p. 1994 rights 
issue at 44p. 22 February 1994; rights issue announced, shares fall 
to 8p. 25.2m shares (18% of enlarged equity) left with 
underwriters, purchased by US Electronics Boutique (EB). May 
1995; EB raises stake to 29.9% through market purchases. 
September 1995; two founder directors, including CEO Terry 
Norris are fired as EB, which has taken management control and 
appoints new CEO, John Steinbrecher.
23 United
Carriers
Floated in February 1994 at 153p, subsequently made two profit 
warnings. March 1995: New chairman appointed (John Toyne), 
former Chairman Alan Brinks becomes CEO. July 1995; Binks 
resigns.
24 Upton & 
Southern
North East department store group purchases Reject Shop chain 
in 1994, but fails to manage acquisition. Share price of U&S falls 
from 63p to 3.5p in 12 months. New Chairman, Ron Trenter, 
appointed (17 April 1995). CEO Jeffrey Gould, responsible for 
Reject Shop strategy resigns April 1995. Reject Shop chain put 
into receivership by U&S May 1995.
Press accounts of CEO resignations were analysed for content and in particular, for 
specific mentions of:
•  a fall in profits (18 Companies)
•  a reduction in dividend (6 companies)
• a fall in share price (20 companies)
•  a previous rights issue (3 companies)
• the recent appointment of a new Chairman (8 companies)
• the loss of jobs or company or factory closures (7 companies)
• the role or concerns of fund managers (10 companies).
Table IV.2 summarises this information for each company.
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Tab e IV.2 Sum m ary of press com m ent
Case
Hist.
C om pany Profitsfall
Div.
reduced
Shares
Down
Rights
issue
New
Chairman
Closures
Jobs
Fund
Managers
1 Cable & Wire. Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
2 Kingfisher Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
3 Bradford Prop. No No No No No No No
4 Calor Group Yes No Yes No No No No
5 Lloyds Chem. Yes No Yes No No Yes No
6 News Intern. No No No No No No No
7 Powell Oyffryn No No No No No No No
8 Hickson Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
9 Kenwood No No Yes mm No No No
10 McDonnell Yes No Yes No No Yes Yes
11 Mowlem Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No
1 2 WEW Group Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
13 Biotrace Yes No Yes No (0 No No No
14 Central Motors Yes No Yes No No No Yes
15 Hornby Yes Yes No No No No Yes
16 Intercare Yes No Yes No No No No
17 JLI Yes No Yes No No Yes No
18 MR Data Yes No Yes No No No No
19 OMI Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
2 0 Platignum Yes Yes Yes No No No No
21 Raine Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
22 Rhino Group Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes
23 United Carriers No No Yes No Yes No No
24 Upton & South No No Yes Yes Yes No No
Total 18 6 2 0 3 8 7 10
(f): McDonnell and Biotrace were relatively recent flotations at the time they announced 
the immediate resignation of their CEOs.
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V  Case H istory Sum m ary
Using information on the ownership of the 24 case history companies and evidence from 
press accounts, an assessment has been made of the degree to which shareholders are 
likely to have influenced the resignation o f the CEO. The evidence for shareholder 
influence was classified on a scale o f 0 - 1- 2, as set out in Table V. 1 below.
T able V .l:  Types o f shareholder influence
Rating Description
2 Strong evidence of shareholder involvement on the basis of:
• press comment
• control of the company by a dominant or majority shareholder
• a CEO leaving a company despite significant board shareholdings14
1 Circum stantial evidence
Although there was no direct press comment signalling the active 
involvement of shareholders in the CEO’s resignation, circumstances 
suggest that shareholders are likely to have played a role, in a number of 
cases through the earlier appointment o f a new Chairman.
0 No evidence of shareholder influence
T able V.2: Sum m ary o f ow nership and press com m ent
CH C om pany Shareholders Media Influence rating
1 C able & Wireless Coalition (11.7%) Yes 2
Numerous press reports (eg; FT, 15 Sept 1995, 17 Nov 1995; IoS, 17 Sept 1995; 
Guardian, 29 Sept 1995; Stel, 19 Nov 1995) of shareholder pressure to resolve public 
strategy/personality dispute between Chairman (Young) and CEO (Ross), although non­
executive directors were responsible for resolving the crisis, it is likely that shareholders 
would have expected only Young to resign. Share price rose 9 %  following 
announcement (Times, 23 Nov 1995).
2 K ingfisher Coalition (14.1%) Yes 2
Numerous press reports (eg; IoS, 22 Jan 1995; MoS, 22 Jan 1995, Independent, 25 Jan 
1995; Guardian, 28 Jan 1995) of shareholders being unhappy with sudden declme in 
performance of Woolworths and Comet chains. Action of Deputy Chairman Nigel 
Mobbs may have pre-empted more direct pressure from shareholders, evidenced by 
survival of Geof Mulachy. Share price rose 5% following announcement (FT, 28 Jan 
1995).
3 Bradford  
Property Trust
Board (19%)
Largest fund manager (8%)
No 0
Normal retirement at age 61 years after 18 years as Managing Director. No evidence of 
shareholder involvement.
14 This judgement particularly applies to Lloyds Chemists, where the holdings o f brothers Allen and 
Peter Lloyd totalled 10.1%.
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CH C om pany Shareholders Media Influence rating
4 C alor Majority shareholder (51%) No 2
As majority shareholder, it is extremely unlikely that SVH was not involved in the 
decision announced 7 Nov 1995 to fire the CEO (Howard Robinson) of Calor, a major 
subsidiary of SVH following the announcement of poor results in Sept 1995. A second 
factor was Robinson's failure to focus on performance of UK company, instead of 
international expansion (FT, 8 Nov 1995)
1 5 1 Lloyds C hem ists Coalition (19.9%) No 2
The announcement on 8 March 1995 of 105 store closures and 750 job losses appears to 
have surprised investors as the share price immediately fell 25%. The failure to quantify 
the cost (£13.4m) for a week (until 13 March 1995) ‘damaged confidence’ in the 
company (DT, 14 march 1995). During the three month period until 13 June 1995, when 
resignation of CEO Peter Lloyd was announced, brothers Allen (Chairman) and Peter 
Lloyd will have undoubtedly been meeting shareholders. It is likely that these 
contributed to the pressure on the CEO.
6 News
International
Majority shareholder (81%) Yes 2
Murdoch’s intervention in News International was response to newsprint crisis, which 
led to circulation losses and reduced advertising revenues, and fired CEO Gus Fisher 
(Independent, 18 March 1995; DT, 18 March 1995: MoS, 19 March 1995).
7 Pow ell DyfTryn Largest fund manager (12.7%) No 0
Normal retirement at age 59 after 19 years as CEO. No evidence of shareholder 
involvement.
8 H ickson Largest fund manager (20.9%) Yes 2
Chairman James Hann appointed October 1994, following a series of problems in 
Hickson. But the Yorkshire Post reported that ‘analysts say investors are becoming 
impatient' (7 March 1995), before the announcement of a dividend cut (YP, 29 March 
1995). CEO Dennis Kerrison resigned 6 Nov 1995. Reported that Hann ‘had backing of 
its biggest shareholders - PDFM, Prudential, M&G - for the recovery strategy' (MoS,
12 Nov 1995).
9 K enw ood Coalition (21.4%) No 0
CEO Tim Parker left Kenwood for a ‘bigger job’ with C&J Clark, but the share price in 
September 1995 was also below 1992 flotation. It is possible that Parker was under 
some pressure from shareholders and took advantage of a career move, but there is no 
direct evidence from the press.
10 M cD onnell Coalition (18.7%) Yes 2
CEO Jerry Causley reported (Independent, 1 March 1995) as having meetings with 
MDIS’s largest shareholders - Prudential, MAM, Commercial Union, Fidelity - 
following profits warning (Independent, 10 January 1995) and subsequent 
announcement of job losses (DT, 1 March 1995). Further profit warning and resignation 
of Causley announced 13 Aug 1995, in which Chairman (since 1994 flotation) Ian Hay 
Davidson played key role (FT, 16 Aug 1995; Independent, 16 Aug 1995).
11 M ow lem Coalition (39.0%) No 1
Continuing losses, failure to sell City airport and other problems led to resignation of 
CEO John Marshall. With a 24% shareholding PDFM is likely to have been involved in 
this decision, almost certainly with the support of Morgan Stanley (15%).
Yes 2u
In addition to its large shareholding, the only non-executive directors on the board were 
appointed as representatives of Warburg Pincus.
Chapter 9: Evidence of Shareholder Influence 294
CH  C om pany Shareholders M edia Influence rating
13 B iotrace Coalition (19.0%) No 1
During 1995 Biotrace failed to respond to increased problems and faced unexpectedly 
high marketing and other costs. CEO Levitt’s resignation triggered by a profits warning. 
The greatest pressure is likely to have come from Baring and Gartmore, but British Gas 
PF, Newton and Hermes may have taken a similar position.
14 C entral M otors Family group (>50% ) Y es 2
CEO George Inch res 
outside core auction t 
tough market conditic
igned after failing to get backing of 
msiness, following poor performanci 
ms
Vlyers family for developments 
; of car auction business in
15 H ornby Coalition (46.5%) Yes 2
After profit warning, dividend cut and concerns about corporate strategy, IC (20 
October 1995) reported that ‘large institutional investors decided in the last few months 
that Mr Ness had to go’.
16 Intercare Insufficient inform ation available No II
The resignation of CEO Peter Cowan (July 1995) was triggered by the buyout of 
Intercare’s largest division by Cowan and Intercare Finance Director. Institutional 
investors are unlikely to have been happy with this conflict of interest, but their reaction 
to an earlier profit warning (May 1995) may have encouraged Cowan in his plans.
17 JLI Coalition (40.0%) No 1
The two week gap between the profit warning (9 Feb 1995) and resignation of CEO 
Graham Scott (23 Feb 1995) suggests that post-announcement meetings with the 
company’s major shareholders put pressure on Chairman Yoav Gottesman to take 
control of the company, by firing Scott and taking on the CEO role himself. As the 
largest shareholder (14%). M&G’s viewr will have been a major influence, but the views 
of the other major shareholders are also likely to have been taken into account by 
Gottesman.
18 M R  Data Coalition (19.8%) No 1
Chairman John Redmond reported as having a history of making senior 
management/board changes and resignation of CEO Michael Elliott in April 1995 
appears to have been due to a split with Redmond (DM, 28 April 1995). Both will have 
been under pressure from investors following a collapse in MR’s share price 1994/5. 
Profits warning in June 1995 followed by appointment of new Chairman (George 
Wardle) and resignation of Redmond two months later.
19 O M I L argest fund m anager (12.3% ) Yes 2
Confidence in Chairman and CEO Gil Williams undermined by a profit warning 3 Feb 
1995. Delay of one month before resignation of Williams suggests that meetings may 
have taken place between one or more non-executive directors (Richard Duggan) during 
this period. Subsequent reduction in NatWest’s holding (13.64% to 6.16% by Aug 
1995) also suggests that MAM may have played the largest role. FT (3 March 1995) 
said that ‘shareholders and the board had lost confidence in Mr Williams’.
20 Platignum Insufficient inform ation available No II
Nicholas Smith appointed Chairman January 1995. CEO Rob Campbell & Finance 
Director David Bridge resign 8 August 1995. Shareholders will have undoubtedly 
played a role in Smith's appointment, but possibly taken a less direct role in the 
resignation of Campbell & Bridges.
Chapter 9: Evidence of Shareholder Influence 295
CH C om pany Shareholders Media Influence rating
21 R aine Coalition (23.6%) Yes 2
Top 3 shareholders controlled 24%, Top 10 47%. Resignation of CEO Peter Parkin 
followed ‘pressure from institutional shareholders' (Birmingham Post, 11 April 1995) 
and FT said that ‘shareholder pressure has forced the removal of Mr Peter Parkin as 
Chief Executive of Raine' (11 April 1995).
22 R hino Major shareholder (29.9%) Yes 2
Resignation of co-founder & CEO Terry Norris in May 1995 followed US-based 
Electronics Boutique acquiring a 30% stake and taking effective management control of 
Rhino
23 U nited  Carriers Coalition (34.1%) No 1
Allan Binks replaced as Chairman by Doug Rogers following profit warning March 
1995 but retains position as CEO. Resigns as CEO 3 July 1995. Shareholders will have 
undoubtedly been responsible for Rogers’ appointment, but possibly taken a less direct 
role in Binks' resignation
24 U p to n  & Southern Insufficient information available No 11
Ron Trenter appointed Executive Chairman in March 1995. CEO Jeffrey Gould, 
responsible for misjudged acquisition of Reject Shop chain, which was a key factor in 
the subsequent 90% fall in U&S's share price, resigned April 1995. FT (17 March 
1995) reported that Trenter approached by non-executive directors, but in view of the 
company's trading performance, it is likely that the company's major shareholders will 
have played a role in instigating these changes
Abbreviations: DT - Daily Telegraph; FT - Financial Times; MoS - M ail on Sunday
Table V.3: Influence ratings
Rating Description Companies (Case History)
2 Strong 1 Cable & W ireless
evidence 2 K ingfisher
4 Calor (msh - SVH)
5 Lloyds C hem ists
6 News International (msh - NC)
8 Hickson (lfm - PDFM)
10 M cD onnell
12 W EW
14 CMA (msh - Myers family)
15 H ornby
19 OMI (lfm - MAM)
21 Raine
22 Rhino (msh -EB)
1 C ircum stantial 11 Mowlem (lfm - PDFM)
evidence 13 Biotrace
17 JLI (lfm - M&G)
18 M R  Data
23 United Carriers (lfm - PDFM)
0 No 3 Bradford Property Trust
evidence 7 Powell Duffryn
9 Kenwood
Table continues on next page
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Rating Description Companies (Case History)
II Insufficient
Information
16 Intercare 
20 Platignum 
24 Upton & Southern
msh = major/majority shareholder 
lfm  = largest fund manager
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VI Post-resignation Shareholder Returns
Eighteen companies scored either 1 (circumstantial evidence) or 2 (strong evidence) of 
shareholder influence playing a role in the resignation of their CEOs in 1995.
Of these, four were subsequently been taken over: Calor (by majority shareholder SVH), 
Central Motor Auctions (by a private company), Lloyds Chemists (by GEHE in January 
1997, after a year-long bid battle between GEHE and UniChem) and News International 
(by majority shareholder News Corporation).
The TSRs of the other 14 companies all showed a positive improvement in the four 
quarters following the resignation of their CEOs (Table VI. 1 and Chart VI.2). The 
average improvement was +60%. In seven cases (Rhino, WEW, Biotrace, Mowlem and 
Hornby, OMI and Kingfisher) the TSRs in the four quarters following the resignation 
announcement were larger than the decline in TSRs in the four quarters preceding the 
announcement, indicating a significant change in shareholder sentiment and a partial 
recovery of share values towards their former levels.
Table VL1: TSRs four quarters before and after resignation announcement
Company Before After Improvement
CEO resignation
Rhino -79 83 162
WEW -49 56 105
Biotrace -42 47 89
Mowlem -31 56 87
Hornby -23 58 81
OMI -68 10 78
Kingfisher -41 27 68
Raine -71 -21 50
MR Data -46 -9 37
McDonnell -52 -20 32
United Carriers -31 -3 28
JLI -35 -16 19
Cable & Wireless 7 9 2
Hickson -26 -25 1
Average -42 18 60
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Chart VL2: TSRs in four quarters before and four quarter improvement in TSR 
following CEO resignation announcement_________________________________
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However in six cases (Raine, MR Data, McDonnell, United Carriers, JLI and Hickson) 
shareholders continued to suffer from negative TSRs in the following four quarters, 
although these were, apart from Hickson, substantially smaller than those experienced in 
the preceding four quarters. In the cases o f Hickson and Cable & Wireless, the four 
quarter TSRs barely changed following the CEO resignation announcement.
This analysis suggests that CEO resignations can have a dramatic impact on shareholder 
returns. Although there are substantial differences in post-resignation TSRs, the overall 
results appear to vindicate any role that fund managers may have played in the 
resignation. Similar conclusions can be drawn from the analysis o f abnormal (risk 
adjusted) shareholder returns before and after the resignation announcement shown in
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Table VI. 3, although the average abnormal returns in the four quarters pre- and post­
resignation announcement and improvement are all lower. These findings also suggest a 
fruitful area for further research15.
Table VL3 Comparison of improvement in abnormal returns in the four quarters
preceding and following CEO resignation announcement
with the improvement in actual returns (Table V1.1)______________
A1mormal returns Improvement in 
actual returnsBefore After Improvement
Biotrace -62 31 93 89
Cable & Wireless -15 -9 6 2
Hickson -46 -40 6 1
Hornby -31 47 78 81
JLI -38 -31 7 19
Kingfisher -32 -2 30 68
McDonnell -71 -40 31 32
Mowlem -49 38 87 87
MR Data -50 -27 23 37
OMI -70 -18 52 78
Raine -73 -47 26 50
Rhino -82 59 141 162
United Carriers -33 -24 9 28
WEW -70 39 109 105
Average -52 -2 50 60
15 For example, this could be directed at a number of areas including comparisons between: different 
types of CEO resignation (immediate, advance) and CEO succession (internal, external, role taken by 
Chairman); changes in TSR relative to the market and comparator groups of companies; companies with 
different levels of shareholder concentration; companies with different degrees of evidence of 
shareholder intervention
VII Summary
This Chapter describes the selection of companies for which evidence of shareholder 
influence was most likely to be obtained. A three-tier selection process was used. The 
first stage involved identifying companies in which the CEO had resigned or announced 
his resignation during 1995. The second selection criteria was based on Stock Market 
and investment under-performance, using total shareholder returns (TSR) in the four 
quarters preceding resignation announcement. The third stage involved the exclusion of 
companies with market capitalisations of £10 million or less one year before the 
resignation announcement. This produced a sample of 47 companies, which were 
analysed in terms of the manner of the CEOs resignation. In 22 cases the resignation was 
immediate and the CEOs employment with the company effectively terminated on the 
same day. Similar events took place at two other major UK listed companies in 1995 
(Cable & Wireless and Calor) and these were added to the group of companies subject to 
more detailed analysis as ‘case history’ companies.
Using information from press accounts of events surrounding these resignations, 
evidence has been sought for shareholder intervention in the resignation of the 24 case 
history companies. Each company has been given an ‘influence rating’ on a three point 
scale. In 18 companies there was either circumstantial (a rating of one) or strong 
evidence (two) of shareholder influence either , at the time of the CEOs resignation or in 
the preceding period. These assessments were also based on information about the 
ownership of each company. In the other six companies there was either no evidence of 
shareholder involvement or insufficient information available about the ownership of the 
company to make an informed judgement on the basis of press comment alone. These six 
companies were given ratings o f ‘0’ and ‘II’ respectively.
This research suggests that major and majority shareholders operating in the same 
industry as the UK listed company (in the cases of Calor, News International and 
Electronics Boutique, CMA); fund managers with holdings of around 20% or more, and 
coalitions of two to six fund managers with combined holdings of between 12% (Cable 
& Wireless) and 55% (Hornby) are in a position to exercise influence over the companies
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in which they invest and specifically to use this influence to cause the resignation and 
subsequent replacement of incumbent CEO.
It is also noticeable that the fund managers which appear to have taken the largest role in 
these events are also those ranked in the Top 10 fund managers and whose portfolios 
were analysed in Chapter 3.
TableVII.lFund managers influencing resignation of CEO.
Fund manager Companies
FTSE 100 / Mid-250 Smaller / Fledgling
PDFM Lloyds Chemists Hickson International
Mowlem
WEW
Raine
United Carriers
MAM Cable & Wireless Kenwood
Kingfisher McDonnell Inf. Systems 
OMI International
Prudential Cable & Wireless 
Kingfisher 
Lloyds Chemists
McDonnell Inf. Systems
Gartmore Lloyds Chemists WEW
Biotrace
Raine
M&G Powell Dyffryn National Home Loans
Hornby
JLI
Schroder Cable & Wireless Kenwood
Bradford Property Trust WEW
Fidelity McDonnell Inf. Systems 
National Home Loans 
WEW
Baring Lloyds Chemists Biotrace
L&G Hornby 
MR Data
Baillie Gifford Kenwood
Fleming Hornby
Hermes / Postel Hornby
Morgan Stanley Hornby
Scottish Amicable Raine
Scottish Widows Kenwood
Standard Life Cable & Wireless
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Other findings from this Chapter are reviewed in Chapter 10 in the context of the 
research into the ownership of UK companies (Chapter 3) and the 120 interviews carried 
out with fund managers, companies and others in 1993/4.
Chapter 10: Conclusions
I Research Summary
II Overview
304
308
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This thesis describes my investigation of the relationships between institutional investors 
and the listed companies in which they own shares.
I Research Summary
My research into these relationships has been carried out in three ways. Firstly, by 
analysing the ownership of 297 listed companies. In January 1996, when the raw data 
was collected from company share registers by Citywatch, these companies accounted 
for approximately 83% of Stock Market value. The same database was used to analyse 
the UK equity portfolios of the UK’s 50 largest fund managers. These accounted for 
close to 50% Stock Market value in December 1995.
Of the Top 20 fund managers, which accounted for close to one-third of Stock Market 
value in December 1995, 13 were also interviewed during the second part of my 
research. This involved a total of 120 in-depth interviews with fund managers, listed 
companies and other organisations closely involved in the management and regulation of 
company shareholder relationships. Approximately one-third of the interviews were held 
with each group.
These interviews strongly indicated that in extreme cases of management or financial 
under-performance, fund managers may seek the removal of the CEO. This would not be 
a pre-emptive action, but would normally be preceded by substantial discussions with the 
company and in the context of a relationship which may have been established over a 
number of years.
Meetings with the company would normally involve the CEO and Finance Director and 
sometimes the Chairman, depending on whether he was executive or non-executive and 
whether the roles of Chairman and CEO were a joint position.
In Chapter 8 (Composite Case History) I have described how a deteriorating financial 
and management position at a company leads to the resignation of the CEO and also, 
subsequently, the Chairman.
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The third stage of my research involved identifying companies in which there was 
evidence of institutional involvement in the resignation of the CEO. One hundred and 
fifty companies announced the resignations of their CEOs in 1995 (approximately 7.5% 
of listed companies). Of these, 69 companies had below average (-15%) shareholder 
returns (TSR) in the four calendar quarters preceding the resignation announcement. Of 
these, around one-third (22) were particularly small companies and were not researched 
further, in order to maintain a balance of companies in terms of their membership of the 
FTSE 100, FTSE Mid-250, SmallerCap and Fledgling indices.
Of the announcements made by the 47 remaining companies, 25 were advance warnings 
of their CEOs’ planned resignation. To the 22 other Cable & Wireless and Calor were 
added, as they were the only other companies in the FTSE 350 series which had 
announced the immediate resignation of their CEOs in 1995.
In 18 companies out of the final group of 24, there was either direct or circumstantial 
evidence of shareholder pressure being brought to bear on the companies, board or the 
CEO or a combination of these. Out of the 69 companies with below average 
performance the proportion is 26%.
In four companies the pressure came from major or majority shareholders. In a further 
four companies the source of influence was almost certainly the fund manager with the 
largest shareholding. In the other ten cases, it is assessed that some form o f coalition may 
have operated, involving between two and five of the companies’ largest fund manager 
shareholders.
The relationships between these fund managers and the ways they may have exerted 
influence on the companies will have been company-specific (fund managers take pains 
to explain that they do not work to a set formula), but there are also certain common 
features. One of these is that, at least in some cases, the largest shareholder will have 
acted as the lead shareholder and acquired the extended ownership role described earlier.
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The analysis of fund managers’ equity portfolios described in Chapter 3 shows that there 
are substantial differences which go beyond their share of the Stock Market. Although 
this leads directly to estimates of portfolio weightings with respect to the market as a 
whole, other measures help distinguish the investment strategies of the major fund 
managers - the Top 20 being selected for more detailed analysis.
Indicators of portfolio concentration include the Lorenz curve, the Gini Coefficient of 
inequality and the Herfindal Index. However one looks at this data, it is clear that around 
ten to fifteen fund managers dominate the ownership of UK listed companies.
The number of times these fund managers appear amongst companies’ Top 5 
shareholders, and the appearance of the same fund managers as the largest shareholders 
in the case history companies analysed in Chapter 9, suggests that there is a close 
relationship between portfolio size, investment strategy and the active management of 
company relationships.
Absent private interests, those of shareholders should coincide, but particular issues arise 
when considering the position of substantial non-financial and board shareholders. 
However, these do not appear to greatly affect the holdings of fund managers once 
account is taken of the reduction in the ‘free float’ of shares available to financial 
investors. Further research in this area could prove fruitful and also test whether 
substantial holdings by fund manager shareholders (particularly MAM, PDFM and 
M&G) are similarly neutral to other investors, or whether their active influencing of 
companies after periods of under-performance in turn affects the investment strategies of 
other fund managers.
In all 14 companies where there was evidence of shareholder intervention and the 
companies remained listed on the Stock Exchange, there was an improvement in TSR 
following the resignation announcement. A similar trend is found when pre-and post 
resignation announcement abnormal returns are analysed. Although share prices 
improved by around 10% between June 1995 and June 1996 (for example), in 12 
companies the improvement in TSR appears to have substantially exceeded the general 
market improvement.
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However, it should be noted that for many shareholders in these companies, this 
improvement will only have partly compensated (but to varying degrees) for the decline 
in share values and negative TSRs in the preceding year. An analysis of the pre-and post- 
CEO resignation announcement ownership of the case history companies indicates little 
change and certainly no systematic trend.
Another issue concerns the resignation process. The companies used in the case histories 
were specifically selected because the CEOs involved left the company the day that the 
resignation was announced. In many cases the wording of press releases and accounts 
given in the press indicate a perfunctory end to their employment. This suggests a 
dramatic turn of events and the building up of pressures within the board and companies, 
as well as between the CEOs, boards, companies and institutional investors.
It is likely that in some cases press comment plays a role in undermining the position of 
CEOs prior to the resignation announcement. This may not have been discouraged by the 
fund managers involved, although fund managers normally have a strong preference for 
working privately with companies and boards ‘behind closed doors’. Accounts given in 
interviews with fund managers suggest that at least part of the resignation process is 
occupied with CEOs negotiating the best possible financial and legal terms for their 
departure. In these circumstances, the actual form of the resignation (‘did he jump or 
was he pushed?’) is less important than the process which leads to the loss of confidence 
and resignation, the identification of the key actors and how the company is subsequently 
managed.
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II Overview
Institutional shareholders dominate the ownership of companies listed on the UK Stock 
Market and on average account for 80% of Stock Market value. Around 50 institutional 
investors account for 50% of Stock Market value, but just ten account for a quarter of 
Stock Market value. Models of investor behaviour need to take into account both this 
degree of concentration and the individual approach to both investment and ownership 
taken by the major institutional investors. They do not form a monolithic or 
homogeneous group and in particular they adopt different approaches to companies held 
in their portfolios which fail to meet expectations or which under-perform.
There is strong evidence that on occasions institutional investors play a significant role in 
determining board composition and other important issues. In the early 1990s, when the 
120 interviews were carried out, some institutional investors reported that they used their 
pre-emption rights to block expansion plans that they considered inappropriate. By 
denying these companies additional equity capital, they exercised a degree of strategic 
control. Those involved almost certainly did so in the context of broader discussions with 
those companies about their financial performance, management capabilities and strategic 
plans.
However, this particular form of influence can only take place when companies are 
seeking additional capital. The case histories analysed in Chapter 9, provide evidence that 
institutional investors also play an active role in influencing CEO resignations in under­
performing companies.
From these public accounts and evidence gathered in interviews, it is evident that only a 
small number of institutional shareholders are typically involved in putting pressure on 
the board and the CEO and it is often the largest shareholder which takes the lead role in 
these discussions. The analysis of company ownership shows that the largest institutional 
investor typically holds 7-8% of a company, and the Top 5 around a quarter of a typical 
company’s shares.
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It is clear that the Top 5 shareholders in many companies hold sufficient shares to be 
considered a ‘minority coalition’, particularly if they act together in a formal way. In 
practice, companies’ major institutional shareholders report that they seldom create 
formal coalitions and prefer to work in loose association. This suggests that in many 
cases the term shareholder coalition should be used in the sense of a commonality of 
interests, informal working relationships and tacit understandings, rather than a formal 
and organised network of major institutional investors.
When confronted with an under-performing company, the largest shareholder normally 
takes the lead role and I have described this as being a form of extended ownership. This 
provides other shareholders with free-rider benefits and also creates a focus for the 
relationship between a company, its board and their advisors with the company’s 
shareholders. Extended ownership does not preclude contact between the company and 
other major shareholders, but instead represents the apex of company investor 
relationships. It is particularly important when detailed and otherwise confidential 
discussions are held about, for example, board composition and the future of the CEO.
Once these have been concluded, other major shareholders may be consulted or their 
support sought, but in essence these subsequent discussions will be used to ratify the 
outcome of meetings and negotiations with the lead shareholder. Depending on the 
circumstances, the lead shareholder may well have had informal discussions with other 
major shareholders to ensure that the position being taken continues to benefit from their 
support. In this sense, the description of major shareholders forming a coalition is 
valuable.
These issues are important because institutional investors now dominate the ownership 
of listed companies, reflecting a long-term trend in the UK and also in the US (Useem 
1993). Useem also describes how pressure from institutional investors in the US has 
focused the attention of boards on the creation of shareholder value and how this has in 
turn led to substantial changes in the management of US corporations.
These outcomes are partly as result of market-wide changes in the role of institutional 
investors, the management of company shareholder relationships and also more specific
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instances where shareholder activists and institutional investors (particularly public 
pension funds) have targeted individual companies. Similar trends in ownership to those 
described by Useem in the US are evident in the UK, although the UK has historically 
lacked the degree of shareholder activism found in the US.
Descriptions of shareholder intervention in the US also highlight the role of banks as 
being particularly important, the outcome of a corporate crises and rescues depending to 
a significant degree on the balance of power between a company’s banks and 
shareholders (Mintz & Schwatz 1985, Glasberg 1989). This did not emerge as a major 
issue in either the 120 interviews or the 24 case histories described in this study.
A further issue to consider is at what point institutional investors seek to influence 
companies and boards and take an active role as part owners of companies. Although 
Mintz & Schwartz (1985) consider newspaper reports to be a valuable source of 
accurate information (and more so than might be expected) about corporate crises and 
interventions by banks and shareholders, in the UK these appear to report shareholder 
intervention at a relatively late stage in the process. Informal contact, behind closed 
doors and without the complications that press comment can bring to sensitive 
negotiations, is the preferred approach of UK institutional investors, until such time that 
they believe off the record press briefings will bring benefit to their interests.
It can therefore be argued that corporate crises involving intervention by institutional 
investors are constructed by them in two senses. The first is the point at which private 
pressure is brought to bear on the company, through discussions with the CEO, 
Chairman and possibly other directors as well. If, over the course of time, these fail to 
produce a satisfactory result and the company’s performance and other factors continue 
to cause concern, knowledge of the role taken by the company’s largest shareholders 
may enter the public domain through targeted press briefings (of the kind which will have 
given rise to many of the newspaper stories set out in Appendix K and summarised in 
Chapter 9). Glasberg (1989) is correct to comment that financial institutions ‘dominate 
the process of defining crises’ (p. 5) but in the UK context it is important to realise that 
the crisis is part of a continuing process which involves both public and private positions 
being taken by companies’ largest shareholders over a period of time.
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I believe that my own study into the relationship between institutional investors and 
listed companies is important because it describes and analyses how these investors 
intervene in companies’ affairs and the factors which influence the role they take. This 
provides a framework with which to analyse company shareholder relationships, the 
nature of shareholder coalitions and the coordination of shareholders’ interests when 
they believe that this is required.
END
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Appendix A
Appendix A.1: Top 50 Fund Managers’ UK Equity Holdings 1989 - 1992 (£ billion)
End 1989 End 1990 End 1991 End 1992
Fund manager UK
Equities
Fund manager UK
Equities
Fund manager UK
Equities
Fund manager UK
Equities
1 Prudential 17.6 MAM 21.9 Prudential 21.0 MAM 24.5
2 MAM 16.0 Prudential 18.1 MAM 20.0 Prudential 21.0
3 Schroder 12.0 Schroder 11.4 BZW 13.3 BZW 13.3
4 Postel 11.2 Abu Dhabi 10.0 Standard Life 13.0 Standard Life 13.0
5 Abu Dhabi 10.0 BZW 10.0 Postel 10.2 M&G 12.5
, 6 BZW 10.0 KIO 10.0 Abu Dhabi 10.0 Postel 10.2
7 KIO 10.0 SAMA 10.0 KIO 10.0 Abu Dhabi 10.0
8 Standard Life 10.0 Standard Life 10.0 SAMA 10.0 KIO 10.0
9 Fleming 8.4 Fleming 8.0 Schroder 10.0 SAMA 10.0
10 Norwich Union 8.0 PDFM 8.0 PDFM 9.3 PDFM 9.3
11 PDFM 8.0 Postel 8.0 Legal & General 9.2 Legal & General 9.2
12 Morgan Grenfell 6.6 AMP 7.0 Fleming 8.9 Schroder 9.1
13 County NatWest 6.0 M&G 6.4 Scottish Widows 7.4 Fleming 8.9
14 Legal & General 5.7 County NatWest 6.0 County NatWest 7.1 Jardine Fleming 8.3
15 M&G 5.3 Norwich Union 5.7 AMP 7.0 Baillie Gifford 8.0
16 CIN 5.0 Legal & General 5.7 Norwich Union 7.0 Scottish Widows 7.4
17 MIM 5.0 CIN 5.0 Alied Dunbar 6.4 Nat West 7.1
18 Pearl 5.0 GRE 5.0 Eagle Star 6.4 AMP 7.0
19 Kleinwort Benson 5.0 MIM 5.0 Invesco 6.3 Norwich Union 7.0
20 Scottish Widows 4.8 Scottish Widows 4.8 M&G 6.2 Alied Dunbar 6.4
21 Allied Dunbar 4.5 Kleinwort Benson 4.5 Gartmore 5.9 Eagle Star 6.4
End 1989 End 1990 End 1991 End 1992
Fund manager UK
Equities
Fund manager UK
Equities
Fund manager UK
Equities
Fund manager UK
Equities
22 Sun Life IM 4.5 Allied Dunbar 4.0 Kleinwort Benson 5.5 Invesco 6.3
23 Henderson 4.3 Friends Provident 4.0 ESN 5.5 Gartmore 5.9
24 GRE 4.0 Sun Alliance 4.0 Lloyds 5.1 Kleinwort Benson 5.5
25 Scottish Amicable 3.8 ESN 3.9 CIN 5.0 ESN 5.5
26 Gartmore 3.8 Gartmore 3.8 Scottish Amicable 4.8 Lloyds 5.1
27 Co-op 3.6 Co-op 3.7 Henderson 4.8 CIN 5.0
28 Royal Insurance 3.6 NM Rothschild 3.6 Baring 4.7 Scottish Amicable 4.8
29 NM Rothschild 3.6 Henderson 3.5 Sun Alliance 4.0 Henderson 4.8
30 Eagle Star 3.2 Scottish Amicable 3.5 Co-op 3.8 Baring 4.7
31 Friends Provident 3.2 Midland Montagu 3.4 Cazenove 3.8 Dunedin 4.0
32 Lloyds 3.2 Baring 3.1 Royal Insurance 3.6 Sun Alliance 4.0
33 Baring 3.1 Lloyds 3.1 Friends Provident 3.6 Co-op 3.8
34 ESN 3.0 Royal Insurance 3.1 Morgan Grenfell 3.5 Cazenove 3.8
35 Sun Alliance 3.0 Cazenove 3.1 Sun Life IM 3.5 James Capel 3.7
36 British Gas 2.9 Morgan Grenfell 3.0 British Gas PF 3.4 Royal Insurance 3.6
37 Clerical Medical 2.5 British Gas PF 2.9 GRE 3.3 Friends Provident 3.6
38 Commercial Union 2.5 ICIPF 2.7 ICI PF 3.1 Morgan Grenfell 3.5
39 Provident Mutual 2.5 Eagle Star 2.7 Provident Mutual 2.9 Sun Life IM 3.5
40 Hambros 2.4 TSB 2.6 BP PF 2.8 British Gas PF 3.4
41 Hill Samuel 2.4 Commercial Union 2.6 Equitable Life 2.7 GRE 3.3
42 Britannic 2.2 Clerical Medical 2.5 Midland Montagu 2.7 ICI PF 3.3
43 Scottish Equitable 2.2 Provident Mutual 2.5 Commercial Union 2.7 AXA Equity & Law 3.1
44 Midland Montagu 2.1 Sun Life IM 2.5 Capel-Cure Myers 2.7 Provident Mutual 2.9
45 Dunedin 2.0 Hill Samuel 2.4 USS 2.6 BP PF 2.8
46 General Accident 2.0 Laing & Cruickshank 2.4 Baillie Gifford 2.5 Equitable Life 2.8
End 1989 End 1990 End 1991 End 1992
Fund manager UK
Equities
Fund manager UK
Equities
Fund manager UK
Equities
Fund manager UK
Equities
47 ICI 2.0 Equity & Law 2.2 Clerical Medical 2.5 Commercial Union 2.7
48 TSB 2.0 Capel-Cure Myers 2.1 British Steel PF 2.5 USS 2.6
49 Capital House 1.8 Hambros 2.1 TSB 2.5 British Steel PF 2.5
50 Cazenove 1.5 Scottish Equitable 2.1 Hill Samuel 2.4 TSB 2.5
Appendix A.2: Top 50 Fund Managers’ UK Equity Holdings 1992 - 1995 (£ billion)
End 1993 End 1994 End 1995
Fund manager UK
Equities
Fund manager UK
Equities
Fund manager UK
Equities
1 MAM 31.7 MAM 38.0 MAM 38.0
2 Prudential 21.0 Prudential 25.8 Prudential 29.3
3 Schroder 19.5 Schroder 18.5 Schroder 22.6
4 BZW 19.2 BZW 17.4 PDFM 20.7
5 Standard Life 17.8 Standard Life 16.5 Standard Life 17.0
6 PDFM 16.5 PDFM 16.0 BZW 15.2
7 Threadneedle 13.9 Postel 13.6 Legal & General 15.2
8 Gartmore 13.0 Legal & General 12.0 Hermes 13.2
9 Legal & General 13.0 Gartmore 12.0 Gartmore 12.5
10 Postel 12.9 Saudi Arabia 10.0 Threadneedle 11.0
11 M&G 12.5 Abu Dhabi 10.0 Norwich Union 10.4
12 Norwich Union 10.6 Singapore 10.0 Scottish Widows 10.2
13 Abu Dhabi 10.0 KIO 10.0 Saudi Arabia 10.0
14 KIO 10.0 Threadneedle 9.4 Abu Dhabi 10.0
15 SAMA 10.0 Norwich Union 9.2 Singapore 10.0
16 Fleming 9.8 CIN 9.0 KIO 10.0
17 Scottish Widows 9.1 Fleming 8.6 Fleming 10.0
18 CIN 9.0 Scottish Widows 8.6 M&G 9.8
19 Jardine Fleming 8.3 Jardine Fleming 8.3 AMP 9.3
20 Henderson 8.0 AMP 8.2 CIN 9.0
21 Hill Samuel 7.9 M&G 8.0 ESN 7.5
22 Sun Life IM 7.2 Sun Life IM 7.2 Morgan Grenfell 7.4
23 NatWest 6.7 ESN 7.2 Sun Life IM 7.3
24 Invesco 6.3 Co-op 7.0 NatWest 7.1
25 AMP 6.1 Baring 6.5 Co-op 7.0
26 Baring 6.1 NatWest 6.4 Baring 6.5
27 Kleinwort Benson 6 Hill Samuel 6.4 Hill Samuel 6.4
28 Lloyds 5.6 Morgan Grenfell 6.0 Clerical Medical 6.0
29 ESN 5.5 Lloyds 6.0 GRE 5.9
30 Sun Alliance 5.1 GRE 5.9 Friends Provident 5.9
31 Scottish Amicable 5.0 Henderson 5.9 Royal Insurance 5.8
32 Baillie Gifford 4.6 Sun Alliance 5.5 USS 5.8
33 Dunedin 4.0 Kleinwort Benson 5.4 Sun Alliance 5.5
34 Co-op 3.8 Newton 5.2 Scottish Amicable 5.5
35 Cazenove 3.8 Clerical Medical 5.0 Baillie Gifford 5.5
36 HSBC 3.7 Scottish Amicable 5.0 Cazenove 5.4
37 USS 3.7 Baillie Gifford 4.9 Henderson 5.4
38 Royal Insurance 3.6 British Gas PF 4.5 Lloyds 5.2
39 ICI PF 3.6 Royal Insurance 4.4 Sun Life IM 5.0
40 Friends Provident 3.6 HSBC 4.2 British Gas PF 4.9
41 Morgan Grenfell 3.5 USS 3.7 HSBC 4.8
42 British Gas PF 3.4 General Accident 3.6 Newton 4.5
43 GRE 3.3 Friends Provident 3.6 Tilney 4.4
44 Clerical Medical 3.3 Provident Mutual 3.5 Jupiter 4.2
45 Shell PF 3 Shell PF 3.4 General Accident 3.6
46 Tilney 3 National Provident 3.3 Shell PF 3.6
47 National Provident 2.9 BP PF 3.2 Fidelity 3.6
48 Provident Mutual 2.9 Tilney 3.2 Provident Mutual 3.5
49 BP PF 2.8 Jupiter 3.0 AXA 3.5
50 Equitable Life 2.8 AXA 3.0 BP PF 3.2
Appendix B: Top 5 financial shareholders in Top 300 UK companies
Company Index Largest Second Third Fourth Fifth
1 3i FTSE 100 NatWest PB Gartmore MAM Threadneedle Prudential
2 Abbey National FTSE 100 MAM Legal & General Morgan Grenfell Hermes BZW
3 ABF FTSE 100 PDFM Standard Life Hermes BZW Legal & General
4 Aegis FTSE 250 Warburg Pincus PDFM Fidelity BZW Pictet Asset Mgmt
5 Airtours FTSE 250 Schroder General Electric IC Prudential National Provident PDFM
6 Albert Fisher FTSE 250 PDFM Lloyds Abbey Life MAM BZW Scottish Amicable
7 Allied Colloids FTSE 250 Schroder Gartmore Prudential Foreign & Colonial Baillie Gifford
8 Allied Domecq FTSE 100 PDFM MAM Schroder Prudential M&G
9 Amersham FTSE 250 MAM Prudential Gartmore Threadneedle Abu Dhabi
10 Anglian Water FTSE 250 Prudential Schroder M&G Fleming Threadneedle
11 Argos FTSE 250 Schroder MAM Prudential Baillie Gifford Gartmore
12 Argyll Group FTSE 100 PDFM Scottish Widows BZW Standard Life Prudential
13 Ario Wiggins FTSE 100 MAM Baring Schroder Standard Life Morgan Grenfell
14 ASDA FTSE 100 Schroder MAM PDFM Fleming Standard Life
15 ABPs FTSE 250 Schroder Prudential Morgan Grenfell Standard Life MAM
16 BAA FTSE 100 MAM Prudential Gartmore Scottish Widows HM Treasury
17 Babcock FTSE 250 PDFM Fleming M&G Morgan Grenfell Sun Life IM
18 Baird William FTSE 250 PDFM Threadneedle M&G Prudential Clerical Medical
19 Bank of Scotland FTSE 100 Standard Life Britannic Norwich Union BZW Hermes
20 Barclays FTSE 100 MAM Prudential Schroder BZW Standard Life
21 Barratt Developments FTSE 250 Schroder Provident Mutual HSBC Morgan Grenfell M&G
22 Bass FTSE 100 Prudential Standard Life PDFM Threadneedle BZW
23 BAT FTSE 100 MAM Prudential PDFM Schroder Standard Life
24 BBA FTSE 250 MAM Gartmore Threadneedle Standard Life Fleming
25 Beazer Homes FTSE 250 Prudential Threadneedle Fleming Sun Life Canada Morgan Grenfell
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26
Company
Berisford
Index
FTSE 250
Largest
Fleming
Second
MAM
Third
M&G
Fourth
Scottish Amicable
Fifth
Sun Life Canada
27 Berkeley FTSE 250 HSBC Legal & General GMO Woolley Hill Samuel Royal Ins
28 BET FTSE 250 M&G Threadneedle Fidelity Prudential Sun Life IM
29 BICC FTSE 250 M&G Capital Group AMP Britannic Assurance BZW
30 Bilton FTSE 250 Schroder CIN Clerical Medical MAM Fleming
31 Blue Circle FTSE 100 MAM Schroder M&G Morgan Grenfell Prudential
32 BOC Group FTSE 100 PDFM Scottish Widows Schroder Prudential Standard Life
33 Body Shop FTSE 250 Prudential Fleming Hermes BZW Friends Provident
34 Booker FTSE 250 M&G PDFM MAM Threadneedle Baring
35 Boots FTSE 100 Prudential MAM AMP Standard Life Schroder
36 Bowthorpe FTSE 250 Prudential Threadneedle Gartmore Schroder Sun Alliance
37 BP FTSE 100 KIO MAM Prudential Standard Life Schroder
38 BPB FTSE 250 MAM Gartmore Prudential Scottish Widows Clerical Medical
39 Bradford Property FTSE 250 Schroder Gartmore British Airways PT Singer & Friedlander Ivory & Sime
40 Britannic Assurance FTSE 250 Refuge Group Prudential Wesleyan Ass Soc AMP Legal & General
41 British Aerospace FTSE 100 Schroder MAM Standard Life Threadneedle Scottish Widows
42 British Airways FTSE 100 MAM Schroder Standard Life Universities Prudential
43 British Biotech FTSE 250 Morgan Grenfell MAM National Provident GRE Scottish Widows
44 British Gas FTSE 100 Prudential PDFM Schroder MAM BZW
45 British Land FTSE 250 Schroder MAM Fleming Morgan Grenfell Scottish Widows
46 British Steel FTSE 100 MAM Schroder M&G Standard Life Legal & General
47 British Telecom FTSE 100 Prudential Schroder Standard Life BZW Legal & General
48 British Vita FTSE 250 Fleming Sun Life Canada Prudential Gartmore MAM
49 Brixton Estates FTSE 250 Clerical Medical Royal Ins Schroder Standard Life Sun Life Canada
50 Brown N Group FTSE 250 Gartmore Prudential BZW Hermes NatWest
51 Bryant FTSE 250 Schroder Standard Life Dunedin Legal & General Prudential
52 BSkyB FTSE 100 L&G ESN Hermes BZW Schroder
319
Company Index Largest Second Third Fourth Fifth
53 BTP FTSE 250 MAM British Airways PT Prolific M&G Cazenove
54 BTR FTSE 100 Prudential MAM Standard Life PDFM Legal & General
55 Bunzl FTSE 250 MAM Threadneedle M&G Prudential Hill Samuel
56 Burford FTSE 250 Schroder Singer & Friedlander Scottish Widows Prudential MAM
57 Burmah Castrol FTSE 100 MAM Scottish Widows M&G Threadneedle HSBC
58 Burton FTSE 250 MAM PDFM Standard Life M&G Schroder
59 Cable & Wireless FTSE 100 Schroder Prudential MAM Standard Life BZW
60 Cadbury Schweppes FTSE 100 Schroder Prudential Standard Life Norwich Union Legal & General
61 Caledonia Investments FTSE 250 MAM Equitable Prudential BZW Royal Ins
62 Calor Group FTSE 250 M&G Sun Life IM Hermes BZW PDFM
63 CAMAS FTSE 250 M&G Schroder Prudential Royal Ins Sun Life Canada
64 Capital Radio FTSE 250 Prudential MAM Fidelity Baillie Gifford Gartmore
65 Caradon FTSE 250 Prudential Hermes PDFM Fleming Clerical Medical
66 Carlton FTSE 100 MAM BZW Standard Life Scottish Widows Capital Group
67 Charter FTSE 250 M&G Schroder Baring BZW HSBC
68 Chelsfield FTSE 250 Provident Mutual PDFM Prudential Gartmore Schroder
69 Christian Salvesen FTSE 250 Morgan Stanley PDFM Scottish Widows Prudential BZW
70 Christies International FTSE 250 Merrill Lynch MAM Schroder Fleming Credit Suisse
71 Chubb Security FTSE 250 Schroder Threadneedle GRE Provident Mutual BZW
72 Coats Viyella FTSE 250 M&G Threadneedle Baring Schroder Prudential
73 Cobham FTSE 250 Royal Ins Sun Life IM Scottish Widows M&G British Airways PT
74 Commercial Union FTSE 100 MAM M&G Prudential Gartmore Standard Life
75 Compass FTSE 250 MAM Threadneedle Prudential Newton HSBC
76 Cookson Group FTSE 100 MAM M&G Prudential Schroder Gartmore
77 Cordiant FTSE 250 PDFM M&G General Electric IC Provident Mutual GMO Wooley
78 Courtaulds FTSE 100 Schroder Threadneedle MAM Prudential BZW
79 Courtaulds Textiles FTSE 250 Schroder Morgan Grenfell Gartmore Clerical Medical CIN
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80 Cowie FTSE 250 Prudential Friends Provident MAM Prolific Gartmore
81 Cray Electronics FTSE 250 PDFM Prudential Newton Morgan Grenfell MAM
82 Croda International FTSE 250 Fleming Threadneedle Prudential Britannic Assurance HSBC
83 Daily Mail & General FTSE 250 MAM Schroder Legal & General BZW Morgan Grenfell
84 Dalgety FTSE 250 PDFM M&G MAM BZW AMP
85 Danka FTSE 250 Prudential Co-operative Ins Hermes Legal & General BZW
86 David S Smith FTSE 250 Prudential Schroder Fleming MAM HSBC
87 Dawson FTSE 250 PDFM Schroder M&G Royal Ins Lloyds Abbey Life
88 De La Rue FTSE 100 Schroder Prudential Britannic MAM Scottish Widows
89 Delta FTSE 250 Prudential Schroder Sun Life Canada MAM Threadneedle
90 Devro FTSE 250 Prudential Baillie Gifford MAM Standard Life BZW
91 DFS Furniture FTSE 250 Prudential Baillie Gifford Commercial Union Legal & General Standard Life
92 Diploma FTSE 250 Gartmore Threadneedle Prudential Baillie Gifford Norwich Union
93 Dixons FTSE 250 Gartmore MAM Prudential Standard Life Baring
94 East Midlands Elec. FTSE 250 MAM Prudential Newton HSBC Norwich Union
95 ED&F Man FTSE 250 BZW Prudential Hermes Baillie Gifford Legal & General
96 Electrocomponents FTSE 250 Prudential Schroder Threadneedle Co-operative Ins Standard Life
97 EMAP FTSE 250 Gartmore MAM Schroder CIN Standard Life
98 English China Clays FTSE 250 Schroder M&G Capital Group Prudential Gartmore
99 Enterprise Oil FTSE 100 PDFM Schroder Fleming Norwich Union Prudential
100 Eurotherm FTSE 250 MAM Schroder Prudential Threadneedle Baillie Gifford
101 Eurotunnel FTSE 250 Foreign & Colonial Caisse des Depots BZW Legal & General Hermes
102 Fairey FTSE 250 MAM Prudential Hill Samuel Schroder General Accident
103 Farnell Electronics FTSE 250 MAM Prudential Fleming Norwich Union Scottish Widows
104 Fine Art Dev. FTSE 250 MAM Gartmore Prudential Legal & General Sun Alliance
105 First Leisure FTSE 250 Threadneedle Schroder Legal & General Prudential Royal Ins
106 FKI FTSE 250 MAM Gartmore Baring Morgan Grenfell Fleming
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107 Forte FTSE 100 MAM Capital Group Prudential Baring IM Gartmore
108 Gartmore FTSE 250 Standard Life Pictet Asset Mgmt Hermes MAM Legal & General
109 GEC FTSE 100 Prudential PDFM Standard Life BZW Norwich Union
110 General Accident FTSE 100 Schroder Threadneedle MAM Gartmore M&G
111 General Cable FTSE 250 Prudential Standard Life Legal & General Lloyds Abbey Life Provident Mutual
112 GKN FTSE 100 Schroder Scottish Widows Prudential MAM M&G
113 Glaxo Wellcome FTSE 100 Prudential Schroder Standard Life MAM Legal & General
114 Glynwed FTSE 250 Britannic Assurance Prudential Sun Life Canada Baring Legal & General
115 Granada FTSE 100 MAM Schroder Prudential Standard Life Scottish Widows
116 Grand Metropolitan FTSE 100 MAM Prudential Norwich Union PDFM BZW
117 GRE FTSE 100 Schroder MAM M&G Fleming Prudential
118 Great Portland FTSE 250 MAM PDFM M&G Prudential Friends Provident
119 Greenalls FTSE 250 PDFM Schroder Fleming Legal & General Britannic Assurance
120 Guinness FTSE 100 MAM Prudential Standard Life Legal & General Hermes
121 GUS FTSE 100 Barclays PB MAM Standard Life Legal & General Prudential
122 Halma FTSE 250 Gartmore MAM Abu Dhabi Friends Provident Legal & General
123 Hambros FTSE 250 Hambros GRE Norwich Union Prudential Dean Witter Reynolds
124 Hammerson FTSE 250 Standard Life PDFM Hermes ABN AMRO Prudential
125 Hanson FTSE 100 Prudential Standard Life Legal & General BZW Hermes
126 Harrisons & Crosfield FTSE 250 M&G Schroder Fleming Morgan Grenfell AMP
127 Hays FTSE 250 MAM Gartmore Standard Life Schroder Clerical Medical
128 Hazlewood Foods FTSE 250 Baring Prudential M&G Fleming Fidelity
129 Hepworth FTSE 250 M&G Sun Life Canada Prudential Schroder Britannic Assurance
130 Hewden Stuart FTSE 250 MAM Morgan Grenfell British Airways PT Fleming Co-operative Ins
131 Hickson FTSE 250 PDFM AMP M&G Britannic Assurance Prudential
132 Highland Distilleries FTSE 250 MAM Royal Ins Baillie Gifford Britannic Assurance Prudential
133 Hillsdown Holdings FTSE 250 Templeton Prudential M&G PDFM Hermes
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134 House of Fraser FTSE 250 PDFM Schroder CIN Clerical Medical Morgan Grenfell
135 Howden FTSE 250 M&G BZW Clerical Medical Lloyds Abbey Life MAM
136 HSBC FTSE 100 Prudential Standard Life Legal & General BZW Schroder
137 Iceland FTSE 250 PDFM Fleming Rothschild Clerical Medical Sun Life Canada
138 ICI FTSE 100 MAM Schroder Standard Life Prudential BZW
139 IMI FTSE 250 Prudential Schroder Threadneedle MAM AMP
140 Inchcape FTSE 100 Gartmore Prudential Fleming Baring IM Legal & General
141 INVESCO FTSE 250 INVESCO Morgan Grenfell Prudential GT BZW
142 Johnson Matthey FTSE 250 Schroder Prudential M&G Sun Alliance Co-operative Ins
143 Kalon FTSE 250 Schroder Capital Group Prolific Commercial Union BZW
144 Kingfisher FTSE 100 MAM Prudential Threadneedle BZW Norwich Union
145 Kwik Fit Holdings FTSE 250 MAM Gartmore Sun Life Canada Standard Life Prudential
146 Ladbroke FTSE 100 MAM Threadneedle Scottish Widows Gartmore Clerical Medical
147 Laing J FTSE 250 PDFM MAM BZW Hermes Equitable
148 Laird FTSE 250 Schroder Prudential MAM Baring Morgan Grenfell
149 Land Securities FTSE 100 MAM Prudential Schroder Scottish Widows BZW
150 Laporte FTSE 250 MAM Prudential Scottish Widows BZW Standard Life
151 LASMO FTSE 100 PDFM Fleming Schroder Abu Dhabi Standard Life
152 Legal & General FTSE 100 Schroder Prudential PDFM Sun Life IM Standard Life
153 Lex Service FTSE 250 Prudential Morgan Grenfell MAM HSBC M&G
154 Lloyds Chemists FTSE 250 PDFM Baring Lloyds Abbey Life Gartmore Prudential
155 London & Manchester FTSE 250 Schroder Britannic Assurance Perpetual M&G Dunedin
156 London Electricity FTSE 250 Prudential Fleming Standard Life Gartmore Baillie Gifford
157 London International FTSE 250 Threadneedle Prudential Scottish Amicable PDFM Morgan Grenfell
158 London Merchant FTSE 250 General Accident Schroder MAM BZW Hermes
159 Lonrho FTSE 250 Credit Suisse Standard Life Hermes Lloyds Abbey Life BZW
160 Low & Bonar FTSE 250 Prolific British Airways PT Sun Life Canada AMP Gartmore
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161 Lucas FTSE 250 Lucas PF Schroder MAM M&G Scottish Widows
162 M&G FTSE 250 Commercial Union GT Standard Life Schroder ESN
163 Macallan Glenlivet FTSE 250 Barclays PB Prudential Britannic Assurance Hambros Hermes
164 MAI FTSE 250 MAM Schroder HSBC Scottish Widows Newton
165 Marks & Spencer FTSE 100 Prudential Standard Life Schroder BZW Legal & General
166 Marley FTSE 250 MAM PDFM Fleming Clerical Medical Royal London
167 Marston Thompson FTSE 250 Gartmore PDFM Royal Ins Prudential Britannic Assurance
168 McKechnie FTSE 250 MAM Prudential BZW Britannic Assurance Threadneedle
169 Medeva FTSE 250 General Electric IC Templeton Standard Life Schroder Legal & General
170 Menzies J FTSE 250 D C Thomson PDFM Prudential Legal & General Hermes
171 MEPC FTSE 250 Co-operative Ins PDFM MAM BZW Britannic Assurance
172 Mersey Docks FTSE 250 Prudential MAM M&G Mersey CC Schroder
173 Meyer FTSE 250 PDFM MAM Prudential Sun Life Canada Standard Life
174 MFI Furniture FTSE 250 Threadneedle Gartmore Schroder Prudential Baillie Gifford
175 Midlands Electricity FTSE 250 Prudential Legal & General Threadneedle BZW Hermes
176 Mirror Group FTSE 250 PDFM Fidelity Baillie Gifford MAM Lloyds
177 ML Laboratories FTSE 250 Gartmore BZW Clerical Medical Hermes Legal & General
178 Monument Oil & Gas FTSE 250 Prudential MAM Standard Life HSBC Legal & General
179 Morgan Crucible FTSE 250 Standard Life Britannic Assurance Sun Life Canada Sun Life IM Schroder
180 Morrison WM FTSE 250 MAM Prudential Co-operative Ins Royal Ins Standard Life
181 National Power FTSE 100 Schroder BZW Standard Life Legal & General Hermes
182 Nat West FTSE 100 MAM Schroder Prudential Standard Life Legal & General
183 Next FTSE 250 MAM Morgan Grenfell HSBC Fleming Standard Life
184 NFC FTSE 250 Prudential Standard Life Abu Dhabi Legal & General Shell PF
185 Northern Electric FTSE 250 Prudential M&G Sun Life IM BZW Fleming
186 Northern Foods FTSE 250 PDFM Prudential BZW Sun Life Canada AMP
187 N. Ireland Electricity FTSE 250 HM Treasury Equitable MAM Principal Standard Life
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215 RTZ FTSE 100 MAM Prudential Schroder PDFM Standard Life
216 Rugby FTSE 250 Gartmore MAM Schroder HSBC Prudential
217 Sainsbury J FTSE 100 Prudential Standard Life Legal & General Hermes MAM
218 Savoy Hotel A FTSE 250 Barclays PB NatWest Commercial Union Lloyds Henderson TR
219 Scapa FTSE 250 Schroder Sun Life Canada PDFM Prudential Gartmore
220 Schroders FTSE 100 MAM Ivory & Sime Prudential Legal & General BZW
221 Scottish & Newcastle FTSE 100 PDFM MAM Prudential Scottish Widows Britannic Assurance
222 Scottish Hydro FTSE 250 AMP Standard Life Gartmore MAM M&G
223 Scottish Power FTSE 100 Prudential Schroder Norwich Union PDFM Legal & General
224 Scottish Television FTSE 250 Fidelity Prudential Schroder Baillie Gifford GT
225 Sears FTSE 100 M&G Prudential Baring Sun Life IM Sun Life Canada
226 Securicor FTSE 250 MAM Commercial Union British Steel PF Provident Mutual Prudential
227 Sedgwick FTSE 250 PDFM Schroder Gartmore BZW MAM
228 Sema FTSE 250 MAM Abu Dhabi Shell PF Commercial Union Prolific AM
229 Senior Engineering FTSE 250 M&G Prudential Schroder Morgan Grenfell Scottish Amicable
230 Severn Trent FTSE 100 BZW Sun Life IM PDFM HSBC MAM
231 Shell FTSE 100 MAM Prudential Schroder BZW Legal & General
232 Siebe FTSE 100 Norwich Union BZW Standard Life Baillie Gifford GRE
233 Slough Estates FTSE 250 Schroder MAM Britannic Assurance Sun Life IM PDFM
234 Smith & Nephew FTSE 100 PDFM Sun Life IM MAM Prudential Schroder
235 SmithKline Beecham FTSE 100 Standard Life Prudential MAM Norwich Union ESN
236 Smiths Industries FTSE 250 Morgan Grenfell Prudential Norwich Union Standard Life Britannic Assurance
237 South Wales Elec. FTSE 250 Norwich Union Prudential Standard Life Clerical Medical Legal & General
238 South West Water FTSE 250 PDFM Norwich Union Sun Life IM Prudential MAM
239 Southern Electric FTSE 100 Sun Life IM BZW Standard Life Capital Group MAM
240 Southern Water FTSE 250 Prudential MAM Morgan Grenfell PDFM M&G
241 Spirax Sarco FTSE 250 Schroder Prudential Britannic Assurance Sun Alliance Prolific AM
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242 St Ives FTSE 250 Schroder Gartmore Threadneedle MAM Prudential
243 St James's Place FTSE 250 MAM NatWest AMP Lloyds Fleming
244 Stagecoach FTSE 250 MAM Standard Life Baillie Gifford M&G John Govett
245 Stakis FTSE 250 Schroder PDFM Morgan Grenfell MAM BZW
246 Standard Chartered FTSE 100 Schroder Prudential Fleming MAM Threadneedle
247 Storehouse FTSE 250 Prudential Scottish Widows Threadneedle M&G Baring
248 Sun Alliance FTSE 100 MAM Gartmore Schroder Standard Life Sun Life IM
249 T&N FTSE 250 M&G Norwich Union Abu Dhabi Baring Fleming
250 Takare FTSE 250 Gartmore Fiduciary Trust Fleming General Electric IC Lloyds Abbey Life
251 Tarmac FTSE 250 PDFM Schroder Fleming AMP BZW
252 Tate & Lyle FTSE 250 MAM PDFM Perpetual Prudential AMP
253 Taylor Woodrow FTSE 250 Schroder MAM Standard Life Norwich Union Prudential
254 Telegraph FTSE 250 PDFM Caledonia Invest. Norwich Union Hermes Lloyds
255 Telewest Comm. FTSE 250 Prudential Abu Dhabi Hermes Legal & General BZW
256 Tesco FTSE 100 Prudential MAM Standard Life Schroder Norwich Union
257 Thames Water FTSE 100 PDFM Capital Group MAM CIN BZW
258 Thorn EMI FTSE 100 MAM Prudential Capital Group Standard Life Schroder
259 TI FTSE 100 Scottish Widows Threadneedle Schroder HSBC Standard Life
260 TLG FTSE 250 Prudential AMP Friends Provident Singapore Mon Auth BZW
261 Tomkins FTSE 100 Norwich Union Morgan Grenfell CIN IM MAM Gartmore
262 Trafalgar House FTSE 250 PDFM Abu Dhabi BZW Legal & General Britannic Assurance
263 Transatlantic Hldgs FTSE 250 Hambros Scottish Widows MAM Fleming Sun Life IM
264 Transport Dev. FTSE 250 PDFM Threadneedle Britannic Assurance AMP Clerical Medical
265 Travis Perkins FTSE 250 MAM Gartmore Prudential AMP Hill Samuel
266 TSB FTSE 100 Schroder Prudential Sun Life IM PDFM Hill Samuel
267 TT FTSE 250 Newton Gartmore Standard Life Fleming Jupiter
268 Unichem FTSE 250 PDFM HSBC Schroder AMP Newton
327
269
Company
Unigate
Index
FTSE 250
Largest
M&G
Second
MAM
Third
Fleming
Fourth
Standard Life
Fifth
Legal & General
270 Unilever FTSE 100 Prudential MAM Schroder Legal & General Hermes
271 United Biscuits FTSE 250 PDFM M&G Standard Life MAM Legal & General
272 United Friendly FTSE 250 Prudential United Friendly Britannic Assurance Legal & General PDFM
273 United News & Media FTSE 250 PDFM Gartmore HSBC T Rowe Price Prudential
274 Vaux FTSE 250 PDFM MAM Britannic Assurance Caledonia Inv. Royal Ins
275 Vendome FTSE 250 MAM Fleming Morgan Grenfell Prudential British Gas PF
276 Vickers FTSE 250 Schroder Gartmore Standard Life MAM CIN
277 Vodafone FTSE 100 Schroder Prudential Standard Life Baillie Gifford Legal & General
278 Wassail FTSE 250 Fleming Gartmore HSBC Hill Samuel Abu Dhabi
279 Watmoughs FTSE 250 Schroder Provident Mutual Cazenove Gartmore Friends Provident
280 Weir FTSE 250 Schroder Prudential Fleming Threadneedle Gartmore
281 Welsh Water FTSE 250 Capital Group Sun Life IM Brown Brothers Morgan Grenfell Gartmore
282 Wessex Water FTSE 250 Prudential MAM Newton Standard Life Legal & General
283 WH Smith FTSE 250 Baring Capital Group Prudential BZW MAM
284 Whitbread FTSE 100 Whitbread Inv Co Schroder BZW Standard Life Sun Life IM
285 Wickes FTSE 250 Threadneedle Fidelity MAM M&G Lloyds
286 Williams FTSE 100 Norwich Union Schroder Threadneedle Prudential PDFM
287 Willis Corroon FTSE 250 PDFM HSBC Fleming Friends Provident BZW
288 Wilson Bowden FTSE 250 Ivory & Sime CIN Legal & General Morgan Grenfell Shell PF
289 Wilson Connolly FTSE 250 Sun Life Canada Baillie Gifford CIN Royal Ins BZW
290 Wimpey G FTSE 250 MAM Schroder PDFM Gartmore Provident Mutual
291 Wolseley FTSE 100 Prudential Schroder MAM Baillie Gifford Gartmore
292 W olverhampton & Dudley FTSE 250 Britannic Assurance Gartmore Prudential MAM Baillie Gifford
293 WPP FTSE 250 Fleming Baring Provident Mutual BZW Clerical Medical
294 Yorkshire Electricity FTSE 250 Prudential Fleming AMP Standard Life Threadneedle
295 Yorkshire Water FTSE 250 Schroder Prudential Standard Life MAM CIN
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296 Yule Catto FTSE 250 Morgan Grenfell HSBC Prudential Clerical Medical Newton
297 Zeneca FTSE 100 MAM Schroder Prudential Standard Life BZW
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Appendix C: Measures of concentration
No. Company Index Financial shareholders Gini Herfindahl
Largest Top 3 Top 5 Top 10 Top 20 Coefficient Index
1 3i FTSE 100 17.11 27.97 34.48 41.82 50.91 0.52 0.152
2 Abbey National FTSE 100 4.63 7.78 10.06 15.03 22.30 0.28 0.079
3 ABF FTSE 100 4.11 8.21 11.20 14.96 19.68 0.40 0.092
4 Aegis FTSE 250 31.69 39.61 45.09 53.69 60.10 0.66 0.297
5 Airtours FTSE 250 10.52 17.84 22.02 29.20 37.82 0.44 0.117
6 Albert Fisher FTSE 250 11.73 19.97 25.71 37.22 48.62 0.40 0.098
7 Allied Colloids FTSE 250 13.67 27.75 34.01 44.47 58.30 0.42 0.108
8 Allied Domecq FTSE 100 7.23 17.99 22.62 32.60 45.46 0.34 0.077
9 Amersham FTSE 250 11.22 19.96 26.88 42.83 58.30 0.34 0.078
10 Anglian Water FTSE 250 6.81 17.00 22.04 32.50 43.53 0.36 0.077
11 Argos FTSE 250 10.27 25.57 33.53 44.67 57.00 0.44 0.091
12 Argyll Group FTSE 100 3.76 9.12 13.71 23.42 35.11 0.22 0.058
13 Arjo Wiggins FTSE 100 12.40 17.68 21.58 28.85 35.95 0.48 0.148
14 ASDA FTSE 100 9.26 18.11 25.13 35.22 48.16 0.36 0.081
15 Associated British Ports FTSE 250 6.86 18.73 27.88 40.29 55.39 0.32 0.071
16 BAA FTSE 100 7.90 16.10 22.36 32.01 43.19 0.36 0.079
17 Babcock FTSE 250 15.27 29.71 36.39 49.34 62.45 0.46 0.109
18 Baird William FTSE 250 17.54 33.20 41.68 53.93 67.74 0.48 0.115
19 Bank of Scotland FTSE 100 32.34 37.33 40.26 45.43 52.20 0.66 0.394
20 Barclays FTSE 100 6.65 13.89 19.16 28.54 38.83 0.34 0.075
21 Barratt Developments FTSE 250 9.86 20.45 27.99 41.15 57.54 0.32 0.074
22 Bass FTSE 100 4.31 9.95 14.43 23.39 36.40 0.22 0.059
23 BAT FTSE 100 4.29 10.18 15.57 24.58 35.28 0.26 0.063
24 BBA FTSE 250 8.07 20.07 26.94 39.12 55.47 0.30 0.072
No. Company Index Financial shareholders Gini Herfindahl
Largest Top 3 Top 5 Top 10 Top 20 Coefficient Index
25 Beazer Homes FTSE 250 6.90 18.05 27.38 43.79 60.48 0.30 0.065
26 Berisford FTSE 250 14.71 29.05 36.49 47.51 57.19 0.50 0.118
27 Berkeley FTSE 250 6.07 16.46 23.06 34.23 49.14 0.30 0.067
28 BET FTSE 250 6.21 17.14 26.22 42.54 56.32 0.32 0.068
29 BICC FTSE 250 6.93 14.59 20.10 30.99 43.66 0.30 0.071
30 Bilton FTSE 250 11.48 23.35 28.70 38.70 49.67 0.44 0.108
31 Blue Circle FTSE 100 9.49 17.43 23.05 34.37 46.34 0.36 0.084
32 BOC Group FTSE 100 4.56 12.18 18.52 28.93 42.04 0.26 0.062
33 Body Shop FTSE 250 3.56 8.43 11.23 16.09 20.10 0.44 0.092
34 Booker FTSE 250 14.34 27.28 36.16 49.16 62.83 0.42 0.098
35 Boots FTSE 100 3.86 9.33 13.96 21.51 31.88 0.26 0.062
36 Bowthorpe FTSE 250 8.08 20.70 29.49 41.30 56.49 0.34 0.075
37 BP FTSE 100 5.95 13.11 17.47 26.10 36.08 0.32 0.074
38 BPB FTSE 250 13.18 27.77 34.54 45.99 58.64 0.44 0.101
39 Bradford Property Trust FTSE 250 9.06 14.59 19.18 28.07 36.47 0.40 0.099
40 Britannic Assurance FTSE 250 11.04 25.74 32.78 44.51 59.11 0.40 0.095
41 British Aerospace FTSE 100 8.65 16.80 20.93 30.07 42.94 0.32 0.082
42 British Airways FTSE 100 9.96 18.92 23.66 30.78 39.76 0.44 0.110
43 British Biotech FTSE 250 11.00 26.46 33.02 44.88 57.45 0.44 0.097
44 British Gas FTSE 100 3.44 9.15 13.72 22.47 32.65 0.26 0.061
45 British Land FTSE 250 13.02 30.10 36.21 47.35 59.47 0.46 0.111
46 British Steel FTSE 100 17.79 26.63 30.73 38.21 47.81 0.50 0.168
47 British Telecom FTSE 100 3.56 8.34 12.17 19.26 28.05 0.26 0.063
48 British Vita FTSE 250 6.16 16.32 23.71 35.41 50.13 0.30 0.067
49 Brixton Estates FTSE 250 18.88 42.68 49.94 61.58 74.40 0.52 0.132
50 Brown N Group FTSE 250 6.51 12.09 15.39 21.78 27.58 0.44 0.102
No. Company Index Financial shareholders Gini Herfindahl
Largest Top 3 Top 5 Top 10 Top 20 Coefficient Index
51 Bryant FTSE 250 7.98 16.08 22.99 35.03 50.42 0.30 0.069
52 BSkyB FTSE 100 1.09 2.90 4.33 13.48 18.56 0.20 0.122
53 BTP FTSE 250 10.57 19.16 26.57 40.71 58.04 0.30 0.073
54 BTR FTSE 100 3.32 8.39 12.48 20.32 31.11 0.22 0.059
55 Bunzl FTSE 250 10.50 21.66 29.45 44.96 61.43 0.34 0.075
56 Burford FTSE 250 8.41 20.71 30.04 44.64 59.87 0.34 0.072
57 Burmah Castrol FTSE 100 5.38 14.92 21.80 32.03 45.00 0.30 0.068
58 Burton FTSE 250 20.98 36.16 43.63 55.39 66.72 0.52 0.145
59 Cable & Wireless FTSE 100 3.99 10.00 14.24 21.21 29.97 0.30 0.068
60 Cadbury Schweppes FTSE 100 4.17 10.28 14.39 22.25 32.55 0.26 0.065
61 Caledonia Investments FTSE 250 10.67 23.44 28.24 34.84 40.86 0.56 0.133
62 Calor Group FTSE 250 4.21 8.61 11.62 18.00 25.12 0.32 0.073
63 CAMAS FTSE 250 14.33 32.00 39.15 47.99 60.63 0.48 0.120
64 Capital Radio FTSE 250 8.68 20.64 27.78 39.09 51.48 0.38 0.084
65 Caradon FTSE 250 4.42 10.06 15.56 26.66 41.42 0.20 0.057
66 Carlton Communications FTSE 100 10.58 17.40 22.84 32.10 42.50 0.38 0.099
67 Charter FTSE 250 8.56 23.11 30.73 42.72 54.59 0.42 0.086
68 Chelsfield FTSE 250 6.38 14.80 20.18 27.21 33.04 0.48 0.096
69 Christian Salvesen FTSE 250 6.53 13.19 16.90 23.16 31.38 0.38 0.089
70 Christies International FTSE 250 12.56 27.98 33.68 41.07 47.41 0.58 0.156
71 Chubb Security FTSE 250 9.37 21.18 26.77 38.21 51.80 0.36 0.085
72 Coats Viyella FTSE 250 5.04 13.00 19.62 31.57 46.00 0.26 0.061
73 Cobham FTSE 250 6.39 17.33 24.00 38.19 54.76 0.28 0.064
74 Commercial Union FTSE 100 8.41 16.32 22.07 30.31 39.85 0.40 0.090
75 Compass FTSE 250 5.12 12.57 17.94 28.07 41.27 0.26 0.063
76 Cookson Group FTSE 100 6.53 16.76 23.52 37.95 55.05 0.26 0.063
No. Company Index Financial shareholders Gini Herfindahl
Largest Top 3 Top 5 Top 10 Top 20 Coefficient Index
77 Cordiant FTSE 250 7.14 12.46 15.21 18.61 20.61 0.62 0.169
78 Courtaulds FTSE 100 6.02 17.42 24.01 34.14 48.24 0.30 0.071
79 Courtaulds Textiles FTSE 250 6.80 16.59 25.36 37.53 52.66 0.30 0.067
80 Cowie FTSE 250 8.82 19.22 26.05 36.38 51.42 0.32 0.076
81 Cray Electronics FTSE 250 7.22 20.46 26.67 37.75 51.22 0.36 0.077
82 Croda International FTSE 250 11.93 28.42 37.11 49.93 65.32 0.40 0.093
83 Daily Mail and General Trust FTSE 250 20.84 28.39 32.26 38.74 43.56 0.64 0.256
84 Dalgety FTSE 250 14.76 31.60 36.63 45.03 54.91 0.52 0.141
85 Danka Business Systems FTSE 250 3.96 8.25 10.54 12.91 14.49 0.60 0.142
86 David S Smith FTSE 250 7.79 17.31 24.46 36.40 51.06 0.32 0.071
87 Dawson FTSE 250 23.78 36.30 42.50 52.36 65.88 0.50 0.163
88 De La Rue FTSE 100 9.84 17.89 22.52 31.82 45.28 0.34 0.087
89 Delta FTSE 250 8.63 19.38 28.65 44.92 62.22 0.30 0.068
90 Devro FTSE 250 11.32 20.80 27.05 38.36 53.78 0.34 0.084
91 DFS Furniture FTSE 250 7.51 16.33 22.12 31.10 38.96 0.44 0.091
92 Diploma FTSE 250 8.56 21.17 31.43 44.00 59.40 0.36 0.075
93 Dixons FTSE 250 9.63 19.36 27.67 40.69 56.14 0.32 0.074
94 East Midlands Electricity FTSE 250 5.74 15.12 19.92 28.95 41.12 0.30 0.072
95 ED&F Man FTSE 250 2.30 6.00 8.50 13.45 17.14 0.38 0.076
96 Electrocomponents FTSE 250 7.16 15.32 22.21 35.33 51.24 0.26 0.064
97 EMAP FTSE 250 7.97 18.22 23.74 32.37 45.47 0.34 0.079
98 English China Clays FTSE 250 11.16 26.65 35.65 44.57 57.08 0.44 0.100
99 Enterprise Oil FTSE 100 11.37 25.06 32.17 40.51 50.94 0.46 0.112
100 Eurotherm FTSE 250 8.99 22.24 28.91 40.86 53.65 0.40 0.085
101 Eurotunnel FTSE 250 1.05 2.85 4.08 5.97 7.05 0.48 0.089
102 Fairey FTSE 250 7.05 17.12 23.36 35.46 52.94 0.26 0.066
No. Company Index Financial shareholders Gini Herfindahl
Largest . Top 3 Top 5 Top 10 Top 20 Coefficient Index
103 Farnell Electronics FTSE 250 9.34 21.42 28.13 39.58 55.26 0.34 0.077
104 Fine Art Developments FTSE 250 12.06 21.82 27.56 37.49 51.18 0.38 0.095
105 First Leisure FTSE 250 6.35 15.69 23.67 36.32 51.20 0.30 0.066
106 FKI FTSE 250 13.57 25.36 35.05 48.20 61.17 0.42 0.095
107 Forte FTSE 100 11.91 18.61 23.42 32.96 44.16 0.38 0.107
108 Gartmore FTSE 250 2.51 5.56 7.60 11.20 14.37 0.40 0.082
109 GEC FTSE 100 6.47 12.34 16.52 25.24 37.32 0.28 0.071
110 General Accident FTSE 100 4.86 12.87 19.12 30.83 44.47 0.26 0.062
111 General Cable FTSE 250 2.82 7.69 11.04 16.75 23.55 0.30 0.067
112 GKN FTSE 100 7.28 15.14 21.14 30.38 42.14 0.34 0.075
113 Glaxo Wellcome FTSE 100 3.70 8.38 12.12 19.43 28.65 0.24 0.062
114 Glynwed FTSE 250 5.17 13.69 20.06 29.33 43.34 0.26 0.064
115 Granada FTSE 100 14.00 20.42 26.07 35.94 47.68 0.40 0.118
116 Grand Metropolitan FTSE 100 3.88 10.27 15.17 23.78 34.70 0.26 0.063
117 GRE FTSE 100 12.40 19.75 25.53 36.70 50.05 0.36 0.096
118 Great Portland FTSE 250 13.12 31.79 39.21 49.70 61.80 0.48 0.110
119 Greenalls FTSE 250 7.95 21.57 27.68 37.78 49.94 0.40 0.085
120 Guinness FTSE 100 4.73 10.14 13.53 20.69 28.66 0.32 0.074
121 GUS FTSE 100 12.38 23.10 27.02 35.38 45.10 0.46 0.129
122 Halma FTSE 250 10.50 21.38 28.31 37.82 49.90 0.40 0.092
123 Hambros FTSE 250 14.81 29.57 35.53 46.68 58.49 0.46 0.117
124 Hammerson FTSE 250 20.94 51.22 56.68 66.56 76.45 0.60 0.163
125 Hanson FTSE 100 2.77 6.82 10.06 15.95 24.42 0.22 0.060
126 Harrisons & Crosfield FTSE 250 10.99 23.80 30.82 41.51 54.07 0.42 0.093
127 Hays FTSE 250 10.48 20.78 26.93 37.77 50.33 0.38 0.090
128 Hazlewood Foods FTSE 250 9.83 19.77 25.67 34.97 46.76 0.40 0.091
No. Company Index Financial shareholders Gini Herfindahl
Largest Top 3 Top 5 Top 10 Top 20 Coefficient Index
129 Hepworth FTSE 250 7.78 16.45 24.14 34.73 48.31 0.32 0.072
130 Hewden Stuart FTSE 250 10.13 17.20 23.77 36.54 53.49 0.28 0.074
131 Hickson FTSE 250 20.89 38.17 49.34 63.57 78.45 0.48 0.117
132 Highland Distilleries FTSE 250 5.64 15.27 23.35 29.82 36.27 0.46 0.094
133 Hillsdown Holdings FTSE 250 9.24 19.68 25.71 35.92 50.70 0.32 0.079
134 House of Fraser FTSE 250 22.32 30.23 35.91 46.82 58.46 0.50 0.171
135 Howden FTSE 250 11.35 26.98 36.41 50.93 68.23 0.36 0.080
136 HSBC FTSE 100 5.81 12.80 18.86 28.36 40.39 0.30 0.068
137 Iceland FTSE 250 6.04 17.11 26.32 41.35 55.65 0.32 0.068
138 ICI FTSE 100 10.85 15.44 19.31 27.28 36.35 0.38 0.119
139 IMI FTSE 250 5.59 15.29 22.84 35.02 48.22 0.32 0.068
140 Inchcape FTSE 100 6.35 15.89 20.88 28.96 40.55 0.34 0.078
141 INVESCO FTSE 250 4.76 10.52 14.91 24.42 34.68 0.28 0.066
142 Johnson Matthey FTSE 250 13.95 23.51 26.91 33.08 42.05 0.48 0.152
143 Kalon FTSE 250 4.45 10.27 14.83 21.55 27.48 0.40 0.080
144 Kingfisher FTSE 100 13.04 21.59 26.63 37.06 48.24 0.42 0.111
145 Kwik Fit Holdings FTSE 250 14.38 26.13 34.43 43.19 53.98 0.48 0.116
146 Ladbroke FTSE 100 4.41 11.68 17.42 27.51 40.24 0.26 0.062
147 Laing J FTSE 250 3.29 8.22 10.87 14.27 16.24 0.56 0.114
148 Laird FTSE 250 13.41 26.94 37.01 48.33 64.08 0.40 0.092
149 Land Securities FTSE 100 7.69 19.03 24.77 34.70 46.06 0.38 0.086
150 Laporte FTSE 250 6.70 17.36 23.80 35.18 48.63 0.34 0.072
151 LASMO FTSE 100 7.66 18.87 23.75 32.04 41.87 0.40 0.090
152 Legal & General FTSE 100 5.67 13.07 18.97 30.51 41.60 0.32 0.068
153 Lex Service FTSE 250 6.89 17.16 26.97 43.10 58.11 0.32 0.068
154 Lloyds Chemists FTSE 250 6.78 17.91 26.01 37.07 47.64 0.40 0.079
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155 London and Manchester FTSE 250 13.24 23.96 31.13 42.85 58.78 0.36 0.092
156 London Electricity FTSE 250 5.78 13.54 20.03 31.10 43.52 0.30 0.067
157 London International FTSE 250 12.51 23.57 31.51 44.25 59.86 0.38 0.086
158 London Merchant Securites FTSE 250 9.36 18.04 23.67 29.62 35.07 0.52 0.125
159 Lonrho FTSE 250 6.41 9.94 12.50 17.16 22.01 0.44 0.119
160 Low & Bonar FTSE 250 10.22 18.73 24.50 35.96 53.13 0.28 0.076
161 Lucas FTSE 250 7.87 22.33 30.34 44.04 56.85 0.40 0.079
162 M&G FTSE 250 5.15 10.15 14.34 22.65 32.38 0.30 0.069
163 Macallan Glenlivet FTSE 250 25.20 31.17 34.64 40.03 43.44 0.72 0.354
164 MAI FTSE 250 9.62 23.01 28.81 40.33 54.85 0.36 0.085
165 Marks & Spencer FTSE 100 5.52 10.39 14.30 21.60 30.53 0.30 0.074
166 Marley FTSE 250 15.78 27.29 33.28 44.13 58.12 0.42 0.115
167 Marston Thompson & Evershed FTSE 250 12.12 29.28 41.85 61.09 75.21 0.44 0.085
168 McKechnie FTSE 250 5.84 15.41 22.72 39.28 59.69 0.22 0.058
169 Medeva FTSE 250 6.11 15.51 20.36 28.20 38.66 0.36 0.080
170 Menzies J FTSE 250 9.90 19.84 23.46 29.33 33.23 0.60 0.161
171 MEPC FTSE 250 16.34 38.17 41.91 49.85 60.17 0.54 0.149
172 Mersey Docks and Harbour FTSE 250 6.28 16.18 22.76 32.13 44.70 0.34 0.074
173 Meyer FTSE 250 7.02 19.24 28.19 43.87 60.49 0.30 0.067
174 MFI Furniture FTSE 250 9.44 20.54 30.14 45.79 65.76 0.28 0.067
175 Midlands Electricity FTSE 250 5.44 10.82 14.00 19.71 28.83 0.30 0.078
176 Mirror Group FTSE 250 15.66 24.96 31.47 41.49 54.73 0.42 0.117
177 ML Laboratories FTSE 250 8.50 11.72 14.55 18.24 21.32 0.56 0.188
178 Monument Oil and Gas FTSE 250 6.52 17.17 23.67 31.29 40.75 0.40 0.085
179 Morgan Crucible FTSE 250 4.22 12.53 20.39 33.59 48.90 0.24 0.060
180 Morrison WM FTSE 250 5.01 11.24 15.20 22.91 31.90 0.32 0.071
No. Company Index Financial shareholders Gini Herfindahl
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181 National Power FTSE 100 3.43 7.51 11.10 17.00 24.57 0.28 0.065
182 NatWest FTSE 100 6.68 14.23 18.17 26.17 35.89 0.34 0.081
183 Next FTSE 250 10.30 19.56 25.77 37.80 49.57 0.38 0.088
184 NFC FTSE 250 5.48 10.45 14.55 22.30 32.99 0.26 0.069
185 Northern Electric FTSE 250 8.23 14.94 19.90 27.60 38.27 0.34 0.086
186 Northern Foods FTSE 250 7.06 12.63 17.49 27.08 39.52 0.28 0.072
187 Northern Ireland Electricity FTSE 250 3.73 8.84 12.54 18.84 26.60 0.30 0.068
188 Nurdin & Peacock FTSE 250 4.76 10.25 15.39 23.21 33.64 0.28 0.066
189 Nynex Cablecomms FTSE 250 1.64 3.34 4.69 7.00 9.60 0.32 0.074
190 Ocean FTSE 250 14.14 25.49 33.18 44.18 55.55 0.46 0.108
191 P&O. FTSE 100 6.76 15.50 21.63 31.76 44.22 0.34 0.073
192 Pearson FTSE 100 10.10 19.00 24.81 32.71 44.02 0.38 0.096
193 Pentland FTSE 250 5.61 12.18 16.81 25.56 29.99 0.48 0.093
194 Perpetual FTSE 250 4.54 9.08 12.06 16.84 22.05 0.40 0.089
195 Persimmon FTSE 250 11.72 21.86 27.55 38.46 51.63 0.38 0.093
196 Pilkington FTSE 250 17.55 27.94 34.51 45.83 57.61 0.46 0.128
197 Powell Duffryn FTSE 250 13.47 26.34 34.89 46.20 58.53 0.44 0.100
198 PowerGen FTSE 100 4.64 8.24 11.49 18.65 25.67 0.30 0.074
199 Powerscreen FTSE 250 5.32 13.62 20.75 32.62 46.44 0.28 0.064
200 Provident Financial FTSE 250 7.28 18.10 25.04 38.87 56.48 0.28 0.066
201 Prudential FTSE 100 4.41 9.95 15.05 25.22 37.21 0.24 0.061
202 Racal Electronics FTSE 250 6.64 15.41 21.42 31.65 44.43 0.32 0.071
203 Rank FTSE 100 6.75 18.48 24.57 35.43 48.36 0.34 0.075
204 RBS FTSE 100 11.56 16.93 21.47 29.88 38.25 0.42 0.123
205 Reckitt & Colman FTSE 100 4.09 8.88 13.25 21.52 33.18 0.22 0.060
206 Redland FTSE 100 3.60 8.63 13.55 23.94 38.09 0.18 0.055
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207 Reed FTSE 100 7.59 15.86 20.69 29.97 40.94 0.36 0.082
208 Refuge FTSE 250 11.00 28.50 36.74 46.37 56.40 0.50 0.108
209 Rentokil FTSE 100 2.60 6.68 9.97 16.02 22.93 0.28 0.064
210 Reuters FTSE 100 5.32 12.76 17.29 24.37 31.82 0.40 0.082
211 Rexam FTSE 100 3.82 9.79 15.44 24.98 38.31 0.22 0.058
212 RMC Group FTSE 100 21.25 29.03 34.68 44.03 54.24 0.52 0.179
213 Rolls Royce FTSE 100 13.77 22.94 28.47 37.39 49.11 0.42 0.116
214 Royal Insurance FTSE 100 6.37 13.24 18.62 28.70 43.41 0.24 0.064
215 RTZ FTSE 100 10.43 18.01 22.45 30.63 40.00 0.42 0.106
216 Rugby FTSE 250 7.80 18.04 25.77 40.98 55.83 0.32 0.068
217 Sainsbury J FTSE 100 2.14 5.30 7.81 12.89 19.71 0.22 0.058
218 Savoy Hotel A FTSE 250 3.74 8.76 10.75 13.33 14.35 0.64 0.153
219 Scapa FTSE 250 15.42 27.46 38.52 51.59 68.18 0.40 0.094
220 Schroders FTSE 100 8.27 14.60 18.42 23.70 29.73 0.48 0.120
221 Scottish & Newcastle FTSE 100 12.43 20.52 26.06 36.78 50.02 0.38 0.098
222 Scottish Hydro-Electric FTSE 250 3.40 9.01 14.07 22.79 34.55 0.22 0.058
223 Scottish Power FTSE 100 5.64 12.72 18.08 27.76 38.84 0.30 0.069
224 Scottish Television FTSE 250 7.12 15.27 21.21 31.60 43.83 0.32 0.073
225 Sears FTSE 100 6.01 13.54 19.11 30.06 45.20 0.24 0.063
226 Securicor (A) FTSE 250 15.25 26.75 33.56 44.73 58.86 0.42 0.106
227 Sedgwick FTSE 250 21.41 40.47 46.44 56.53 66.65 0.56 0.170
228 Sema FTSE 250 7.47 18.02 23.45 32.38 39.55 0.48 0.097
229 Senior Engineering FTSE 250 9.47 23.41 33.45 46.24 61.63 0.36 0.078
230 Severn Trent FTSE 100 3.94 9.47 14.76 24.15 36.20 0.24 0.059
231 Shell FTSE 100 3.91 10.68 14.34 22.19 31.31 0.30 0.068
232 Siebe FTSE 100 4.01 10.65 15.75 25.00 38.41 0.22 0.059
No. Company Index Financial shareholders Gini Herfindahl
Largest Top 3 Top 5 Top 10 Top 20 Coefficient Index
233 Slough Estates FTSE 250 8.05 18.13 25.95 39.97 52.33 0.36 0.075
234 Smith & Nephew FTSE 100 7.50 16.39 22.17 34.35 49.71 0.28 0.068
235 SmithKline Beecham A FTSE 100 4.46 12.28 17.32 25.75 35.29 0.32 0.070
236 Smiths Industries FTSE 250 5.80 14.16 19.76 30.53 45.82 0.26 0.063
237 South Wales Electricity FTSE 250 5.57 14.09 19.42 30.04 44.90 0.26 0.063
238 South West Water FTSE 250 12.04 23.62 31.04 41.59 54.03 0.42 0.095
239 Southern Electric FTSE 100 7.54 14.24 18.45 25.33 35.13 0.34 0.087
240 Southern Water FTSE 250 9.24 17.30 23.57 35.12 47.02 0.36 0.082
241 Spirax Sarco FTSE 250 10.96 27.77 37.09 51.84 68.40 0.38 0.081
242 St Ives FTSE 250 13.53 29.38 39.30 50.72 66.09 0.42 0.095
243 St James's Place FTSE 250 14.10 24.64 28.91 37.68 47.88 0.46 0.127
244 Stagecoach FTSE 250 6.92 14.50 17.24 21.79 27.52 0.48 0.116
245 Stakis FTSE 250 8.36 17.68 24.06 34.84 47.93 0.34 0.077
246 Standard Chartered FTSE 100 6.46 15.84 22.66 32.36 45.91 0.30 0.070
247 Storehouse FTSE 250 5.91 16.52 24.18 37.27 54.00 0.28 0.063
248 Sun Alliance FTSE 100 10.27 16.79 21.20 30.48 44.50 0.30 0.088
249 T&N FTSE 250 14.11 22.86 29.79 41.46 56.90 0.36 0.097
250 Takare FTSE 250 9.34 18.73 26.35 39.60 52.73 0.36 0.078
251 Tarmac FTSE 250 10.94 20.82 25.44 33.59 45.44 0.40 0.100
252 Tate & Lyle FTSE 250 7.15 16.33 23.37 34.06 46.17 0.34 0.074
253 Taylor Woodrow FTSE 250 12.83 24.59 32.47 43.73 60.43 0.36 0.088
254 Telegraph FTSE 250 2.15 6.05 9.12 16.02 23.60 0.24 0.059
255 Telewest Communications FTSE 250 2.42 5.55 7.70 11.09 14.74 0.36 0.077
256 Tesco FTSE 100 4.09 10.55 14.89 24.12 36.28 0.24 0.061
257 Thames Water FTSE 100 6.44 12.77 17.61 27.26 39.11 0.28 0.070
258 Thom EMI FTSE 100 9.50 17.39 23.71 33.80 46.19 0.36 0.084
No. Company Index Financial shareholders Gini Herfindahl
Largest Top 3 Top 5 Top 10 Top 20 Coefficient Index
259 TI FTSE 100 4.10 10.26 15.31 24.92 38.51 0.22 0.058
260 TLG FTSE 250 5.14 12.16 17.27 26.76 40.99 0.22 0.062
261 Tomkins FTSE 100 3.10 8.95 13.89 24.43 39.06 0.16 0.055
262 Trafalgar House FTSE 250 9.88 18.09 22.67 30.62 36.08 0.52 0.123
263 Transatlantic Hldgs FTSE 250 23.35 27.06 28.22 29.75 30.62 0.86 0.591
264 Transport Development FTSE 250 17.17 30.23 36.67 50.26 65.62 0.42 0.110
265 Travis Perkins FTSE 250 8.71 20.10 24.15 32.13 42.96 0.40 0.101
266 TSB FTSE 100 4.30 10.94 16.04 25.92 35.86 0.30 0.065
267 TT FTSE 250 11.32 21.15 29.20 44.11 60.34 0.34 0.078
268 Unichem FTSE 250 6.03 13.73 20.33 32.39 47.17 0.26 0.063
269 Unigate FTSE 250 5.95 14.92 22.21 34.52 47.80 0.30 0.066
270 Unilever FTSE 100 5.74 10.14 13.60 20.99 30.72 0.28 0.074
271 United Biscuits FTSE 250 8.69 18.46 22.63 31.46 44.22 0.34 0.089
272 United Friendly FTSE 250 6.09 16.38 23.63 36.73 49.87 0.32 0.069
273 United News & Media FTSE 250 13.10 19.33 25.00 35.85 49.43 0.36 0.102
274 Vaux FTSE 250 8.14 21.21 29.89 43.19 58.46 0.34 0.073
275 Vendome FTSE 250 7.31 10.12 11.38 13.96 17.11 0.54 0.208
276 Vickers FTSE 250 10.12 22.94 29.88 41.78 54.25 0.40 0.088
277 Vodafone FTSE 100 3.86 9.22 12.89 20.10 27.75 0.32 0.069
278 Wassail FTSE 250 14.83 25.59 30.04 38.94 50.77 0.44 0.126
279 Watmoughs FTSE 250 6.21 17.60 24.83 36.74 52.84 0.28 0.066
280 Weir FTSE 250 15.11 30.86 41.10 55.06 69.89 0.44 0.097
281 Welsh Water FTSE 250 5.84 12.07 17.11 25.68 37.02 0.28 0.069
282 Wessex Water FTSE 250 7.99 16.93 23.18 33.26 45.53 0.34 0.077
283 WH Smith FTSE 250 5.52 13.62 19.45 30.43 47.86 0.20 0.059
284 Whitbread FTSE 100 10.09 17.33 23.23 34.31 48.94 0.32 0.081
No. Company Index Financial shareholders Gini Herfindahl
Largest Top 3 Top 5 Top 10 Top 20 Coefficient Index
285 Wickes FTSE 250 10.37 26.02 39.11 62.16 81.31 0.34 0.070
286 Williams FTSE 100 5.22 14.74 22.81 33.42 46.30 0.32 0.068
287 Willis Corroon FTSE 250 16.29 22.74 27.09 34.60 45.17 0.46 0.156
288 Wilson Bowden FTSE 250 8.16 14.40 18.56 27.20 39.01 0.30 0.081
289 Wilson Connolly FTSE 250 5.52 11.97 17.26 26.96 39.98 0.26 0.064
290 Wimpey G FTSE 250 11.51 23.49 31.43 42.46 55.54 0.40 0.091
291 Wolseley FTSE 100 5.12 13.67 20.87 31.82 46.52 0.26 0.062
292 Wolverhampton & Dudley Brews FTSE 250 6.23 16.90 25.68 39.36 54.63 0.30 0.066
293 WPP FTSE 250 6.93 16.72 23.29 33.80 45.99 0.34 0.075
294 Yorkshire Electricity FTSE 250 7.48 15.20 22.05 33.00 45.71 0.32 0.072
295 Yorkshire Water FTSE 250 7.48 18.62 26.34 37.34 48.60 0.38 0.080
296 Yule Catto FTSE 250 7.44 19.18 25.09 35.02 46.70 0.38 0.081
297 Zeneca FTSE 100 11.19 17.82 22.35 30.28 40.45 0.40 0.111
Average 8.82 18.02 23.88 33.75 45.37 0.37 0.09
Appendix D: Companies used to creating profile of the *modar Top 300 company
Allied
Domecq
Berkeley Blue Circle Courtaulds De La Rue Emap Hepworth IMI Land
Securities
Laporte Rank
FTSE 100 FTSE 250 FTSE 100 FTSE 100 FTSE 100 FTSE 250 FTSE 250 FTSE 250 FTSE 100 FTSE 250 FTSE 100
1 7.23 6.07 9.49 6.02 9.84 7.97 7.78 5.59 7.69 6.70 6.75
2 5.98 5.25 4.71 5.86 5.00 5.28 4.45 4.91 7.69 6.62 6.30
3 4.78 5.14 3.23 5.54 3.05 4.97 4.22 4.79 3.65 4.04 5,43
4 2.45 3.57 2.95 4.10 2.45 3.18 3.98 4.35 3.27 3.48 3.14
5 2.18 3.03 2.67 2.49 2.18 2.34 3.71 3.20 2.47 2.96 2.95
6 2.17 2.49 2.65 2.34 2.07 2.20 2.34 3.17 2.14 2.76 2.46
7 2.04 2.47 2.54 2.02 1.97 1.75 2.32 3.14 2.13 2.30 2.35
8 2.00 2.10 2.24 2.01 1.81 1.59 2.05 2.57 2.12 2.12 2.10
9 1.92 2.06 1.95 1.89 1.79 1.55 2.02 1.69 1.95 2.12 1.99
10 1.85 2.05 1.94 1.87 1.66 1.54 1.86 1.61 1.59 2.08 1.96
11 1.65 1.98 1.78 1.67 1.65 1.52 1.60 1.53 1.55 2.04 1.94
12 1.58 1.95 1.65 1.56 1.58 1.50 1.58 1.47 1.44 1.62 1.58
13 1.56 1.82 1.24 1.56 1.50 1.44 1.57 1.43 1.44 1.56 1.46
14 1.56 1.82 1.16 1.43 1.49 1.39 1.54 1.41 1.34 1.47 1.27
15 1.32 1.64 1.14 1.42 1.43 1.34 1.33 1.35 1.02 1.39 1.20
16 1.17 1.25 1.12 1.32 1.38 1.28 1.23 1.31 1.00 1.23 1.20
• 17 1.04 1.21 1.05 1.31 1.19 1.21 1.22 1.26 0.99 1.12 1.15
18 1.02 1.13 0.98 1.30 1.10 1.19 1.21 1.18 0.88 1.05 1.10
19 0.98 1.07 0.96 1.27 1.08 1.14 1.16 1.13 0.87 0.99 1.05
20 0.98 1.04 0.89 1.26 1.06 1.09 1.14 1.13 0.83 0.98 0.98
Top 20 45.46 49.14 46.34 48.24 45.28 45.47 48.31 48.22 46.06 48.63 48.36
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Smith & 
Nephew
Southern
Water
Stakis Standard
Chartered
Tate & Lyle Thom EMI Wessex
Water
WPP Yorkshire
Electricity
Average Cumulative
FTSE 100 FTSE 250 FTSE 250 FTSE 100 FTSE 250 FTSE 100 FTSE 250 FTSE 250 FTSE 250 All 20 Total
1 7.50 9.24 8.36 6.46 7.15 9.50 7.99 6.93 7.48 7.59 46.98
2 4.67 4.71 5.21 5.42 4.92 4.00 4.95 5.94 3.88 5.29 39.40
3 4.22 3.35 4.11 3.96 4.26 3.89 3.99 3.85 3.84 4.22 34.11
4 2.92 3.23 3.53 3.79 3.85 3.47 3.25 3.32 3.65 3.40 29.89
5 2.86 3.04 2.85 3.03 3.19 2.85 3.00 3.25 3.20 2.87 26.50
6 2.70 2.83 2.45 2.20 2.76 2.59 2.66 3.08 2.75 2.54 23.62
7 2.55 2.61 2.28 2.14 2.12 2.37 2.16 2.20 2.44 2.30 21.08
8 2.47 2.41 2.15 1.94 2.06 1.92 2.09 1.89 2.40 2.10 18.79
9 2.25 2.20 1.95 1.75 2.02 1.65 1.59 1.80 1.69 1.89 16.69
10 2.21 1.50 1.95 1.67 1.73 1.56 1.58 1.54 1.67 1.77 14.80
11 2.15 1.44 1.83 1.67 1.68 1.53 1.55 1.53 1.54 1.69 13.02
12 1.77 1.38 1.72 1.57 1.47 1.49 1.53 1.42 1.50 1.57 11.33
13 1.69 1.31 1.54 1.50 1.43 1.48 1.40 1.37 1.44 1.49 9.77
14 1.69 1.23 1.54 1.48 1.23 1.45 1.37 1.31 1.34 1.43 8.28
15 1.68 1.18 1.45 1.38 1.17 1.24 1.36 1.22 1.27 1.33 6.85
16 1.58 1.17 1.15 1.36 1.13 1.13 1.20 1.21 1.21 1.23 5.53
17 1.40 1.14 1.06 1.36 1.08 1.10 1.02 1.15 1.18 1.16 4.29
18 1.14 1.14 0.95 1.23 1.07 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.15 1.09 3.13
19 1.13 1.00 0.93 1.05 0.95 0.99 0.93 0.98 1.07 1.04 2.04
20 1.13 0.91 0.92 0.95 0.90 0.97 0.89 0.97 1.01 1.00 1.00
Top 20 49.71 47.02 47.93 45.91 46.17 46.19 45.53 45.99 45.71 46.98
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Appendix E: Non-financial shareholders (NFS)
Appendix E.l: Strategic NFS with shareholdings over 50%
Company Largest NFS > 50% Holding Second NFS Holding Largest Top 3 Top 5
1 Gartmore Indosuez 75.0 2.51 5.56 7.6
2 Telewest Communications TCI & US West 70.6 2.42 5.55 7.7
3 Vendome Companie Financiere 70.0 Sofina 3.6 7.31 10.12 11.38
4 Savoy Hotel A Forte 69.7 3.74 8.76 10.75
5 Nynex Cablecomms Nynex Network Systems 67.0 1.64 3.34 4.69
6 Telegraph Conrad Black (Chairman) 64.3 2.15 6.05 9.12
7 General Cable General Utilities Holdings 57.9 2.82 7.69 11.04
8 Kalon Total Group 56.3 4.45 10.27 14.83
9 Calor Group SHV Holdings 51.6 4.21 8.61 11.62
10 Rentokil Sophus Berendsen 51.4 2.6 6.68 9.97
Average 63.38 3.39 7.26 9.87
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Appendix E.2: Strategic NFS with shareholdings of 20% - 50%
Company Largest NFS 20% - 50% Holding Second NFS Holding Largest Top 3 Top 5
1 Transatlantic Hldgs Conduit Insurance 42.3 TAI Investments 30.5 23.35 27.06 28.22
2 Sema Financiere Sema 41.3 Schneider 6.54 7.47 18.02 23.45
3 Arjo Wiggins Arjomori Priox & Others 40.0 12.4 17.68 21.58
4 BSkyB News International 40.0 BSB Holdings 14 1.09 2.9 4.33
5 Monument Oil and Gas Nimex Resources 37.9 6.52 17.17 23.67
6 Yule Catto Kuala Lumpar Kepong 29.5 7.44 19.18 25.09
7 Macallan Glenlivet Highland Distillers 26.2 Suntory 25.4 25.2 31.17 34.64
8 Trafalgar House Hong Kong Land 26.1 9.88 18.09 22.67
9 Compass Accor 22.9 5.12 12.57 17.94
10 Midlands Electricity PowerGen 21.0 5.44 10.82 14.00
Average 32.72 10.39 17.47 21.56
Appendix E.3: Strategic NFS with shareholdings of 10% - 20%
Company Largest NFS 10% - 20% Holding Second NFS Holding Largest Top 3 Top 5
1 Guinness Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton 20.0 4.73 10.14 13.53
2 Scottish Television Mirror Group 20.0 7.12 15.27 21.21
3 Wessex Water Waste Management 19.7 7.99 16.93 23.18
4 Capital Radio Dominfast 18.9 Radio Investment 8.86 8.68 20.64 27.78
5 Johnson Matthey Garrick Inv. 18.6 13.59 23.51 26.91
6 Hambros Grupo Banco San Paolo 16.0 14.81 29.57 35.53
7 Standard Chartered Tan Sri Teck Puat 14.9 6.46 15.84 22.66
8 Bradford Property Trust Warner Estates 13.2 Reddihoigh Trust 3.99 9.06 14.59 19.18
9 Enterprise Oil Elf Aquitane 12.9 11.37 25.06 32.17
10 South Wales Electricity Welsh Water 12.9 5.57 14.09 19.42
11 Berkeley Saad Investment Co. 11.5 6.07 16.46 23.06
12 Cable & Wireless Veba 10.5 3.99 10.00 14.24
13 Forte Granada 10.1 11.91 18.61 23.42
Average 15.32 8.57 17.75 23.25
Appendix E.4: Strategic NFS with shareholdings of below 10%
Company Largest NFS <10% Holding Second NFS Holding Largest Top 3 Top 5
1 TI Mannesman 9.0 4.1 10.26 15.31
2 Menzies J DC Thompson 8.7 9.9 19.84 23.46
3 Harrisons & Crosfield Sime Darby Bhd 7.8 10.99 23.80 30.82
4 Tate & Lyle Archer Daniels Midland 7.5 7.15 16.33 23.37
5 First Leisure London Merchant Securities 7.0 6.35 15.69 23.67
6 Commercial Union Societe Generale 6.3 Munich Re 4.32 8.41 16.32 22.07
7 Inchcape Toyota 4.8 6.35 15.89 20.88
8 British Biotech Japan Tobacco Inc 3.9 11.00 26.46 33.02
9 Allied Domecq Suntory 3.7 7.23 17.99 22.62
10 Eurotunnel Bombadier 3.4 1.05 2.85 4.08
11 Welsh Water Rockleigh Corporation 3.3 5.84 12.07 17.11
Average 5.94 7.12 16.14 21.49
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Appendix E.5: Board NFS with shareholdings above 10%
Company Largest NFS Holding Second NFS Holding Largest Top 3 Top 5
1 Pentland S Rubin (Chairman) 56.4 5.61 12.18 16.81
2 ML Laboratories K Leech (Chairman/CEO) 53.6 8.50 11.72 14.55
3 ABF Wittington Trust (G Weston) 50.9 4.11 8.21 11.20
4 Wilson Bowden DW Wilson (Chairman/CEO) 43.5 8.16 14.40 18.56
5 Body Shop B McGlinn 28.0 T & A Roddick 25.5 3.56 8.43 11.23
6 ED&F Man Directors 27.5 ESO Trust 4.7 2.30 6.00 8.50
7 Perpetual M Arbib (Chairman) 26.6 4.54 9.08 12.06
8 Airtours D Crossland, Chairman 26.1 10.52 17.48 22.02
9 Lonrho D Bock (CEO) 24.4 RW Rowland 6.68 6.41 9.94 12.50
10 Stagecoach B Suter (Chairman) 21.4 Ann Gloag (MD) 17.7 6.92 14.50 17.24
11 TT JW Newman/ND Shipp (Joint CEs) 19.2 11.32 21.15 29.20
12 Sainsbury J D Sainsbury (Chairman) 17.5 2.14 5.30 7.81
13 Daily Mail and General Viscount Rothermere (Chair) 17.4 20.84 28.39 32.26
14 London Merchant Lord Rayne (Chairman)
Average
17.0
30.68
9.36
7.45
18.04
13.20
23.67
16.97
Appendix E.6: Board NFS with shareholdings below 10%
Company Largest NFS Holding Second NFS Holding Largest Top 3 Top 5
1 Eurotherm Directors 9.9 8.99 22.24 28.91
2 Iceland Directors 9.3 6.04 17.11 26.32
3 Travis Perkins ERA Travis (Chairman) 9.0 8.71 20.10 24.15
4 Fine Art Developments K Chapman (Chairman) 8.6 12.06 21.82 27.56
5 INVESCO ESO Trust 8.3 4.76 10.52 14.91
6 Kwik Fit Floldings T Farmer (Chairman) 8.0 14.38 26.13 34.43
7 St James's Place Lord Rothschild (Chairman) 7.7 14.10 24.64 28.91
8 Lloyds Chemists AJ Lloyd (Chairman) 7.5 6.78 17.16 26.97
9 Berisford ABF 7.0 Rockwood 5.06 14.71 29.05 36.49
10 Hays R Frost (Chairman) 5.0 10.48 20.78 26.93
11 United Friendly RE Balding (MD) 4.3 6.09 16.38 23.63
12 Brown N Group ESO Trust 3.9 6.51 12.09 15.39
13 Halma DS Barber (Chairman) 3.7 10.50 21.38 28.31
14 Scottish & Newcastle Directors 3.2 12.43 20.52 26.06
15 Carlton Michael Green (Chairman) 2.3 10.58 17.40 22.84
16 Hazlewood Foods Peter Barr (Chairman) 2.2 9.83 19.77 25.67
17 Diploma AC Thomas (Chair/CEO) 1.9 8.56 21.17 31.43
18 Fairey D Kingsbury (Chairman) 1.9 7.05 17.12 23.36
19 Baird William J Jackson, NED 1.6 17.54 33.20 41.68
20 GEC Directors 1.5 6.47 12.34 16.52
21 Bowthorpe W Penny, NED 1.1 8.08 20.70 29.49
22 Watmoughs PE Walker (Chairman) 1.0 6.21 17.60 24.83
Average 4.95 9.58 19.96 26.58
Appendix E.7: Private and family NFS with shareholdings above 10%
Company Holdings > 10% Holding Second NFS Holding 1 ____ Largest Top 3 Top 5
1 DFS Furniture Kirkham family 43.4 Family 7.51 16.33 22.12
2 Nurdin & Peacock CH & WM Peacock 38.6 Makro NV 14 Private 4.76 10.25 15.39
3 Caledonia Investments Cayzer Family Trust 36.8 Family 10.67 23.44 28.24
4 Schroders Vincitas / Veritas 33.8 Private 8.27 14.6 18.42
5 Bilton Glazehazel IT 29.4 Bilton Charity 5.34 Private 11.48 23.35 28.7
6 Christies International Abel Inc 25.3 Private 12.56 27.98 33.68
7 Wilson Connolly LA & FCT Wilson 23.6 Family 5.52 11.97 17.26
8 Greenalls Daresbury/Hatton/Brown 19.1 Private 7.95 21.57 27.68
9 Morrison WM AR Wilson 14.2 NG & SB Pritchard 12.4 Private 5.01 11.24 15.2
Average 29.36 Average 8.19 17.86 22.97
Appendix E.8: Private and family NFS with shareholdings below 10%
Company Largest NFS Holding Second NFS Holding Type Largest Top 3 Top 5
1 Bryant AC Bryant & Trust 9.3 Family 7.98 16.08 22.99
2 St Ives R Gavron 6.7 Private 13.53 29.38 39.3
3 MEPC HJ Hyams 5.3 Private 16.34 38.17 41.91
4 Slough Estates Hack/Heathers/Others 5.0 Private 8.05 18.13 25.95
5 Christian Salvesen AEH Salvesen 4.6 Family 6.53 13.19 16.9
6 Cowie Sir Tom Cowie 3.9 Private 8.82 19.22 26.05
7 Stakis R Capoynapolous 3.3 Sir Reo Stakis 1.8 Private 8.36 17.68 24.06
8 Cray Electronics RM Holland 3.1 Private 7.22 20.46 26.67
Average 5.15 Average 9.60 21.54 27.98
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Appendix E.9: Charitable & trust shareholdings
Company Largest NFS Holding Second NFS Holding Type
1 GUS Wolfson Foundation 8.6 Charity
2 Laing J Rufford Foundation 9.2 Eskmuir Ltd 6.25 Charity
3 M&G Esmee Fairbum Trust 33.5 Charity
4 Unilever Leverhulme Trust 5.4 Charity
5 Wimpey G Grove Charity 4.0 Charity
Appendix E.10: Cross-holdings
Company Largest NFS Holding Second NFS Holding Type
1 Highland Distilleries Edrington Holdings 20.0 Andromede Inv. 9.5 Cross-Holdings
1Pearson Lazard Freres 8.7 David Weil 8.7 Cross-holdings
Appendix E .l l :  Government shareholdings
Company Largest NFS Holding Second NFS Holding Type
1Mersey Docks and Harbour Treasury Solicitor 13.8 Government
2 Northern Ireland Electricity Treasury Solicitor 3.3 Government
Appendix E.12: Unidentified/unclassified shareoldings
Company Largest NFS Holding Second NFS Holding Type
1 Chelsfield Summerwind 12.5 Competrol 10.1 Not known
2 Cobham Falaisse Investments 4.8 Not Known
3 London International Powerstock Ltd 3.7 Not known
Appendix F
Appendix F .l: Top 300 companies with market capitalisations above £10 billion
Cap. Financial shareholders Gini Herfindahl
Company Index £ m Largest Top 3 Top 5 Top 10 Top 20 Coefficient Index
1 Glaxo Wellcome FTSE 100 32,071 3.70 8.38 12.12 19.43 28.65 0.42 0.062
2 BP FTSE 100 29,326 5.95 13.11 17.47 26.10 36.08 0.40 0.074
3 Shell FTSE 100 28,339 3.91 10.68 14.34 22.19 31.31 0.38 0.059
4 HSBC FTSE 100 28,234 5.81 12.80 18.86 28.36 40.39 0.36 0.068
5 Unilever FTSE 100 26,260 5.74 10.14 13.60 20.99 30.72 0.34 0.074
6 British Telecom FTSE 100 22,141 3.56 8.34 12.17 19.26 28.05 0.32 0.063
7 BAT FTSE 100 17,622 4.29 10.18 15.57 24.58 35.28 0.30 0.063
8 Lloyds TSB FTSE 100 17,021 13.24 23.96 31.13 42.85 58.78 0.28 0.092
9 Barclays FTSE 100 12,821 6.65 13.89 19.16 28.54 38.83 0.26 0.075
10 Marks & Spencer FTSE 100 12,325 5.52 10.39 14.30 21.60 30.53 0.26 0.115
11 BTR FTSE 100 12,257 3.32 8.39 12.48 20.32 31.11 0.26 0.059
12 Zeneca FTSE 100 11,937 11.19 17.82 22.35 30.28 40.45 0.26 0.111
13 NatWest FTSE 100 11,778 6.68 14.23 18.17 26.17 35.89 0.24 0.088
14 Hanson FTSE 100 10,613 2.77 6.82 10.06 15.95 24.42 0.22 0.060
15 Reuters FTSE 100 10348 5.32 12.76 17.29 24.37 31.82 0.22 0.058
16 British Gas FTSE 100 10,334 3.44 9.15 13.72 22.47 32.65 0.22 0.061
17 SmithKline Beecham A FTSE 100 10,186 4.46 12.28 17.32 25.75 35.29 0.22 0.063
> £10bn Average 17,860 5.62 11.96 16.48 24.66 34.72 0.29 0.073
Appendix F.2: Top 300 companies with market capitalisations of £5 - £10 billion
Cap. Financial shareholders Gini Herfindahl
Company Index £ m Largest Top 3 Top 5 Top 10 Top 20 Coefficient Index
1 GEC FTSE 100 9,903 6.47 12.34 16.52 25.24 37.32 0 .5 0 0.071
2 RTZ FTSE 100 9,668 10.43 18.01 22.45 30.63 40.00 0 .4 6 0.068
3 Cable & Wireless FTSE 100 9,571 3.99 10.00 14.24 21.21 29.97 0.44 0.068
4 Guinness FTSE 100 9,479 4.73 10.14 13.53 20.69 28.66 0.44 0.074
5 Grand Metropolitan FTSE 100 9,418 3.88 10.27 15.17 23.78 34.70 0.40 0.063
6 Prudential FTSE 100 8,156 4.41 9.95 15.05 25.22 37.21 0.38 0.071
7 Abbey National FTSE 100 8,107 4.63 7.78 10.06 15.03 22.30 0.36 0.079
8 Thom EMI FTSE 100 7,179 9.50 17.39 23.71 33.80 46.19 0.34 0.058
9 Vodafone FTSE 100 7,101 14.83 25.59 30.04 38.94 50.77 0.32 0.126
10 GUS FTSE 100 7,060 12.38 23.10 27.02 35.38 45.10 0.32 0.129
11 BSkyB FTSE 100 6,843 1.09 2.90 4.33 13.48 18.56 0.32 0.122
12 Bass FTSE 100 6,408 4.31 9.95 14.43 23.39 36.40 0.30 0.059
13 Tesco FTSE 100 6,300 4.09 10.55 14.89 24.12 36.28 0.28 0.070
14 Standard Chartered FTSE 100 6,167 6.46 15.84 22.66 32.36 45.91 0.28 0.063
15 Granada FTSE 100 6,071 14.00 20.42 26.07 35.94 47.68 0.28 0.118
16 Boots FTSE 100 5,895 3.86 9.33 13.96 21.51 31.88 0.28 0.062
17 ICI FTSE 100 5,820 10.85 15.44 19.31 27.28 36.35 0.26 0.119
18 Reed FTSE 100 5,748 7.59 15.86 20.69 29.97 40.94 0.26 0.108
19 Allied Domecq FTSE 100 5,439 7.23 17.99 22.62 32.60 45.46 0.26 0.077
20 Cadbury Schweppes FTSE 100 5,323 4.17 10.28 14.39 22.25 32.55 0.22 0.065
21 BAA FTSE 100 5,089 7.90 16.10 22.36 32.01 43.19 0.22 0.079
22 British Airways FTSE 100 5,076 9.96 18.92 23.66 30.78 39.76 0.20 0.110
£5 - lObn Average 7,083 7.13 14.01 18.51 27.07 37.60 0.32 0.085
Appendix F.3 Top 300 companies with market capitalisations of £3 - £5 billion
Cap. Financial shareholders Gini Herfindahl
Company Index £ m Largest Top 3 Top 5 Top 10 Top 20 Coefficient Index
1 National Power FTSE 100 4,933 3.43 7.51 11.10 17.00 24.57 0.66 0.081
2 RBS FTSE 100 4,742 11.56 16.93 21.47 29.88 38.25 0.52 0.060
3 BOC Group FTSE 100 4,409 4.56 12.18 18.52 28.93 42.04 0.50 0.062
4 Commercial Union FTSE 100 4,129 8.41 16.32 22.07 30.31 39.85 0.42 0.090
5 Rank FTSE 100 3,797 6.75 18.48 24.57 35.43 48.36 0.42 0.123
6 British Aerospace FTSE 100 3,792 8.65 16.80 20.93 30.07 42.94 0.40 0.082
7 Scottish & Newcastle FTSE 100 3,777 12.43 20.52 26.06 36.78 50.02 0.38 0.058
8 Argyll Group FTSE 100 3,772 3.76 9.12 13.71 23.42 35.11 0.38 0.058
9 PowerGen FTSE 100 3,764 4.64 8.24 11.49 18.65 25.67 0.38 0.064
10 Forte FTSE 100 3,761 11.91 18.61 23.42 32.96 44.16 0.38 0.107
11 Bank of Scotland FTSE 100 3,677 32.34 37.33 40.26 45.43 52.20 0.36 0.394
12 Pearson FTSE 100 3,618 10.10 19.00 24.81 32.71 44.02 0.36 0.093
13 Kingfisher FTSE 100 3,593 13.04 21.59 26.63 37.06 48.24 0.36 0.111
14 Scottish Power FTSE 100 3,577 5.64 12.72 18.08 27.76 38.84 0.34 0.073
15 Legal & General FTSE 100 3,513 5.67 13.07 18.97 30.51 41.60 0.32 0.068
16 British Steel FTSE 100 3,419 17.79 26.63 30.73 38.21 47.81 0.32 0.168
17 P&O. FTSE 100 3,326 6.76 15.50 21.63 31.76 44.22 0.32 0.096
18 Whitbread FTSE 100 3,319 10.09 17.33 23.23 34.31 48.94 0.32 0.081
19 Tomkins FTSE 100 3,318 3.10 8.95 13.89 24.43 39.06 0.28 0.123
20 Siebe FTSE 100 3,307 4.01 10.65 15.75 25.00 38.41 0.26 0.075
21 Land Securities FTSE 100 3,183 7.69 19.03 24.77 34.70 46.06 0.26 0.086
22 General Accident FTSE 100 3,179 4.86 12.87 19.12 30.83 44.47 0.22 0.062
23 ASDA FTSE 100 3,094 9.26 18.11 25.13 35.22 48.16 0.22 0.081
24 Sun Alliance FTSE 100 3,091 10.27 16.79 21.20 30.48 44.50 0.22 0.097
£3 - 5bn Average 3,670 9.03 16.43 21.56 30.91 42.40 0.36 0.100
Appendix F.4: Top 300 companies with market capitalisations of £2 - £3 billion
Cap. Financial shareholders Gini Herfindahl
Company Index £ m Largest Top 3 Top 5 Top 10 Top 20 Coefficient Index
1 Reckitt & Colman FTSE 100 2,971 4.09 8.88 13.25 21.52 33.18 0.18 0.055
2 Rolls Royce FTSE 100 2,921 13.77 22.94 28.47 37.39 49.11 0.24 0.064
3 GKN FTSE 100 2,820 7.28 15.14 21.14 30.38 42.14 0.34 0.075
4 Wolseley FTSE 100 2,551 5.12 13.67 20.87 31.82 46.52 0.26 0.062
5 Royal Insurance FTSE 100 2,526 6.37 13.24 18.62 28.70 43.41 0.42 0.106
6 Blue Circle FTSE 100 2,479 9.49 17.43 23.05 34.37 46.34 0.36 0.084
7 RMC Group FTSE 100 2,423 21.25 29.03 34.68 44.03 54.24 0.42 0.116
8 Carlton FTSE 100 2,415 10.58 17.40 22.84 32.10 42.50 0.38 0.099
9 3i FTSE 100 2,414 17.11 27.97 34.48 41.82 50.91 0.52 0.152
10 Schroders FTSE 100 2,395 8.27 14.60 18.42 23.70 29.73 0.38 0.098
11 GRE FTSE 100 2,356 12.40 19.75 25.53 36.70 50.05 0.36 0.096
12 Severn Trent FTSE 100 2,294 3.94 9.47 14.76 24.15 36.20 0.30 0.068
13 TI FTSE 100 2,278 4.10 10.26 15.31 24.92 38.51 0.22 0.062
14 Thames Water FTSE 100 2,170 6.44 12.77 17.61 27.26 39.11 0.36 0.084
15 Ladbroke FTSE 100 2,029 4.41 11.68 17.42 27.51 40.24 0.26 0.062
16 Southern Electric FTSE 100 2,028 7.54 14.24 18.45 25.33 35.13 0.36 0.082
£2 - 3bn Average 2,442 8.89 16.15 21.56 30.73 42.33 0.34 0.085
Appendix F.5: Top 300 companies with market capitalisations £1 - £2 billion
Cap. Financial shareholders Gini Herfindahl
Company Index £ m Largest Top 3 Top 5 Top 10 Top 20 Coefficient Index
1 Burmah Castrol FTSE 100 1,996 5.38 14.92 21.80 32.03 45.00 0.60 0.068
2 Redland FTSE 100 1,994 3.60 8.63 13.55 23.94 38.09 0.52 0.082
3 Smith & Nephew FTSE 100 1,993 7.50 16.39 22.17 34.35 49.71 0.52 0.070
4 Smiths Industries FTSE 250 1,984 5.80 14.16 19.76 30.53 45.82 0.52 0.063
5 Cookson Group FTSE 100 1,953 6.53 16.76 23.52 37.95 55.05 0.48 0.063
6 Williams FTSE 100 1,953 5.22 14.74 22.81 33.42 46.30 0.48 0.068
7 Pilkington FTSE 250 1,945 17.55 27.94 34.51 45.83 57.61 0.46 0.100
8 Rexam FTSE 100 1,904 3.82 9.79 15.44 24.98 38.31 0.46 0.179
9 Enterprise Oil FTSE 100 1,883 11.37 25.06 32.17 40.51 50.94 0.44 0.112
10 Tate & Lyle FTSE 250 1,878 7.15 16.33 23.37 34.06 46.17 0.44 0.088
11 Burton FTSE 250 1,858 20.98 36.16 43.63 55.39 66.72 0.44 0.145
12 Argos FTSE 250 1,812 10.27 25.57 33.53 44.67 57.00 0.44 0.091
13 Courtaulds FTSE 100 1,795 6.02 17.42 24.01 34.14 48.24 0.42 0.071
14 Greenalls FTSE 250 1,734 7.95 21.57 27.68 37.78 49.94 0.42 0.085
15 Next FTSE 250 1,707 10.30 19.56 25.77 37.80 49.57 0.42 0.069
16 British Land FTSE 250 1,702 13.02 30.10 36.21 47.35 59.47 0.40 0.111
17 Lucas FTSE 250 1,700 7.87 22.33 30.34 44.04 56.85 0.40 0.069
18 LASMO FTSE 100 1,670 7.66 18.87 23.75 32.04 41.87 0.40 0.090
19 Dixons FTSE 250 1,664 9.63 19.36 27.67 40.69 56.14 0.38 0.074
20 MEPC FTSE 250 1,624 16.34 38.17 41.91 49.85 60.17 0.38 0.074
21 De La Rue FTSE 100 1,580 9.84 17.89 22.52 31.82 45.28 0.38 0.087
22 Anglian Water FTSE 250 1,522 6.81 17.00 22.04 32.50 43.53 0.38 0.077
23 Compass FTSE 250 1,500 5.12 12.57 17.94 28.07 41.27 0.36 0.063
24 BPB FTSE 250 1,495 13.18 27.77 34.54 45.99 58.64 0.36 0.101
Cap. Financial shareholders Gini Herfindahl
Company Index £ m Largest Top 3 Top 5 Top 10 Top 20 Coefficient Index
25 Hays FTSE 250 1,494 10.48 20.78 26.93 37.77 50.33 0.36 0.090
26 Arjo Wiggins FTSE 100 1,469 12.40 17.68 21.58 , 28.85 35.95 0.36 0.148
27 Electrocomponents FTSE 250 1,468 7.16 15.32 22.21 35.33 51.24 0.34 0.064
28 Sears FTSE 100 1,453 6.01 13.54 19.11 30.06 45.20 0.34 0.106
29 United News & Media FTSE 250 1,448 13.10 19.33 25.00 35.85 49.43 0.34 0.102
30 Midlands Electricity FTSE 250 1,447 5.44 10.82 14.00 19.71 28.83 0.34 0.117
31 Britannic Assurance FTSE 250 1,431 11.04 25.74 32.78 44.51 59.11 0.34 0.095
32 Inchcape FTSE 100 1,415 6.35 15.89 20.88 28.96 40.55 0.34 0.078
33 Scottish Hydro-Electric FTSE 250 1,376 3.40 9.01 14.07 22.79 34.55 0.34 0.069
34 Coats Viyella FTSE 250 1,336 5.04 13.00 19.62 31.57 46.00 0.34 0.061
35 East Midlands Elect. FTSE 250 1,331 5.74 15.12 19.92 28.95 41.12 0.34 0.072
36 United Biscuits FTSE 250 1,327 8.69 18.46 22.63 31.46 44.22 0.32 0.089
37 Caradon FTSE 250 1,307 4.42 10.06 15.56 26.66 41.42 0.32 0.057
38 Laporte FTSE 250 1,265 6.70 17.36 23.80 35.18 48.63 0.32 0.072
39 BET FTSE 250 1,259 6.21 17.14 26.22 42.54 56.32 0.32 0.068
40 Hillsdown Holdings FTSE 250 1,237 9.24 19.68 25.71 35.92 50.70 0.32 0.079
41 Dalgety FTSE 250 1,231 14.76 31.60 36.63 45.03 54.91 0.32 0.141
42 Yorkshire Water FTSE 250 1,231 7.48 18.62 26.34 37.34 48.60 0.32 0.080
43 BBA FTSE 250 1,228 8.07 20.07 26.94 39.12 55.47 0.32 0.072
44 WPP FTSE 250 1,223 6.93 16.72 23.29 33.80 45.99 0.30 0.075
45 Storehouse FTSE 250 1,223 5.91 16.52 24.18 37.27 54.00 0.30 0.088
46 London Electricity FTSE 250 1,217 5.78 13.54 20.03 31.10 43.52 0.30 0.086
47 Danka Business Systems FTSE 250 1,192 3.96 8.25 10.54 12.91 14.49 0.30 0.142
48 WH Smith FTSE 250 1,168 5.52 13.62 19.45 30.43 47.86 0.30 0.059
49 Johnson Matthey FTSE 250 1,151 13.95 23.51 26.91 33.08 42.05 0.30 0.152
50 EMAP FTSE 250 1,136 7.97 18.22 23.74 32.37 45.47 0.30 0.079
Cap. Financial shareholders Gini Herfindahl
Company Index £ m Largest Top 3 Top 5 Top 10 Top 20 Coefficient Index
51 Morrison WM FTSE 250 1,136 5.01 11.24 15.20 22.91 31.90 0.30 0.065
52 MAI FTSE 250 1,135 9.62 23.01 28.81 40.33 54.85 0.30 0.074
53 Associated British Ports FTSE 250 1,100 6.86 18.73 27.88 40.29 55.39 0.30 0.071
54 Northern Foods FTSE 250 1,095 7.06 12.63 17.49 27.08 39.52 0.30 0.068
55 British Biotech FTSE 250 1,079 11.00 26.46 33.02 44.88 57.45 0.28 0.097
56 NFC FTSE 250 1,076 5.48 10.45 14.55 22.30 32.99 0.26 0.086
57 IMI FTSE 250 1,073 5.59 15.29 22.84 35.02 48.22 0.26 0.068
58 Provident Financial FTSE 250 1,072 7.28 18.10 25.04 38.87 56.48 0.26 0.061
59 Harrisons & Crosfield FTSE 250 1,059 10.99 23.80 30.82 41.51 54.07 0.26 0.093
60 Tarmac FTSE 250 1,055 10.94 20.82 25.44 33.59 45.44 0.26 0.074
61 Yorkshire Electricity FTSE 250 1,048 7.48 15.20 22.05 33.00 45.71 0.26 0.072
62 Southern Water FTSE 250 1,033 9.24 17.30 23.57 35.12 47.02 0.24 0.081
63 BICC FTSE 250 1,027 6.93 14.59 20.10 30.99 43.66 0.20 0.071
64 Unigate FTSE 250 1,022 5.95 14.92 22.21 34.52 47.80 0.20 0.066
£1 - 2bn Average 1,436 8.28 18.30 24.34 34.82 47.56 0.35 0.086
Appendix F.6: Top 300 companies with market capitalisations £500 million - £1 billion
Cap. Financial shareholders Gini Herfindahl
Company Index £ m Largest Top 3 Top 5 Top 10 Top 20 Coefficient Index
1 English China Clays FTSE 250 986 11.16 26.65 35.65 44.57 57.08 0.30 0.100
2 Cray Electronics FTSE 250 975 7.22 20.46 26.67 37.75 51.22 0.60 0.077
3 M&G FTSE 250 965 5.15 10.15 14.34 22.65 32.38 0.60 0.354
4 Hammerson FTSE 250 964 20.94 51.22 56.68 66.56 76.45 0.56 0.163
5 MFI Furniture FTSE 250 955 9.44 20.54 30.14 45.79 65.76 0.56 0.078
6 Transatlantic Hldgs FTSE 250 936 23.35 27.06 28.22 29.75 30.62 0.48 0.110
7 Welsh Water FTSE 250 917 5.84 12.07 17.11 25.68 37.02 0.48 0.069
8 Chubb Security FTSE 250 913 9.37 21.18 26.77 38.21 51.80 0.48 0.085
9 David S Smith FTSE 250 901 7.79 17.31 24.46 36.40 51.06 0.48 0.071
10 Racal Electronics FTSE 250 887 6.64 15.41 21.42 31.65 44.43 0.46 0.075
11 FKI FTSE 250 884 13.57 25.36 35.05 48.20 61.17 0.44 0.095
12 Morgan Crucible FTSE 250 876 4.22 12.53 20.39 33.59 48.90 0.42 0.071
13 T&N FTSE 250 860 14.11 22.86 29.79 41.46 56.90 0.42 0.078
14 Vickers FTSE 250 859 10.12 22.94 29.88 41.78 54.25 0.42 0.088
15 Farnell Electronics FTSE 250 859 9.34 21.42 28.13 39.58 55.26 0.42 0.077
16 Booker FTSE 250 855 14.34 27.28 36.16 49.16 62.83 0.42 0.098
17 Bunzl FTSE 250 848 10.50 21.66 29.45 44.96 61.43 0.42 0.075
18 Slough Estates FTSE 250 828 8.05 18.13 25.95 39.97 52.33 0.40 0.068
19 Glynwed FTSE 250 819 5.17 13.69 20.06 29.33 43.34 0.40 0.064
20 Christian Salvesen FTSE 250 790 6.53 13.19 16.90 23.16 31.38 0.40 0.089
21 South Wales Electricity FTSE 250 790 5.57 14.09 19.42 30.04 44.90 0.40 0.095
22 Mirror Group FTSE 250 789 15.66 24.96 31.47 41.49 54.73 0.40 0.085
23 Bowthorpe FTSE 250 789 8.08 20.70 29.49 41.30 56.49 0.40 0.075
24 Eurotunnel FTSE 250 736 1.05 2.85 4.08 5.97 7.05 0.40 0.089
Cap. Financial shareholders Gini Herfindahl
Company Index £ m Largest Top 3 Top 5 Top 10 Top 20 Coefficient Index
25 Charter FTSE 250 734 8.56 23.11 30.73 42.72 54.59 0.38 0.086
26 Hepworth FTSE 250 727 7.78 16.45 24.14 34.73 48.31 0.36 0.072
27 Securicor FTSE 250 720 15.25 26.75 33.56 44.73 58.86 0.36 0.170
28 Wessex Water FTSE 250 719 7.99 16.93 23.18 33.26 45.53 0.36 0.077
29 Refuge FTSE 250 717 11.00 28.50 36.74 46.37 56.40 0.36 0.082
30 Rugby FTSE 250 691 7.80 18.04 25.77 40.98 55.83 0.34 0.094
31 Sedgwick FTSE 250 689 21.41 40.47 46.44 56.53 66.65 0.34 0.097
32 Medeva FTSE 250 686 6.11 15.51 20.36 28.20 38.66 0.34 0.161
33 Allied Colloids FTSE 250 677 13.67 27.75 34.01 44.47 58.30 0.34 0.108
34 Burford FTSE 250 646 8.41 20.71 30.04 44.64 59.87 0.34 0.072
35 INVESCO FTSE 250 638 4.76 10.52 14.91 24.42 34.68 0.34 0.066
36 Willis Corroon FTSE 250 629 16.29 22.74 27.09 34.60 45.17 0.34 0.156
37 South West Water FTSE 250 629 12.04 23.62 31.04 41.59 54.03 0.34 0.087
38 United Friendly FTSE 250 600 6.09 16.38 23.63 36.73 49.87 0.32 0.069
39 Caledonia Investments FTSE 250 593 10.67 23.44 28.24 34.84 40.86 0.32 0.133
40 Ocean FTSE 250 588 14.14 25.49 33.18 44.18 55.55 0.32 0.073
41 Northern Ireland Elec. FTSE 250 586 3.73 8.84 12.54 18.84 26.60 0.32 0.066
42 Northern Electric FTSE 250 582 8.23 14.94 19.90 27.60 38.27 0.32 0.072
43 Delta FTSE 250 578 8.63 19.38 28.65 44.92 62.22 0.32 0.068
44 Great Portland FTSE 250 566 13.12 31.79 39.21 49.70 61.80 0.30 0.110
45 Scapa FTSE 250 565 15.42 27.46 38.52 51.59 68.18 0.30 0.120
46 Laird FTSE 250 558 13.41 26.94 37.01 48.33 64.08 0.28 0.092
47 Lloyds Chemists FTSE 250 557 6.78 17.91 26.01 37.07 47.64 0.28 0.079
48 Wimpey G FTSE 250 523 11.51 23.49 31.43 42.46 55.54 0.28 0.091
49 Taylor Woodrow FTSE 250 521 12.83 24.59 32.47 43.73 60.43 0.28 0.061
50 Cowie FTSE 250 520 8.82 19.22 26.05 36.38 51.42 0.28 0.076
Cap. Financial shareholders Gini Herfindahl
Company Index £ m Largest Top 3 Top5 Top 10 Top 20 Coefficient Index
51 Sema FTSE 250 513 7.47 18.02 23.45 32.38 39.55 0.26 0.078
52 Fairey FTSE 250 504 7.05 17.12 23.36 35.46 52.94 0.26 0.066
53 Wassail FTSE 250 501 3.86 9.22 12.89 20.10 27.75 0.24 0.069
£500m - £ lbn Average 731 9.93 20.74 27.40 37.93 50.35 0.38 0.094
Appendix F.7: Top 300 companies with market capitalisations below £50m million
Cap. Financial shareholders Gini Herfindahl
Company Index £ m Largest Top 3 Top 5 Top 10 Top 20 Coefficient Index
1 London and Manchester FTSE 250 490 4.30 10.94 16.04 25.92 35.86 0.86 0.067
2 Spirax Sarco FTSE 250 489 10.96 27.77 37.09 51.84 68.40 0.66 0.095
3 Low & Bonar FTSE 250 488 10.22 18.73 24.50 35.96 53.13 0.62 0.079
4 Amersham FTSE 250 486 11.22 19.96 26.88 42.83 58.30 0.58 0.078
5 Eurotherm FTSE 250 486 8.99 22.24 28.91 40.86 53.65 0.56 0.085
6 BTP FTSE 250 484 10.57 19.16 26.57 40.71 58.04 0.54 0.073
7 Cordiant FTSE 250 483 7.14 12.46 15.21 18.61 20.61 0.52 0.169
8 Beazer Homes FTSE 250 480 6.90 18.05 27.38 43.79 60.48 0.50 0.065
9 Berkeley FTSE 250 478 6.07 16.46 23.06 34.23 49.14 0.50 0.067
10 Wickes FTSE 250 472 10.37 26.02 39.11 62.16 81.31 0.50 0.070
11 Meyer FTSE 250 472 7.02 19.24 28.19 43.87 60.49 0.48 0.067
12 Cobham FTSE 250 468 6.39 17.33 24.00 38.19 54.76 0.48 0.064
13 Croda International FTSE 250 459 11.93 28.42 37.11 49.93 65.32 0.48 0.093
14 St Ives FTSE 250 457 13.53 29.38 39.30 50.72 66.09 0.48 0.127
15 Weir FTSE 250 456 15.11 30.86 41.10 55.06 69.89 0.48 0.097
16 Halma FTSE 250 452 10.50 21.38 28.31 37.82 49.90 0.46 0.092
17 McKechnie FTSE 250 445 5.84 15.41 22.72 39.28 59.69 0.46 0.080
18 Courtaulds Textiles FTSE 250 433 6.80 16.59 25.36 37.53 52.66 0.46 0.067
19 British Vita FTSE 250 433 6.16 16.32 23.71 35.41 50.13 0.46 0.067
20 Barratt Developments FTSE 250 432 9.86 20.45 27.99 41.15 57.54 0.46 0.074
21 Unichem FTSE 250 432 6.03 13.73 20.33 32.39 47.17 0.46 0.063
22 Highland Distilleries FTSE 250 429 5.64 15.27 23.35 29.82 36.27 0.44 0.094
23 DFS Furniture FTSE 250 425 7.51 16.33 22.12 31.10 38.96 0.44 0.091
Cap. Financial shareholders Gini Herfindahl
Company Index £ m Largest Top 3 Top 5 Top 10 Top 20 Coefficient Index
24 London International FTSE 250 424 12.51 23.57 31.51 44.25 59.86 0.44 0.076
25 Devro FTSE 250 423 11.32 20.80 27.05 38.36 53.78 0.44 0.084
26 Capital Radio FTSE 250 420 8.68 20.64 27.78 39.09 51.48 0.44 0.084
27 Stakis FTSE 250 419 8.36 17.68 24.06 34:84 47.93 0.42 0.070
28 Vaux FTSE 250 416 8.14 21.21 29.89 43.19 58.46 0.40 0.073
29 House of Fraser FTSE 250 414 22.32 30.23 35.91 46.82 58.46 0.40 0.171
30 Monument Oil and Gas FTSE 250 414 6.52 17.17 23.67 31.29 40.75 0.40 0.060
31 Iceland FTSE 250 414 6.04 17.11 26.32 41.35 55.65 0.40 0.068
32 Marley FTSE 250 406 15.78 27.29 33.28 44.13 58.12 0.40 0.085
33 Brixton Estates FTSE 250 402 18.88 42.68 49.94 61.58 74.40 0.40 0.132
34 Wolverhampton & 
Dudley Brews
FTSE 250 395 6.23 16.90 25.68 39.36 54.63 0.40 0.066
35 Powell Duffiyn FTSE 250 390 13.47 26.34 34.89 46.20 58.53 0.40 0.074
36 Brown N Group FTSE 250 387 6.51 12.09 15.39 21.78 27.58 0.40 0.102
37 Hewden Stuart FTSE 250 379 10.13 17.20 23.77 36.54 53.49 0.38 0.074
38 Travis Perkins FTSE 250 371 8.71 20.10 24.15 32.13 42.96 0.38 0.065
39 Mersey Docks and 
Harbour
FTSE 250 371 6.28 16.18 22.76 32.13 44.70 0.38 0.067
40 Lex Service FTSE 250 369 6.89 17.16 26.97 43.10 58.11 0.36 0.068
41 Aegis FTSE 250 361 31.69 39.61 45.09 53.69 60.10 0.36 0.297
42 Hambros FTSE 250 352 14.81 29.57 35.53 46.68 58.49 0.36 0.117
43 Trafalgar House FTSE 250 350 9.88 18.09 22.67 30.62 36.08 0.36 0.591
44 Albert Fisher FTSE 250 349 11.73 19.97 25.71 37.22 48.62 0.34 0.098
45 Fine Art Developments FTSE 250 343 12.06 21.82 27.56 37.49 51.18 0.34 0.095
46 Powerscreen FTSE 250 343 5.32 13.62 20.75 32.62 46.44 0.34 0.066
47 Wilson Connolly FTSE 250 340 5.52 11.97 17.26 26.96 39.98 0.34 0.064
Cap. Financial shareholders Gini Herfindahl
Company Index £ m Largest Top 3 Top 5 Top 10 Top 20 Coefficient Index
48 Christies International FTSE 250 328 12.56 27.98 33.68 41.07 47.41 0.34 0.156
49 Yule Catto FTSE 250 328 7.44 19.18 25.09 35.02 46.70 0.32 0.081
50 Bradford Property Trust FTSE 250 317 9.06 14.59 19.18 28.07 36.47 0.32 0.099
51 Kwik Fit Holdings FTSE 250 316 14.38 26.13 34.43 43.19 53.98 0.32 0.116
52 Menzies J FTSE 250 305 9.90 19.84 23.46 29.33 33.23 0.30 0.149
53 Watmoughs FTSE 250 305 6.21 17.60 24.83 36.74 52.84 0.30 0.066
54 Scottish Television FTSE 250 297 7.12 15.27 21.21 31.60 43.83 0.30 0.063
55 Bryant FTSE 250 296 7.98 16.08 22.99 35.03 50.42 0.30 0.069
56 Transport Development FTSE 250 295 17.17 30.23 36.67 50.26 65.62 0.30 0.101
57 Marston Thompson & 
Evershed
FTSE 250 292 12.12 29.28 41.85 61.09 75.21 0.30 0.058
58 Berisford FTSE 250 289 14.71 29.05 36.49 47.51 57.19 0.30 0.118
59 Senior Engineering FTSE 250 287 9.47 23.41 33.45 46.24 61.63 0.30 0.059
60 Chelsfield FTSE 250 287 6.38 14.80 20.18 27.21 33.04 0.30 0.096
61 St James's Place FTSE 250 278 14.10 24.64 28.91 37.68 47.88 0.30 0.077
62 First Leisure FTSE 250 272 6.35 15.69 23.67 36.32 51.20 0.30 0.066
63 TLG FTSE 250 270 5.14 12.16 17.27 26.76 40.99 0.30 0.055
64 Hazlewood Foods FTSE 250 240 9.83 19.77 25.67 34.97 46.76 0.30 0.091
65 CAMAS FTSE 250 239 14.33 32.00 39.15 47.99 60.63 0.28 0.120
66 Laing J FTSE 250 235 3.29 8.22 10.87 14.27 16.24 0.28 0.114
67 Diploma FTSE 250 232 8.56 21.17 31.43 44.00 59.40 0.28 0.075
68 Babcock FTSE 250 230 15.27 29.71 36.39 49.34 62.45 0.28 0.109
69 Persimmon FTSE 250 223 11.72 21.86 27.55 38.46 51.63 0.28 0.128
70 Nurdin & Peacock FTSE 250 218 4.76 10.25 15.39 23.21 33.64 0.28 0.108
71 Dawson FTSE 250 217 23.78 36.30 42.50 52.36 65.88 0.26 0.163
72 Baird William FTSE 250 213 17.54 33.20 41.68 53.93 67.74 0.26 0.115
Cap. Financial shareholders Gini Herfindahl
Company Index £ m Largest Top 3 Top 5 Top 10 Top 20 Coefficient Index
73 Takare FTSE 250 204 9.34 18.73 26.35 39.60 52.73 0.24 0.100
74 Howden FTSE 250 201 11.35 26.98 36.41 50.93 68.23 0.24 0.080
75 Macallan Glenlivet FTSE 250 197 25.20 31.17 34.64 40.03 43.44 0.24 0.085
76 Bilton FTSE 250 189 11.48 23.35 28.70 38.70 49.67 0.22 0.108
77 Hickson FTSE 250 151 20.89 38.17 49.34 63.57 78.45 0.16 0.117
< £500m Average 359 10.57 21.54 28.51 39.81 52.49 0.39 0.099
Appendix G: Market Capitalisations of Top 300 companies
(End-January 1996)
Company Index Capitalisation £ m
1 3i FTSE 100 2,414
2 Abbey National FTSE 100 8,107
3 ABF FTSE 100 3,320
4 Aegis FTSE 250 361
5 Airtours FTSE 250 489
6 Albert Fisher FTSE 250 349
7 Allied Colloids FTSE 250 677
8 Allied Domecq FTSE 100 5,439
9 Amersham FTSE 250 486
10 Anglian Water FTSE 250 1,522
11 Argos FTSE 250 1,812
12 Argyll Group FTSE 100 3,772
13 Aijo Wiggins FTSE 100 1,469
14 ASDA FTSE 100 3,094
15 Associated British Ports FTSE 250 1,100
16 BAA FTSE 100 5,089
17 Babcock FTSE 250 230
18 Baird William FTSE 250 213
19 Bank of Scotland FTSE 100 3,677
20 Barclays FTSE 100 12,821
21 Barratt Developments FTSE 250 432
22 Bass FTSE 100 6,408
23 BAT FTSE 100 17,622
24 BBA FTSE 250 1,228
25 Beazer Homes FTSE 250 480
26 Berisford FTSE250 289
27 Berkeley FTSE 250 478
28 BET FTSE 250 1,259
29 BICC FTSE 250 1,027
30 Bilton FTSE 250 189
31 Blue Circle FTSE 100 2,479
32 BOC Group FTSE 100 4,409
33 Body Shop FTSE 250 304
34 Booker FTSE 250 855
35 Boots FTSE 100 5,895
36 Bowthorpe FTSE 250 789
37 BP FTSE 100 29,326
38 BPB FTSE 250 1,495
39 Bradford Property Trust FTSE 250 317
40 Britannic Assurance FTSE 250 1,431
41 British Aerospace FTSE 100 3,792
42 British Airways FTSE 100 5,076
43 British Biotech FTSE 250 1,079
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Company Index Capitalisation £ m
280 Weir FTSE 250 456
281 Welsh Water FTSE 250 917
282 Wessex Water FTSE 250 719
283 WH Smith FTSE 250 1,168
284 Whitbread FTSE 100 3,319
285 Wickes FTSE 250 472
286 Williams FTSE 100 1,953
287 Willis Corroon FTSE 250 629
288 Wilson Bowden FTSE 250 341
289 Wilson Connolly FTSE 250 340
290 Wimpey G FTSE 250 523
291 Wolseley FTSE 100 2,551
292 Wolverhampton & Dudley FTSE 250 395
293 WPP FTSE 250 1,223
294 Yorkshire Electricity FTSE 250 1,048
295 Yorkshire Water FTSE 250 1,231
296 Yule Catto FTSE 250 328
297 Zeneca FTSE 100 11,937
Total 757,429
M arket capitalisation Jan-96 917,300
Total/market 82.6%
Company Index Capitalisation £ m
233 Siebe FTSE 100 3,307
234 Slough Estates FTSE 250 828
235 Smith & Nephew FTSE 100 1,993
236 SmithKline Beecham A FTSE 100 10,186
237 Smiths Industries FTSE 250 1,984
238 South Wales Electricity FTSE 250 790
239 South West Water FTSE 250 629
240 Southern Electric FTSE 100 2,028
241 Southern Water FTSE 250 1,033
242 Spirax Sarco FTSE 250 489
243 St Ives FTSE 250 457
244 St James's Place FTSE 250 278
245 Stagecoach FTSE 250 551
246 Stakis FTSE 250 419
247 Standard Chartered FTSE 100 6,167
248 Storehouse FTSE 250 1,223
249 Sun Alliance FTSE 100 3,091
250 T&N FTSE 250 860
251 Takare FTSE 250 204
252 Tarmac FTSE 250 1,055
253 Tate & Lyle FTSE 250 1,878
254 Taylor Woodrow FTSE 250 521
255 Telegraph FTSE 250 583
256 Telewest Communications FTSE 250 1,109
257 Tesco FTSE 100 6,300
258 Thames Water FTSE 100 2,170
259 Thom EMI FTSE 100 7,179
260 TI FTSE 100 2,278
261 TLG FTSE 250 270
262 Tomkins FTSE 100 3,318
263 Trafalgar House FTSE 250 350
264 Transatlantic Hldgs FTSE 250 936
265 Transport Development FTSE 250 295
266 Travis Perkins FTSE 250 371
267 TT FTSE 250 478
268 Unichem FTSE 250 432
269 Unigate FTSE 250 1,022
270 Unilever FTSE 100 26,260
271 United Biscuits FTSE 250 1,327
272 United Friendly FTSE 250 600
273 United News & Media FTSE 250 1,448
274 Vaux FTSE 250 416
275 Vendome FTSE 250 3,928
276 Vickers FTSE 250 859
277 Vodafone FTSE 100 7,101
278 Wassail FTSE 250 501
279 Watmoughs FTSE 250 305
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186 Northern Electric FTSE 250 582
187 Northern Foods FTSE 250 1,095
188 Northern Ireland Electricity FTSE 250 586
189 Nurdin & Peacock FTSE 250 218
190 Nynex Cablecomms FTSE 250 800
191 Ocean FTSE 250 588
192 P&O. FTSE 100 3,326
193 Pearson FTSE 100 3,618
194 Pentland FTSE 250 419
195 Perpetual FTSE 250 566
196 Persimmon FTSE 250 223
197 Pilkington FTSE 250 1,945
198 Powell Duffryn FTSE 250 390
199 PowerGen FTSE 100 3,764
200 Powerscreen FTSE 250 343
201 Provident Financial FTSE 250 1,072
202 Prudential FTSE 100 8,156
203 Racal Electronics FTSE 250 887
204 Rank FTSE 100 3,797
205 RBS FTSE 100 4,742
206 Reckitt & Colman FTSE 100 2,971
207 Redland FTSE 100 1,994
208 Reed FTSE 100 5,748
209 Refuge FTSE 250 717
210 Rentokil FTSE 100 3,388
211 Reuters FTSE 100 10,348
212 REXAM FTSE 100 1,904
213 RMC Group FTSE 100 2,423
214 Rolls Royce FTSE 100 2,921
215 Royal Insurance FTSE 100 2,526
216 RTZ FTSE 100 9,668
217 Rugby FTSE 250 691
218 Sainsbury J FTSE 100 7,225
219 Savoy Hotel A FTSE 250 400
220 Scapa FTSE 250 565
221 Schroders FTSE 100 2,395
222 Scottish & Newcastle FTSE 100 3,777
223 Scottish Hydro-Electric FTSE 250 1,376
224 Scottish Power FTSE 100 3,577
225 Scottish Television FTSE 250 297
226 Sears FTSE 100 1,453
227 Securicor FTSE 250 720
228 Sedgwick FTSE 250 689
229 Serna FTSE 250 513
230 Senior Engineering FTSE 250 287
231 Severn Trent FTSE 100 2,294
232 Shell FTSE 100 28,339
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Company Index Capitalisation £ m
139 IMI FTSE 250 1,073
140 Inchcape FTSE 100 1,415
141 INVESCO FTSE 250 638
142 Johnson Matthey FTSE 250 1,151
143 Kalon FTSE 250 457
144 Kingfisher FTSE 100 3,593
145 Kwik Fit Holdings FTSE 250 316
146 Ladbroke FTSE 100 2,029
147 Laing J FTSE 250 235
148 Laird FTSE 250 558
149 Land Securities FTSE 100 3,183
150 Laporte FTSE 250 1,265
151 LASMO FTSE 100 1,670
152 Legal & General FTSE 100 3,513
153 Lex Service FTSE 250 369
154 Lloyds Chemists FTSE 250 557
155 Lloyds TSB FTSE 100 17,021
156 London and Manchester FTSE 250 490
157 London Electricity FTSE 250 1,217
158 London International FTSE 250 424
159 London Merchant Securites FTSE 250 226
160 Lonrho FTSE 250 1,636
161 Low & Bonar FTSE 250 488
162 Lucas FTSE 250 1,700
163 M&G FTSE 250 965
164 Macallan Glenlivet FTSE 250 197
165 MAI FTSE 250 1,135
166 Marks & Spencer FTSE 100 12,325
167 Marley FTSE 250 406
168 Marston Thompson & Evershed FTSE 250 292
169 McKechnie FTSE 250 445
170 Medeva FTSE 250 686
171 Menzies J FTSE 250 305
172 MEPC FTSE 250 1,624
173 Mersey Docks and Harbour FTSE 250 371
174 Meyer FTSE 250 472
175 MFI Furniture FTSE 250 955
176 Midlands Electricity FTSE 250 1,447
177 Mirror Group FTSE 250 789
178 ML Laboratories FTSE 250 660
179 Monument Oil and Gas FTSE 250 414
180 Morgan Crucible FTSE 250 876
181 Morrison WM FTSE 250 1,136
182 National Power FTSE 100 4,933
183 NatWest FTSE 100 11,778
184 Next FTSE 250 1,707
185 NFC FTSE 250 1,076
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92 Diploma FTSE 250 232
93 Dixons FTSE 250 1,664
94 East Midlands Electricity FTSE 250 1,331
95 ED&F Man FTSE 250 411
96 Electrocomponents FTSE 250 1,468
97 EMAP FTSE 250 1,136
98 English China Clays FTSE 250 986
99 Enterprise Oil FTSE 100 1,883
100 Eurotherm FTSE 250 486
101 Eurotunnel FTSE 250 736
102 Fairey FTSE 250 504
103 Famell Electronics FTSE 250 859
104 Fine Art Developments FTSE 250 343
105 First Leisure FTSE 250 272
106 FKI FTSE 250 884
107 Forte FTSE 100 3,761
108 Gartmore FTSE 250 505
109 GEC FTSE 100 9,903
110 General Accident FTSE 100 3,179
111 General Cable FTSE 250 423
112 GKN FTSE 100 2,820
113 Glaxo Wellcome FTSE 100 32,071
114 Glynwed FTSE 250 819
115 Granada FTSE 100 6,071
116 Grand Metropolitan FTSE 100 9,418
117 GRE FTSE 100 2,356
118 Great Portland FTSE 250 566
119 Greenalls FTSE 250 1,734
120 Guinness FTSE 100 9,479
121 GUS FTSE 100 7,060
122 Halma FTSE 250 452
123 Hambros FTSE 250 352
124 Hammerson FTSE 250 964
125 Hanson FTSE 100 10,613
126 Harrisons & Crosfield FTSE 250 1,059
127 Hays FTSE 250 1,494
128 Hazlewood Foods FTSE 250 240
129 Hepworth FTSE 250 727
130 Hewden Stuart FTSE 250 379
131 Hickson FTSE 250 151
132 Highland Distilleries FTSE 250 429
133 Hillsdown Holdings FTSE 250 1,237
134 House of Fraser FTSE 250 414
135 Howden FTSE 250 201
136 HSBC FTSE 100 28,234
137 Iceland FTSE 250 414
138 ICI FTSE 100 5,820
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45 British Land FTSE 250 1,702
46 British Steel FTSE 100 3,419
47 British Telecom FTSE 100 22,141
48 British Vita FTSE 250 433
49 Brixton Estates FTSE 250 402
50 Brown N Group FTSE 250 387
51 Bryant FTSE 250 296
52 BSkyB FTSE 100 6,843
53 BTP FTSE 250 484
54 BTR FTSE 100 12,257
55 Bunzl FTSE 250 848
56 Burford FTSE 250 646
57 Burmah Castrol FTSE 100 1,996
58 Burton FTSE 250 1,858
59 Cable & Wireless FTSE 100 9,571
60 Cadbury Schweppes FTSE 100 5,323
61 Caledonia Investments FTSE 250 593
62 Calor Group FTSE 250 418
63 CAMAS FTSE 250 239
64 Capital Radio FTSE 250 420
65 Caradon FTSE 250 1,307
66 Carlton FTSE 100 2,415
67 Charter FTSE 250 734
68 Chelsfield FTSE 250 287
69 Christian Salvesen FTSE 250 790
70 Christies International FTSE 250 328
71 Chubb Security FTSE 250 913
72 Coats Viyella FTSE 250 1,336
73 Cobham FTSE 250 468
74 Commercial Union FTSE 100 4,129
75 Compass FTSE 250 1,500
76 Cookson Group FTSE 100 1,953
77 Cordiant FTSE 250 483
78 Courtaulds FTSE 100 1,795
79 Courtaulds Textiles FTSE 250 433
80 Cowie FTSE 250 520
81 Cray Electronics FTSE 250 975
82 Croda International FTSE 250 459
83 Daily Mail and General Trust FTSE 250 1,358
84 Dalgety FTSE 250 1,231
85 Danka Business Systems FTSE 250 1,192
86 David S Smith FTSE 250 901
87 Dawson FTSE 250 217
88 De La Rue FTSE 100 1,580
89 Delta FTSE 250 578
90 Devro FTSE 250 423
91 DFS Furniture FTSE 250 425
Appendix H: Interviews
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Through one-to-one interviews qualitative research was undertaken involving 120 subjects, 
comprising around one-third each of: company directors and senior executives; directors and 
senior fund managers in fund management organisations; regulatory and policy and opinion- 
forming organisations. All but six of these interviews took place in the UK, the others in New 
York. A list of all those interviewed, their titles and organisations at the time of interviewing 
is included in Appendix I.
A Objectives
The objectives of these interviews were to provide answers to the following:
1) What aspects of fund management influence the relationship between the institutional 
investor and listed company and how are these factors changing?
2) How do the information flows that take place between fund managers and the 
directors of listed companies influence their relationship?
3) What other factors influence the approach taken by a fund manager towards a 
company about whose performance it is concerned?
4) When a fund manager actively intervenes in the future of a company, how is this 
undertaken and what are the issues involved?
B Accessing an Elite
It was crucial to this research to access directors and senior managers of companies and fund 
management organisations actively involved in managing the relationship between the two - 
and not executives removed from the process.
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The approach I adopted was one of'networking' and not random selection. The first stage of 
this process was to write to a group of around 30 personal contacts who I thought might 
know someone in my target group well enough to support an introduction. Around ten 
friends, business contacts and former colleagues were able to help. I provided them with 
information about my study, and in most cases they suggested that I sent this same 
information to their own contacts with their endorsement.
With this material I also enclosed a copy of a paper I co-authored for the Social Market 
Foundation (Gaved & Goodman 1992) on 'Deeper Share Ownership'. This described some of 
the trends reviewed in Chapter 3 and a number of 'social market' based policy 
recommendations.
The endorsement of a mutual personal contact, enclosing a copy of the above paper and 
writing on 'LSE notepaper all contributed to my success in arranging these and subsequent 
interviews1. The first interviews took place in May and June 1993 and set the pattern for 
'networking' my way to interview subjects with whom I felt that I had little hope of success 
through direct personal contact.
The majority of interview subjects suggested by the end of their interview and of their own 
accord the names of other people 'I should speak to'. In a small number of cases I specifically 
asked for this sort of help; in only four or five cases was it directly refused - and in a few 
others I decided not to ask for further help. Overall, around three-quarters of interviews 
resulted in the offer of further contacts, should I need them; in practice, and partly to bring the 
interviewing programme to a conclusion by the end of 1993, I ceased to try to elicit new 
contacts after the end of October 1993, which corresponded with my having carried out 
interviews at 15 out of the top UK fund managers (the final interview in 1993 being with 
Mercury Asset Management, I also took the opportunity to conduct a double interview at 
AMP Asset Management in April 1994).
1 Around 150 potential interview subjects in the UK were contacted through the networking process 
described. Of these, ten could not be arranged for logistical reasons so m y success rate was around 
114/140, or over 80%.
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This networking process was not entirely random. Researching the interests (eg other 
directorships, membership of policy and opinion forming organisations) of my interview 
subjects helped me plan their interview and identify who they would probably know well 
enough to help me to another interview.
At the end of my research programme I had interviewed 38 directors (Executive and Non­
executive) and senior executives of the companies in this universe.
Other interviews and mutiple non-executive directorships meant that I interviewed 
directors (executive and non-executive) of 99 listed companies.
C Conducting the Interviews
The objectives of the interviews are set out above. In the letters I sent to potential subjects I
also said that I would seek to canvas their views about:
• The structural changes that are taking place in the ownership of large quoted companies.
• Changes in corporate relationships with different types of shareholder.
•  The potential and practical impact of the changes in institutional ownership, voting and
investment strategy that are already starting to take place in the USA, Europe and the UK.
This list provided sufficient scope for my interview subjects to establish that 1) they would be 
leading the interview (not me) and 2) we would be discussing the areas which they most 
wanted to talk about. The advance letter also established that the interviews would not be 
recorded, although I would make notes.
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The reason for not using a tape recorder was that I felt that the interview subject would be 
more relaxed and able to talk about 'sensitive' subjects which would inevitably arise (if an 
interview went well)2. This strategy was endorsed by the quality of the interviews that I was 
able to undertake.
In my initial letter I had suggested an interview of 30 minutes; on the basis that anything less 
would sound trivial, 45 minutes may have sounded as if the interview was too structured and 
an hour too presumptive. In practice, few interviews lasted less than an hour; most taking 
between a few minutes and a quarter of an hour more. The minimum length of interview was 
30 minutes, the maximum nearly two hours.
Most of the people I interviewed were relatively relaxed about how much time they had 
available; how long they spent with me appeared to substantially depend on how interesting 
they found the interview and whether they were personally comfortable with me as an 
interviewer.
Working with company chairman and chief executives of major companies at this level is very 
demanding of the interviewer; for my research purposes I needed to cover as much of my 
agenda as possible - but to keep them interested I had to play to theirs.
Taking notes facilitated this process, as well as demonstrating that I was taking what they said 
veiy seriously; I was able to easily refer back to a previous comment in order to 'tie things 
together1; this often helped pin down a third point - the one I was really trying to research. 
Two other techniques helped the interviewing process:
• Not being afraid to ask simple questions. This approach seems to works like cracking a 
nut; at the right stage of an interview it is possible to get to the core of an issue from a 
very simple angle.
2 Including for example: insider dealing by market makers; recent takeovers; personal experiences during 
corporate reconstructions; investment strategy o f competing fund managers; failures o f regulatory 
authorities; personal networking amongst senior fund managers.
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• Not pursuing a subject beyond the subject's competence; a point at which they may feel 
that the questioning has become repetitive and the interview uninteresting. Rescuing an 
interview from a dead end can be very difficult; I discovered that the less it fell to the 
subject like an interview the more material I obtained.
The scope of the interviews was relatively broad, particularly with senior fund managers and 
company directors with a number of non-executive directorships. Interviews with, for 
example, more junior fund managers or investor relations managers were usually 'narrower' in 
focus but a lot more detailed with reference to the practicalities of company fund manager 
relationships.
D Analysis
I either typed up interview notes directly or dictated them on to tape for a helper to type. 
Interview summaries on average amounted to around 1,200 words, although were generally 
longer for fund managers as the subject matter was often more complex and varied than that 
obtained in company interviews.
The summary for each interview was organised into paragraphs. These were then:
• prefixed with initials to identify the person interviewed,
• allocated a code summarising its subject matter,
and then aggregated with similarly coded paragraphs from others in the same (because the 
same subject may arise more than once in an interview) and other interviews.
The aggregated interview notes were then used as the basis for the analysis described in 
Chapters 4, 5,6 and 7.
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Appendix I: Interview Subjects
Mr Rowley Ager 
Mr John Ainsworth
Mr Sandy Anson 
Mr Nigel Atkinson 
Mr Ralph Axford 
Mr Peter Barnes Wallis 
Mrs Elisa Bayer 
Mr Nicholas Beale 
Dr Carolyn Brancato 
Mr Alan Bowkett 
Mr Donald Butcher 
Sir Adrian Cadbury
Mr David Cairns
Mr Jonathan Charkham
Mr Richard 
Chevenix-T rench
Mr Alan Clements 
Mr James L Cochrane
Sir Brian Corby 
Mr Michael Cormack 
Mr Bob Cowell
Director 
Fund Manager
Policy Unit 
Head of Listings 
Pension Fund Manager 
Investor Relations Manager 
Associate Director 
Project Coordinator 
Research Director 
ChiefExecutive 
Chairman 
Chairman
Secretary-General 
Former Advisor 
Director 
Chairman
Senior Vice President, 
Research & Planning
Chairman
Investment Secretary 
Partner
Tesco
Hill Samuel Investment 
Management Group
Institute of Directors
Stock Exchange (London)
Trafalgar House pic
Rolls Royce pic
Gerrard Vivian Gray
SCITEB
The Conference Board
Berisford International pic
UK Shareholders Ass.
Committee on the Financial 
Aspects of Corporate 
Governance
International Accounting 
Standards Committee
Bank of England
Barings International 
Investment Management
David S Smith (Holdings)
New York Stock Exchange 
Prudential Corporation pic 
Scottish Equitable 
Makinson Cowell
Mr Andrew Curtis 
Mr Charles Curtis
Mr Job Curtis 
Mr Iain Dale 
Mr Ged R Davis
Mr Richard Davis 
Mr Pete Deighton 
Mr Roger Dickinson 
Mr Mike Doherty 
Mr Tony Dye 
Mr Neil Dunford
Mr Ralph Edmonson 
Sir John Egan 
Mr Ken Fenlon 
Mr Brian Fidler 
Mr Kennedy C Foster 
Mr Valentine Furness
Mr Clive Gilcrest 
Mr Richard Giordano 
Mr S Green
Mr Ray Haines
Mr Martin Hall
Director
Director
Fund Manager
Chairman
Head of Group 
Investor Relations
Director
Engineering Research/Sales 
Group Company Secretary 
Chairman
Deputy Chief Executive 
Deputy Chairman
Investor Relations Manager 
Chief Executive 
Investment Manager
i
Finance Director
Secretary
Director
Managing Director 
Deputy Chairman 
Managing Director
Director
Head of Public Policy 
& External Relations
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Nat West Stockbrokers
Morgan Grenfell Asset 
Management
Henderson TR
Dale Electric International
Shell Limited 
Fulcrum Research 
Smith New Court 
Anglian Water 
Norcros
UBS Asset Management
Morgan Grenfell 
Asset Management
BAT Industries
BAA pic
Scottish Provident 
Christian Salvesen pic 
Royal Bank of Scotland 
SBC
Portfolio Management 
Bestrustees
Grand Metropolitan pic
Fraser Green 
Fund Management
Lloyds
Investment Managers 
Stock Exchange
Sir Christopher Harding 
Mr Mike Hart
Mr Andrew Hartley 
Ms Jane Henderson
Mr Gavin Hepburn 
Mr Paul Heward 
Mr David Hurst-Brown 
Mr John Jackson 
Mr Blenyth Jenkins
MrHugh Jenkins
Mr Bill Johnston 
Mr Peter Jones 
Dr Henry Kaufman 
Mr Brian Kent 
Mr Mike Keohane 
Mr A Ketteringham 
Ms Lesley Knox
Mr Oscar Lewisohn 
Mr Colin Lever 
Mr David Lowe
Mr Geoffrey Madrell 
Mr John Mackinson
Chairman
Chairman
Portfolio Manager 
Fund Manager
Chairman
Investor Relations Manager 
Executive Director 
Chairman 
Director,
Corporate Governance 
Chief Executive
Director
Head of Research
President
Chairman
Investor Relations Manager 
Director of Public Affairs 
Director
Deputy Chairman 
Senior Partner 
Assistant Director
Chief Executive 
Partner
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BET
Foreign & Colonial 
Investment Management
Scottish Equitable
Life Association 
of Scotland
Fifelndmar
National Power
S G Warburg
Mishcon de Reya
Institute of Directors
Prudential 
Portfolio Managers
NYSE
Gerrard Vivian Gray
Henry Kaufman & Co
Staveley Industries
Scottish Hydro-Electric
TSB Group pic
Kleinwort Benson 
Investment Management
S G Warburg
Bacon & Woodrow
Singer & Friedlander 
Investment Management
Proshare
Makinson Cowell
Mr John Mazoni 
Mr Jeremy Marshall 
Mr John Martin 
Mr Graham Mason 
Mr John McLachlan 
Mr Colin Mitchell-Rose 
Mr Gerry Mortimer 
Mr Paul Myners
Dr Sandy Naim
Mr Colin Nicholl 
Mr Peter O'Brien 
Dr A ODochartaigh 
Mr Rod ODonohue 
Mr Gavin Oldham 
Mr Danny O'Shea 
Mr D Bruce Pattullo 
Mr Mark Phelps
Dr David Potter 
Mr Julian Potter
Mr Scott Prentice
Mr Ashley Rayfield 
Mr Robert Reiner
Group IR Manager 
Chief Executive 
Head of Investment 
Director, Corporate Affairs 
Investment Director 
Chairman 
Associate Director 
Chairman
Investment Director
Director, UK Investments 
Head of Investor Relations 
Director of Communication 
Finance Director 
Chief Executive 
Research Director 
Governor & Group CEO 
Fund Manager
Chairman & CEO
Secretary General 
Committee
Senior Investor 
Relations Executive
Investor Relations Manager
Vice President
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BP International 
De La Rue 
BP Pension Fund 
CBI
United Friendly Insurance 
Craig & Rose 
Smiths Industries 
Gartmore
Investment Managers 
Templeton
Investment Management
AMP Asset Management
Barclays Bank
Bass
Inchcape
The Share Centre
M&G Group
Bank of Scotland
Kleinwort Benson 
Investment Management
Psion
Institutional Shareholders
National Westminster Bank 
BT
Scudder Stevens Clark
Mr Richard Regan Manager, 
Investment Affairs
Mr John Rogers Secretary,
Investment Committee
Mr Christopher Roshier Director
Mr A Ross Goobey Chief Executive
Mr David Rough Investment Director
Ms Nina Salimbeni Fund Manager
Mr Mike Sandland Chief Investment Manager
Mr Geoff Saunders Fund Manager
Sir Allen Sheppard Chairman & CEO
Mr Robert E Sherby Comptroller
Ms Anne Simpson Joint Managing Director
Mr Humphrey Smeeton Director
Mr George Sofianos Director,
Research & Planning
Dr Anthony Spiro Head of Investor Relations
Mr Colin St Johnson Managing Director
Mr George Stuart Clark Director
Mr Christopher Storey Company Secretary
Mr Graham Sweetman Finance Director
Mr Stuart Tarrant Group Finance Director
Mr Martin Taylor Chief Executive
Mr Martin Taylor Joint Vice-Chairman
Ms L Paige Thompson MD; Domestic Listings
Sir Peter Thompson Life President
Association of British 
Insurers (ABI)
National Association of 
Pension Funds (NAPF)
European Capital
Postel
Legal & General 
Lazard Freres 
Norwich Union 
Standard Life 
GrandMet 
AIG
PIRC Limited 
Ocean Trading
NYSE 
Tompkins 
Pro Ned
European Capital 
Vaux
Morgan Crucible
Sedgwick Group
Courtaulds Textiles pic
Hanson
NYSE
NFC
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Mr Francis Tomlinson Associate Director, 
Marketing
Nomura Capital 
Management (UK)
Mr Mike Trippitt Group Finance Controller TSB Group pic
Prof. David Tweedie Chairman Accounting Standards Board
Mr Stuart Valentine Director of Research Proshare
Dr Caroline Vaughan ChiefExecutive Newmarket Venture Capital
Dr Philip Ward Director Investor Relations SmithKline Beecham
Mr John Ward Controller, UK Investments AMP Asset Management
Mr Brian Watkins Finance Director John Mowlem & Co pic
Mr G. Weingarten Partner Goldman Sachs
Mr Brian Winterflood Managing Director Winterflood Securities
Mr Andy Wrathall Public Affairs Executive British Aerospace
Sir Ian Wrigglesworth Director Crabtree pic
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Appendix J . l :  Summary of Case History companies
Company Resigning CEO Announcement TSR
CH. 1 Cable & Wireless James Ross 21-Nov-95 7
CH.2 Kingfisher Alan Smith 27-Jan-95 -22
CH.3 Bradford Property Trust John Burgess 28-Apr-95 -23
CH.4 Calor Group Howard Robinson 07-Nov-95 3
CH. 5 Lloyds Chemists Peter Lloyd 13-Jun-95 -45
CH.6 News International Gus Fischer 16-Mar-95 -20
CH.7 Powell Duffryn WG Andrews 18-Jul-95 -23
CH. 8 Hickson International Dennis Kerrison 06-Nov-95 -26
CH.9 Kenwood Appliances Tim Parker 29-Sep-95 -16
CH. 10 McDonnell Information Jerry Causley 15-Aug-95 -52
CH. 11 Mowlem (John) John Marshall 19-Oct-95 -31
CH. 12 WEW Group Peter Carr 07-Nov-95 -49
CH. 13 Biotrace International Brian Levett 24-Nov-95 -42
CH. 14 Central Motor Auctions George Inch 05-Sep-95 -27
CH. 15 Hornby Group Keith Ness 20-Oct-95 -23
CH. 16 Intercare Group Peter Cowan 18-Jul-95 -56
CH. 17 JLI Group Graham Scott 19-Jun-95 -35
CH 18 MR Data Michael Elliott 25-Apr-95 -44
CH. 19 OMI International Gil Williams 02-Mar-95 -21
CH.20 Platignum Rob Campbell 08-Aug-95 -73
CH.21 Raine Peter Parkin 10-Apr-95 -45
CH.22 Rhino Group Terry Morris 09-May-95 -79
CH.23 United Carriers Allan Binks 30-Jun-95 -31
CH. 24 Upton & Southern Jeffrey Gould 18-Apr-95 -78
Average -35.5
Table J.2 Analysis of CEO resignations FTSE 100 companies)
Resigning CEO 
(Announced)
Type Timing/Replacement
Cable & W ireless James Ross 
21 Nov 95
Term Immediate
(Richard Brown/1 July 96/H&R Block)
General Accident WN Robertson 
26 April 95
Term Advance/Successor/Intemal
(RA Scott/DepCEO/31 Dec 95)
Grand Metropolitan George Bull 
17 Oct 95
Chair Advance/Successor/Intem al 
(John M cGrath/DivExD/1 A pril 96)
K ingfisher Alan Smith 
27 Jan 95
Term Im mediate/Successor/Intemal
(Geof Mulcahy/Exec Chairman)
Rank Organisation M ichael Gifford 
8 Nov 95
Term A dvance/Successor/Extem al 
(Andrew Teare/10 A pril 96/ECC)
Rolls Royce Terence Harrison 
21 Dec 95
Term Advance/Successor/Intemal
(John Rose/DivExD/30 April 96)
W olseley Jeremy Lancaster 
24 Oct 95
Term Advance/Successor/I ntem a 1
(John Young/DepCEO/1 August 96)
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Table J.3 Analysis of CEO resignations from FTSE Mid-250 companies
Resigning CEO 
(Announced)
Type Timing/Replacement
Bradford Property Trust John Burgess 
28 April 95
Term Immediate/Successor/Intemal 
(David Baker & Tim Watts/ExDs)
Calor Group Howard Robinson 
7 Nov 95
Term Immediate/Successor/Intemal 
(John Harris/Operations Director)
Halma David Barber 
2 Aug 95
Split Immediate/Successor/Intemal 
(Stephen O 'Shea/Deputy CEO)
Lloyds Chemists Peter Lloyd 
13 June 95
Term Immediate/Successor/Intemal 
(Michael Ward/Finance Director)
News International Gus Fischer 
16 March 95
Term Immediate/Successor/Intemal 
(William O/Neill -  until 24 Nov 95)
Powell Duffiyn Bill Andrews 
18 July 95
Term Immediate/Successor/Intemal 
(Barry Hartiss/Deputy CEO)
Waste Management Edwin Falkman 
25 July 94
Chair Immediate/Successor/Extemal 
(Joseph Holsten)
Table J.4: Analysis of CEO resignations (Smal erCap companies)
Resigning CEO Type Timing/Replacement
Asprey
(Acquired Nov 95)
Naim Attallah 
11 Aug 95
Term Advance
(Company
Austin Reed C Evans 
30 Nov 95
Chair Advance/Successor/Intemal 
(Christopher Thompson/FD/8 June 96)
British Data Man. Stephen Crown 
15 Sep 95
Split Advance/Successor/Extemal 
(Ian Pirie/Oct 96)
Cordiant Charles Scott 
11 Jul 95
Chair Immediate/Successor/Extemal 
(Bob Seelert)
Costain Peter Costain 
27 Sept 95
Deputy
Chair
Immediate/Successor/Intemal 
(Alan Lovell/Finance Director)
Heath (CE) Peter Presland 
16 Nov 95
ExD Immediate/Successor/Intemal 
(John MacKenzie Green/ExD)
Hickson Int. Dennis Kerrison 
6 Nov 95
Term Immediate
(David Wilbraham/Feb 1996/Laporte)
Kenwood Tim Parker 
29 Sep 95
Term Immediate/Successor/Intemal 
(Tim Beech/Finance Director)
McDonnell Information Jerry Causley 
15 Aug 95
Term Immediate 
(John Klein)
Meggitt Kenneth Coates 
4 Dec 95
Split Immediate/Successor/Intemal 
(Michael Stacey/Divisional Director)
Mowlem John Marshall 
19 Oct 95
Term Immediate/Successor/Intemal 
(John Gains/Executive Director)
Thorntons John Thornton 
6 Nov 95
Split Advance/Successor/Extemal 
(Roger Pafford/Jan 96)
WEW Group Peter Carr 
7 Nov 95
Term Immediate/Successor/Intemal 
(Richard Boland/Group MD)
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Table J.5 Analysis of CEO resignations (Fledgling companies)
Resigning CEO 
Announced
Type Timing/Replacement
Avesco David Murray 
17 May 95
Split Immediate/Successor/Extemal
(David Nicholson/? ? ? ? ?)
Biotrace Brian Levett 
24 Nov 95
Term Immediate
(James Keir/Feh 96)
Central Motor Auctions 
(AcquiredAug 96)
George Inch 
5 Sep 95
Term Immediate „ 
(Role>Brian Carter/Group MD)
Coda Group Rodney Potts 
12 June 95
Split Immediate
(Robert Brown/FD/12 June 95)
Conrad Riblat Peter Goldsmith 
7 June 95
ExD Immediate/Successor/Intemal 
(Philip Lewis/ExD)
Cornwell Parker Martin Jourdan 
25 Oct 95
Split Immediate/Successor/Extemal 
(James Moore/? ? ?)
FII Group Monty Sumray 
31 Jan 95
Split Immediate/Successor/Extemal 
(Charles Ryder/Claremont)
Hampson Industries Ian Walker 
24 July 95
ExD Immediate
(Christopher Davies/1 Feb 96)
Hornby Group Keith Ness 
20 Oct 95
Term Immediate
(Role >ExecChairman/Malcolm Thomas)
Intercare Peter Cowan 
18 July 95
Term Immediate (following buyout)
(John Parker/4 Dec 95/Barr & Wallace)
JLI Graham Scott 
22 Feb 95
Term Immediate
(Role >ExecChairman/Yoav Gottesman)
Lovell (YD Robert Sellier 
23 Oct 95
Term Advance/Successor/Extemal 
(David Heppell/1 Dec 95/G Wimpey)
MR Data Group Michael Elliott 
25 April 95
Term Immediate
(Role>ExecChairman/C.olin Haylock)
OMI International Gil Williams 
2 March 95
Term Immediate
(Role >ExecChairman/Richard Duggan)
Platignum Rob Campbell 
8 Aug 95
Term Immediate
(Role>ExecC.hairman/Nick Smith)
PWS Holdings Lord Pearson 
20 Jan 95
Split
/
Immediate/Successor/Intemal 
(Peter Smith/DivDir/20 Jan 95)
Raine Peter Parkin 
10 April 95
Term Immediate
(Roy Barber/Chairman)
Rhino Group
(Electronic Boutique)
Teny Norris 
9 May 95
Term Immediate/Successor/Extemal 
(J Steinbrecher/Electronics Boutique)
Ross Group Noel Hayes 
5 April 95
Split Immediate/Successor/Extemal 
(Marcus Evans/THG Worldwide)
Sycamore Holdings 
(Deans Holdings)
Andrew Johnson 
31 Jan 95
Term Immediate
(Role > C.hairman/Lars A hrell)
United Carriers Alan Binks 
30 June 95
Term Immediate
(Role>Group MD/John Toyne)
Upton & Southern Jeffrey Gould 
18 April 95
Term Immediate
(Role>ExecChairman/Ron Trenter)
Appendix J.6: Advance announcements of CEO resignation
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Company Resigning CEO Announcement TSR
1 Asprey Naim Attallah 11-Aug-95 -74
2 Austin Reed Group C Evans 30-Nov-95 -17
3 Avesco David Murray n/a -29
4 British Data Management Stephen Crown n/a -28
5 Coda Group Rodney Potts 12-Jun-95 -64
6 Conrad Ritblat Group Peter Goldsmith 07-Jun-95 -42
7 Cordiant Charles Scott 11-Jul-95 -32
8 Cornwell Parker n/a 25-Oct-95 -59
9 Costain Peter Costain 27-Sep-95 -61
10 General Accident WN Robertson 26-Apr-9 5 -25
11 Hampson Industries Ian Walker 24-Jul-95 -23
12 Heath (CE) Peter Presland 16-Nov-95 -36
13 Lovell (YJ) Robert Sellier 23-Oct-95 -58
14 PWS Holdings n/a 20-Jan-95 -38
15 Ross Group Noel Hayes 05-Apr-95 -64
16 Waste Management Int. Edwin Falkman 25-Jul-95 -53
17 Bellwinch Ray Davies 27-Jun-95 -39
18 British Telecom Ian Vallance 24-Nov-95 -15
19 Hambros n/a 15-Nov-95 -22
20 Huntingdon International David Anslow 08-Feb-95 -70
21 OIS Intern. Inspection n/a 19-Jan-95 -68
22 Rathbone Brothers Michael Ingall 17-Feb-95 -20
23 Sutcliffe Speakman n/a 06-Apr-95 -44
24 Sycamore Holdings Andrew Johnson 19-May-95 -97
25 Wembley Brian Wolfson 11-Apr-95 -74
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Appendix J.7:
Companies < £10 million capitalisation during 12 months before announcement
Company Resigning CEO Announcement TSR
1 Billam n/a n/a -42
2 Booth Industries Robert Booth 20-Nov-95 -39
3 Campari International Kit Maunell 24-Feb-95 -64
4 Campbell & Armstrong J Naylor 17-Nov-95 -41
5 Craig & Rose Colin Mitchell-Rose 30-Oct-95 -43
6 Daniels (S) Peter Daniels 03-May-9 5 -50
7 Davies (DY) Martyn Kemp 06-Oct-95 -59
8 EBC Group Bert Cockroft 22-Nov-95 -35
9 Excalibur Group Arthur Church 24-Jul-95 -34
10 Kynoch Group Kevin D'Silva 12-Jan-95 -31
11 Lyles (S) John Lyles 16-Nov-95 -18
12 Magnolia Group Rodney Daffern 31-Mar-95 -37
13 Martin International n/a 13-Jun-95 -19
14 Paramount n/a 12-Jan-95 -15
15 Penna Peter Needham 06-Dec-95 -31
16 PEX Peter Bailey 31-May-95 -32
17 Prime People n/a 25-Jul-95 -62
18 Quiligotti James Walton 13-Apr-95 -17
19 Rossmont Stanley Assiss 29-Dec-95 -21
20 Select Industries Edward VanDyk 10-Jul-95 -47
21 Victoria Carpet Michael Allman 29-Dec-95 -40
22 Westminster Scaffolding TB Greenham 03-Feb-95 -72
Average -38.6
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Appendix J.8: Companies with 1995 TSR > -15%
Company Resigning CEO Announcement TSR
1 Acorn Sam Wauchope 2 8-Jul-95 27
2 Allen Donald Geenhalgh 04-Apr-95 5
3 Amstrad David Rogers 28-Dec-95 93
4 BICC n/a n/a -5
5 BNB Resources David Norman 31-Jul-95 -8
6 BOC Group Alexander Dyer 27-Jul-95 2
7 Boddington Group Hubert Reid n/a -7
8 Bowthorpe John Westhead 15-May-95 3
9 Breedon John Shields 05-Apr-95 -14
10 British Airways Colin Marshall 03-Nov-95 30
11 British Dredging Michael Brown 10-Apr-95 -14
12 BTR Alan Jackson 19-Jan-95 -9
13 Bum Stewart Distillers Bill Thornton n/a 17
14 Burtonwood Brewery JG Dutton Forshaw 23-Mar-95 1
15 Cable & Wireless James Ross 21-Nov-95 7
16 CALA Tony Kelley 24-Oct-95 4
17 Calor Group Howard Robinson 07-Nov-95 3
18 Carlclo Engineering John Ewart 19-Jun-95 1
19 Chamberlin & Hill John Bather 30-Mar-95 -10
20 Compco Holdings RA Nadler 02-Jun-95 -5
21 Cosalt EA Brian 20-Jan-95 5
22 English China Clays A Teare 18-Dec-95 8
23 ETAM Rodney East 27-Apr-9 5 -1
24 Evans Halshaw Arthur Dale 06-Dec-95 13
25 Expamet International Alex Orr 27-Jan-95 37
26 Farringford n/a 16-Nov-95 227
27 FH Group Monty Sumray 31-Jan-95 -14
28 Frogmore Estates Phillip Davies 28-Apr-9 5 -12
29 GEI International Michael Hale 30-Aug-95 41
30 Gerrard & National Andrew Jones 29-Jun-95 12
31 Gowrings n/a 09-Jan-95 31
32 Granada Gerry Robinson 03-Oct-95 25
33 Grand Metropolitan George Bull 17-Oct-95 -1
34 Halma DavidBarber 02-Aug-95 -8
35 Helene Norman Fetterman 19-May-95 -6
36 Henderson Administration Jeremy Edwards 30-Mar-95 10
37 Hicking Pentecost John Carlsen 15-Feb-95 2
38 EPECO Holdings Christopher Johnson 15-Mar-95 17
39 Jacks (William) n/a 17-Nov-95 5
40 Kalamazoo Michael Langmore 22-Feb-95 13
41 Laporte Ken Minton 23-Aug-95 10
42 Lincat Group Martin Craddock 17-Nov-95 33
43 Lister & Co Martin Parker 15-Aug-9 5 0
44 Locker (Thomas) Peter Douglas 20-Dec-95 7
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45 London Electricity Roger Urwin 08-Aug-95 18
46 Lookers Ken Martindale 18-Jan-95 42
47 Low & Bonar Jim Leng 23-Aug-95 34
48 Macdonald Martin n/a 28-Feb-95 80
49 McLeod Russel Holdings n/a 21-Nov-95 40
50 Meggitt n/a 04-Dec-95 2
51 Metalrax Group Eric Moore 30-Jan-95 7
52 Molins Peter Greenwood 26-Apr-95 -11
53 More O'Ferrall Russell Gore-Andrews 05-Oct-95 13
54 MTL Instruments Barrie Marson 24-Jul-95 10
55 Nurdin & Peacock n/a 01-May-95 -8
56 Oliver Group Graham Dunn 22-Feb-95 142
57 Osprey Communications n/a 10-Jan-95 4
58 Prestwick Holdings n/a 28-Sep-95 4
59 Prudential Corporation Nick Newmarch 21-Mar-95 -8
60 Queensborough Hold. n/a 03-Nov-95 -13
61 Rank Organisation Andrew Gifford 08-Nov-95 10
62 Rea Brothers International Tony Hall 04-Apr-95 12
63 Rolls Royce Terence Harrison 21-Dec-95 0
64 Ropner Max Gladwyn 05-Oct-95 9
65 Rotork Tom Eassie 27-Mar-95 1
66 Sanderson Electronics n/a 16-Nov-95 43
67 Scholl Neil Franchino 05-Sep-95 14
68 Scottish Radio Holdings James Gordon 30-Nov-95 27
69 Secure Retirement A Savery 15-Sep-95 14
70 Spandex Charles Dobson 16-Mar-95 74
71 St James Beach Hotels Richie Alleyne 07-Dec-95 25
72 Tams (John) Group n/a 12-Sep-95 25
73 Tesco David Malpas 21-Nov-95 38
74 Thorntons n/a 06-Nov-95 -13
75 TI Group Christopher Lewinton 20-Mar-95 -1
76 Trade Indemnity Group Victor Jacob 20-Jan-95 26
77 Trinity Holdings GH Hollyhead 28-Sep-95 19
78 Triplex Lloyd Graham Lockyer 11-Jul-95 -8
79 Watts, Blake, Beame John Pike 01-May-95 -9
80 Waverley Mining Finance n/a 21-Nov-95 18
81 Wolseley Jeremy Lancaster 24-Oct-95 -3
Average 15.5
Appendix K: 
Case Histories of CEO resignations
1. Cable & Wireless
2. Kingfisher
3. Bradford Property Trust
4. Calor Group
5. Lloyds Chemists
6. News International
7. Powell Dyffiyn
8. Hickson International
9. Kenwood
10. McDonnell Information Systems
11. Mowlem
12. WEW Group
13 Biotrace
14 Central Motor Auctions
15 Hornby Broup
16 Intercare
17 JLI
18 MR Data Group
19 OMI International
20 Platignum
21 Raine
22 Rhino Group
23 United Carriers
24 Upton & Southern
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Case History No. 1 C ab le  & W ireless
1. Resignation of CEO James Ross announced 21 November 1995.
2. SHAREHOLDERS
Top 10 fund 
managers
Before 
Oct 95
After 
May 96
After 
May 1996
%
Schroder 3.81 4.20 Schroder 4.20
Prudential 2.98 2.93 MAM 3.28
MAM 2.84 3.28 Prudential 2.93
Standard Life 2.08 2.27 Standard Life 2.27
BZW 1.99 2.02 BZW 2.02
L&G 1.68 1.81 L&G 1.81
Hermes 1.56 1.49 Chase 1.81
Norwich Union 1.29 1.33 Hermes 1.49
Threadneedle 1.35 1.26 Norwich Union 1.33
ESN 1.14 0.00 Royal & Sun 1.30
Total 20.72 20.59 Total 22.44
Other major shareholders: In January/February 1995 the German telecommunications 
company VEBA acquired a 10.5% stake in C&W through stockmarket purchases. This 
followed the announcement of joint-ventures agreement between VEBA and C&W.
This cross-holding remained in place during 1996 although recent announcements 
suggest that the joint-venture and shareholding agreements between the two companies 
will be unwound in 1997.
3. PRESS COMMENT
1 4  S e p t e m b e r  1 9 9 5 :  ‘Duncan Lewis, the chief executive o f Mercury Communications 
who resigned without explanation on Tuesday, had threatened to resign several times 
since joining Cable & Wireless, Mercury’s 80% owner, in 1991, according to colleagues. 
On each occasion he was talked out of it by Lord Young o f Graffham, chairman of 
C&W. But not this time. Mr Lewis, 44, quit for ‘personal reasons’ though not family or 
health reasons which everyone suspects was code for saying that he had argued with 
either Lord Young or James Ross, chief executive of C&W. After just nine months as 
boss, Mr Lewis has severed all connections with Mercury and C&W but not to join a 
competitor.’
(The Times)
1 5  S e p t e m b e r  1 9 9 5 :  ‘Mr Lewis’s departure ... [is] now seen to centre on a fundamental 
policy disagreement with the board [and] has inevitably raised questions about the logic 
of C&W’s commercial strategy, the quality o f the company’s senior management and its 
direction. ... [An] analyst said yesterday: ‘The company’s overall strategy is a mystery to 
the market’. Investors seem to share their diffidence. Although all the large institutions
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are represented among C&W’s stockholders, most have holdings which are significantly 
smaller than would be expected for a company the size of C&W. One fund manager 
explained: ‘It is difficult to be enthusiastic about C&W. There is no clear measure of 
success. Other companies steam ahead but C&W is always chopping and changing’. ... 
Mr Ross makes it clear that he has little time for City criticism of the company’s strategy. 
He believes it is tied to last year’s financial results, where profits declined after a faltering 
performance from Mercury. Pre-tax profits fell to £844 from £1 bn on a turnover of 
£5.13. Mercury - the UK’s second largest telecoms operator and BT’s largest competitor 
- had allowed its costs to run ahead of revenues.’ (Financial Times'!
17September 1995: ‘Institutional investors have expressed concern about the role of 
Lord Young, executive Chairman of Cable & Wireless, in the wake of another abrupt 
management departure this week. ... One fund manager commented: ‘If a company has a 
strategy that is not paying off, then the finger points at the chairman. I wouldn’t say that 
there was huge satisfaction with him.’ Mr Lewis was brought in to turn round Mercury, 
where profits fell last year by 16% to £203m before exceptional charges of £60m to 
cover the cost o f2,500 redundancies.’ (Independent on Sunday)
18 September 1995: ‘Cable & Wireless’s top management badly needs to re-establish its 
reputation with investors. The City’s confidence in C&W’s strategy was at a low ebb 
even before the resignation last week of Mr Duncan Lewis, chief executive of the 
group’s Mercury Communications subsidiary. ... Big shareholders and non-executive 
directors are not currently pressing for a shake-up of top management. But Lord Young, 
executive chairman, and Mr James Ross, the chief executive cannot allow the appearance 
of strategic drift to continue. They need to show not only that they know where they 
wish to take the group but also that they are making progress in getting there.’
(Financial Times)
29 September 1995: ‘Growing institutional pressure for more radical changes at Cable & 
Wireless will be strengthened by the re-emergence in the US press of a confidential 
memo by Duncan Lewis, who resigned unexpectedly as chief executive of Mercury 
earlier this month. ... the message to the markets is that C&W is going through a tough 
profits patch at the moment as a result of its involvement in a wide range of new 
ventures which will come good in the near future. But many institutions are not buying 
the ‘jam tomorrow’ argument. ... Unless Lord Young takes action to boost shareholder 
value now, including a top management reshuffle in which the City has confidence, then 
he can expect no mercy should he fail to deliver.’ (The Guardian)
17November 1995: ‘Investors have two main concerns about Cable & Wireless: 
management and strategy. Yesterday’s announcement by Lord Young that he will stand 
down as executive chairman in 15 months addresses neither worry. Now that a power 
struggle has broken o u t ... it is unclear who will be running the group or where it will be 
heading in the period before a new chairman is chosen. ... Investors are confused by 
C&W’s continual talks with different possible joint venture partners. There is also 
scepticism over the group’s much-vaunted ‘federation’, which is supposed to knit 
together its operations around the globe. But from the outside it is hard to decide 
whether Lord Young or Mr Ross bears the greater responsibility for the group’s drift or 
whether they are equally responsible. The task for the non-executive directors is to bring 
the dispute to a successful and swift conclusion.’ (Financial Times)
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19 November 1995: ‘Rarely has the boardroom of a leading British company witnessed 
such a damaging conflict. The non-executive directors and leading institutional 
shareholders are determined to bring the battle to an early close to prevent the damage 
spreading throughout the business. (Sunday Telegraph)
21 November 1995: ‘Directors spent yesterday seeking a peace formula that would leave 
a united board and pacify investors. Shareholders have become increasingly concerned 
about the group’s lack of direction, which has seen the share price fall by more than a 
fifth since disagreements between the two top directors.’ (The Guardian)
21 November 1995: ‘One City analyst said ‘Institutions want to see a new chairman who 
has a record of serving shareholders well and who would go about it in a straightforward 
way at C&W.’ (The Independent)
22 November 1995: ‘Lord Young of Graffham, chairman of Cable & Wireless since 
1991, and Mr James Ross, its chief executive, left the company yesterday after two days 
of crisis talks failed resolve a rancorous power struggle between the two men.
(Financial Times")
23 November 1995: ‘Shares in Cable & Wireless broke through their year-high yesterday 
in the wake of the ousting of Lord Young of Graffham ... and James Ross. The shares 
ended the day at 466p, up by 37p, or 8.6%. Their previous high was 449p. Analysts said 
that the shares climbed because C&W was now in a ‘no-lose’ situation. Investors think 
that the company will either be taken over or that the new executive team, which has not 
yet been appointed, will boost the value of the group.* (The Times)
4. SUMMARY
Factors Cable & Wireless
1 Profits warning/decline Yes
2 Reduction in dividend No
3 Fall in share price Yes
4 Rights issue No
5 New chairman No
6 Closures/redundancies Yes (Mercury)
7 Other factors Boardroom split between chairman & CEO
8 Shareholders involved Yes
As James Ross was CEO at the time of the agreement with VEBA it is perhaps unlikely 
that VEBA will have taken a particularly active role in forcing his resignation, and that of 
Lord Young, Chairman. These events followed public disagreements amongst members 
of the C&W board, and it is more likely that the companies’ top five or six institutional 
shareholders (each of whom had stakes of 2.0% or more) will have put pressure on the 
Chairman, CEO and other members of the board to resolve the situation. Out of these, 
the four largest shareholders (Schroder, Prudential, MAM and Standard Life) are likely 
to have played the dominant role. Given their size, it is unlikely that one of these acted as
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a ‘lead shareholder’. The most likely relationship is that o f a loose coalition, operating 
with limited coordination, but characterised by common interests.
The dispute between Chairman Lord Young and CEO James Ross was resolved by the 
co-deputy chairman Win BischofF taking the lead on the board as the most senior non­
executive director. As Young was an executive chairman, and his position was anyway 
undermined by his role in the dispute, BischofF became the d e  f a c t o  head o f the board, 
although was also viewed (Financial Times, 21 November 1995) as being closer to 
Young than Ross.
In addition to the fall in share price and profits, the major issues were a lack of 
confidence in the strategic direction o f the company and the very public boardroom split 
between Young and Ross on this issue.
Press accounts during September to November make repeated references to the views o f 
institutional investors and the pressure they were putting on the company to resolve the 
strategic and boardroom issues. The share price was reported to have risen 9% to its 
1995 high the day the resignations were announced.
| Case History No 2 Kingfisher
1. Resignation o f CEO Alan Smith announced 27 January 1995.
2. SHAREHOLDERS
Top 10 fund 
managers
Before
Feb 95
After
July 95
After
July 1995
%
MAM 8.06 9.74 MAM 9.74
Prudential 5.96 5.80 Prudential 5.80
Schroder 2.85 2.68 Schroder IM 2.68
Norwich Union 2.37 2.34 Norwich Union 2.34
Scottish Widows 2.35 2.29 PDFM 2.31
Citicorp 2.08 2 . 0 8 Scottish Widows 2.29
Standard Life 2.04 2 . 0 4 CIN 2.24
Threadneedle 1.90 1 . 9 0 BZW 2.17
Legal & General 1.80 1.82 Threadneedle 1.82
CIN 1.75 1 . 7 5 L&G 1.82
Total 31.16 32.84 Total 33.21
The two largest shareholders both before and after the resignation o f Alan Smith were 
MAM and Prudential. After his replacement by Geof Mulachy (previously Chairman), 
Prudential reduced its stake slightly but MAM increased its holding by a fifth, from just 
over 8% to just under 10%. Both the size o f its holding and subsequent action suggests 
that MAM will have taken a lead role in influencing the course o f events, with Prudential 
taking a more secondary role.
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3. PRESS COMMENT
22 January 1995: ‘Institutional investors are demanding blood at Kingfisher. They have 
seen more than £1 bn wiped from the value of their shares in the last year. They may 
have to wait until the preliminary results in March, but they do seem to want heads to 
roll. One theory is that Sir Geof Mulcahy, the executive chairman, will move more 
quickly than that, ousting his chief executive, Alan Smith, at once in order to pre-empt 
the complaints.’ (Independent on Sunday)
22 January 1995: ‘After the company’s admission of its dire trading performance 
figures last week, the chief executive, [Alan] Smith, is likely to be leaving. He was 
recruited to bring expensive retail expertise to the group, but Woolworths, where he was 
most directly involved, has responded by returning to its former status as the white 
elephant of the high street. Kingfisher’s electrical business, Comet, stunned analysts with 
the scale of its downturn. When chairman Sir Geoffrey Mulcahy does the round of his 
institutional shareholders, they will want to know who is to blame and what is being 
done to put things right. Since Smith’s stint with Kingfisher has coincided with a 
downturn in performance, the City taskmasters are unlikely to see him as the route to 
salvation.’ (Mail on Sunday)
24 January 1995: ‘Irate institutional shareholders are calling for heads to roll at 
Woolworths-to-Superdrug retailer Kingfisher, in the wake of last week’s profit warning. 
One fund manager said chairman Sir Geoffrey Mulcahy - once seen as a High Street 
visionary - should step down after the shares (down 6p to 393p) nearly halved in the past 
year.’ (Daily Main
25 January 1995: ‘Directors of Kingfisher, the beleaguered Woolworths and Comet 
retailer, are to visit institutional investors in an attempt to calm City nerves about the 
company’s performance. Kingfisher has been under mounting pressure since last week, 
when the group announced a disastrous trading statement which showed that profits at 
Woolworths would fall by a third and Comet would make a loss for the year. Nigel 
Whittaker, the corporate affairs director, insisted that the meetings were routine and 
declined to comment further before the company’s final results announcement in March.
... Some City analysts are surprised that the board is considering institutional visits when 
it has not completed its strategy review. Nick Hawkins, of UBS, said: ‘They have not 
really decided what they are going to do so what will they say? They will probably get 
shouted at.” (The Independent")
28 January 1995: ‘Non-executive directors of Kingfisher, the troubled owner of 
Woolworths, B&Q and Comet, yesterday acted to halt the City’s loss of confidence in 
the group by ousting chief executive Alan Smith and finance director James Kerr-Miur. 
Sir Geoffrey Mulcahy. ... The executive chairman ... will now revert to one of his 
former roles, as chief executive. Sir Nigel Mobbs, the non-executive deputy chairman, 
will become non-executive chairman while Kingfisher seeks someone to fill the role on a 
permanent basis. The shake-up follows a plunge in Kingfisher’s share price over the last 
year - it was the worst performing stock in the FTSE 100 index last year - and a series of 
trading disappointments.’ (Daily Telegraph")
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28 January 1995: ‘Sir Nigel Mobbs, Kingfisher’s non-executive deputy chairman, 
deserves a degree of congratulation for initiating change within the retailers boardroom. 
The move shows a welcome willingness to respond to shareholders’ disquiet ... The 5% 
bounce in the share price yesterday is a sign of investors’ relief that something at last is 
being done after a year in which the stock fell by 40%.’ (Financial Times)
28 January 1995: ‘The shake up was greeted with dismay among investing institutions, 
who were surprised that Sir Geoffrey had survived the coup. One investor said: ‘There is 
a credibility gap. There needs to be some pretty good explaining done when they come 
and see us. ... Sir Nigel Mobbs, who led the putsch and has taken over as acting 
chairman, said that shareholders would see that the right decision had been taken. He 
talked to about a dozen institutions yesterday and said they now understood the 
rationale.’ (The Guardian")
4. SUMMARY
Factors Kingfisher
1 Profits warning/decline Yes
2 Reduction in dividend No
3 Fall in share price Yes
4 Rights issue No
5 New chairman Yes (Deputy chairman)
6 Closures/redundancies No
7 Other factors Failure to address problems at Woolworths/Comet
8 Shareholders involved Yes
Deputy chairman, Sir Nigel Mobbs took the lead in reorganising the board, firing CEO 
Alan Smith and reappointing chairman Sir Geoffrey Mulachy as CEO. Although only 
deputy chairman, Mobbs became the de facto chairman and independent head o f the 
board in January 1995.
The crisis was triggered by very poor Christmas 1994 trading results from the 
Woolworths and Comet chains. These problems were seen as both strategic and as 
indicating a lack of in-depth practical retailing expertise on the board.
Press accounts during January 1995 make repeated references to the views of 
institutional investors and the pressure they were putting on the company. Immediately 
after the resignation of Smith and reappointment of Mulachy as CEO, Mobbs had 
meetings with Kingfisher’s major institutional investors in London and Scotland. The 
share price was reported as rising 5% the day the resignation of Smith was announced.
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| Case History No. 3: B rad fo rd  P ro p e rty  T ru s t
1. Resignation of CEO John Burgess announced 28 April 1995.
2. SHAREHOLDERS
Top 10 fund 
managers
Before
March 95
After
Sept 95
After
September 1995
%
Schroder 7.52 8.43 Schroder 8.43
Stanhope PF 3.26 0.00 Gartmore 2.90
BA PF 2.50 2.47 BA PF 2.47
S & F 2.34 2.32 MAM 2.39
MAM 2.13 2.39 I&S 2.33
Equitable 2.08 0.00 S & F 2.32
BZW 1.92 1.99 BZW 1.99
Cazenove 1.68 1.46 Hermes 1.64
Hermes 1.66 1.64 GA 1.59
GA 1.63 1.59 Cazenove 1.46
Total 26.72 22.29 Total 27.52
Both before and after the resignation of John Burgess, the Chairman of Bradford 
Property Trust held 13.36% of the shares and a Non-Executive Director, Mr FJ 
Reddington, a further 5.63%. The latter was described in the company’s 1995 annual 
report as ‘a farmer who has long-standing family connections with the Company’. The 
CEO resigned shortly after his 61st Birthday.
3. PRESS COMMENT
1 8  M a y  1 9 9 5 :  ‘David Baker and Tim Watts have taken over as joint managing directors 
o f Bradford Property Trust, following the retirement o f John Burgess after 18 years as 
managing director.’ (Financial Times!
1 5  J u n e  1 9 9 5 :  ‘Lower property trading income last year hit profits at Bradford Property 
Trust, the UK’s largest residential landlord. ... Bradford Property Trust has a long 
record of generating profits and dividend growth by buying old-style regulated tenancies. 
... On a discount to net assets o f 5%, Bradford looks expensive compared to 
conventional property stocks. But its impressive record o f dividend growth, reinforced 
by yesterday’s 10% increase, combined with a yield o f 4.75%, make the shares better 
value than they look’. (Financial Times)
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4. SUMMARY
Factors
1 Profits warning/decline No
2 Reduction in dividend No
3 Fall in share price No
4 Rights issue No
5 New chairman No
6 Closures/redundancies No
7 Other factors No
8 Shareholders involved No
No. 4:_______Calor Group
1. Resignation o f CEO Howard Robinson announced 7 November 1995.
2. SHAREHOLDERS
Top 10 fund 
managers
Before
Oct 95
After
May 96
After
May 96
%
M&G . 4.07 4.21 M&G 4.21
Sun Life 2.71 2.80 Sun Life 2.80
BZW 1.79 1.44 Morgan Grenfell 1.66
Hermes 1.68 1.57 Hermes 1.57
PDFM 1.43 1.34 BZW 1.49
Britannic 1.36 1.36 Britannic 1.36
ESN 1.34 0.00 PDFM 1.34
Fleming 1.21 0.09 F&C 1.34
Morgan Grenfell 1.17 1.66 Schroder 1.32
Legal & General 1.10 1.13 L&G 1.13
Total 17.86 15.60 Total 18.22
Other major shareholders: The Dutch-based energy Group SHV held a 50.04% stake 
in Calor in August 1995, which through stock market purchases gradually increased to 
around 51.6% by the end of the year. As majority shareholder with a stake over ten times 
larger than any other shareholder, the resignation of Howard Robinson will have been a 
matter for SHV alone.
3. PRESS COMMENT
1 4  S e p t e m b e r  1 9 9 5 :  ‘Calor Group, the bottled and bulk gas supplier, yesterday blamed a 
mild winter and increased commodity prices for a 16% fall in first-half profits. . Calor is 
trying to reduce its dependence on the UK bottled gas market by investing in new
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projects in Central and South America with SHV Energy, the privately owned Dutch 
group that has a controlling stake in Calor.’ (Financial Times')
8 November 1995: ‘Calor Group said Howard Robinson, its chief executive, was leaving 
the group after a profit warning wiped £47 million off its stock market value.’
(The Guardian)
8 November 1995: ‘Howard Robinson is thought to have lost out in boardroom 
differences to John Harris, managing director of Calor’s main liquid petroleum gas 
business, who will replace him at the head of the group.’ (The Independent)
8 November 1995: ‘Tension within the group is thought to have increased since April 
this year when Mr Robinson relinquished his role as managing director of Calor gas, the 
operating company in Britain and Ireland.. At that time, Mr Robinson made it clear that 
he wanted to concentrate on Calor’s expansion into overseas markets and new business 
selling mains gas, refrigerants and gas for drinks dispensers. The company, meanwhile, 
said that it was also planning to appoint a new group finance director.’ (Financial Times)
4. SUMMARY
Factors Calor Group
1 Profits warning/decline Yes
2 Reduction in dividend No
3 Fall in share price Yes
4 Rights issue No
5 New chairman No
6 Closures/redundancies No
7 Other factors Yes
8 Shareholders involved No
Press accounts suggest that CEO Howard Robinson had focused too much on 
developing the international interests of Calor (Financial Times, 8 November 1995) and 
that following the fall in 1995 (half-year) profits announced in September 1995, and a 
profit warning on 7 November 1995, was ousted from the board (Independent, 8 
November 1995).
Appendix K: Case Histories o f CEO resignations 402
Case History No. 5:_______Lloyds C hem ists
1. EVENT Resignation of CEO Peter Lloyd announced 13 June 1995.
2. SHAREHOLDERS
Top 10 fund 
managers
Before 
May 95
After 
Dec 95
After 
Dec 95
%
Baring 7.45 6.20 PDFM 6.44
Gartmore 5.57 5.09 Baring 6.20
Lloyds Abbey 5.24 5.25 Lloyds Abbey 5.25
Prudential 3.97 3.49 Gartmore 5.09
L&G 3.26 2.68 Singapore 3.62
PDFM 2.84 6.44 Prudential 3.49
MAM 2.14 0.44 L&G 2.68
Equitable 1.65 1.93 Equitable 1.93
Hermes 1.61 1.59 BZW 1.78
BZW 1.56 1.78 Hermes 1.59
Total 35.29 34.89 Total 38.07
Other major shareholders: Just over 10% of the company’s shares were held by 
Chairman Allen Lloyd (7.68%) and CEO Peter Lloyd (2.46%), at the time o f the latter’s 
resignation. Although only ranked sixth prior to the resignation, it is particularly notable 
that PDFM subsequently more than doubled its stake in the company, to become the 
largest shareholder by the end o f the year. This suggests that PDFM may have taken a 
larger role in influencing events than its ranking indicates.
3. PRESS COMMENT
9  M a r c h  1 9 9 5 :  ‘Lloyds Chemists is set to close Supersave, its drugstore chain, with the 
loss of about 600 jobs. Peter Lloyd, chief executive, said that Supersave had been hit by 
the supermarkets’ expansion into toiletries and the rise o f local discount retailers.’
(The Times)
1 4  M a r c h  1 9 9 5 :  ‘Peter Lloyd, chairman of Lloyds Chemists, the retail group whose 
share price slumped after he announced a massive restructuring o f the Supersave 
Drugstore chain last week and refused to comment on the cost, estimated it at £13.4 
yesterday and said that 750 jobs would go. Mr Lloyd said 105 of the loss-making 
Supersave stores would be closed, 27 would be converted to the group’s Holland and 
Barrett healthfood format and the remaining would be turned into a new health and 
beauty format. ... City analysts were relieved the figure was no higher, but Goldman 
Sachs retail analyst Rod Whitehead said: ‘While this does demonstrate that the company 
is willing to address the concerns of investors, damage has been done in terms of the 
credibility o f management’.
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14 March 1995 continuedV The shares, which fell by a quarter to 214p on the first 
announcement, nudged up 5p to 219p yesterday. A company spokesman admitted: 
‘Clearly, it has to some extent damaged confidence, but the company genuinely did not 
have the figure last week’.’ (Daily Telegraph)
14 June 1995: ‘A series of board changes have been announced by Lloyds Chemists 
after Mr Peter Lloyd relinquished his role as chief executive and resigned as a director 
due to ill health. Mr Lloyd, who has been ill for several months, has been a director on 
the Tamworth-based chemists and retail group for 16 years. He became chief executive 
in 1993 when his brother Mr Allen Lloyd, chairman and founder of Lloyds, split the role 
of chairman and chief executive.’ (Birmingham Post)
14 June 1995: ‘Lloyds Chemists chief executive Peter Lloyd has resigned and left the 
board because o f ‘stress-induced illness’. His chairman and older brother. Allen Lloyd, 
said he had received ‘medical treatment’ , but refused to give other details. ... Finance 
Director Michael Ward becomes managing director. He is replaced by Jonathan Fellows, 
who joins from Central TV. Some City sceptics were disappointed. They had wanted 
Allen Lloyd to accept a major shake-up, injecting new blood to improve performance, 
but he remains firmly in charge.* (Daily Mail)
14 June 1995: ‘Peter Lloyd, who helped his elder brother Allen to build up the Lloyds 
Chemists group, yesterday resigned as chief executive of the group because of ill-health. 
Allen Lloyd, who founded the group in 1973 with a single pharmacy, said yesterday that 
his brother had become seriously ill through stress, about a month after the group had 
announced plans to reorganise its loss-making drugstore business in March. As a result 
the board had been reshuffled.’ (Financial Times)
28 June 1995: ‘Lloyds Chemists could soon feature in corporate action. ... The group 
has had a difficult time, with a wide-ranging reorganisation expected to hit this year’s 
profits. They are likely to fall from £55.5 to around £42m. This month Lloyds was driven 
into management changes when its chief executive, peter Lloyd, resigned because of ill- 
health. The shares fell 3p to 21 lp. They touched 305p earlier this year.’
(The Independent^
4. SUMMARY
Factors Lloyds Chemists
1 Profits warning Restructuring charge of £13.4m
2 Reduction in dividend No
3 Fall in share price Yes (305p to 21 lp = 30%)
4 Rights issue No
5 New chairman No
6 Closures/redundancies 105 stores to close/750 redundancies
7 Other factors I Failure to respond to competition
8 Other factors II Resignation due to stress/ill-health
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The group was seen as having failed to respond to competitive pressures on its 
Supersave chain, the result being the closure of 105 stores and loss o f 750 jobs. When 
announced on 8 March 1995, CEO Peter Lloyd failed to tell investors how much these 
and other changes would cost, contributing to the 25% fall in share price on 8 March, 
(Times, 9 March 1995; Daily Telegraph, 14 March 1995). Costs o f £13.4m were 
announced on 13 March 1995. On 13 June 1995 the resignation o f CEO Peter Lloyd was 
announced, due to stress and ill health, following the earlier announcements.
Case History No, 6:______ News International
1. Resignation o f CEO Gus Fisher announced 16 March 1995.
2. SHAREHOLDERS
News International is 81.2% owned by News Corporation, o f which the largest 
shareholder is Rupert Murdoch. No information available on other shareholders.
3. PRESS SUMMARY
1 6  M a r c h  1 9 9 5 :  ‘Mr Gus Fisher, one o f the small inner team of managers who helped 
Mr Rupert Murdoch run News Corporation, resigned unexpectedly yesterday. No 
explanation was given and ... no attempt was made to suggest that Mr Fisher, who in 
1991 also became chief operating officer o f the parent News Corporation, was leaving to 
pursue other interests. ... For the past year ... Mr Fisher was concentrating on his role at 
News International in London and less involved in the world-wide business. This 
suggests that his power within the organisation was on the wane.’ (Financial Times')
1 8  M a r c h  1 9 9 5 :  ‘Rupert Murdoch, the media magnate, wrapped up a busy week at his 
Wapping headquarters by letting go John Dux, managing director o f News International 
- the latest casualty, in part, o f an embarrassing and potentially costly newsprint shortage 
at the publisher. ... The departure followed the announcement earlier this week that Gus 
Fisher, chief executive of news international, would be replaced by a long-time Murdoch 
associate, a fellow Australian, Bill O’Neill. The bloodbath was reminiscent o f past visits 
by Murdoch to his many operations. He is renowned for his whirlwind visits to outposts 
o f his empire, which sometimes lead to management shakeups. ... The clearing o f senior 
executives was apparently triggered by a short-term shortage o f newsprint. ‘The 
newsprint shortage has finally hit home’, said a senior editor at News International last 
night.’ (The Independent)
1 8  M a r c h  1 9 9 5 :  ‘News International has been forced to cut back production o f The 
Times, Sunday Times, Sun and News o f the World because o f a shortage o f newsprint.
... News International - which this week announced the abrupt resignation o f its chief 
executive, Gus Fisher - also said that John Dux, managing director o f News International 
Newspapers, would leave the group.’ (Titlel
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19 March 1995: ‘Rupert Murdoch’s News International moved yesterday to limit the 
damage following a newsprint shortage and the resignations of senior executives. ... 
Insiders say the newsprint crisis happened when group managers gambled on trying to 
force down its price because of the volume they ordered. But they were fighting a 
seller’s market which has seen newsprint prices leap by more that 30%. The 
misjudgement threatens circulation losses.’ (Mail on Sunday)
4. SUMMARY
Factors News International
1 Profits warning No
2 Reduction in dividend No
3 Fall in share price No
4 Rights issue No
5 Chairman Rupert Murdoch, controlling shareholder of News Corp.
6 Closures/redundancies Paper shortages reduce print runs/circulation
7 Other factors I Negotiations to secure newsprint mishandled
8 Other factors II Impact on circulation and advertising revenues
The chairman of News International is Rupert Murdoch, majority shareholder (directly 
and through family trusts and shareholdings) of News International’s parent company 
News Corporation. Murdoch is therefore effectively the controlling shareholder of News 
International and Gus Fisher’s resignation followed a week long visit to the UK, 
reviewing the UK newsprint problem.
Although no direct job losses were reported (other than Gus Fisher’s and a number of 
other senior News International executives), the failure to secure adequate supplies of 
newsprint at a time of rising prices meant that circulations of key News International 
titles had to be reduced (Sun, Times, Sunday Times, News of the World) and paginations 
reduced, hitting advertising revenues.
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Case History No. 7:_______Powell D uffryn
1. Resignation o f CEO William Andrews announced 18 July 1995.
2. SHAREHOLDERS
Top 10 fund 
managers
Before 
June 95
After 
Dec 95
After 
December 1995
%
M&G 12.74 13.49 M&G 13.49
Morgan Grenfell 6.42 7.25 Morgan Grenfell 7.25
BZW 6.09 5.81 BZW 5.81
AMP 4.30 4.76 AMP 4.76
Britannic 3.68 3.67 Britannic 3.67
Henderson 2.81 2.70 GT 2.90
L&G 2.32 1.92 Henderson 2.70
HSBC 2.21 2.15 HSBC 2.15
CCLA 2.11 0.08 L&G 1.92
L&M 1.87 1.70 L&M 1.70
Total 44.55 43.53 Total 46.35
3. PRESS COMMENT
2  J u n e  1 9 9 5 :  ‘A strong contribution from Teeside and Humberside boosted full year 
profits and helped Powell Duffryn overcome the adverse effects on its fuel distribution 
division of a mild winter. Pre-tax profits climbed 10.5% to £36.9m in the year to March 
31, as turnover advanced 8.6% to £791.3m. ... A maintained final dividend of 17p ... 
lifts the total payout to 24.8p (22.9p), from earnings of 33.7p (30.9p) a share.
(The Times)
2 8  J u n e  1 9 9 5 :  ‘Mr Bill Andrews, who retires as chief executive o f Powell Duffryn after 
the distribution and engineering group’s annual meeting next month, received a 76% pay 
rise to “£295,000 last year. His basic salary rose from £168,000 to £185,000, according 
to the group’s annual report, and he was awarded a £110,000 performance related 
bonus. Powell Duffryn said that the bonus reflected the group’s performance over the 
last four years, during which pre-tax profits rose from £28.9m to £36.9m.’ (Financial 
Times)
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4. SUMMARY
Factors Powell Duffryn
1 Profits warning No
2 Reduction in dividend No
3 Fall in share price No
4 Rights issue No
5 New chairman No
6 Closures/redundancies No
7 Other factors None
Case History No.8:_______ Hickson
1. Resignation o f  CEO announced 6 November 1995.
2. SHAREHOLDERS
Top 10 fund 
managers
Before 
Oct 96
After 
April 96
After 
April 1996
%
PDFM 20.89 21.95 PDFM 21.95
AMP 8.91 8.91 AMP 8.91
M&G 8.37 8.40 M&G 8.40
Britannic 7.14 7.34 Britannic 7.34
Prudential 4.03 3.99 Prudential 3.99
MAM 3.17 3.17 MAM 3.17
Clerical Medical 2.86 2.77 Baring 2.90
Schroder 2.84 2.12 Clerical Medical 2.77
Abbey Life 2.76 2.76 Abbey Life 2.76
BZW 2.6 2.56 BZW 2.56
Total 63.57 63.97 Total 64.75
3. PRESS COMMENT
7 M a r c h  1 9 9 5 :  ‘The company provided what Unilever ordered and was caught in the 
soap wars cross fire when Proctor & Gamble claimed the ingredient could damage 
clothes. ... The aim is to focus on pharmaceutical intermediates ... but there is no quick 
fix. ... Mr Kerrison reckons that it will take another 18 months to get PharmaChem back 
to where it was. But has he got that long? Analysts say investors are becoming 
impatient and would succumb to a bid if the price was right. The appointment to the 
chair, in October [1994], o f James Hann, the outspoken former chairman o f Scottish 
Nuclear, is seen as strengthening the company’s communication skills.’ (Yorkshire Post)
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29 March 1995: ‘Even though the City has already made allowances for the impact of 
the soap wars, [Hickson’s] shares dipped 4p to 13 lp after investors were told the 
dividend was being cut from 8p to 5p.’ (Yorkshire Post)
27April 1995: ‘Speciality chemicals group Hickson International has moved quickly to 
fill the finance director’s post vacated by Michael Rowley with the appointment of Justin 
Court from Wellcome.’ (Yorkshire Post)
16 August 1995: ‘Analysts were disappointed that Hickson demonstrated little, if any, 
signs of recovery following its disastrous 1994. Although the impact of losing the 
Unilever contract was expected, the other hiccups were not.’ (Financial Times)
6 November 1995: ‘Hickson International. The chemicals group damaged by ‘soap wars’ 
and operational problems, today issued a profit warning and announced the departure of 
its chief executive. Chairman James Hann says a huge shake-up with the disposal of two 
subsidiaries and the closure of plants would mean 600 job losses and a £13 million 
exceptional charge.’ (Evening Standard)
7 November 1995: ‘The City saw yesterday’s news as evidence that tough chairman 
James Hann was getting to grips with the business.’ (Yorkshire Post)
9 November 1995: ‘Mr Kerrison took over as chief executive after more than two years 
of boardroom and financial upheaval, during which the chairman, finance director and 
chief executive had resigned unexpectedly... ‘Obviously the combination of the industrial 
accidents and the woes of the Unilever contract were beyond Mr Kerrison’s control said 
one analyst. ‘But he has never been able to get his arms around the business’.’
(Financial TimesJ
12 November 1995: James Hann, the chairman of troubled chemicals company Hickson 
International, says he can turn around its fortunes after ousting chief executive Dennis 
Kerrison last week. ... Hann claims to have won the backing of its biggest shareholders - 
Phillips and Drew Fund Management, Prudential & M&G - for the recovery 
strategy. PDFM, which has increased its stake from 5% to 22% over the last two year 
years, is smarting from losses of around £40 million on its holding. ... Hann said that 
Kerrison failed to get to grips with Hickson’s problems.’ (Mail on Sunday!
4. SUMMARY
Factors Hickson International
1 Profits warning/decline Yes
2 Reduction in dividend Yes
3 Fall in share price Yes
4 Rights issue No
5 New chairman Yes
6 Closures/redundancies Yes
7 Other factors Yes
8 Shareholders involved Yes
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Hickson suffered a number of substantial problems in 1994, including a factory fire and 
the loss of a major contract with Unilever. But analysts and investors became concerned 
that the company was not effectively responding to these during 1995.
Chairman James Hann (appointed December 1994) held meetings with Hickson’s major 
shareholders (PDFM, Prudential, M&G) during November 1995 on the management and 
strategic direction o f the company (Mail on Sunday, 12 November 1995)
Case History No. 9:_______Kenwood_______
1. Resignation of CEO Tim Parker announced 29 September 1995.
2. SHAREHOLDERS
Top 10 fund 
managers
Before 
Aug 95
After 
Feb 96
After 
February 1996
%
Schroder 7.63 9.86 Schroder 9.86
BoS 5.86 6.42 BoS 6.42
MAM 4.95 1.66 HSBC 5.03
Baillie Gifford 4.50 2.20 Scottish Widows 4.30
Scottish Widows 4.30 4.30 Sun Life 4.08
Chase 3.44 3.11 Chase 3.11
Standard Life 3.37 0.76 NatWest 3.09
Sun Life 3.12 4.08 NFU Mutual 3.05
NFU Mutual 2.94 3.05 M&G 3.01
Liverpool Victoria 2.46 2.40 BZW 2.86
Total 42.57 37.84 Total 44.81
Tim Parker held 1.64% of Kenwood at the time of his resignation from the company.
3. PRESS COMMENT
3 0  S e p t e m b e r  1 9 9 5 :  ‘Tim Parker, chief executive of Kenwood Appliances, is soon to 
step into a new pair of shoes. He is leaving the teamaker and toasters outfit to become 
the new boss at C&J Clark; maker of the famous Hush Puppies brand and Britain’s 
second largest private company.’ (Daily Telegraph)
3 0  S e p t e m b e r  1 9 9 5 :  ‘Kenwood Appliances chief executive Tim Parker is getting out of 
the kitchen to join shoe firm C&J Clark. Kenwood shares tumbled 25p to 23 5p after the 
surprise announcement, but steadied to 25Op after it said that there were no ‘black 
holes’. Kenwood has grown substantially since Parker led a buyout from Thorn EMI 10 
years ago, but its shares are below the 285p at which they were floated in 1992. That 
caused some disenchantment. Standard Life cut its stake, But Parker says his move is 
‘just a case o f Man gets Bigger Job’. ... He has 750,000 shares. He says: I have no
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intention of selling. I think they are undervalued.’ Kenwood faces tough competition 
from giant rivals, but a 5.5% yield should prop the shares.’ (Daily Mail!
4. SUMMARY
Factors Kenwood
1 Profits warning/decline No
2 Reduction in dividend No
3 Fall in share price No
4 Rights issue No
5 New chairman No
6 Closures/redundancies No
7 Other factors No
8 Shareholders involved No
Case History No. 10: McDonnell Information Systems______
1. Resignation of CEO Jerry Causley announced 15 August 1995.
2. SHAREHOLDERS
Top 10 fund 
managers
Before 
July 95
After 
Jan 96
After 
January 1996
%
Fidelity 9.96 10.45 Fidelity 10.45
Prudential 8.73 9.23 Prudential 9.23
MAM 8.12 0.09 Schroder 5.27
Commercial Union 4.25 3.90 PDFM 4.75
Clerical Medical 3.62 2.75 Commercial Union 3.90
PDFM 3.31 4.75 BZW 3.26
BZW In 3.23 3.26 Bankers Trust 3.02
Morgan Grenfell 3.05 0.70 Clerical Medical 2.75
Citicorp 2.71 1.44 BoS 1.79
L&G 2.40 1.50 Baring 1.66
Total 49.38 38.07 Total 46.08
At the time o f his resignation, Jerry Causley held 2.39% of the shares in McDonnell 
Information Systems.
3. PRESS COMMENT
1 1  J a n u a r y  1 9 9 5 :  ‘About 332m - 30% - was wiped off the value o f McDonnell 
Information Systems, the computer software group, triggered by its second profits 
warning in four months. [The] shares slumped 32p, from 106p to 74p, in MDIS, the
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biggest of a string of computer business flotation flops last year, after it said that 1994 
profits would significantly undershoot revised market expectations.’ (The Independent!
11 January 1995: ‘An immediate casualty of MDIS’s troubles appeared to be Ian Knox, 
who has resigned as finance director and will be succeeded by Richard Barfield, his 
deputy, who joined in September. Ian Hay Davidson, chairman, and Jerry Causley, chief 
executive, intend to remain in their posts.’ (The Times!
1 M arch 1995: ‘McDonnell Information Systems, the computer software company that 
issued two profit warnings within 10 months of coming to the market last March, 
yesterday unveiled plans to cut 100 jobs and slash its research and development budget 
20%. Two-thirds of the cuts will be made in Britain.’ (Daily Telegraph^
1 March 1995: ‘In spite of its troubles, MDIS has protected its cash position, allowing it 
to maintain an uncovered dividend. This puts the shares on a 10% yield. If the group can 
achieve its intended cost reductions this year earnings should cover the dividend.’
(The Times)
1 March 1995: ‘McDonnell Information Systems, the computer software group, is in 
fence mending talks with institutional shareholders in the shadow of halved full year 
profits less than 12 months after going public. ... Mr Causley yesterday admitted that he 
had his work cut out in winning back City credibility, as MDIS’s institutional roadshow, 
taking in the likes of Prudential, Mercury Asset Management, Commercial Union and 
Fidelity, swung into action. The company ... blamed the profits setback on delays in 
securing orders from public sector clients, including local authority councils and the 
police, allied to disappointing orders for its new PRO-IV IBS banking system.
(The Independent!
2 May 1995: ‘Doug Thompson, the McDonnell Information Systems director 
responsible for the computer services group’s international business units and its 
international banking systems software, has resigned from the company. ... Following 
Thompson’s departure, Causley will take over direct responsibility for the group’s 
overseas operations.’ (Financial Timesl
16 August 1995: ‘Analysts said they were ‘appalled’ yesterday as computer software 
company MDIS put out its third profit warning in less than a year, along with interim 
results showing a fall into the red. Chief executive Jerry Causley resigned after 25 years 
in the company.’ (Daily Teleeraphl
16 August 1995: ‘Shares in McDonnell Information Systems slumped 30% to 62.5p 
after the ... group issued its third profits warning in 11 months, reported a dive into the 
red for the first half of the year and announced that its chief executive, Mr Jerry Causley, 
had resigned. Mr Causley’s duties will be taken up by Mr Ian Davidson, the non­
executive chairman, until a replacement is found. The last profits warning in January 
prompted the resignation of the finance director.’ (Financial Times)
16 August 1995: ‘Hired originally as an archetypal ‘trophy’ chairman designed to bolster 
the company’s credibility, Ian Hay Davidson has been forced into a much more active 
role. Out goes the chief executive, Jerry Causley, the ‘visionary’ who failed to deliver.
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Out too goes the company’s investment bank, Barings, already in truth well out of it, 
having unloaded a large part of its stake in the company onto hapless investors during 
the flotation. Issued at 260p, the shares were yesterday trading at 62.5p.’ (Independent)
20 August 1995: ‘The tale of MDIS is a tangled one, from which few players emerge 
with credit. The murkiest involvement is that of Barings, leader and dominant player in 
the syndicate of venture capitalists that saw its equity stake soar in value from £5m to 
£110m. Between £40m and £50m was taken in profit, although Barings itself hung on to 
9% of the company. Barings, as well as being a leading shareholder, was also the 
company’s advisor on the flotation.’ (Independent)
21 December 1995: ‘Shares in McDonnell Information Systems more than halved today 
as the troubled computer services group warned that it is passing its final dividend and 
taking a £20 hit this year to cover rationalisation costs. The warning ... provoked a 32p 
drop in the shares to 29p, leaving it with a market capitalisation of just £30m. The shares 
were floated at 260p. ... The £20m exceptional provisions will cover 170 redundancies 
and a write-down on the disposal of surplus freehold property arising from McDonnell’s 
rationalisation programme.’ (Evening Standard)
4. SUMMARY
Factors McDonnell Information Systems
1 Profits warning/decline Yes
2 Reduction in dividend No - but uncovered
3 Fall in share price Yes
4 Rights issue No - but floated in 1994
5 New chairman No
6 Closures/redundancies Yes
7 Other factors Third profits warning in 11 months
8 Shareholders involved Yes (Prudential, MAM, Commercial Union, Fidelity)
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Case History No. 11 Mowlem
1. Resignation o f CEO John Marshall announced 19 October 1995.
2. SHAREHOLDERS
Top 10 fund Before After After %
managers Sept 95 March 96 March 96
PDFM 23.68 23.68 PDFM 23.68
Morgan Stanley 15.30 10.04 Morgan Stanley 10.04
Baring 5.88 5.91 Baring 5.91
Sun Life 4.95 4.53 Morgan Stanley 4.74
Norwich Union 2.55 2.97 Sun Life 4.53
First Quadrant 2.42 0.00 Norwich Union 2.97
Co-op 2.38 2.38 Cursitor Alliance 2.84
Fidelity 2.15 2.15 Co-op 2.38
BZW 1.97 1.97 Fidelity 2.15
Cursitor Alliance 1.95 2.84 BZW 1.97
Total 63.23 56.47 Total 61.21
3. PRESS COMMENT
2 5  M a r c h  1 9 9 5 :  ‘Mowlem has achieved all that could have been asked of it when it went 
cap in hand to shareholders last March. The shares, up 1.5p at 83p yesterday, are now 
trading close to asset value. Further gains can be expected this year from improved 
efficiencies with Mowlem now tackling its French scaffolding problems.
(Financial Times)
2 2  S e p t e m b e r  1 9 9 5 :  ‘Shares in construction and scaffolding group John Mowlem 
dropped 4p to 65p today as it revealed massive half-year losses.’ (Evening Standard)
2 3  S e p t e m b e r  1 9 9 5 :  ‘John Marshall does not sound very confident that this time he will 
finally find a buyer for the City airport. The Mowlem chief executive has been looking 
for one, on and off, for years, but to get even the knock down price of £319 m, at which 
the airport stands in Mowlem’s books, looks hard. ... Stressed out already by a 15% 
drop in its order book and other disasters in France and eastern Germany, which have 
forced it to make provisions of £17.8 m in the first half, it has had enough.’
(Daily Telegraph)
2 3  S e p t e m b e r  1 9 9 5 :  ‘John Mowlem, the building contractor, yesterday announced 700 
job losses and the sale of several non-core businesses as part o f a wide-ranging 
restructuring.’ (Financial Times)
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19 October 1995: ‘Beleaguered construction group John Mowlem today shocked the 
City as it parted company with chief executive John Marshall.’ Chairman Kenneth 
Minton says: ‘Marshall and the board have decided it was appropriate that they separate.
... Though he has sat on Mowlem’s board since 1987, Marshall was only appointed as 
chief executive in August 1994. ... The shares slumped 3p to 53p on the news.
20 October 1995: ‘The market has become so blase about the travails of the construction 
sector, and especially of J Mowlem, one of its more troubled constituents, that it pretty 
much shrugged off the departure of the company’s chief executive, John Marshall. The 
shares lost just 3p to 58p, [which] means that they have lost almost 90% of their value 
since they peaked in 1989. After the announcement a month ago that the company had 
plunged into a £31.8m loss, manly thanks to the heavy costs of re-focusing itself on a 
profitable core, it was perhaps no surprise that senior heads would roll.’ Ken Minton, 
chairman since the summer, has clear views about where he should take Mowlem and his 
ideas clearly did not chime with Mr Marshall’s. (The Independent!
27 October 1995: ‘In an industry which has been hammered by recession, low inflation, 
and the shrinkage of government spending, is the problem really one of under-performing 
managers? Robert Donald, construction analysts at NatWest Securities [said] ‘the losses 
are wholly indicative of the fact that the industry has a grotesque need for restructuring, 
and certain people at the top are either not performing or are an obstacle to the necessary 
changes’. (Investors Chronicled
20 October 1995: ‘Mr Marshall’s downfall was Mowlem’s decision, as an ailing builder, 
to take on Eagle Star over the Carlton Gate housing development in Maida Vale. 
Insurance companies do not get to be as rich and powerful as Eagle Star by being over- 
generous in court, and the latter dug its heels in. Mowlem had been looking for £20 
million in damages, but ended with costs of £14 million, which were rolled into last 
month’s halfway loss. (The Times')
4. SUMMARY
Factors Mowlem
1 Profits warning/decline Yes
2 Reduction in dividend No
3 Fall in share price Yes
4 Rights issue No
5 New chairman Yes
6 Closures/redundancies Yes
7 Other factors Yes
8 Shareholders involved No
Significant problems during 1995 which contributed to CEO John Marshall’s resignation 
were: the continuing failure to find a buyer for City airport; unsuccessful litigation with 
Eagle Star; and problems at Mowlem’s French and German subsidiaries.
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Case History No, 12:______W E W  G roup
1. Resignation of CEO and Chairman Peter Carr announced 7 November 1995.
2. SHAREHOLDERS
Top 10 fund 
managers
Before 
Oct 95
After 
April 96
After 
April 1996
%
Fidelity 9.86 9.91 Warburg Pincus 23.51
Gartmore 5.74 0.64 Fidelity 9.91
PDFM 4.96 4.56 Chase 5.79
Schroder 4.69 4.69 NatWest 5.26
L&G 3.28 3.36 Schroder 4.69
Lucas PF 2.78 2.78 PDFM 4.56
Citicorp 2.30 2.11 L&G 3.36
M&G 2.24 2.24 Lucas PF 2.78
Abu Dhabi 1.99 1.75 SBC 2.55
BZW 1.72 1.72 M&G 2.24
Total 39.56 33.76 Total 64.65
3. PRESS COMMENT
2 1  J u n e  1 9 9 5 :  ‘Shares in WEW Group, the owner o f the What Everyone Wants 
discount stores, fell 4p to 20p yesterday as it warned of a trading downturn, partly 
blaming the arrival of the National Lottery. The group made pre-tax profits in the six 
months to January of £5.81 m but said yesterday that it will move into a loss for the 
second half o f the year. Analysts had expected the full-year outcome to be around £6m.’ 
(Daily Telegraph)
2 9  O c t o b e r  1 9 9 5 :  ‘Troubled discount clothing retailer WEW Group is to announce that 
chairman Peter Carr is stepping down and development director is resigning. The moves 
come when the What Everyone Wants chain is suffering from like-for-like sales more 
than 20% down on last year. The scale of the decline is causing alarm in the 80-store 
company, which has been cancelling orders from suppliers. The problems have also 
focused attention on the WEW boardroom, where the only non-executive directors 
represent US investment house Warburg Pincus, which holds 28% o f the shares. The 
company is actively seeking to recruit two independent non-executive directors. ...
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29 October 1995 cont/  With the share price languishing around 16p against a rights 
issue price of 56p early last year, potential bidders are believed to have been looking at 
WEW. Gerrald Weisfeld, who sold the group five years ago to Philip Green’s Amber 
Day, has approached Warburg Pincus in London and the United States about mounting a 
bid. However, Warburg Pincus is showing a hefty loss on its investment in the company, 
with its average buying price around 55p, so it is not keen to sell at the current levels.’ 
(Mail on Sundavl
5 November 1995: ‘The shares remain in the doldrums, having lost most of their value 
over the last two years, on Friday’s closing price of 16p. Ever since a profits warning in 
June that said that the second half might show losses, the City has feared the worst. Part 
of the problem is the failure of the group’s discount stores format to spark the 
imagination of shoppers. Chairman Peter Carr has few fans in the City, and there is little 
to commend the shares.* (Independent on Sundavl
8 November 1995: ‘Group pre-tax profits showed a 25% increase to £4. lm (£3.25) on 
turnover up at £122. lm (£111.7m). ... The final dividend is held at 0.35p for a 
maintained total of 0.7p, payable from earnings of 1.65p (1.35p). (Financial Times')
8 November 1995: ‘What Everyone Wants, the regional fashion chain, added to the 
retailing gloom yesterday, reporting that last year’s like-for-like sales fell 9.4%, and have 
continued to plummet since year end. WEW is to make management changes in a bid to 
reverse the sales decline. Managing director Richard Boland, hired from Sears home 
shopping division, Freemans’, this summer, becomes chief executive. James Millar, 
former chairman of William Low, ... is to join the group as chairman. Peter Carr, who 
had filled both roles, remains as a non-executive director. David Ramage, development 
director, is to leave to pursue other interests.’ (Daily Telegraph)
4. SUMMARY
Factors WEW
1 Profits warning/decline No l
2 Reduction in dividend No
3 Fall in share price Yes
4 Rights issue No
5 New chairman Yes
6 Closures/redundancies No
7 Other factors 20% sales decline
8 Shareholders involved Yes - Warburg Pincus
The most important factor was the accelerating decline in like-for-like sales from around 
10% at the beginning of 1995 to around 20% during year.
US investor Warburg Pincus held 28% of the company’s shares and the only non­
executive positions on the board during 1995.
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Case History No. 13: Biotrace
1. Resignation o f CEO Brian Levitt announced 24 November 1995.
2. SHAREHOLDERS
Top 10 fund 
managers
Before 
Oct 95
After 
April 96
After 
April 1996
%
Baring 7.79 7.79 Baring 7.79
Gartmore 5.04 0.43 NatWest 4.95
British Gas PF 3.62 2.51 Hermes 2.79
Newton 3.43 1.78 British Gas PF 2.51
Hermes 2.79 2.79 BoS 2.37
BoS 2.68 2.37 Newton 1.78
Chase 0.71 0.71 Rutherford 1.30
Equitable 0.52 0.52 Chase 0.71
Northern Trust 0.44 0.44 Equitable 0.52
Citicorp 0.24 0.31 Northern Trust 0.44
Total 27.26 19.65 Total 25.16
3. PRESS COMMENT
2 5  N o v e m b e r  1 9 9 5 :  ‘Biotrace International said that it had terminated the contract o f 
employment o f its chief executive, Brian Levett. The company also said that it is likely to 
make a loss for the year of about £1.5 million on a turnover broadly similar to that o f the 
previous 12 months.’ (The Independent)
2 5  N o v e m b e r  1 9 9 5 :  ‘New acting chief Terry Clements declined to explain the full 
background to Levett’s abrupt departure. The company was brought to the market two 
years ago by Levett. (Daily Mail)
2 5  N o v e m b e r  1 9 9 5 :  ‘Following investment in developing its European and US markets - 
announced at the interim stage - the group said that the impact o f this expansion, coupled 
with increased competition and expenses incurred on the upgrade o f one o f its products, 
was ‘greater than envisaged in the half year report. ... Mr Clements declined to comment 
on why Mr Levett’s contract had been terminated, but it is understood that his departure 
is not directly related to the trading performance of the group.’ (Financial Times)
1  D e c e m b e r  1 9 9 5 :  ‘Shares in Biotrace, the maker of kits to detect microbiological 
contamination in food and drink, slumped 22p to 42p following a profits warning. Chief 
Executive Brian Levett has been sacked. (Investors Chronicle)
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4. SUMMARY
Factors Biotrace
1 Profits warning/decline Yes
2 Reduction in dividend No
3 Fall in share price Yes
4 Rights issue No (but recently floated)
5 New chairman No
6 Closures/redundancies No
7 Other factors Yes
8 Shareholders involved No
Biotrace was floated in 1993.
Failure to respond to competition, over-rapid expansion in Europe and US, cost over­
runs o f product upgrades (Financial Times, 25 November 1995).
Case History No. 14: Central Motor Auctions________________
1. Resignation o f CEO George Inch announced 6 September 1995
2. SHAREHOLDERS: Insufficient information available
3. PRESS COMMENT
1 9  J u l y  1 9 9 5 :  ‘CMA yesterday announced it had returned to the black after a 
reorganisation last year tipped it into losses. Turnover was up 8% at £5.6lm and the 
group made £205,000 pre-tax in the six months to April 30, against a loss o f £420,000.
... There is again a dividend of 0.5p, payable from earnings o f 0.9p. The group moved to 
a full listing in April. Mr George Inch, chief executive, said: ‘Tough trading conditions 
experienced in the first half are continuing into the second half. ’ (Financial Times)
7 S e p t e m b e r  1 9 9 5 :  ‘Shares in car auction group CMA stuck yesterday at their low for 
the year o f 58p as the market digested the implications o f the resignation of chief 
executive George Inch. Mr Inch was seen by analysts as a casualty o f his own drive to 
focus on the remarketing of vehicles through electronic databases rather than 
conventional auctions. ... At its half year results in July, the group indicated that trading 
conditions were tough. Two days ago it issued a profits warning, saying that at best it 
would only break even in the second half o f the year. ... Insiders said the warning gave 
ammunition to board members who argued that the pace o f change should be slowed. 
Others saw the hand of the Myers family, which effectively controls the group through 
its shareholding. ’ (Yorkshire Post)
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7 September 1995: ‘CMA ... lost its chief executive this week and warned full-year 
profits would be no more that the £250,000 achieved last year. Its shares fell 15% to 
58p. George Inch, chief executive since November 1993, masterminded CMA’s move 
into ‘remarketing ... But after two years of diversification and with a glut of cars for too 
few buyers, it seems that the board wanted a rest. ... The Myers family, which owns over 
half of CMA, supported the move.’ (Investors Chronicle!
4. SUMMARY
Factors Central Motor Auctions (CMA)
1 Profits warning/decline Yes
2 Reduction in dividend No
3 Fall in share price Yes
4 Rights issue No
5 New chairman No
6 Closures/redundancies No
7 Other factors Failure to concentrate on core auctions business
8 Shareholders involved Myers family - majority shareholders
Significant problems during 1995 which contributed to CEO George Inch’s resignation 
were: the continuing weakness of the UK car market coupled with an excessive focus on 
the use of computer databases and remarketing techniques (Yorkshire Post, 7 September 
1995).
The controlling shareholder of CMA is reported as being the Myers family (Yorkshire 
Post, 7 September 1995, Investors Chronicle, 7 September 1995). Nigel Myers is an 
executive director and has a direct holding of 6.7% and is a joint trustee to a further 
25.5% with Mrs H Beilin, who is not a director but has a declared holding of 6.6%. 
These together total 38.8%. From newspaper pomments it would appear that other 
family/trust holdings may account for a further 12% or more of CMA’s issued share 
capital.
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Case History No. 15:______Hornby Group_____________
1. Resignation o f CEO Keith Ness announced 20 October 1995
2. SHAREHOLDERS
Top 10 fund 
managers
Before 
Sept 95
After 
March 96
After 
March 1996
%
Morgan Stanley 10.20 9.26 M&G 10.00
M&G 9.98 10.00 Electra Fleming 9.89
Electra Fleming 9.87 9.89 Morgan Stanley 9.26
Hermes 8.55 9.07 Hermes 9.07
Citicorp 8.28 8.12 Citicorp 8.12
L&G 7.81 7.83 L&G 7.83
Laurence Keen 6.27 6.28 Laurence Keen 6.28
Gartmore 4.47 0.43 Hill Samuel 6.28
Fidelity 4.30 0.00 NatWest 3.93
Abbey Life 4.16 0.24 Hambros 2.44
Total 73.89 61.12 Total 73.10
CEO Keith Ness owned 1.25% of the company’s shares at the time o f his resignation.
3. PRESS COMMENT
2 5  M a r c h  1 9 9 5 :  ‘Hornby’s annual results bore out the profits warning delivered in 
December by the USM-traded toys group. Despite strong sales in its core brands ... pre­
tax profits dropped to £611,000 (£1.5m).’ (Financial Times’)
2 5  M a r c h  1 9 9 5 :  ‘The fall in profits at Hornby was blamed on aggressive pricing in the 
export market, increased advertising support and higher production costs. The company 
has cut the interim dividend to 5p a share from 9p, Earnings per share fell from 9.5p a 
share from 10.9p.’ (The Times)
3 1  M a r c h  1 9 9 5 :  ‘Who is .. Hornby chairman Malcolm Thomas kidding when he says 
‘we now intend to build on the considerable successes achieved during last year’?. 1994 - 
the year in question - was a disaster with pre-tax profits falling from £1.5 m to £611,000.
... The shares at 117p are on a forward PE ration of 12. A big support comes from the 
5.3% yield. But Hornby only pays a final dividend each year so once it goes ex-dividend 
it’s time to sell.’
1 3  A p r i l  1 9 9 5 :  ‘It’s hard to be confident about Hornby, given so many things take it by 
surprise. And that’s despite directors’ recent share buying. Then there’s the issue o f chief 
executive Keith Ness’s generous salary package. His 1994 pay has not been published 
but £230,000 would be embarrassing given the group’s total pre-tax profit last year was 
a poor £610,000. ... Hornby has some issues to address. Until then, better to sell.’ 
(Investors Chronicle’)
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17 October 1995: ‘Hornby ... is ‘actively seeking’ a successor to Mr Keith Ness, who is 
to cease being chief executive at the end of this week. The board announced yesterday 
that Mr Peter Newly, a non-executive director, would undertake the role until a new one 
is appointed.’ (Financial Times'!
17 October 1995: ‘Hornby Group ... announced a boardroom shake-up yesterday, with 
Keith Ness, chief executive, ceasing to be a director from the end of the week and 
Malcolm Thomas stepping down as chairman in the New Year.’ (Daily Telegraph^
20 October 1995: ‘Mr Ness has been the driving force in the company and his sudden 
exit even surprised some large investors, despite Hornby’s uneven performance since its 
1986 flotation. ... However, it is understood larger institutional investors decided in 
the last few months that M r Ness had to go if the company was going to make the 
best of its Hornby and Scalextric brands. The cost of meeting Mr Ness’s three-year 
rolling contract was a price considered worth paying.’ (Investors Chronicled
4 SUMMARY
Factors Hornby
1 Profits warning/decline Yes
2 Reduction in dividend Yes
3 Fall in share price No
4 Rights issue No
5 New chairman No
6 Closures/redundancies No
7 Other factors Yes
8 Shareholders involved Yes
Investors Chronicle (31 March 1995) refers to the dividend yield of 5.5% providing ‘big’ 
support for the share price. (But also advises that once the 1995 dividend has been paid, 
the shares should be sold.)
Problems during 1995 which contributed to the resignation of CEO Keith Ness were; 
impact of price competition on profits, high marketing and export market development 
costs, failure to concentrate on core Hornby and Scalextric brands and an excessive pay 
package (Times, 25 March 1995, Investors Chronicle, 13 April 1995; 20 October 1995).
Investors Chronicle (20 October 1995) commented that ‘it is understood larger 
institutional investors decided in the last few months that Mr Ness had to go’ and that 
‘the cost of meeting Mr Ness’s three-year rolling contract was a price considered worth 
paying’.
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Case History No. 17: In te rc a re
1. Resignation o f CEO Peter Cowan announced 18 July 1995.
2. SHAREHOLDERS: Insufficient information available
3. PRESS COM M ENT
7  M a y  1 9 9 5 :  ‘The saga of Intercare, the medical products supplier is not a happy one. In 
February 1994, chairman and founder Peter Cowan sold 600,000 shares at 140p ‘for 
personal reasons’. In July of that year he issued a profits warning and the share price 
tumbled to 43p. This year the price began to rise again and after a 20p increase in a 
fortnight, the company was forced to admit two weeks ago that its executive directors, 
led by Cowan, were exploring the possibility o f bidding for the company.’
(The Observer)
8  J u l y  1 9 9 5 :  ‘Intercare Group, the healthcare products supplier, is in talks with two of 
its executive directors about the sale o f the optical division. ... The move follows a 
breakdown in May of talks between the company and its executive directors about a 
management buy-out for the company. ’ (Financial TimesJ
1 9  J u l y  1 9 9 5 :  ‘The chief executive and finance director o f the Intercare medical 
products group, who tried to take it private earlier this year, are to buy the more 
profitable o f its two divisions. ... Mr Cowan will retail his 8% stake in Intercare, which 
would use the sale proceeds to develop its electrical wheelchair side. ’ (Financial Times)
4. SUMMARY
Factors Intercare
1 Profits warning/decline Yes
2 Reduction in dividend No
3 Fall in share price Yes
4 Rights issue No
5 New chairman No
6 Closures/redundancies No
7 Other factors Yes
8 Shareholders involved No
The resignation of CEO Peter Cowan followed the buyout by Cowan and the Finance 
Director of Intercare’s largest subsidiary.
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Case History No. 17: J L I
1. EVENT Resignation of CEO announced 22 February 1995
2. SHAREHOLDERS
Top 10 fund 
managers
Before 
Jan 95
After 
July 95
After 
July 1995
%
M&G 14.11 14.11 M&G 14.11
Aberforth 5.99 5.99 Aberforth 5.99
BoS 5.86 5.86 BoS 5.86
Schroder IM 5.75 5.75 Schroder 5.75
Framlington 4.81 4.81 Framlington 4.81
Postel 4.69 4.69 Hermes 4.69
L&G 4.60 4.6 L&G 4.6
Morgan Grenfell 4.15 4.25 Morgan Grenfell 4.25
Scottish Amicable 3.76 3.76 Scottish Amicable 3.76
Colonial Mutual 3.57 3.57 Colonial Mutual 3.57
Total 57.29 57.39 Total 57.39
O ther m ajor shareholders: None
3. PRESS COMMENT
9 February 1995: ‘Popcorn and peanut packer JLI became the latest victim of the snack 
food wars yesterday, when it issued a profits warning and announced the closure of one 
of its Leeds factories.’ (Yorkshire Post)
9 February 1995: ‘Disappointing sales of nuts in the Christmas season hit the snack 
foods division of JLI and prompted the company to issue a profits warning yesterday. ... 
To improve performance, Mr Yoav Gottesman, chairman, said the division would be 
broadening its range into ‘non-potato related’ areas. (Financial Times!
9 February 1995: ‘The shares of JLI Group tumbled 13p to 70p yesterday after the 
dried fruit and nuts supplier sounded a profits warning in the wake of a poor Christmas 
for its snack foods division.’ (Daily Telegraph!
23 February 1995: ‘JLI Group, the food processing company that issued a profit 
warning earlier this month, has reorganised its group structure and management, 
resulting in the departure of Graham Scott as chief executive. ... Yoav Gottesman, the 
chairman, said there were no plans to replace Mr Scott.’ (The Timesl
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2 3  F e b r u a r y  1 9 9 5 :  ‘Mr Yoav Gottesman, executive chairman, said that Mr Scott was 
asked to leave because the company did not need both a chief executive and a full-time 
chairman. Mr Gottesman said: ‘We are removing a layer o f management and creating a 
more focused management team’. The move follows the closure o f a popcorn factory in 
Leeds after the group issued a profits warning.’ (Financial Times)
4. SUMMARY
Factors JLI
1 Profits warning/decline Yes
2 Reduction in dividend No
3 Fall in share price Yes
4 Rights issue No
5 New chairman No
6 Closures/redundancies Yes
7 Other factors No
8 Shareholders involved No
1 Case History No 18 MR Data Group "
1. Resignation of CEO Michael Elliott announced 25 April 1995.
2. SHAREHOLDERS
Top 10 fund 
managers
Before 
March 95
After 
Sept 95
After 
September 1995
%
L&G 7.96 7.96 L&G 7.96
Universities 6.41 6.41 Universities 6.41
Baring 5.44 5.67 Baring 5.67
John Govett 3.63 3.63 John Govett 3.63
Equitable 2.81 2.81 Equitable 2.81
MAM 2.48 2.48 MAM 2.48
Matheson 2.47 2.47 Matheson 2.47
Morgan Grenfell 2.24 2.33 Morgan Grenfell 2.33
BoS 1.97 1.97 BoS 1.97
Northern Trust 1.84 1.84 Murray Johnston 1.95
Total 37.25 37.57 Total 37.68
JA Redmond, Chairman, held 3.21% in April 1995 (resigned 30 July 1995).
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3. PRESS COMMENT
25 April 1995: ‘MR Data Management, a little company specialising in document 
processing, seems to be having a few problems distributing information to its 
shareholders. For example, although there was no official confirmation yesterday, 
managing director Michael Elliott appears to have left the company - fact apparently 
picked up by one or two smarter brokers, who seemed to be selling stock. Despite 
rumours that another director was on the way out - the shares have fallen 60% over the 
last year or so ... The firm lost several board members the year before last. It looked to 
be rebuilding its image before delays over completing sales of data management systems 
to certain police forces sparked a profits warning last summer.’ (Daily Telegraph^
28 April 1995: ‘On Monday chief executive Michael Elliott resigned after rumours of 
disputes with chairman John Redmond. Now Elliott has been followed out of the door by 
executive director Michael Bushell. This is the second boardroom clear-out engineered 
by Redmond. Two years ago he ousted a respected management team to appoint Elliott. 
Since then MR’s shares have more than halved to 92p.’ (Daily Main
1 June 1995: ‘MR Data Management was forced to issue a profits warning yesterday 
after its shares fell 35p to 55p, their lowest ever level. The [company] forecast that 
operating profits for the year to 30 June would be about £4.7 m, with pre-tax profits of 
£3.5 after exceptional items. Mr Barry Kelly, acting chief executive, said the company 
had previously been expecting pre-tax profits of about £6m. ... He stressed ‘shareholders 
have seen the worst. We are in a strong position and have a bright future.’ A profits 
warning last July resulted in a 19% fall in the share price. Mr John Redmond, chairman, 
said then: ‘The effects of our reorganisation are complete and we are now in a stronger 
position to market our business services in the area of information management.’ 
(Financial Times)
1 June 1995: ‘Shares in MR Data Management plunged almost 40% yesterday after the 
document processing specialist warned that profits for the year to end-June will be less 
than half City expectations. ... MR Data expects to report profits of around £3.5 m ... 
MR’s house broker Cazenove is thought to have been expecting profits of £7m, while 
other analysts were looking for £8m.’
4 June 1995: ‘Former French Connection chairman George Wardle is expected to be 
appointed chairman of MR Data Management, the troubled data management group. 
Wardle is being recruited to turn around the company, which in three years has issued 
two profit warnings and undergone two rounds of board upheaval. MR issued its latest 
warning last week.’ (Sunday Telegraph)
I August 1995: ‘John Redmond, until recently the chairman, has resigned his non­
executive position - and there is talk of further blood being shed in the boardroom.’ 
(Daily Telegraph)
II November 1995: ‘MR Data ... suffered another casualty yesterday, with the 
departure of finance director Brian Boswell. ... Mr Boswell’s resignation follows the exit
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of chief executive Michael Elliott and director ... and the retirement of chairman John 
Redmond earlier this year.’ (Daily Telegraph)
4. SUMMARY
Factors MR Data
1 Profits warning Yes
2 Reduction in dividend No
3 Fall in share price Yes (around 40%, to lowest ever level)
4 Rights issue No
5 Chairman Resigned June 1995.
6 Closures/redundancies No
7 Other factors I New chairman June 1995, entire board replaced by end 1995
8 Other factors II Second profits warning and board upheaval in 2/3 years
John Redmond, the chairman o f MR Data responsible for the resignation of Michael 
Elliott on 25 April 1995, himself resigned in June 1995 and was replaced by George 
Wardle.
Case History No. 19 OMI International
1. Resignation o f  Chairman and CEO Gil Williams announced 2 March 1995.
2. SHAREHOLDERS
Top 10 fund 
managers
Before 
Feb 95
A fter 
Aug 95
After 
August 1995
%
NatWest 13.64 6.16 MAM 12.31
MAM 12.31 12.31 Clerical Medical 8.06
British Gas PF 6.40 6.40 British Gas PF 6.40
Thornton 6.15 6.31 Thornton 6.31
Hill Samuel 5.76 5.76 NatWest 6.16
BA PF 4.96 4.96 Hill Samuel 5.76
Sun Alliance 4.92 4.92 BA PF 4.96
BZW 3.24 3.24 Sun Alliance 4.92
BoS 3.16 3.16 BZW 3.24
Irish Life 2.98 2.98 BoS 3.16
Total 63.52 56.2 Total 61.28
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3. PRESS COMMENT
3 February 1995: ‘OMI International’s profit warning this week was a huge blow to the 
company’s credibility. Shares in the industrial logistics group fell 7.5p to 33.5p on the 
news. Under the guidance of chief executive Gill Williams OMI has been working hard 
to retrieve its reputation following a profits collapse two years ago. But profit delays in 
the fourth quarter has upset the profits outlook to March 1995 ... Mr Williams maintains 
that ‘we just have a timing problem’. But analyst Stephen Williams at James Capel has 
slashed this year’s forecasts from £2.1m to £1.3m and has maintained March 1996 
estimates at £4.6m. ‘The forward PE ratio of only 7 tells its own story’, he declares.’ 
(Investors Chronicle!
3 March 1995: The market value of OMI International, the supplier of measurement 
technology products and services tumbled by £9 million to £11.2 million yesterday after 
Mr Gil Williams was ousted as chairman and chief executive. Mr Richard Duggan, who 
has taken the position of executive chairman pending the appointment of a new chief 
executive, said that shareholders and the board had lost confidence in Mr Williams.’ 
(Financial Times!
3 March 1995: ‘Little OMI International, designer of electronic control systems, sacked 
its chairman and chief executive Gil Williams yesterday, two weeks after a profits 
warning. The shares crashed from 28p to 15.5p, after 41 p earlier this year. ... The 
decision to replace Williams follows a rise in costs in some parts of the business.’
(Daily Maill
4 June 1995: ‘Gil Williams was fired in March from the helm of OMI - after it issued a 
profits warning in January. This had come just three months after the company raised 
£9.5 million in a rights issue priced at 37p a share. The shares stood at 15p on Friday. 
(Mail on SundavJ
9 June 1995: ‘Shareholders in OMI International have had a torrid time, The shares 
have collapsed, two profits warnings have been issues, a final dividend passed and full- 
year losses increased from £73,000 to £4.2 million. Little wonder that executive 
chairman Gil Williams was forced out in March’. (Investors Chronicle")
4 August 1995: ‘Mr Williams, ousted in March two weeks after the company put out a 
profit warning, has issued a summons on the company for next week, but the case is 
unlikely to come to trial until the end of the year. ... ‘There is pressure from 
shareholders to pay him nothing’, the new chairman, Richard Duggan, said yesterday. 
(Daily Telegraph!
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4. SUMMARY
Factors OMI International
1 Profits warning/decline Yes
2 Reduction in dividend Yes
3 Fall in share price Yes
4 Rights issue Yes
5 New chairman Yes
6 Closures/redundancies No
7 Other factors No
8 Shareholders involved Yes
The Financial Times (3 March 1995) quotes Mr Richard Duggan, newly appointed 
chairman o f OMI as saying that ‘ shareholders and the board had lost confidence in Mr 
Williams’ (the CEO).
Case History No. 20: Platignum
1. Resignation o f CEO Rob Campbell announced 8 August 1995.
2. SHAREHOLDERS: Insufficient information available
3. PRESS COMMENT
1 8  J a n u a r y  1 9 9 5 .  ‘Platignum, the supplier o f stationery products, is passing the interim 
dividend after incurring losses of £1.4 million in the six months to 
September 30’. (The Times)
9  A u g u s t  1 9 9 5 :  ‘Loss-making stationery products supplier Platignum looks to have a 
problem. Yesterday, chief executive Rob Campbell and finance director David Bridge 
resigned. The Smaller Companies Investment Trust recently sold its entire 4.89% 
shareholding. The shares retreated from 8p to close at 7.5p following the resignations 
and could come under selling pressure today’. (Daily Mail)
2  S e p t e m b e r  1 9 9 5 :  ‘Expect action at Platignum ... there is talk of a substantial 
acquisition and rights issue being announced soon. The group has an uninspiring record, 
it has a stock market valuation o f around £ 2 million with its shares at 8p. Ahead o f the 
1987 crash they were almost 250p. Last month in a boardroom shake up chief executive 
Rob Campbell and finance director David Bridge quit’. (The Independent!
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4. SUMMARY
Factors Platignum
1 Profits warning/decline Yes
2 Reduction in dividend Yes
3 Fall in share price Yes
4 Rights issue No
5 New chairman No
6 Closures/redundancies No
7 Other factors No
8 Shareholders involved No
Case Histoty No. 21 Raine
1. Resignation o f CEO David Vincent announced 10 April 1995.
2. SHAREHOLDERS
Top 10 fund 
managers
Before 
March 95
After 
Sept 95
After 
September 1995
%
Scottish Amicable 8.56 8.56 Scottish Amicable 8.56
PDFM 8.01 8.01 PDFM 8.01
Gartmore 7.00 7.78 Gartmore 7.78
Chase 4.56 4.56 Chase 4.56
MAM 4.16 4.16 MAM 4.16
Fleming 3.61 3.61 Fleming 3.61
BZW 3.31 3.33 BZW 3.33
Citicorp 2.98 2.98 Citicorp 2.98
AMP 2.72 2.72 AMP 2.72
Baring 2.16 2.16 Baring 2.16
Total 47.07 47.87 Total 47.87
Other major shareholders: None
3. PRESS COMMENT
1 0  M a r c h  1 9 9 5 :  ‘Investors in Raine, the housebuilder, were reeling yesterday after a 
collapse in half year profits and a bleak warning on prospects. The shares crashed from 
47p to 30p, a 10-year low and less than a third o f the price they traded at a year ago. 
Besides the dent in their capital worth of shareholdings, investors’ pockets are also going 
to be hit by a 50% cut in the interim dividend to 0.5p. Raine will have to dip into 
reserves to make the payment as earnings per share are only 0.38p, down from 1 06p. 
Taxable profits for the six months to December dived from £3.4 m to barely more than 
£1 m. Peter Parkin, chairman, said: ‘It is appropriate to express caution on earnings
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prospects for the full year in acknowledgement of the uncertainty surrounding the 
markets for both house building and contracting in the UK.’ (The Independent)
10 March 1995: ‘Shares in housebuilder, construction and shopfitting group Raine 
plunged by more than a third yesterday after it announced a severe fall in interim profits 
and a halving of the dividend payout. ... It signalled that it would pull out of its 
Coventry-based Plumb Contracting shop refitting operations which have been devastated 
by a lack of investment by major retailers. Further disposals are likely as it refocuses on 
core house building and contracting activities.’ (Title)
10 March 1995: ‘Shares in Raine lost a third of their value yesterday as the housebuilder 
surprised the City with a slump in profits and halved the dividend. ... Increased losses 
were revealed in Plumb contracting, the shopfitting arm, and west Venture, the 
Californian housing company hit by an earthquake that last year cut motorway access to 
the main development site. Chairman Peter Parkin said he was taking on the chief 
executive role from managing director David Vincent to oversee a ‘limited 
restructuring’. Roy Barber, the ‘company doctor’ who has been a non-executive director 
for five years, is becoming chairman. He said Mr Vincent, who will revert to running the 
Hall & Tawse contracting and social housing arm, ‘has been refocused’. ... Plumb is to 
be sold or closed by the end of the year and may result in a provision in the full year 
accounts. West Venture would also be on the market, but the company has accepted that 
there are no buyers and has decided to try to minimise losses by continuing to trade.’ 
(Daily Telegraph!
10 March 1995: ‘Raine ... rocked by earthquakes and shaken by the refusal of Britain’s 
housing market to recover, is to trim its operations and withdraw to a core of house 
building and contracting. ... As part of the plan to concentrate on core activities, Mr 
Parkin is to resume being chief executive and his chairmanship will be taken by non­
executive Roy Barber.’ (Yorkshire Post)
11 April 1995: ‘Chief executive and former chairman of the troubled Derby-based Raine 
Industries Mr Peter Parkin resigned followingpressure from institutional 
shareholders. ... Mr Roy Barber, a Raine non-executive director for four years who has 
taken over as group chairman, said Mr Parkin will continue to be employed on a 
consultancy basis . Mr Barber said institutional investors had reacted adversely to Mr 
Parkin’s move to chief executive. ‘They did not think the change was radical enough in 
view of the company’s decline over the last three years,’ he explained.’
(Birmingham Post)
11 April 1995: ‘Shareholder pressure has forced the removal of Mr Peter Parkin as chief 
executive of Raine, the .... Group he has run for the last nine years. Raine announced 
last month that it was halving its interim dividend to 0.5p after the pretax profits fell 69% 
in the six months to the end of December. ... Mr Parkin last month said he would stand 
down as chairman in favour of Mr Barber but continue as chief executive, but after the 
interim results institutional shareholders made it clear that they wanted a change at the 
top. ... Shareholders’ dissatisfaction increased after a string of acquisitions mainly for 
shares failed to stop a profit slip. Two deals in particular were criticised: the £28.5m 
purchase of Walter Lawrence, the struggling UK and US housebuilder in 1992; and the 
£26.3m acquisition in 1989 of Plumb Holdings. ... The number of Raine shares has more
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than trebled from 50m to 188m since 1986 ... The company’s share price, which was 
136p in April three years ago, rose yesterday by 1.5p to 29p only just above its low point 
o f 24p at the end o f March.’ (Financial Times’)
4. SUM MARY
Factors Raine Industries
1 Profits warning/decline Yes
2 Reduction in dividend Yes
3 Fall in share price Yes
4 Rights issue No
5 New chairman Yes
6 Closures/redundancies Yes
7 Other factors No
8 Shareholders involved Yes
The Financial Times (11 April 1995) said that ‘Shareholder pressure has forced the 
removal o f Mr Peter Parkin as chief executive o f Raine’ and a similar comment was 
made by the Birmingham Post: ‘Mr Peter Parkin resigned following pressure from 
institutional shareholders’ (11 April 1995).
No. 22: Rhino Group
1. Resignation of CEO Terry Morris announced 9 May 1995
2. SHAREHOLDERS: Insufficient information available
3. PRESS COM M ENT
7 J a n u a r y  1 9 9 5 :  ‘Shares in the video games retailer Rhino, which lost half their value 
during last year, fell further yesterday after the group issued a profits warning. Rhino said 
that it expected to make a pre-tax loss of about £2m, worse than brokers’ estimates. The 
shares dropped a further 2p to 17p. Smith New Court is forecasting losses of more than 
£2.5m for the year. Management blamed discounting by competitors and the reluctance 
o f customers to buy games before Sega and Sony launch new computer systems later this 
year. ... However some blame Rhino for initiating the price war. It was been 
aggressively expanding market share and has 112 stores under the Future Zone name 
(The Independent)
7 J a n u a r y  1 9 9 5 :  ‘Like its real-life namesake, Rhino group is an endangered species. The 
company has built itself into the country’s largest computer games retailer just as they 
are disappearing into fashion history. ... Subscribers to the most recent rights issue at 
44p a share may not be too happy to see the shares now at 17p. At least borrowings are 
still manageable and Rhino has belatedly decided not to open any more stores until the 
market improves. (The Times)
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23 February 1995: ‘More than 30% was wiped off the value of shares in Rhino Group, 
when the retailer of computer and video games announced a cash call along with 
confirmation of previously flagged trading losses. The shares fell 4p to 8p as the group 
revealed it needed a £3.7m rights issue ... to fund capital requirements. The 
announcement came as Rhino reported that in 1994 it fell £2.67m into the red, against a 
restated £1.13 profit in the previous year. The company, which issued a profits warning 
in January, has also passed the dividend (0.5p). (The Independent)
13 April 1995: ‘Electronics Boutique, the US-based computer and video game retailer, 
has made a tender offer to acquire up to 29.9% of Rhino Group, ... which launched a 
rescue rights issue in February. The rights issue, which was partly underwritten by 
Panmure Gordon, was under-subscribed by 50%. The 25.2m shares not taken up were 
placed with Electronics Boutique yesterday, giving the US retailer 17.9% of the enlarged 
share capital of Rhino.’ (Financial Times)
10 May 1995: ‘Rhino Group founders Bev Ripley and Terry Norris are among the 
casualties in a shake-out of the troubled video games retailer’s board following the 
arrival of Electronics Boutique, the American retailer that made a tender offer to increase 
its stake to 29.9% after picking up the rump of Rhino’s recent £4m rights issue’.
(Daily Telegraph^
3 September 1995: ‘Electronics Boutique President Joseph Firestone has little time for 
Rhino founders Bev Ripley and Terry Norris, who left the board in May shortly after 
Electronics Boutique took control. Electronics Boutique president said: ‘The company 
was in big trouble as it had no financial reporting systems and no stock control.’ The 
sales mix and pricing was poor and there was no staff training. Electronics Boutique 
appointed its own man John Steinbrecher as Rhino managing director.’ (Mail on Sunday')
4. SUMMARY
Factors Rhino Group
1 Profits warning/decline Yes
2 Reduction in dividend Yes
3 Fall in share price Yes
4 Rights issue Yes
5 New chairman No
6 Closures/redundancies No
7 Other factors Over-expansion, lack of controls, failed rights issue
8 Shareholders involved Yes - Electronics Boutique
A ‘rescue’ rights issue in February 1995 was under-subscribed by 50% and was left with 
Panmure Gordon, which partly underwrote the rights issue. These shares were 
subsequently acquired by Electronics Boutique (Financial Times, 13 April 1995), which 
also made market purchases to increase its stake to 29.9% (Daily Telegraph, 10 May 
1995).
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Factors cited by Electronics Boutique President Joseph Firestone and others in the Mail 
on Sunday (3 September 1995) included: over-expansion, lack o f stock and financial 
controls; poor sales mix and pricing and no staff training.
Terry Norris, CEO and joint-founder of Rhino, were effectively fired by Electronics 
Boutique on 10 April 1995 following the latter’s acquisition o f a 29.9% stake in the 
company (although it appears that Norris may have briefly stayed on the board as a non­
executive director).
| Case History No. 23: United Carriers
1. Resignation o f CEO Allan Binks announced 30 June 1995.
2. SHAREHOLDERS
Top 10 fund Before After After %
managers May 95 Nov 95 November 1995
PDFM 18.45 18.12 PDFM 18.12
Fidelity 7.95 0.00 Hermes 8.81
MAM 7.76 8.35 MAM 8.35
Henderson 2.95 0.00 Schroder 4.43
Scottish Widows 2.70 2.70 Morgan Grenfell 3.17
AMP 2.56 2.56 Fleming 2.95
BoS 2.21 2.72 BoS 2.72
Schroder 1.77 4.43 Scottish Widows 2.70
Norwich Union 1.77 0.00 AMP 2.56
Derbyshire CC 1.70 1.70 BZW 2.04
Total 49.82 40.58 Total 55.85
At the time of his resignation (May 1995), Allan Binks held 8.97% of United Carriers; 
TM Smith (Company Secretary) 1.18% and NP Sargent (Finance Director) 1.09%. The 
latter resigned on 29 September 1995 with immediate effect. A significant (5.76%) 
shareholding was attributed to AL Aston, who was not a director o f the company during 
this period.
3. PRESS COMMENT
1 4  M a r c h  1 9 9 5 :  ‘United Carriers, the parcels and freight group that blotted its copy 
book last year, sounding two profit warnings within nine months o f going public, has 
returned full-year profits £110,000 ahead at £1.85m. This performance compares with 
analysts’ revised forecasts of around £2m, or £4.8m ahead o f the first profits warning last 
may. Despite the disappointing figures and earnings of 5.4p a share, holders collect a 
3.3p final dividend on May 17, making 4.9p for the year. The shares, floated at 153p in 
February last year, closed unchanged at 90p. Doug Rogers, who took the chair following 
a boardroom shake-up in November, when managing director Michael Howe resigned
Appendix K: Case Histories o f CEO resignations 434
from the group, admitted the group’s performance since flotation had been 
unacceptable.’ (Daily Telegraphs
1 7 M a r c h  1 9 9 5 :  ‘Two profits warnings since flotation at 153p have earned United 
Carriers antipathy. First time it was too little business, second time too much. New 
chairman Doug Rogers, who has a track record in turn-round and sell-off, has been 
brought in. Former chairman Allan Binks has been demoted to chief executive.’ 
(Investors Chronicle)
4  J u l y  1 9 9 5 :  ‘Allan Binks, former chairman and chief executive o f United Carriers 
Group, has resigned from the board o f the group and all its subsidiaries, less than eight 
months after he stepped down as chairman and almost exactly six months after John 
Toyne became group managing director.’ (Financial Times")
4. SUMMARY
Factors United Carriers
1 Profits warning/decline No
2 Reduction in dividend No
3 Fall in share price Yes
4 Rights issue No
5 New chairman Yes
6 Closures/redundancies No
7 Other factors No
8 Shareholders involved No
Case History No. 24______ Upton & Southern
1 Resignation o f CEO Geoffrey Gould announced 18 April 1995.
2. SHAREHOLDERS: Insufficient information available 
3 PRESS COMMENT
1 7  M a r c h  1 9 9 5 :  ‘Ron Trenter, 50, a former chief executive o f Texas Homecare, has 
become executive chairman of Upton & Southern Holdings, the North East department 
store group nearly bankrupted by last year’s acquisition o f the Reject Shop chain. ... 
Trenter, who was approached by one of Upton’s non-executive directors, thinks that 
Upton can be turned round. ... Upton’s share price, which has fallen from 63p to 3.5p 
over the last year, did not respond to Trenter’s appointment. The company publishes its 
interim figures in about a month’s time; the market will be waiting for these to judge 
whether it needs another rights issue. Trenter’s arrival raises a question mark over the 
position o f Upton’s chief executive, Jeffrey Gould.’ (Financial Times)
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4 April 1995: ‘Jeffrey Gould, the man who led Upton & Southern’s disastrous bid for 
the Reject Shop, has resigned as chief executive of the Middlesborough department store
group Within months of the acquisition, Upton & Southern warned its shareholders
that the Reject Shop’s trading position was materially worse off than had been 
represented at the time of the acquisition.’ (Financial Times)
5 April 1995: ‘Jeffrey Gould’s resignation suggests he is now paying the price for the 
disastrous acquisition of the Reject Shop chain last year which has once again cast a big 
question mark over Upton’s future. ... Uptons ... was on the brink of collapse in 1992. 
The group made a brief return to the black in the second half of 1993 before it ran into 
trouble with the purchase of the 31-strong Reject Shop chain. Uptons’ long-suffering 
shareholders were tapped for nearly £10 m in two rescue rights issues following the deal. 
Announcing the second cash call in October last year, Uptons warned that it would be 
forced to cease trading if the money was not forthcoming.’ (Northern Echo)
20 May 1995: ‘The Reject shop chain was put into receivership yesterday by its parent 
company Upton & Southern with liabilities of around £8m.’ (Title)
4. SUMMARY
Factors Upton & Southern
1 Profits warning/decline No
2 Reduction in dividend No
3 Fall in share price Yes
4 Rights issue Yes
5 New chairman Yes
6 Closures/redundancies No
7 Other factors Problems with Reject Shop chain
8 Shareholders involved No
The acquisition of the Reject Shop chain, masterminded by CEO Jeffrey Gould, was a 
disaster (Northern Echo, 5 April 1995) for Upton & Southern and nearly bankrupted the 
company (Financial Times, 17 March 1997). Gould resigned on 18 April 1995 and the 
Reject Shop was put into receivership on 19 May 1995.
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